VOLUME 2, NUMBER 2
SPRING 1966

Arms Control & Disarmament



A QUARTERLY
BIBLIOGRAPHY
WITH ABSTRACTS
AND ANNOTATIONS

VOLUME 2, NUMBER 2
SPRING 1966

Arms Control & Disarmament

A QUARTERLY BIBLIOGRAPHY WITH ABSTRACTS AND ANNOTATIONS

Prepared by the
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT BIBLIOGRAPHY SECTION
GENERAL REFERENCE AND BIBLIOGRAPHY DIVISION · REFERENCE DEPARTMENT
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
WASHINGTON, D.C.

L.C. CARD 64–62746

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402
Price: 65 cents (single copy).
Subscription Price: $2.25 per year (50 cents additional for foreign mailing).

PREFACE

Arms Control & Disarmament attempts to bring under bibliographic control a large and growing body of literature in an important subject area. It is prepared by the Arms Control and Disarmament Bibliography Section of the Library of Congress, through the support of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Each quarterly issue contains abstracts and annotations of current literature in the English, French, German, and Russian languages, as well as abstracts and annotations of current literature in all languages published in English translation. Author and subject indexes appear in the first three numbers of each volume, with the fourth number containing cumulative author and subject indexes.

To facilitate the use of this bibliography the title of each foreign language entry is preceded by its English translation in brackets. Titles in the Cyrillic alphabet are transliterated according to the Library of Congress system, but with ligatures omitted. For the convenience of readers in the Library of Congress, call numbers are given for all cataloged and classified materials. Uncataloged materials are designated by symbols indicating the custodial divisions of the Library in which they can be found. A list of these symbols appears on the next page.

Matters of fact and opinion presented in *Arms Control & Disarmament* are solely the responsibility of the authors of the items abstracted, and their inclusion does not constitute endorsement by either the Library of Congress or the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Information about the periodicals cited can in most instances be obtained readily from standard reference works.

The bibliography is compiled from a survey of the literature received by the Library of Congress that is likely to be available in the larger research and public libraries in the United States. Sources surveyed include trade books, monographs, selected government publications, publications of national and international organizations and societies, and approximately 1,700 periodicals. With the exception of materials delayed in arriving at the Library, the literature cited has been published in the 3 months preceding the month in which a number is sent to press. Entries are chosen under the assumption that arms control and disarmament is a subject area encompassing related topics such as weapons development and basic factors in world politics. The coverage is not exhaustive, however. It excludes articles in newspapers and the reporting of day-to-day events in newsmagazines.

The abstracts are written by the Arms Control and Disarmament Bibliography Section, except that abstracts or summaries published with the articles to which they relate may be used verbatim or in a modified form; they are designated "author's abstract," "author's summary," etc.

Library of Congress Location Symbols

(Uncataloged Materials)

Chi Kor	Chinese and Korean Section
LL RR	Anglo-American Law Reading Room
Newsp	Newspaper Reading Room
P&GP RR	Periodical and Government Publication Reading Room
Sci RR	Science Reading Room
Slav Rm	Slavic Room

CONTENTS

	Page
Preface	iii
I. The international political environment	99
A. General analyses of basic factors in world politics	99
B. Foreign policies of states and international political organizations	104
1. General analyses	104
2. Unilateral policies	106
3. Bilateral and multilateral policies	113
II. The strategic environment	117
A. Modern war	117
1. General analyses	117
2. Major war	119
3. Limited war	119
4. Unconventional war	119
B. Modern weaponry and related technological developments	121
C. National security policies and military strategies of states and international political organizations	126
1. General analyses	126
2. Unilateral policies and strategies	129
3. Bilateral and multilateral policies and strategies	141
4. Related policies and problems	148
D. Consequences of national defense policies and war	152
1. General analyses	152
2. Political	154
3. Military	154
4. Economic	154
5. Ethical and social	156
6. Biological	156
III. Institutions and means for the maintenance of peace	158
A. International law	158
1. Pacific settlement	158
2. Adjudication	158
B. International organizations	160
C. International peace and security forces	163
D. Other processes, plans, and proposals	164
IV. The historical background	169
A. General studies	169
B. The background up to World War I	169
C. The interwar period and the League of Nations	169
D. The post-World War II period and the United Nations	169

	Page
V. General analyses and basic approaches	171
A. General analyses	171
B. Approaches and proposals	174
1. Comprehensive measures and proposals	174
2. Noncomprehensive measures and proposals	174
a. Regional	174
b. Outer space	175
c. Other measures and proposals	176
VI. Specific problems and related measures	179
A. Negotiation of arms control and disarmament measures	179
B. Reduction of the risk of war	179
1. Escalation	179
2. Miscalculation and accidental war	180
3. Surprise attack	180
4. Proliferation	180
5. Communication	186
6. Command and control of weapons	186
C. Violations of agreements and responses	186
1. Violations, inspection, and verification	186
2. Enforcement	187
a. By international organizations	187
b. By other means	187
D. Consequences of arms control and disarmament measures	187
1. General analyses	187
2. Military	188
3. Political	188
4. Economic	188
Author index	190
Subject index	193

I. THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

A. GENERAL ANALYSES OF BASIC FACTORS IN WORLD POLITICS

434
The American behavioral scientist. THE ABS GUIDE TO RECENT PUBLICATIONS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES. New York, 1965. 781 p. Z7161.A4

A cumulation of the American Behavioral Scientist's monthly bibliography, "New Studies: A Guide to Recent Publications in the Social and Behavioral Sciences." Its index is "based on a general classification of social science topics and methods," and it is arranged by author.

435
Bebler, Ales. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE UNITED NATIONS. Pakistan horizon, v. 18, 2d quarter 1965: 124-130. DS376.P32, v. 18

Two issues manifest themselves in the U.N. financial crisis: the cold war clash, and the changes that have taken place in the United Nations since 1945 as the result of its increased membership. The great powers are displaying "a certain cool up" toward the organization, and especially toward the General Assembly, where their influence has declined. The financial crisis is "psychologically connected" with the failure of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament and the continuation of the arms race. Real **disarmament** means complete disarmament--there is no middle way. The Moscow test ban treaty, for example, can be considered more as an attempt by the nuclear powers to guard their monopoly indefinitely than as a helpful disarmament step. Besides not producing much of value to improve East-West relations, the United Nations has been ineffective in dealing with the North-South conflict (the most basic source of world tension). Through the United Nations the developing countries must "work for peace on two fronts, East-West, which means disarmament, and North and South, which means economic development of the South. There can be no such thing as permanent peace between the East and the West if there is conflict between the North and the South, and if there is pressure and interference in the internal affairs of smaller countries by the more powerful ones." The United Nations is the only powerful instrument the smaller countries can wield to bring about disarmament and to uphold the principles of nonintervention, self-determination, and international cooperation.

436
Benson, Ivor. [DESTRUCTION OF CULTURE--LIQUIDATION OF RACE] Zestörung der Kultur--Liquidation der Rasse. Nation Europa, 15. Jahrg., Dez. 1965, Suppl. Biopolitik [Nr.] 1: 11-16. D1050.N3, v. 15

Culture is the spiritual product of a nation or a family of nations. When threatened it should be defended with adequate political and military means. At the present time it is being seriously threatened by movements promoting creation of a utopian, universal world culture on the ruins of existing cultures. Spokesmen for this idea are decay-prone intellectuals and liberals who in the name of tolerance, ward off any effort in the defense of culture. They fail to recognize that without differentiation there cannot be any culture. The very essence of culture depends on the difference between the innermost natures of peoples and races.

437
Boehm, Eric H., ed. BIBLIOGRAPHIES ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD AFFAIRS: AN ANNOTATED DIRECTORY. Santa Barbara, Calif., Clio Press, 1965. 33 p. (Bibliography and reference series, no. 2) Z1002.B65

Lists bibliographies that appear continuously or at least with some frequency. "The term international relations is understood to include world affairs, international law, foreign relations and area studies, theoretical studies on international relations, or any related subject relevant to understanding foreign affairs or formulating foreign policy."

438
Clark, Robert A. PSYCHIATRISTS AND PSYCHOANALYSTS ON WAR. American journal of psychotherapy, v. 19, Oct. 1965: 540-558. RC321.A54, v. 19

Surveys the psychiatric literature on war and its causes. Although the specialists who have commented on war have presented hypothetical explanations for it that cover the whole gamut of psychoneurotic defenses, psychiatrists have had little to say about treating the illness known as war. To the author it appears that war is rooted in the images of male and female. Thus the solution is "the recognition of a tempered masculinity and a nurturing feminity, a virile, inventive creativity which encourages bold exploration and initiative on the one hand, and cares for the suffering and the weak on the other. Myths of creation supplant myths of destruction and death."

439
Coulmas, Peter. [A RETURN TO NATIONALISM?] Eine Rückkehr zum Nationalismus? Aussenpolitik, 16. Jahrg., Nov. 1965: 733-739. D839.A885, v. 16

Nationalism is now undergoing its renaissance, 20 years after the end of the war. The idea of one world has been shattered by the East-West feud. Supranational movements have been drowned in egoism. The Eastern bloc suffers from schisms of nationalist imprint; Asia and Africa are seeking opportunities for a new start, this time under the aegis of nationalism: and in Germany there is a reunification-nationalism that has absolutely nothing in common with the corrupted nationalism of earlier decades. Dr. Peter Coulmas of Hamburg investigates thus-far ignored premises and utopias and defines the realities of the present situation. (Translation of supplied abstract)

440
Fucks, Wilhelm. [FORMULAS FOR POWER: PROGNOSES ABOUT POPULACE, ECONOMY, POTENTIAL]

Formeln zur Macht: Prognosen über Völker, Wirtschaft, Potentiale. Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt [1965] 220 p. HC59.F86

The relative strength of the world's major powers has undergone a radical change since the end of the World War II. The question now is, how durable is the present power structure in the world? When may other changes be expected to occur, and how great will their impact be on the problem of peace or war? Although there are no absolute answers to these questions, with the help of modern statistical methods we can make fairly accurate estimates of the future values of some elementary components of the world power status of a nation, the most important of which are population strength, and production and consumption levels of steel and energy. Statistical analysis produces a hypothesis for defining quantitatively the impact of certain patterns of population change on the process of industrialization and vice versa. Thus defined, behavioral patterns seem to have universal validity regardless of the nation in question. With the help of this method one may estimate the length of time needed for the creation of a new power structure in the world and the future periods of greatest danger to world peace, which coincide with each new change in the world power structure. Out of a number of theoretical combinations of alliances to counterbalance a leading power in the world the most important are the two extremes: a potential confrontation between the Soviet Union and Red China on one side and the United States on the other; and a confrontation between the United States, West Europe, and the Soviet Union on one side and China on the other. The most critical period for the first possibility was 1963-65, when the combined power of China and the U.S.S.R. first reached the level of the United States and then the level of the combined power of the United States and Western Europe. For the second possibility the most critical point will be the year 1985, when Red China's power will equal the combined power of the United States, West Europe, and the Soviet Union. For a confrontation between Red China and the United States the critical moment will be 1975, and for Red China vs. the United States and West Europe the year will be 1980.

441
Ganovski, Sava. [SOCIAL-ECONOMIC STRUCTURE AND PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE] Obshchestvenno-ekonomicheskaia formatsiia i mirnoe sosushchestvovanie. Perevod s bolgarskogo D. D. Nikolaeva. Pod obshchei red. i posleslovieм M. T. Iovchuka. Moskva, Progress, 1964. 513 p. HX542.G347

Partial contents.--Our transitional epoch and the problem of peace and war.--The problem of the peaceful coexistence of Socialist and capitalist states.--Peaceful coexistence and ideological struggle.--Peaceful coexistence and modern dogmatism.--Peaceful coexistence in the Balkans.

Examines the essence and laws of development of social and economic structures. The author argues that an understanding of the nature of pre-socialist forms of society can both help man gain a true appreciation of the era in which he lives and also further the transition from capitalist to Socialist social-economic forms. Peaceful coexistence between states of diverse social and economic structures is absolutely necessary, but the ideological struggle between Socialist and bourgeois philosophies must continue. The Balkan countries are cited as an example of the peaceful coexistence of a number of peoples who have recognized that the interests of their countries can best be served through friendship and cooperation.

442
Hagemann, Max. [THE PROVISIONAL PEACE: WORKING PRINCIPLES OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER SINCE 1945] Der provisorische Frieden: die Bauprinzipien der internationalen Ordnung seit 1945. Erlenbach-Zürich, E. Rentsch [c. 1964] 744 p.
JX1952.H2

Contents.--The legalists' concept.--The realists' proposal.--The answer of practice: A. The Soviet post-war offensive as a factor of change; B. The emerging modus vivendi of the transition period.--Conclusions. --Appendix.

Describes and evaluates various concepts of the world order from the political, social, and legal viewpoints. The author discusses in great detail the relevant developments since World War II, especially divergent views on the role and mission of the United Nations.

443
Hammond, Kenneth R. NEW DIRECTIONS IN RESEARCH ON CONFLICT RESOLUTION. Journal of social issues, v. 21, July 1965: 44-66.
HN51.J6, v. 21

This essay argues that it is important to make our assumptions about the future explicit so that our research policies may be criticized from the point of view of the assumed future. In the next twenty years, it is seen that conflict between men will be derived from their cognitive differences concerning the means by which problems are to managed. A research paradigm along these lines is formulated for the study of cognitive conflict and its resolution confronting a problem which is not susceptible to a perfect solution. Each person receives training in ways to think differently about a set of problems and then is brought together with another. (Abstract supplied)

444
Krippendorff, Ekkehart. NEO-NATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. Quest, no. 47, Oct./Dec. 1965: 9-16. AP8.Q4, 1965
"Translated from the German. Courtesy Der Monat."

From the end of World War II to the mid-1950's the cause of the cold war seemed to be military in nature, determined by the expansionist desires of the Soviet Union. During the later 1950's, however, social conflict--the struggle between two opposing ideological systems to influence future world development--was postulated as the cause. This change could not have taken place so long as the two contending blocs were monolithic in their stability and uninfluenced by "any new approach likely to strike at the very roots of the Cold War philosophy." The refusal of the emerging nations of Africa and Asia to become either Communist or capitalist, the dissolution of the large power blocs, and social and political changes in the Communist and capitalist camps demonstrated that the world could no longer function according to a bipolar arrangement. The rumblings of national independence and particularism, from China to Rumania to Canada, have heralded "the failure of attempts to break down national cultural behaviour patterns in favour of all-embracing collective systems covering large areas." When encouragement is given to nationalist aspirations in any region, that encouragement will heighten nationalism throughout the world and inevitably sponsor racial and ethnic antagonisms. If the West were to stimulate independence among members of the Eastern bloc with the view toward weakening the hegemony of the Soviet Union, would the nationalistic

states that emerged (Poland, for example) act to reduce regional tensions? World leaders must do all in their power to prevent increasing regional strife from expressing itself militarily, especially with the proliferation of nuclear weapons so real a possibility. Means must be found to limit nuclear arms to the two superpowers and to deny them to their allies; "it is heaping fuel recklessly on to an already smouldering fire to demand nuclear weapons casually for brittle supranational institutions such as the MLF." With the dawn of a new era in which traditional identifications promise to increase international chaos, national policies must secure "systematic control and limitation of armaments, beginning at home" and initiate internal social and educational programs aimed at the societal origins of international tension.

445
Levi, Werner. THE RELATIVE IRRELEVANCE OF MORAL NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. Social forces, v. 44, Dec. 1965: 226-233.
HN51.S5, v. 44

An analysis of decision-making in foreign policy and of the nature and function of moral norms leads to the conclusion that morality has little effect upon international politics. The nation-state system compels statesmen to place national interests above morality, so that in most cases moral norms serve rather than determine interests. In some imponderable ways moral norms influence foreign policy decisions because they form part of the environment in which the decision-makers function. But this influence is vastly outweighed by the compelling need to guarantee the nation's survival under all circumstances and by the possibility to justify almost any behavior designed to do this in moral terms. This possibility exists because the broad, general and abstract formulation of moral norms subjects them to the most varied interpretation in concrete cases and because the system of norms permits an expedient choice of any of its parts to suit a given situation. How a norm is interpreted and which norms are chosen under given circumstances is largely determined by the interests at stake. Thus, an improvement of international relations toward more cooperation and peacefulness is more likely to come from the development and awareness of common interests than from commonly held moral norms. (Author's abstract)

446
Manelis, B. L. [THE APOLOGETIC NATURE OF THE VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVES OF MODERN BOURGEOIS SCIENCE ON SOVEREIGNTY] Apologeticheskii kharakter vzgliadov predstavitelei sovremennoi burzhuaznoi nauki na suverenitet. In his Problema suvereniteta i ee znachenie v sovremennykh usloviiakh. Tashkent, Nauka, 1964. 305 p. JX4041.M26

The crisis of capitalism together with contradictions in imperialist relations have created conditions that prompt bourgeois statesmen, philosophers, and lawyers to attack the principles and the very concept of national sovereignty. Since the 19th century Western political thinkers have sought to convince the world that national sovereignty hinders economic growth and vitiates cultural rapprochement between peoples. But the experience of Socialist states and the new nations of Asia and Africa demonstrates that attainment of sovereignty does not impede economic accomplishments, but is rather their most important prerequisite. Without sovereignty developing nations could not protect themselves against the encroachments of imperialist powers. Were states to surrender their sovereignty and subordinate themselves to a "world state," they would quickly come under the control of American imperialism. Mindful of Arnold Toynbee's warning that the West will perish if it remains a group of 40 independent states but will survive if it becomes one supranational body, European political theorists have acquiesced in the establishment of a new Roman Empire, with its capital at Washington and with the once sovereign states of Europe as its provinces, each ruled by a proconsul. By so doing the governments of Western Europe allowed the United States to extend its hegemony over the entire capitalist world. Thus it becomes apparent that the motivation behind the attack on sovereignty is nothing more than traditional anticommunism. No world organization of united states is possible. Sovereignty is determined by social and national factors that no one can abrogate or circumvent. Viewed in their totality, the pronouncements of modern bourgeois sociologists, political scientists, and lawyers emerge as nothing more than imperialist apologetics, devoid of real scientific analysis and objective thinking.

447
Meier, Dorothy L. SIMULATION TECHNIQUES IN A "REALISTIC" POLICY CONTEXT. Journal of human behavior, v. 13, no. 3: 356-371.
HI.J55, v. 13

Discusses the varieties and typology of simulation approaches to the study of international relations, the utility of simulation techniques, and validation research on simulation techniques.

448
Melchior de Molènes, Charles. [DISCORD IN THE FREE WORLD CONCERT] Dissonances dans le concert des peuples libres. Revue politique des idées et des institutions, 54. année, nov. 1965: 356-365.
H3.R38, v. 54

With quotes from American and European officials, scientists, and members of private groups supporting Atlantic unity, compares and contrasts Western views on the usefulness of the Atlantic Alliance and NATO. The author concludes that the majority of the advocates of the Atlantic Community agree with Manlio Brosio's judgment that the peace has thus far been maintained by alliances and that the dissolution of the Western bloc would produce international anarchy and imperil peace.

449
Metron, inc., New York. Universal Reference System. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS: AN ANNOTATED AND INTENSIVELY INDEXED COMPILATION OF SIGNIFICANT BOOKS, PAMPHLETS, AND ARTICLES, SELECTED AND PROCESSED BY THE UNIVERSAL REFERENCE SYSTEM, A COMPUTERIZED INFORMATION RETRIEVAL SERVICE IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES. Prepared under the direction of Alfred de Grazia. New York [1965] 1205 p. illus. (Its Political science, government & public policy series, v. 1) Z6461.M45

Classifies the more than 3030 items appearing herein by asking the question: Who says "Who does what with whom, where and when, by what means, why," and how does he know so? The Universal Reference System attempts to help social science information retrieval catch up with the information resources found in the physical sciences. The present volume, the International Affairs CODEX, consists of a computer print-out.

450
Middleton, Drew. THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY: A STUDY IN UNITY AND DISUNITY. New York, D. McKay Co. [1965] 303 p.
D844.M513

Contents. --Twenty years after. --European unity vs. nationalism. --De Gaulle and la grande nation. --Britain, decay or revival? --Germany on the boil. --Italy, the neglected ally. --Russia's troubles, the satellites' chance. --European rethink. --Europe and the "more equal" ally. --The larger alliance.

Paints a gloomy picture of the present situation in Europe and the U.S. attitude toward it. Today "national interests are exalted over international security . . . [and] appeasement is presented as common sense." For the sake of security and for dealing with the problems of poverty and military instability throughout the world a new kind of international organization in the Atlantic Community must be forged.

451
Miksche, Ferdinand O. [A COMING WORLD PROBLEM? A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF DEVELOPMENT AID AND ITS BENEFICIARIES] Kommendes Weltproblem? Kritische Betrachtung über die Entwicklungshilfe und deren Nutzniesser. Wehr und Wirtschaft, 9. Jahrg., Dez. 1965: 670-672. U3.W38, v. 9

The outcome of the decolonization process is not encouraging. The liberated looked forward to an end to their miseries, but instead have become poorer. The colonialists thought they were contributing to world peace and at the same time saving vast subsidies, yet the very opposite has come about. The growth in population over the next 25 years will require an increase in world food production on a scale which seems unattainable, and development aid creates international chaos by conducing to a dangerous policy of playing off East against West. To what further crises will this development lead? This is the subject which the author examines here in its most important aspects. (Abstract supplied)

452
Modrzhinskaia, Elena D. [THE COLLAPSE OF THE COLONIAL SYSTEM AND THE IDEOLOGY OF IMPERIALISM] Raspad kolonial'noi sistemy i ideologiia imperializma. Moskva, Nauka; Glav. red. vostochnoi lit-ry, 1965. 341 p.
D844.M56

Contents. --Foreword. --The collapse of the colonial system and neocolonialism. --A reflection of the collapse of the colonial system in the ideology of imperialism. --A critique of the principles of the political philosophy of contemporary colonialism. --Attempts at an ideological justification of economic servitude. --Imperialist theorists: the enemies of the democratization of social life in the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. --The natural path for the development of all peoples of liberated countries: the path to socialism.

Examines the collapse of the colonial system as part of the dialectical development of history, defines the Communist concept of neocolonialism, outlines the strategy and tactics of the imperialist powers under conditions of anticolonial revolution, and shows how "contemporary bourgeois ideology" views the movement of developing nations toward independence and democratization.

453
Morgenthau, Hans J. PARADOXES IN NUCLEAR WAR AGE. Radical humanist, v. 29, Mar. 7, 1965: 117-118, 120. DS401.R27, v. 29
"Text of speech delivered at the Peace conference held in Japan."

Since 1945 the impact of nuclear weapons on international affairs has produced a number of paradoxical situations involving national foreign policies. No longer can statesmen, like gamblers, risk part of their resources for the possibility of securing greater gain. The United States, for example, cannot sanely consider the possibility of going to war with the Soviet Union to achieve the complete liberation of the countries of Eastern Europe; the very objectives of such a war would be destroyed and the belligerents would suffer unacceptable damage. Yet nations continue to threaten each other with the use of force "as though nothing has happened since 1945," their foreign policies seemingly unmindful of the absurdities upon which they are based. Armament races among nations were rational when quantity of weapons resulted in quality of defense. But nuclear powers stockpile weapons as though 50,000 nuclear devices might secure advantages impossible to nations having but 20,000. It is also paradoxical that the major nations today possess destructive capabilities unequaled in history yet "are less able to use that enormous power for the purposes of their national policies than their predecessors were with regard to much more limited resources of power." Cuba, Rumania, and China have provoked the great nuclear powers with impunity, for the very enormity of strength enjoyed by the United States and the U.S.S.R. has rendered them impotent. Nuclear weapons have also made it necessary to rethink and reformulate alliances. The traditional alliance system is still maintained, even though the major nuclear powers can hardly be expected to defend their partners at the risk of their own existence (a point clearly understood by De Gaulle). Nations remain so committed to the outworn notion that foreign policies can be pursued only through the threat of force that they continue to seek ways of using nuclear weapons without sacrificing their own existence (counterforce strategies, tactical nuclear wars, and the like). But nuclear war can be neither limited nor civilized; there is no hope that nuclear war can be made acceptable and stripped of its absurdity.

454
[NEAR THE FINAL BOUNDARY: THE IMPACT OF THE CRISIS OF WORLD CAPITALISM ON THE MILITARY-ECONOMIC POSITION OF THE IMPERIALIST CAMP] U poslednei cherty: vliianie krizisa mirovogo kapitalizma na voenno-ekonomicheskie pozitsii imperialisticheskogo lageria [edited by P. V. Sokolov] Moskva, Voen. Izd-vo, 1964. 285 p.
HC59.U2

Contents. --Contemporary militarism. --The weakening position of imperialism in the struggle of the two world systems. --The bankruptcy of the colonial system: a blow at imperialism's military-economic rear. --The growth of military-state monopolistic capitalism. --The influence of capitalism's internal contradictions on the preparation and use of economic resources in war. --The irregularity of capitalist development and contradictions in the military blocs of imperialism.

Evaluates the relative strengths and weaknesses of the two opposing world systems and concludes that imperialism is losing ground to socialism. Disintegration of the colonial order has seriously weakened the economic resources of imperialism, a circumstance

which has in turn adversely affected the strength of the capitalist military blocs. The reactionary measures undertaken by imperialism to preserve its dissipating resources constitute the most serious threat to the future of world peace.

455
Nicholson, Michael. A METEOROLOGY OF WAR AND PEACE? Listener, v. 74, Nov. 18, 1965: 787-788.
AP4.C4164, v. 74

Men began, several decades ago, to study the causes of war through methodology used in the social and natural sciences. In the interwar period Lewis Fry Richardson, a mathematician, propounded a simple theory of an arms race. More recently a group working at Stanford University has considered, among other things, the effect of psychological stress on high-level decisionmakers who are immersed in crisis situations. A similar effort has been made elsewhere by staging a diplomatic game that simulated the 1914 crisis. Of two groups of players, the one with personalities similar to those of the decisionmakers actually involved in the 1914 escalation got into war. The group with dissimilar personalities found ways out of the crisis and resolved the situation peacefully. Since the 1950's such analytical efforts have grown rapidly. Studies made at the University of Chicago, the University of Michigan, the Peace Research Institute in Oslo, and England's Conflict Resolution Society all exemplify continuing and widening efforts to approach the understanding of conflict from new directions and on interdisciplinary roadways. Certainly much has been accomplished in related fields. One case in point is the success of economists in developing a theory of the behavior of the business organization, where the factor of human decision is paramount. Within the new discipline of conflict theory the tools of analysis are mostly borrowed and have been crudely used thus far. Yet there is hope for believing that insights and theories can be realized from this effort and applied toward a fuller understanding of the causes and cure of war.

456
Philip, André. [THE EUROPEAN CRISIS] La crise européenne. Preuves, 15. année, nov. 1965: 54-63.
AP20.P74, v. 15

Maintains that Europe's present crisis is a result of three major deviations from the original "European myth" of an independent and effective entity: (1) the weakening of the spirit of independence under U.S. military protection; (2) Common Market evolution in a liberal capitalist rather then left Socialist direction; (3) excessive nationalism.

457
Slater, Jerome. A REVALUATION OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY: THE OAS IN ACTION. [Columbus] Ohio State University Press [1965] 56 p. (The Social Science Program of the Mershon Center for Education in National Security, the Ohio State University. Pamphlet series, no. 1) F1402.S55

Attempts to redefine the concept of collective security with a view toward relating "security and alliance aspects to the total complex of regional and universal systems." It is the author's hope that the Organization of American States (OAS) will not be molded to fit the pattern of other such systems, for this would hamper and perhaps destroy its utility. The OAS is discussed in the context of national behavior, the structure of the hemispheric political system, and the definition of a collective security system.

458
Sobakin, Vadim K., comp. [CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A COLLECTION OF DOCUMENTS] Sovremennoe mezhdunarodnoe pravo; sbornik dokumentov. Moskva, Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1964. 666 p. JX3695.R9S6

This collection, intended for anyone studying or interested in contemporary international law and international relations, will acquaint him with basic international documents, which are systematized in such a way as to present the most important questions of our time: peaceful coexistence, general and complete disarmament, liquidation of the colonial system, the military-political blocs of the imperialist states, territorial and border problems, peaceful methods of resolving international disputes, the politics of neutralism, international organizations of states, the recognition of new states and new governments, control of outer space, diplomatic and consular law, guarantees of human rights, and others. (Translation of supplied summary)

459
Tammelo, Ilmar. [THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF THE DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION] Theoretische Aspekte der Definition der Aggression. Moderne Welt, 6. Jahrg., Heft 3, 1965: 315-331.
D839.M58, v. 6

Considers the definition of aggression to be a communication problem, due to the scientists' failure to give in terms of modern logic exact meaning to the word "definition." The author describes various types of definition of aggression, outlines the difficulties in evaluating the meaning of aggression, and discusses the present state of scientific research on the formulation of that definition.

460
Tarasenko, N. [PROBLEMS OF WAR, PEACE, AND REVOLUTION IN THE MODERN ERA] Problemy voiny, mira i revoliutsii v sovremennuiu epokhu. Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, g. 46, no. 22, 1965: 66-73.
U717.R9A27, v. 46

Outlines for use by military discussion groups an 8-hour lecture and seminar series dealing with the following problems: capitalism as the source of war; the possibility of avoiding war in modern times; Leninist policies of peaceful coexistence and class warfare; revolutions for national independence in modern times; and the defense of peace and national security.

461
Varga, Eugen. [INTERIMPERIALISTIC CONTRADICTIONS AND WAR] Mezhimperialisticheskie protivorechiia i voina. In his Ocherki po problemam politekonomii kapitalizma. Moskva, Izd-vo polit. lit-ry, 1964. p. 78-88. HC59.V35

During the dogmatic days of Joseph Stalin it was commonly thought that Lenin's thesis on the inevitability of war between the imperialist powers remained true even under contemporary conditions. The 20th Party Congress affirmed, however, that although economic conditions conducive to the outbreak of war will exist as long as imperialism survives, fatalistic thinking about the matter is misguided. This is not to say that the contradictions of capitalism have been resolved. NATO, the Common Market, and other imperialist alliances cannot stabilize capitalism. But political and economic instability can hardly be expected to result in war between the United States and any or all of the

European nations. To rival the U.S. defense establishment the countries of Western Europe would have to unite in a program of defense development that would consume one-third of the national income of each country. Capitalist nations have also learned from the world wars that one of the consequences of interimperialist clashes is the creation of conditions favorable to the emergence of new Socialist states. Wars to acquire new colonies are no longer feasible; imperialism now prefers to exploit countries with bourgeois social structures through the methods of neocolonialism. So long as the leaders of imperialism are so well aware of the great danger war poses for the capitalist system, a third interimperialist war will remain possible but quite unlikely.

462
Vernant, Jacques. [THE INDIAN-PAKISTANI CONFLICT] Le conflict indo-pakistanais. Revue de défense nationale, 21. année, nov. 1965: 1769-1773.
D410.R45, v. 21

Draws three conclusions from the September war between India and Pakistan: the strategic and political stability of the subcontinent has been shattered; the conflict, with its religious, ideological, and international implications, is typical of those besetting relations between newly independent countries and is, in some way, the price of decolonization; this type of dispute is likely to recur in the next decade all over the world. The permanent tension engendered by the war places an already troubled Asia in a state of maximum instability. Ideological clashes and Chinese expansionism are major but not sole causes of this instability.

463
Warren, Roland L. THE CONFLICT INTERSYSTEM AND THE CHANGE AGENT. Journal of human relations, v. 13, no. 3: 339-355.
H1.J55, v. 13

Reports the experience of the author in attempting to play a mediating role between officials of East and West Berlin. Professor Warren sought to answer two questions: "1. How do two diametrically opposed belief-action systems sustain themselves respectively in adaptive response to continuing new developments and in hostile interaction with each other? 2. What are some of the implications of this analysis for the role of a mediatory change agent?" Flexibility of attitudes, dissonance, and other social and psychological traits of both sides are evaluated.

464
THE WORLD IN A MESS. U.S. news & world report, v. 59, Dec. 6, 1965: 38-42.
JK1.U65, v. 59

Highlights the world's tension areas that conceivably could erupt into war. The "U.S. seems to be caught up, one way or another, in just about every trouble spot around the globe."

B. FOREIGN POLICIES OF STATES AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS

1. General Analyses

465
Chandrasekhar, Sripati. INDIA, CHINA AND ASIA. In his Communist China today. London, Asia Pub. House [1964] p. 195-208.
DS777.55.C337, 1964

The struggle in Asia today is one between communism (represented by China) and democracy (introduced into Asia by Western colonialists and now represented by India). Asia desires to attain political, economic, and cultural equality with Europe, but the new Asian nations are unsure of whether this end might be achieved better and more quickly by democratic or by Communist means. India's attempts to achieve the benefits enjoyed by the West have been regulated by considerations of democracy, the rule of law, personal freedom, and individual rights. China has created a sham democratic system, suppressed individual rights, violated the principles of peaceful coexistence announced at Bandung, and embarked upon an expansionist policy. In view of China's belligerence the United Nations could hardly expect enhanced prestige or power were it to admit the Communists to its sessions. India should revise its policy of neutrality and protect its internal development through membership in an anti-Chinese military alliance.

466
Egorov, Valerii N., comp. [FOREIGN POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS] Vneshniaia politika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia. Moskva, Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1965. 280 p.
Z6204.V6

A bibliography of Soviet monographic literature on the subjects of foreign policy, international relations, world economics, the international Communist movement, international law, and international organizations. Brief annotations are included for each entry; contents notes are supplied for many. All the works cited were published from 1961 to June 1964.

467
Etinger, Iakov Ia., and Ovanes N. Melikian. [NEUTRALISM AND PEACE: THE NEUTRALIST POLICIES OF THE COUNTRIES OF ASIA AND AFRICA] Neitralizm i mir; neitralistskaia politika stran Azii i Afriki. Moskva, Mysl', 1964. 317 p.
DS35.E8

Contents.--The essence and peculiarities of Afro-Asian neutralism.--Neutralism and the struggle for consolidation of national independence.--The nonalined nations and fundamental problems of the times.--Southeast Asia: one of the strongholds of neutralism.--Policies of nonalinement in the Arab East.--The growth of neutralism in Africa.--The conference of nonalined nations in Belgrade.--Neutralism gathers strength.--The imperialists maneuver.

A study of the role of neutralist nations in the modern world and the importance of neutralist policies to the preservation of peace. The authors find it significant that not one of the nations experiencing a struggle for national independence in recent times has joined a military bloc. They conclude that neutralist countries exercise a calming effect on international relations and are of great importance to the continuation of peaceful coexistence.

468
Flechtheim, Ossip K. [WORLD COMMUNISM IN TRANSFORMATION] Weltkommunismus im Wandel. In his Weltkommunismus im Wandel [Köln] Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik [1965] p. 193-239.
HX40.F57

Some changes in the character of world communism have been veiled by the movement's continued promulgation of a monistic, eschatological doctrine requiring,

in the fashion of any absolute dogma, a high degree of orthodoxy. One such hidden change has been the gradual "derevolutionization" of communism. In its various versions the doctrine becomes increasingly nationalistic and thus fragmented; it suffers the natural evolutionary fate of all socio-political mass movements. The chances for creation of the universal Communist state thus have become more and more remote each day, even if otherwise favorable circumstances appear. This trend became apparent immediately after World War II with the failure of the U.S.S.R. to incorporate its satellite nations and thus actualize its self-proclaimed status as the future "Universal Communist State." Soviet, Chinese, and other versions of world communism are, to a large extent, functions of individual power politics in its classical form. The difference between the "have" and "have not" nations is as great in the Communist camp as in the non-Communist world. In addition, other ever-increasing contrasts may lead to further diffusion of power within the bloc and to a weakening of the present "bipolar antagonism" in the world. Today's communism is heading in neither Koestler's nor Orwell's direction, but toward gradual resignation from both its utopian aspirations and "anti-utopian" (viz political oppression and terror) practices. On the success of the evolutionary humanization and democratization of the Soviet Union and other Communist countries depend the world's security and peace.

469
Frederik, Hans. [GERMANY BETWEEN BONN AND PANKOW] Deutschland zwischen Bonn und Pankow. München-Inning, Humboldt-Verlag [1964] 299 p. DD257.25.F67

The history of the German State from the time of its reunification under Bismarck through its present division, with heavy emphasis on the postwar period. Included is an extensive compilation of relevant political pronouncements by Western and Communist leaders, writers, and philosophers. The author points out some inconsistencies in Western and Soviet policies toward Germany and defines the differences between both Germanies in legal, political, and sociological terms. He concludes that the international situation as well as political and sociological realities inside Germany make political-doctrinal appeals for German reunification ineffective. Since the strongest mutual bond between people on both sides of the demarcation line is the German language, appeals to German national feelings would be a much more effective means of keeping the reunification idea alive until its final realization.

470
Kaiser, Karl. [THE GERMAN QUESTION--SUMMED UP: II. REUNIFICATION AND THE BALANCE OF POWER IN EUROPE] Die deutsche Frage--rekapituliert: II. Wiedervereinigung und europäisches Gleichgewicht. Frankfurter Hefte, 20. Jahrg., Dez. 1965: 861-870. AP30.F555, v. 20

Any plan for German reunification providing for all of Germany to be West-oriented or neutral must be viewed by Moscow as unacceptable. Calling for East Germany's severance from the Soviet bloc would necessarily open the door for independence movements in the satellite nations. Germany has long been regarded by Marxism-Leninism as a steppingstone to the Communist domination of Europe and the World. Soviet foreign policy toward Germany is therefore aimed at two objectives. As a defensive measure it tries to prevent any unfavorable change in Germany's status quo. As an offensive measure it uses the German problem as an instrument to fragment the Atlantic Alliance to the point where a common Western answer to selective Soviet pressure is no longer possible, or where a bilateral agreement between Bonn and Moscow, on Soviet terms, is feasible. De Gaulle's policy toward Germany is subservient to his main goal of securing for France a first-rank place in the world before other developments (e.g., an increase of American dominance in Europe or rapid growth of Germany's economic and political strength) make this impossible. Hence De Gaulle opposes West European federation and German reunification during the East-West confrontation in Europe. But he does foresee German reunification when the East-West confrontation subsides, when Europe is united from the Atlantic to the Urals, and when strong East European nations help France to counterbalance Germany's power. De Gaulle's policy aimed at a decrease in American influence in Europe would have adverse consequences for both German national interests and European security. U.S. hesitancy to look for new solutions to the German problem may be explained by American foreign policy's preoccupation with the East-West confrontation as a whole and on a world scale. Only since the Kennedy administration has it tried to combine a settlement of the German problem with its detênte policy. British policy was marked by the 1955 Eden Plan to reunify Germany and include it in partially disarmed zone of Central Europe; this was later dropped as the strength of the German Federal Republic grew. Britain now wants to consolidate its relations with Western Europe. It shows uneasiness, however, about West Germany's newly gained economic strength.

471
McWhinney, Edward, ed. LAW, FOREIGN POLICY, AND THE EAST-WEST DÉTENTE. [Toronto] University of Toronto Press [1964] 213 p. JX1395.M18

Contents. --Soviet law reform and its significance for Soviet international relations, by Harold J. Berman. --Co-existence, co-operation, and the common law, by John N. Hazard. --Objectives and method in international law and the east-west détente, by Edward McWhinney. --Co-existence or friendly relations? The Canadian approach, by Paul Martin. --The changing Soviet Union: Implications for Canadian foreign policy, by Blair Seaborn. --Canadian initiatives in East-West legal relations in the United Nations, by J. Alan Beesley. --Canadian attitudes to change and conflict in the Soviet bloc, by H. Gordon Skilling. --The changing society of the Soviet Union, by Mark Gayn. --The Soviet viewpoint on co-existence between states with different social systems, by Ivan F. Shpedko. --Selected bibliography.

Essays (many of which come from the Conference on Law and World Affairs held at Toronto, Jan. 17-18, 1964) that examine the "response of the West in general, and of Canada in particular, to the far-reaching changes in Soviet external relations in the last several years." Two events, the October 1962 crisis, and the Moscow Test Ban Treaty of August 1963, are emphasized.

472
Nesmelov, Oleg V. [WHAT KIND OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE DO THE IDEOLOGISTS OF IMPERIALISM WANT?] Kakogo mirnogo sosushchestvovaniia khotiat ideologi imperializma? Moskva, Izd-vo "Mysl'," 1964. 109 p. D843.N43

Contents. --The Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence and bourgeois fabrications. --The evolution

of bourgeois views of coexistence: from denial to forced recognition. --Criticism of bourgeois conceptions of coexistence. --The specific form of class struggle. --Peaceful coexistence: the sole rational means for the development of contemporary international relations.

Compares Communist and bourgeois conceptions of peaceful coexistence and examines the views of many Western political scientists and theorists concerning relations between the capitalist and Communist nations.

473
Rajan, M. S. THE FUTURE OF NONALIGNMENT. In American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia. Nonalignment in foreign affairs. Special editor: Cecil V. Crabb, Jr. Philadelphia, 1965. (Its Annals, v. 362) p. 121-128.
H1.A4, v. 362

The best way one can predict the future of nonalignment is to see how far the original bases of the policy continue to exist and still hold good, and whether these bases are likely to remain in the foreseeable future. In the writer's view, the still largely bipolarized world politics, the continuing emotional need to demonstrate independence of policy and action in world affairs, the still valid ideological and economic bases, the relaxation of cold-war pressures on the nonaligned--all these and more--seem to indicate that nonalignment has not yet outlived the conditions in which the policy originated, or its utility to many nations of Asia and Africa. It continues to offer to the present adherents (which include about half of the independent states of the world) as well as potential followers, a preferred choice in foreign policy and relations in the present as well as foreseeable future. (Abstract supplied)

474
Wit, Daniel. THE SINO-AMERICAN CLASH OF INTERESTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. United Asia, v. 17, July/Aug. 1965: 287-293.
DS1.U55, v. 17

The Chinese Communist dream envisages a system of Communist states among which China would be leader, the U.S.S.R. a "willing collaborator," and all other states participants. Foremost among immediate Chinese objectives is establishment of primacy in Asia and hegemony in Southeast Asia. Peking views Southeast Asia as Stalin once regarded Eastern Europe, as "a contiguous area whose location and historic role 'naturally' suit it for membership in a new Communist type imperial system." American national interests in Southeast Asia are perhaps more determined by global objectives than are China's, while the international order sought by the United States is perhaps as utopian--"the creation of a peaceful, self-regulating and democratic international order." American foreign policy is based upon the hope that if China can be contained long enough, liberalizing currents similar to those now coursing through the Soviet bloc will suggest to Peking the desirability of peaceful coexistence. Were China to achieve domination of Southeast Asia, it would be closer to its long-range objective of complete control of Asia and would place Japan and India in a precarious position. "The harnessing of Japanese industrial strength to Peking's objectives might force the West into an impossible choice between global nuclear war and complete surrender." Should Southeast Asia fall to China, the line that the United States must hold at all costs is that "formed by the Aleutians, Japan, the Ryukyus, possibly Taiwan, Australia and New Zealand." At this point American national interests dictate stabilization. "Whether or not the United States ultimately withdraws to this Asia littoral defense perimeter will have to depend on the desires of non-Communist Southeast Asians, themselves, and their willingness to fight for their freedom."

2. Unilateral Policies

475
Bateman, Don. THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN AGGRESSION. Socialist leader, v. 57, Dec. 18, 1965: 1, 6. HD4805.N35, v. 57

U.S. proclamations of desire for peace in Vietnam are a cover-up for continuing the war in order to be able to sell American products in foreign markets. Chinese expansion into Asia would mean a reduction of America's potential customers. In addition the war has boosted the American economy out of a minor slump. The United States is an excellent example of "polarisation of economic power under capitalism," with unemployed poverty-stricken people on the bottom and 9,000 millionaires on top. The American economy needs a war to keep itself prosperous. "The fight against the war in Vietnam becomes a major factor in the struggle against world capitalism."

476
Chen, Yi. A NEW AND GREAT ANTI-U.S. REVOLUTIONARY STORM IS APPROACHING. Peking review, v. 9, Jan. 7, 1966: 5-9.
DS701.P42, v. 9

An interview with Chinese Vice-Premier Chen Yi conducted by the Peking correspondent of the Japanese newspaper Akahata. U.S. intentions in Southeast Asia, the upsurge of anti-imperialist revolutionary activity in Asia and Africa, and the "ulterior motives" of the Soviets in offering aid to Vietnam are discussed.

477
Cho, M. Y. [JAPAN'S ASIAN RESPONSIBILITY] Japans asiatische Verantwortung. Aussenpolitik, 16. Jahrg., Dez. 1965: 843-848. D839.A885, v. 16

Japan turns itself more and more toward Asia. It believes today in its own responsibility for Asian economic development, as well as for securing a permanent peace. Hampering those efforts, however, are severed relations with the parts of Asia that became Communist, and the still-alive anti-Japanese resentment in countries occupied by Japan during the war. Its new policy toward Asia prompts it to seek a change in its relations with America. Dr. M. Y. Cho, a Korean . . . now working at the Asia Research Institute in Hamburg, analyzes Japan in relation to all important political factors in Asia. He discusses especially the fluctuation of the peace frenzy and anti-Americanism. (Translation of supplied abstract, modified)

478
Crabb, Cecil V. THE UNITED STATES AND THE NEUTRALISTS: A DECADE IN PERSPECTIVE. In American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia. Nonalignment in foreign affairs. Special editor: Cecil V. Crabb, Jr. Philadelphia, 1965. (Its Annals, v. 362) p. 92-101.
H1.A4, v. 362

When nonalignment first began to attract global attention during the 1950's, the initial reaction of American policy-makers was one of anxiety and skepticism--not to say outright hostility. For several years, American officials demanded that nonaligned

nations "choose" the side they really supported in the Cold War. Legislative and public reactions to nonalignment were, and tended for a longer period to remain, highly critical. Gradually, executive policy-makers began to modify their assessment of nonalignment. From an early stage of apprehension, they moved to a stage of limited co-operation with neutralist countries to achieve common goals. And from that stage, by the early 1960's, they had gone on to endorse the basic idea of diplomatic nonalignment and to hold it out as the ultimate goal of countries like South Vietnam. This change did not, of course, signify official approval of all policies and activities of particular neutralist countries. But the over-all transition in American policy occurred for a number of reasons, not the least of which was realization in Washington that nonalignment had become an influential and growing movement, attracting the vast majority of new states in the Afro-Asian world. In addition, several nations once closely allied diplomatically with the West also showed signs of assuming a de facto position of neutralism. If the public and Congress did not always fully comprehend these facts, executive officials realized that opposition to nonalignment, and noncollaboration with its exponents, could not serve as the basis of effective national policy in a global setting characterized by growing "polycentricity" and by a gradual erosion of rigid diplomatic postures on both sides of the Iron Curtain. (Abstract supplied)

479
De Gaulle, Charles. FRANCE AND NATO. Survival, v. 7, Nov. 1965: 294-295. U162.S9, v. 7

Original text of the part of President de Gaulle's September 9, 1965, press conference that dealt with NATO.

President de Gaulle's vision of an independent role for France within NATO, the United Nations, world monetary organizations, and Europe.

480
Delcour, Roland. [IN VOTING FOR THE MAJORITY CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT PARTY 15 MILLION GERMANS WANTED TO ASSURE THEIR SECURITY] En votant pour le parti majoritaire chrétien démocrate 15 millions d'allemands ont voulu assurer leur sécurité. Revue de Paris, 72. année, oct. 1965: 67-71. AP20.R27, v. 72

Concludes that the 1965 German elections, in which the key issue was security, revealed a public that is pro-American, pro-Western, and pro-NATO.

481
Eren, Nuri. [THE FOREIGN POLICY OF TURKEY] Die internationalen Positionen der Türkei. Aussenpolitik, 16. Jahrg., Okt. 1965: 704-717. D839.A885, v. 16

Discusses Turkey's recent efforts to improve its relations with the Soviet Union and the Balkan and Arab states, as well as with the nonalined world as a whole. The author describes the limitations of the policy, said to be determined by Turkey's security interests, and its need for continued Western protection.

482
Erhard, Ludwig. [GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY] Die deutsche Aussenpolitik. Parlament, 15. Jahrg., 17. Nov. 1965: 4-6. D839.P3, v. 15

That part of German Chancellor Erhard's speech before the Bundestag on November 10, 1965, which deals with his government's foreign policy program. Problems of German reunification, NATO, German defense plans, European unity, and development assistance are singled out as areas of major concern.

483
Ehrhardt, Carl A. [DE GAULLE AND THE IDEA OF INTEGRATION] De Gaulle und die Integrationsidee. Aussenpolitik, 16. Jahrg., Dez. 1965: 801-815. D839.A885, v. 16

The new German Federal Government faces a difficult discussion with the French President, who, since he was established in office, has seriously and directly pushed forward the dissolution of the multilateral, European system of integration, through promoting a bilateral system of separate states with individual interests. Carl A. Ehrhardt, Brussels, describes the road De Gaulle has travelled since his return to power in 1958, and centers his whole discussion of the European situation on the question of living up to the Rome accords. His analysis leads firmly to the most critical point, the present confrontation between France and other European nations. (Translation of supplied abstract)

484
Fleming, D. F. IS CONTAINMENT MORAL? In American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia. Nonalignment in foreign affairs. Special editor: Cecil V. Crabb, Jr. Philadelphia, 1965. (Its Annals, v. 362) p. 18-27. H1.A4, v. 362

The Dulles idea that nonalignment in the Cold War is immoral voiced the view that all the world must choose between the pure white of our cold-war crusade and the total evil of Soviet communism. This absolute doctrine failed to convince any nonaligned people and had to be abandoned. Even our allies condemned its rigidity. However, its propagation and failure inevitably raised the issue of the morality of our containment policy. Was it moral to go to the other side of the earth to build many-sided hostile walls around the two largest peoples in the world; to deplete our own economy and society dangerously by nearly a trillion dollars of cold-war military expenditures, while verging upon international bankruptcy; to proscribe all revolutions in the world, lest they turn Communist, and ally ourselves with socially oppressive and obsolete groups everywhere; to ignore the mounting evidence of social evolution and achievement in Communist lands; to maneuver the Congress into giving four blank checks for world war; and to violate both the United Nations and Organization of American States (OAS) charters as well as the oldest rules of international law? Is it moral, also, to force corrupt governments on the people of South Vietnam and to inch toward a nuclear war on China, in order to maintain ourselves in the trap of deep involvement around China's frontiers? Will the acute dangers created by our encirclement rings, to those living in the rings and to those outside, boomerang upon us? Will President Johnson's proclamation of Pax Americana end in an involuntary Fortress America? (Abstract supplied)

485
FOREIGN RELATIONS. China news analysis, no. 592, Dec. 10, 1965: 1-7. DS777.55.C4469, 1965

Discusses recent setbacks in Communist China's foreign policy, possible Chinese reassessments manifesting a greater degree of moderation, and the varied "tonalities" China utilizes in addressing India, Japan, and Indonesia. Under its present leadership China is unlikely to abandon its dream of revolutionizing the third world. Peking's not yet sophisticated diplomacy "resembles the behavior of animals of the family of the tiger; patient

watch on the moves of the victim until the time to jump comes, and then the terrifying roar."

486
Frenzke, Dietrich. [THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC'S TERRITORIAL CLAIMS AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION] Die Gebietsforderungen der Volksrepublik China gegenüber der Sowjetunion. Europa-Archiv, 20. Jahrg., 10. Nov. 1965: 812-820. map.
D839.E86, v. 20

Considers the Red Chinese territorial claims against the Soviet Union, made public in recent years. The author describes the Soviet reaction to the claims and analyzes the function assigned to them in Peking's general foreign policy. The chances for their realization in the foreseeable future are absolutely nil; their only purpose therefore is to serve as an instrument of Peking's power politics against Moscow.

487
Frisch, Alfred. [GERMANY IN SEARCH OF A POLICY] L'Allemagne à la recherche d'une politique. Revue de défense nationale, 21. année, déc. 1965: 1878-1887.
D410.R45, v. 21

Foreign policy questions scarcely influenced the choice of the West German electorate in the September 1965 elections. The struggle for the direction of foreign policy within and between political parties occupies only a small minority of the responsible elite, and respective positions are often obscure. Yet within the next few years some very difficult decisions will have to be made. The Oder-Neisse frontier poses the first hard option--reunification could not be realized without German recognition of this, but the political repercussions of such recognition are unknown. Secondly Germany must find a balance between its desire for reunification and its political and military security requirements. Its defense organization and atomic pretensions will largely determine Soviet willingness to compromise on the reunification question. A third option concerns Germany's place and role in the West. Leaders face the choice between close Franco-German collaboration aimed at European unity and independence and a preferential bilateral relationship with the United States in the hopes of exploiting the Soviet-American détente for the goal of reunification.

488
Granger, Clinton E. NATIONAL GOALS. Revue militaire générale, no 8, oct. 1965: 327-335.
U2.R48, 1965
Includes summaries in French and German.

Two extreme courses of action for the free world--surrender and preemptive war--can be rejected out of hand because the one sacrifices freedom while the other could devastate civilization. The middle road, or containment, is frequently criticized as a negative policy without real goals, but history proves it offers the best chance of success. Because the world is evolving in a direction that places more and more value on freedom and individual worth, the imaginative and nonrepressive maintenance of the status quo will ultimately lead to a world consistent with U.S. national goals. This is a difficult course because sacrifices must be made to build a military establishment that may never be used. "We must be constantly ready to fight, and fully capable of fighting--in order to prevent the world from fighting at all." To preserve peace and to let evolution work to the advantage of freedom requires this readiness for war.

489
Henle, Hans. [THE FACE OF THE NEW CHINA] Das Gesicht des neuen China. Zeitschrift für Geopolitik, 13. Jahrg., Mai/Juni 1965: 149-158.
D410.Z4, v. 13

Reviews Communist China's domestic and foreign policies. The author considers China's alleged overpopulation to be a problem of secondary importance, merely a function of the nation's low industrial productivity. He believes that Peking's newly acquired nuclear bomb has already had a great political impact abroad and probably has caused some moderation of the American military policy in Southeast Asia.

490
Holzheimer, Hermann. [SIKKIM BETWEEN MYTH AND MIGHT] Sikkim zwischen Märchen und Macht. Aussenpolitik, 16. Jahrg., Nov. 1965: 771-776.
D839.A885, v. 16

During the Indian-Pakistan war, on September 16 [1965] Peking sent New Delhi an ultimatum concerning the northern boundaries of the Indian protectorate, the Principality of Sikkim. That small, still feudal country found itself in the path of an expansionist policy that drives China southwards to the Indian subcontinent. Chinese pressure on Sikkim threatens India's small and only link with Bengal and Assam. Any military action against Sikkim would instantly involve the question of India's existence. (Translation of supplied abstract)

491
[I SAW CHINA IN ARMS] J'ai vu la Chine en armes, by Africanus [pseud.] France Eurafrique, 17. année, oct. 1965: 6-7. JV1801.U53, v. 17

On billboards and posters throughout China American soldiers and planes are being attacked by Chinese soldiers; thousands and thousands of young men and women participate in political-military training courses; the theater exalts military courage; newspapers print studies on strategic problems that came up during the war against Japan. Communist China is being infused with a war and mobilization psychosis. One reason for this is the Party's effort to prevent the army hierarchy from assuming any autonomy. Another is to prepare the population for resisting invasion by giving it "total confidence in the old revolutionary methods." At war China could rely on 80 to 100 million trained fighters. But is China afraid of invasion, or is it rather preparing for a military confrontation, for encircling the "cities of the world" (Europe and North America)? Armed China poses a threat to Asia and the world. Without a tradition of diplomacy and subject to errors of calculation, Peking has rediscovered the feeling of a universal mission. The moderation and realism Chinese leaders frequently manifest in internal policies do not show up in their conduct of international relations. The world and China itself should fear Chinese youth's uncritical acceptance of modern hate campaigns and the concept of wars of liberation.

492
[INITIATIVE-GERMANY FOR PEACE, HUMANITY AND THE PEOPLE'S HAPPINESS: DECLARATION BY WALTER ULBRICHT, CHAIRMAN OF THE GDR STATE COUNCIL, AT THE 13TH SESSION OF THE GDR LOWER HOUSE ON MAY 5, 1965. MANIFESTO TO THE GERMAN PEOPLE AND TO PEOPLES AND GOVERNMENTS ALL OVER THE WORLD] Deutschland-Initiative für Frieden, Menschlichkeit und Glück des Volkes: Erklärung des Vorsitzenden des Staatsrates der DDR, Walter Ulbricht, auf der 13. Sitzung

der Volkskammer der DDR am 5. Mai 1965. Manifest an das deutsche Volk und an die Völker und Regierungen der Welt. [1965] 59 p.
DD261.4.D39

Contents.--National mission of the German Democratic Republic and of the West Germany peace forces, by Walter Ulbricht.--Manifesto on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the liberation.

Statements by Walter Ulbricht and the East German government that accuse West Germany of revisionist and aggressive aims and that appeal for disarmament and peaceful coexistence. Ulbricht outlines the history of the East German government's efforts to secure peace and bring about a relaxation of tensions. He attacks the remilitarization of West Germany under United States sponsorship, discusses the state doctrine of the German Democratic Republic as based on peaceful principles (inter alia on the "untiring struggle to overcome the partition of the German people"). The manifesto appeals for peaceful coexistence between all nations and contends that the mission of the German Democratic Republic and of peaceloving people in West Germany is to prevent a war from ever being staged on German soil. It calls for establishment of normal relations between both German states and concludes that "the solution to the German problem cannot be achieved without or against the will of the German Democratic Republic."

493
Jackson, Henry M. THE WILL TO STAY THE COURSE. Air Force and space digest, v. 49, Jan. 1966: 40-43.
UG633.A65, v. 49

"Adapted from an address . . . to the World Affairs Council of Seattle, Wash., on November 23, 1965."

Eighteen years ago President Truman, while exhorting Congress to help Greece fight Communist aggression, elucidated a principle of U.S. foreign policy that remains highly relevant today. By asserting that "it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures," Truman expressed a U.S. commitment to democratic victory in the cold war. He forecast a long and difficult struggle certain to test the American will and staying power. Today the situation in Vietnam particularly tries the patience of America, which would prefer to choose the ground and the weapons for its fight with communism. However communism will not challenge America in areas where the odds are in the U.S. favor. The Nation must also guard against too great a preoccupation with Vietnam. Most crucial to the United States national interest is Western Europe; America's greatest energies and closest attention must be directed toward relations with the European allies. It should view with suspicion the claim that China is now the world's sole aggressive power and that détente with the Soviet Union is advisable and acceptable. The desire to control nuclear weapons might lead America to "appeal for almost any sort of treaty or arrangement with the Soviets that would give even the appearance of an accommodation." Washington might be deluded into offering substantial concessions to Moscow in return for minimal concessions on the other side. In no case should the United States sponsor a détente with the Soviets at the expense of the interests of the European allies. It should not be misled by those who argue that all problems can best be solved by submitting them to the authority of the United Nations. The United Nations was never intended to be a substitute for national policymaking. The United States, not the United Nations, is the keystone of U.S. foreign policy. The Nation can turn back communism and cause liberty to survive if it affirmatively responds to the question once posed by Winston Churchill: "Are the American people ready to stay the course?"

494
Kertzscher, Günter. PROTESTANT MEMORANDUM STARTS STORM. Democratic German report, v. 14, Nov. 26, 1965: 162. DD261.D3, v. 14
Condensed from Neues Detschland, Nov. 10, 1965. Newsp.

The West German Evangelical Church's memorandum on West German relations with East Europe, issued in October 1965, is ambiguous in its call for a changed attitude toward Germany's Eastern neighbors and especially toward the problem of German boundaries. It criticizes the West German revanchist position, but "refuses to recognize the Oder-Neisse frontier." This notwithstanding, it is a positive document inasmuch as it advocates peace and détente and points to the need for renunciation of acts committed by Germany during the war. But it weakens this by speaking about an alleged "community of guilt" of other nations and keeps silent about the need for normalization of relations between the two German states. Outbursts against the memorandum testify to the strong chauvinism still prevailing in West Germany.

495
Korolev, B. [THE CRISIS OF THE IDEOLOGY OF ANTI-SOVIETISM] Krizis ideologii antisovetizma. Politicheskoe samoobrazovanie, g. 9, noiabr' 1965: 16-23. HX8.V22, v. 9

Traces the development of antagonism between bourgeois and Communist ideologies to the present day. The author feels that recent attempts by the U.S. President and Secretary of State to "build bridges between the West and the East" are directed by imperialist propagandists. They are subtle attempts to subvert Socialist nations through the export of capitalism, merely one more effort to preserve the old world against the international labor movement and the national liberation movement championed by the Soviet Union.

496
La Dany, L. [THE INTERNAL EVOLUTION AND FOREIGN POLICY OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC] Die innere Entwicklung und die Aussenpolitik der Chinesischen Volksrepublik. Moderne Welt, 6. Jahrg., Heft 3, 1965: 227-246.
D839.M58, v. 6

Analyzes the historical background of Red China's present domestic and foreign policies. The author points out both strong and weak points of Peking's foreign policy, the former being its grandiose vision and marked degree of caution; the latter its misconceptions about the outside world and unrealistic hostility toward Russia.

497
Lambilliotte, Maurice. [ANTS OR MEN] Des fourmis ou des hommes. Synthèses, 20. année, oct. 1965: 5-14. AP22.S9, v. 20

The calculations of Chinese Communist leaders are false. If judged by Lin Piao's recent declarations these leaders are ignorant of some of the present epoch's most decisive factors. They underestimate technology and minimize the nuclear threat. That

China has a legitimate political role in the world cannot be denied. But the creative and technologically advanced world must frustrate Peking's attempts to gain influence through sheer weight of numbers and racist appeals. Social justice is a valid goal, but must be sought through fostering man's creative potential, through his ability to edify the whole of civilization. A power whose social ideal would welcome a war between the United States and the Soviet Union as a means for destroying their technological capacities, or a power seeming to view nuclear attack as a mere bloodletting for its surplus population does not hold a legitimate claim to historic or moral supremacy in the world of progressive man.

498
Lavergne, Bernard. [THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, DECEMBER 5, 1965. DE GAULLE WANTS TO SHELTER FRANCE AGAINST THE NUCLEAR WAR THAT IS PERCEPTIBLE ON THE HORIZON] L'Élection présidentielle du 5 décembre 1965. Le Général de Gaulle veut mettre la France à l'abri de la guerre nucléaire qu'on peut apercevoir à l'horizon. Année politique et économique, 38. année, oct. 1965: 325-347.
D410.A6, v. 38

Argues that the foundation of De Gaulle's foreign policy, as expressed in his September 9 press conference, is the desire to avert nuclear war and, failing this, to insure that France avoids entanglement in the war. To realize this goal De Gaulle strives to assure an independent role for France and recognizes the necessity for a cooperative relationship between the United States, the Soviet Union, China, France, and the United Kingdom. In a world in which disarmament has become inconceivable, German rearmament policies and U.S. policies of frustrating Chinese evolution and constantly opposing communism are almost irresistably leading to war.

499
Lehmann, Hans. [THE MAIN TASK OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AFTER THE ELECTIONS: TO SEEK WAYS LEADING TO GERMAN REUNIFICATION] Hauptaufgabe der Bundesregierung nach der Wahl: Wege zur Wiedervereinigung suchen. Der Europäische Osten, 11. Jahrg., Nov. 1965: 614-620.
DR1.E83, v. 11

The results of the recent elections in the German Federal Republic have given the Bonn government a clear mandate to continue and intensify its efforts toward peaceful reunification of Germany as a free nation. Since such a reunification constitutes an essential prerequisite for world peace, the government should exploit, for that purpose, all opportune changes in the world situation. The latter is by no means stable. There has been on the one hand a marked increase in Red China's threat to world peace, and on the other a partial retreat by the Soviet leadership from Marxism. There is at least a tacit agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union to stop Red Chinese expansion in Asia and elsewhere and to prevent a new world war. The Soviet economic situation does not allow Moscow to increase its commitments in underdeveloped countries and makes it imperative for the U.S.S.R. to rely increasingly on the development of trade with the West. Moscow's position on the question of German reunification has remained, however, unchanged. For Germans the cause of reunification can best be served by the German Federal Republic's continued adherence to and increased participation in the Western alliance. This involves the still-unsolved problem of nuclear arms sharing within NATO and the need for closer Franco-German cooperation. In view of the possible creeping disintegration of the Soviet bloc, the German Federal Republic should avoid steps that may be interpreted as direct or indirect recognition of the Communist satellite regimes in East Europe.

500
Poeggel, Walter. [THE DEVELOPMENT AND PRESENT SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NATIONALITY QUESTION IN GERMANY] Zur Entwicklung und gegenwärtigen Bedeutung der nationalen Frage in Deutschland. In Leipzig. Universität. Zentrale Forschungsgemeinschaft "Friedliche Koexistenz und Nationale Frage in Deutschland." Probleme der friedlichen Koexistenz in Deutschland; Beiträge. Berlin, Staatsverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republic, 1965. p. 9-29.
DD257.4.L4

The Potsdam Agreement adopted the concept of one state for all Germany, "to be established by the German people according to the democratic principles of international law." This was the premise on which the German working class based its strategy of setting up a united, anti-fascist, and democratic republic for all Germany. The East German Government unsuccessfully tried to establish its relations with West Germany under constitutional rather than international law, and thus to keep alive the concept of one German state. Until 1955 the West German separatists persistently rejected all proposals to settle the reunification problem according to the Potsdam Agreement, that is by free elections. Only since 1956 has the German Federal Republic proclaimed the idea of "free elections" as a means for reunification. But this came about in an already changed situation. West Germany's NATO membership, rearmament, and pronounced aggressive plans made any pursuit of reunification impossible without first settling the more fundamental and urgent problem of European security. The newly formulated program of the Socialist Unity Party in 1957 took into account the changed conditions and declared that German reunification ceased to be the Germans' internal or constitutional problem and became an international one. Consequently it had to be solved according to the principles of international law, with normalization of relations between both German states constituting the initial step toward solution, and a long period of peaceful coexistence and a later possible confederation of both Germanys as the next steps. Realization of German reunification must be necessarily postponed into the distant future, because "the reunification of capitalism and socialism is truly impossible."

501
Rabinowitch, Eugene. THE NEW PERSPECTIVE. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 21, Nov. 1965: 2-3. TK9145.A84, v. 21

American policy during the cold war era has had two major concerns: halting the spread of Soviet influence in Europe and avoiding nuclear war with the Soviet Union. Two recent changes have taken place that may require a new emphasis in American policy. Firstly the Soviet Union is seriously pursuing "peaceful coexistence" with capitalist countries in the West. "National preservation" has taken priority over expansion of Communist ideology throughout the world. Secondly Communist China is emerging as the third major power in the world. It is also competing with the Soviet Union for the position of "ideological leader" of the Communist world. The Soviet Union is now in the difficult position of trying to maintain a policy of peaceful coexistence with the West while supporting wars of national liberation, tasks that

are complicated by China's vying for major power status. The United States should encourage Soviet coexistence with the West, even at the expense of good U.S. relations with Communist China. Some 20 years hence it would be advantageous for both the Soviet Union and the United States to have created "a stable and economically progressing system in all areas under their control" in order to confront China with only one alternative: fitting into it. A parallel is drawn between the emergence of Germany before World War II and China today. American programs in pursuit of this course of action should, initially, give up the idea of German participation in an allied nuclear force and should halt aerial bombing attacks on North Vietnam. Washington should then orient its policy toward Chinese recognition and admission to the United Nations, without giving up Taiwan. The multilateral force proposal should be abandoned as the main stumbling block to continued rapprochement with the Soviet Union and the main obstacle toward achievement of a comprehensive test ban and other disarmament agreements. Such a policy shift would serve as an expression of U.S.-Soviet mutual interest in "political stabilization and gradual disarmament."

502
Reshetar, John S. THE SOVIET UNION AND THE NEUTRALIST WORLD. In American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia. Nonalignment in foreign affairs. Special editor: Cecil V. Crabb, Jr. Philadelphia, 1965. (Its Annals, v. 362) p. 102-112. H1.A4, v. 362

Although Soviet interest in the "colonial question" is as old as the regime, an active and well-financed policy was initiated only in 1954-1955 as more colonies attained national independence. The first Soviet loans and arms shipments to Afghanistan and Egypt were designed to weaken the Baghdad Pact, support neutralism, and establish Soviet presence in the Middle East. The Soviet Union joined specialized international organizations, and Soviet leaders began to visit selected nonaligned countries. Soviet ideologists developed the concept of "national democracy" and "neocolonialism" in order to rationalize the operation. Long-term loans to a select group of neutralist states, at low interest rates with repayment often on a barter basis or in local currencies, are a significant feature of the Soviet offensive in the "third world." The Soviet Union seeks to weaken and ultimately to eliminate Western influence, disrupting regional military alliances and economic ties with the West; Soviet loans and aid are also designed to promoted political and socioeconomic conditions conducive to the strengthening of local Communist parties and are a means of obtaining neutralist support for Soviet foreign-policy objectives. The Soviet campaign in the "third world" has had limited success, and may have consequences which its initiators did not anticipate. (Abstract supplied)

503
Rondot, Pierre. [FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC] La politique extérieure de la République Arabe Unie. Revue de défense nationale, 21. année, déc. 1965: 1918-1931. D410.R45, v. 21

A summary of the determinants and directions of Egyptian foreign policy in the Arab world, in the third world, and between the great powers. Since 1952 Western observers have worried that revolutionary adventurism would destroy Middle Eastern equilibrium and thereby compromise world peace. But Nasser has pragmatically become more moderate, making these fears far less justified than previously.

504
Sauldie, Madan M. DRAGON ON THE AFRICAN SOIL. Caravan, no. 326, Dec. 1, 1965: 24-26. AP8.C25, 1965

China's policy toward Africa is not conquest, but establishment of a pro-Peking alliance of Asian, African, and Latin American nations that will circumvent U.S. isolation of China. To achieve this goal a vast network of diplomatic outposts, agents, and contacts has been set up with Dar-es-salaam at its center. Chinese economic aid ($156.4 million in credit was awarded to African states in 1964) has been substantial but largely unrewarding. The haphazard nature of China's aid program and her determination to select the particular areas of its application upset African national planning and emphasize the propaganda aspects of Chinese efforts. Africans are largely unimpressed by Mao's thesis that independence can be achieved only through basic revolution. The Chinese approach has been largely ad hoc, with few concessions to ideology. For example China even supported Tutsi aristocrats against the peasantry opposing them in Rwanda. Essentially the Chinese are trying for a foothold in Africa to use "as a springboard for future plans." Although China's most concentrated efforts have been directed toward the youth and have not been fruitless, influential Africans, it seems, have realistically assessed Chinese intentions and have indicated that their nations will preserve independence of action at all costs. If China's policy is to succeed in Africa, the next generation of leaders will certainly have to act differently from the present one. But in the meantime "Africans seem to be realising the dragon's teeth and cannot be beguiled beyond a point."

505
Schönwandt, Max. [THE GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC'S SO-CALLED RIGHT TO SOLE REPRESENTATION] Das sogenannte Alleinvertretungsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Zeitschrift für Geopolitik, 13. Jahrg., Mai/Juni 1965: 141-144. D410.Z4, v. 13

Contends that the German Federal Republic's claim to sole representation of the entire German nation (Hallstein Doctrine) impedes West Germany's chances to influence the liberalization and democratization of East Germany's internal situation. The author believes that German reunification is unattainable in the near future.

506
Schütz, Wilhelm W. [STRATEGY FOR GERMANY: SUGGESTIONS FOR A GERMAN REUNIFICATION POLICY] Strategie für Deutschland: Anregungen für eine deutsche Wiedervereinigungspolitik. Die Zeit, 20, Jahrg., 14. Dez. 1965: 5. AP30.Z39, v. 20

German reunification policy has lacked, thus far, a well planned political strategy that would provide for either a continued East-West confrontation after 1969 or a relaxation of tensions between the two blocs. In either case the German reunification problem should be given a high priority in policy planning, not only by Bonn but also by the Western alliance and NATO. It should also constitute an integral part of any terminal settlement of the cold war, should such a settlement be reached. In view of the prolonged partition of Germany a maintenance of the high sense of national unity between

Germans of both sides should be a prime task of the federal government's policy. This could be achieved by broadening, insofar as possible, economic and cultural relations between both Germanys, preferably below the cabinet level. Only close-knit contacts with the population of "Central Germany" (viz East Germany) can strengthen the Bonn government's claim to be the sole representative of all Germany. Also, possible West German agreements with the "Third World," aimed at a common defense of the, so attractive to them, principle of self-determination of people, may increase international pressure for a satisfactory solution of the problem. The German Federal Republic should develop its own policy toward East Europe and increase mutual cultural and economic ties. The task of reaching an understanding with Poland on the German-Polish boundary is complicated by the fact that Polish foreign policy has aimed at the continuation of Germany's partition. This can be overcome by discussion of the German reunification problem in the wider context of European security, a subject in which all these nations are interested. In such a context the differences between Germany and other nations may diminish and a mutually satisfactory solution may be found with proper safeguards for freedom and for the self-determination of people.

507
Schwarzkopf, Dietrich. [A PEACE TREATY--WHAT FOR? THE SLOGAN AND THE REALITY] Friedensvertrag--wozu? Ein Schlagwort und die Wirklichkeit. Politische Meinung, 10. Jahrg., Okt. 1965: 15-24. H5.P75, v. 10

Argues that the Bonn government's policy of reunification through a German peace treaty is unrealistic. Without such a treaty Germany has a much better chance for a just and durable peace and for reunification. Some danger exists that the peace treaty might permanently affix defeated nation status to Germany, a status that the Federal German Republic, only a part of Germany, has long outgrown.

508
Singh, Baljit. PUNDITS AND PANCHSHEELA: INDIAN INTELLECTUALS AND THEIR FOREIGN POLICY. Background, v. 9, Aug. 1965: 127-136. D839.B2, v. 9

Results of a sample of intellectual Indian opinion on the conduct of foreign policy. India's foreign policy is increasingly manifesting the "anomoly of high prestige and little achievement"; this is realized by the intellectuals, who are showing more interest in Realpolitik and less in moral platitudes.

509
Steiniger, Peter-Alfons. THE GDR AND THE UNITED NATIONS. GDR review, v. 10, Nov. 1965: 26-27. DD261.G2, v. 10

Throughout the past 20 years the foreign policy of the German Democratic Republic has been built upon the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. During this period the GDR has made important contributions to all the important issues on the U.N. agenda. To assist the United Nations in its major task of preventing a third world war the GDR has extirpated the economic and ideological roots of fascism and has urged the Federal Republic of Germany to do likewise. In keeping with the U.N. principle of cooperation and peaceful coexistence among states the GDR has established close contacts with the new nations of Asia and Africa, instituted harmonious economic and political relations with Western nations, and maintained cordial ties with the Socialist system. As part of the world movement toward disarmament the GDR has often proposed that both German states renounce the manufacture of arms and ask the signatory powers of the Potsdam Agreement to respect Germany's nuclear-free status. Sharply opposed to these acts of the GDR have been the West German demands for territorial expansion and control of nuclear weapons. Contrary to the resolve of the GDR to stop trade with racist-dominated states is West Germany's close economic and military collaboration with South Africa. Yet which Germany is allowed to participate in the United Nations and which is barred from its sessions? The aggressive forces of imperialism must not be allowed to keep from the general business of the United Nations countries upholding the principles of that organization.

510
Ströhm, Carl G. [THE DILEMMA OF THE REVOLUTION: PEKING'S STRATEGISTS HAVE RUN INTO TROUBLE] Das Dilemma der Revolution: Pekings Strategen sind in Not geraten. Christ und Welt, 18. Jahrg., 29. Okt. 1965: 3. BR4.C37, v. 18

Considers Peking's 1965 "revolutionary" foreign policy as complete a failure as its domestic policies (e.g., the "Great Leap Forward" in 1958-60). The author concludes that this may cause Red China to revise its conduct of foreign relations and establish closer economic ties with West Europe.

511
Taylor, George E. LIN PIAO AND THE THIRD WORLD. Virginia quarterly review, v. 42, winter 1966: 1-11. AP2.V76, v. 42

The West should seriously study Lin Piao's statement outlining Communist China's foreign policy objectives. It commits China to a protracted conflict with the United States and its allies for control of the underdeveloped areas of the world. The Chinese Communists may have misread or ignored factors that helped them to win in China against great odds. Nonetheless their statement that the strategy they followed should be projected onto the world political scene has serious long-term implications for international peace and stability. Lin's statement is a systematic plan to foment wars of revolution in the underdeveloped areas of the world with the hope of alienating them from the West and bringing them into the Chinese sphere of influence. Unfortunately the Chinese have been successful in developing wars of liberation in a number of areas and have exploited other foreign policy and strategic ploys to their favor, especially with India and Pakistan. Success by a relatively weak adversary cannot be ignored. The economic gap between the developed and undeveloped areas is growing, and China has successfully exploited this fact. Further, the West has not succeeded in keeping the rising expectations of these new countries from being crushed by reality, partly because the necessary capital investment has not been extended, and that which has is draining away money chargeable to interest. The Chinese tactics are designed to exploit these frustrations in hopes of eventually gaining decisive control over the marginal areas, which are the rural battleground. The urban areas--the industrialized areas of the West--will fall when they are cut off from contact with natural resources and from effective political control of the countryside. In this way China hopes to win. The West cannot count

on one lightning stroke that will bring victory. A vigorous attack on the problems of the underdeveloped world's economic and political structure is essential. The West must also train and keep men in reserve for military action. Communist wars of national liberation are catalytic agents, but they can be diverted to serve the needs of the West, if the manpower and resources are provided so that the necessary monumental changes can take place in the third world.

512
Vinacke, Harold M. COMMUNIST CHINA AND THE UNCOMMITTED ZONE. In American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia. Nonalignment in foreign affairs. Special editor: Cecil V. Crabb, Jr. Philadelphia, 1965. (Its Annals, v. 362) p. 113-120. H1.A4, v. 362

Communist China in 1949 held that there was no middle ground between alignment either with the United States or the Soviet Union. From the time of the Bandung Conference, however, Peking accepted nonalignment as possible and legitimate. Its approach to nonalignment states was made in identification of Communist China with underdeveloped countries under a nationalist leadership, struggling against imperialism. The United States was cast in the role of leader of imperialism, and the common struggle was against American imperialism. Thus the Chinese Communists sought to lead the nonaligned states away from the United States rather than toward the Communist camp. A "soft" line was generally used except toward India, against which attacks were launched to extend China's territorial position and to create fear of China's power. The controversy with the Soviet Union over "revisionism" led finally to attempts to detach aligned and nonaligned states from Moscow. Russia was covertly charged with alignment with American imperialism. The underdeveloped states were urged to follow a policy of self-reliance since it was dangerous to accept assistance from either the United States or the Soviet Union, and the situation in China precluded offers of substantial assistance. (Abstract supplied)

513
Zagoria, Donald S. CHINA'S STRATEGY: A CRITIQUE. Commentary, v. 40, Nov. 1965: 61-66.
DS101.C63, v. 40

Mao Tse-tung has spent almost half his adult life in protracted and seemingly hopeless struggle against overwhelming enemy forces. His followers have suffered more and prevailed against greater odds than any other band of revolutionaries in history. It would indeed be strange if the experiences shared by those who made the Long March did not condition the Chinese Communist view of world revolution and the means of achieving it. Lin Piao's article, "Long Live the Victory of the People's War," marks a high point in Chinese attempts to apply their revolutionary experience to the Communist movement at large. Lin's piece, aimed at Hanoi, attempts to convince North Vietnam that it should abandon conventional military operations in the South and return to guerrilla tactics, thereby fulfilling the Chinese strategy of bogging down the Americans in Southeast Asia and limiting their response to trouble in other parts of the world. Lin also attempts to reassure revolutionaries throughout the world that imperialism can be defeated by protracted conflict, though the price may be high (perhaps as high as Mao and his followers paid when they fought simultaneously against the Kuomintang and Japanese invaders in China). Chinese strategy, however, seems destined to flounder on a number of issues. Attempts to "turn Afro-Asian nationalism against the United States and optimally to foment war between the new nations and the U.S." are often vitiated by Afro-Asian refusal to condemn American imperialism and reject all U.S. political, economic, and military aid. To date Maoist strategy has succeeded only in China and Vietnam. Though civil wars and revolutions will occur in the future, they need not yield results inimical to U.S. interests, especially since Communist leaders are experiencing increasing difficulty in gaining control of these movements. In the meantime the United States should begin to prepare the way for an eventual detente with China through a series of diplomatic measures (recognition, admission to the United Nations, and the like) against the day when China's present leaders pass away. Such a policy could put "the onus for the impasse in American-Chinese relations on Peking's present leadership" and provide "an alternative to Mao's anti-American policy for those who will come to power in China after his death."

3. Bilateral and Multilateral Policies

514
Babaa, Khalid I. THE "THIRD FORCE" AND THE UNITED NATIONS. In American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia. Nonalignment in foreign affairs. Special editor: Cecil V. Crabb, Jr. Philadelphia, 1965. (Its Annals, v. 362) p. 81-91. H1.A4, v. 362

The "Third Force," in the United Nations and outside it, is not a bloc in the literary sense of the word, but rather a "group" or caucus" which convenes when the occasion arises to co-operate in settling international disputes that relate to the Cold War--and thus contributes to world peace and tranquility. From a neutralist or nonaligned point of view, international affairs after the Second World War developed in stages: the first, the immediate postwar stage, the second climaxed by the Suez invasion, and the third climaxed by the Cuban crisis. At the United Nations, the "Third Force" exercises influence in international affairs far greater than the economic or military strength of its adherents warrant. The Soviet Union identified itself with the aspirations of the nonaligned and neutralist states rather than the other way around. Neutralist countries share in common the endeavor to work for lessening international tension, to support the right of dependent peoples for self-determination, to oppose colonialism in all of its manifestations, and to struggle for disarmament and the prevention of atomic weapons for the sake of humanity at large. The neutralist states influence the decisions and tendencies of the United Nations, and the latter, in turn, influence the destinies of those states which find in the world organization not only protection from the dangers of global war, or local and limited ones, but also a confidence and dignity unequaled in modern history. (Abstract supplied)

515
Catholic Church in Poland. Bishops. [WE ARE STRETCHING OUT OUR HANDS TO YOU: EXCERPTS FROM A LETTER FROM POLISH BISHOPS TO THEIR GERMAN COUNCIL-BROTHERS] Wir strecken euch die Hände entgegen: Auszüge aus dem Brief der polnischen Bischöfe an die deutschen Konzilsbrüder. Deutsche Volkszeitung, 13. Jahrg., 10. Dez. 1965: 4.
P&GP RR

Long excerpts (quoted from the West German Catholic News Agency) from the formal invitation written by the Polish Roman Catholic bishops to their German counterparts to participate in the celebration of Poland's Millennium of Christianity, 1966. The message, appealing for reconciliation between the Polish and the German peoples, discusses the historical causes of the Polish antagonism toward Germans. The authors contend that the present Oder-Neisse Line is an equitable boundary between both nations. It is, the message states, "a matter of existence for Poland." The bishops also mention Poland's loss (at the end of World War II) of its eastern territory to the Soviet Union and the resettlement of the Polish population from that area to Poland's present western territory. The Polish bishops express the hope that the Polish and German peoples' mutual traditions in both Christian and Western culture will help in bringing about the desired Polish-German reconciliation.

516
Dirks, Walter. [THE MESSAGE FROM POLAND] Die Botschaft aus Polen. Dokumente, 21. Jahr, Dez. 1965: 467-468. H5. D65, v. 21

Comments on the Polish Roman Catholic episcopate's message to the German bishops on the eve of the 1966 celebration of the Millennium of Poland's Christianity. The author points to the historical causes, discussed in the letter, of Polish-German animosity, and to the Polish episcopate's expressed wish for improvement of relations between both peoples. He presents his understanding of, but not approval for the Polish bishops' justification of the Oder-Neisse line as an equitable boundary between both nations. He sees in the dialogue of Polish and German Christians a good start for Polish-German reconciliation, as the post-war dialogue between French and German Christians was responsible to some extent for the later French-German rapprochement. The author feels that "to leave the business of peace solely to exporters and importers would be a sad matter."

517
[EAST-WEST TRADE--A PATH TO UNDERSTANDING? JOINT SESSION OF BOTH EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTS IN STRASBOURG] Ost-West-Handel--ein Weg zur Verständigung? Gemeinsame Tagung der beiden Europa-Parlamente in Strassburg. Parlament, 15. Jahrg., 3. Nov. 1965: 2, 4, 7-9. D839.P3, v. 15

Excerpts from speeches by European officials at the joint meeting of the European Parliament and the Council of Europe in Strasbourg. The stated theme of the session was the possible political and economic benefits from an expansion of East-West trade. Many delegates spoke on the Common Market crisis and relations between the "six" and the rest of Western Europe.

518
Fontaine, Andre. THE USSR IS TEMPTED BY ISOLATIONISM. Washington, U.S. Joint Publications Research Service, 1965. 5 p. (U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. JPRS: 32,246) P&GP RR
CSO: 9935-N
TT: 65-32736

"Translation of an article by Andre Fontaine in the French-language newspaper Le Monde, Paris 26 August 1965, pages 1-2."

Anxious to devote its full efforts to domestic problems and loath to get into international embroilments inimical to this work, the Soviet Union "has not shown greater inclination to retire within itself since the October Revolution." Relaxation of Moscow's dictatorial control has elicited a reemergence of the "national contradictions" that Marxism had once declared impossible in a Socialist order, with China and Rumania claiming Russian territories and the remainder of the bloc squabbling within itself. Kremlin policy now serves two main purposes: to thwart China in its attempt to win Socialist and nonalined nations to its side of the ideological controversy and to avoid any confrontation with the United States. Friends and enemies of the U.S.S.R. have been served notice (through the scant Soviet aid to Hanoi and the idealogical ambiguity of Communist parties throughout the world) that nothing will take precedence over Soviet national interests. What is the cause of this new prudence of the Soviets? Perhaps joint rule, traditionally unlikely to evolve offensive policies is one answer. Certainly the "prodigious recovery of American strategy", which will insure the United States against nuclear blackmail for years to come, is another. In the meantime the U.S.-Soviet détente raises new problems for the nations of Europe, as peace between the two powers would perpetuate Europe's division.

519
Golikov, V. [AN IMPORTANT PRINCIPLE OF LENINIST FOREIGN POLICY] Vazhnyi printsip leninskoi vneshnei politiki. Kommunist, g. 42, no. 18, Dec. 1965: 91-99.
HX8.K56, v. 42

Demonstrates through citations of Lenin's writings that peaceful coexistence of nations with different social and economic structures has always been a principle of Communist foreign policy. The inevitable victory of Communism over capitalism will be achieved, the author argues, without the necessity of a state of permanent war between the two camps. In the meantime "Marxist-Leninists consider that even with the world divided into two opposing systems the necessity for economic, cultural, and other ties between peoples and states does not cease."

520
Gross, Johannes. [THE MESSAGE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES: HAVE THE THEOLOGIANS WON "THE ROOM FOR DECISION"?] Die Denkschrift und ihre Folgen: haben die Theologen "Raum zur Entscheidung" freigekämpft? Christ und Welt, 18. Jahrg., 26 Nov. 1965: 3. BR4.C37, v. 18

Critical appraisal of the German Evangelical Church's message on refugees from the once-German territories annexed by Poland in 1945, and on Germany's relations with its neighbors. The author feels the message damages the official West German position on the problem of German-Polish boundaries.

521
Malewsky-Malevitch, S. de. [IDEOLOGY AND AGGRESSION] Idéologie et agression. Revue; littérature, histoire, arts et sciences des deux mondes, no 23, 1. déc. 1965: 414-421. AP20.R243, 1965

Because Marxism is a religion it is endowed with considerable power. Its proselytizing nature imposes a global mission and aggressiveness. Perhaps the Soviet Union has, for various reasons, lost its aggressive character. But the free world is still in danger. Red China's revolutionary dynamism is in full flower, it esteems the application of Marxist theory more than national well-being, and it does not recoil from the concept of "total sacrifice." Danger arises from the susceptibility of the nonalined countries to demagogic appeals. In assuming the task of defending the free

world the United States is face to face with a terrible dilemma: to throw men and resources into the vast gulf in a futile effort to half the flood, or to surrender the third world without struggle? Everyone understands the situation, but no one does anything about it beyond inefficacious disarmament conferences and diplomatic meetings. Sooner or later the free world will opt for general conflict rather than capitulation. Now the only solution the Western world offers against Marxist materialism is capitalist and bourgeois materialism; its weapons for stemming Communist aggression are the same nuclear weapons brandished by the enemy. Bombs and dollars cannot defeat the false Communist religion. The only adequate weapon is a powerful social, cultural, economic and political "idea" founded on the Christian conception of the world. Only a united West possesses the moral and spiritual potential capable of offering the true solution.

522
Muller, Steven. NATO: THE ENTANGLED ALLIANCE. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 21, Nov. 1965: 26-28. TK9145.A84, v. 21

The proliferation of studies and books on NATO and problems confronting the Western alliance is highlighted by Henry Kissinger's publication, The Troubled Partnership: A Reappraisal of the Atlantic Alliance (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1965). This book, as do Zbigniew Brzezinski's Alternative to Partition: For a Broader Conception of America's Role in Europe (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1965) and Richard Barnet and Marcus Raskin's After Twenty Years: Alternatives to the Cold War in Europe (New York, Random House, 1965), conveys a recognition of the need for reappraisal of American relations with a divided Europe and, in the future, with a more integrated Europe. The dilemma, as seen by the reviewer, is this: "on the one hand, there has been enough change to make a revised relationship desirable and necessary; but on the other hand, things have not changed enough to make a really fundamental realignment practicable." As long as Germany--and Europe--remain divided the opportunity for a changed and satisfactory relationship between the United States and its European allies remains "elusive." Kissinger recommends minor changes in the existing structure of the Atlantic Alliance including a new form of political authority to facilitate unified policymaking and control of nuclear weapons. He recommends creation of an "allied nuclear force." Whereas Kissinger concerns himself with Western Europe alone, Brzezinski's Europe is the whole continent. He seeks a solution to the partition between East and West Europe and the power stalemate that divides them. An American initiative in the direction of a more integrated Europe, for example a U.S. proposal for a joint all-European economic development program, is desirable both to achieve unity in Europe and to enhance U.S. influence there. The reunification of Germany can only take place within the context of the reassociation of Europe. Barnet and Raskin anticipate the reunification of East and West Germany only after substantial arms control and disarmament has been brought about and a collective security treaty for Europe has been established. It appears that the needed impetus for reassessment of the relationship between the United States and Western Europe is an American initiative, in particular one to break the power deadlock that stands in the way of continued European development. If the United States should take the initiative in the directions indicated, it must accept the requirement of a "fateful reappraisal of America's future relationship to the whole of Europe, and to a Soviet Union that buried Stalin years ago."

523
Nixon, Richard M. WHY NOT NEGOTIATE IN VIETNAM? Reader's digest, v. 87, Dec. 1965: 49-54. AP2.R255, v. 87

The tide has begun to turn against Communist aggression in South Vietnam. Air strikes and troop commitments have made the difference, and if they are increased military victory is possible within two years. Yet the real danger is not military defeat but diplomatic defeat. As the war goes in America's favor the pressure to negotiate will increase. To do so now would prove disastrous. Recent irresponsible demonstrations are disturbing but carry less weight than criticism from such respected sources as Senator J. W. Fulbright, Dr. Martin Luther King, and Walter Lippmann, who advocate that both sides make concessions. This would not be in America's best interest at the present time. Vietnam must be a reaffirmation of U.S. intent, and the United States must negotiate only from military superiority. Continued fighting will not lead to world war III. It will deter future Communist ambitions and support the advocates of peaceful coexistence over hard-line Communists such as the Chinese, who are the real supporters of covert aggression in Asia. To stop this aggression now will prevent Southeast Asia, Malaysia, and Indonesia, with their 200 million people and valuable natural resources from falling into the hands of China. To deter minor aggression now can well prevent a holocaust later on. To offer to negotiate now will only be interpreted as a show of weakness. It will encourage the Communists to undertake more "wars of liberation." America should insist upon three preconditions for negotiation: the cessation of North Vietnamese aggression against the South; a guarantee of independence to South Vietnam; and acceptance of the principle that aggression cannot be rewarded. Above all the United States has a moral committment to abide by its pledge of support to South Vietnam and thereby assure Asian nations that China will be contained and that the right of the neutral nations to choose their own forms of government without outside interference will be supported.

524
THE POLEMIC ON THE GENERAL LINE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT. Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1965. 585 p. HX387.K773

Partial contents.--Two different lines on the question of war and peace.--Peaceful coexistence--two diametrically opposed policies.

Criticizes the revisionist approach in the international Communist movement. "Nuclear fetishism and nuclear blackmail are the theoretical basis and guiding policy of modern revisionism." The Communist Party of the Soviet Union's position on peaceful coexistence is similarly discussed.

525
Schweitzer, Wolfgang. [THE EVANGELICAL CHURCH'S MESSAGE ON GERMANY'S EASTERN POLICY] Die evangelische Denkschrift zur Ostpolitik. Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, 10. Jahrg., Nov. 1965: 894-897. D839.B57, v. 10

Comments on the German Evangelical Church's message concerning postwar refugees from the once-German territories annexed in 1945 by Poland, and on

Polish-German relations. The author gives an extensive summary of the message, in which the Evangelical Church appeals to Germans for moral reconciliation to the present Polish-German boundaries (the Oder-Neisse Line) and for a brotherly attitude toward the Polish nation. The author contends that the message opens the road to peace between Germany and its Eastern neighbors and that the formulation of an adequate West German policy in that respect belongs now to statesmen.

526
SHASTRI-TITO REDEFINE ROLE OF NON-ALIGNMENT. Forum, v. 22, Aug. 1965: 9-10.
AP2. F8, v. 22

Prime Minister Shastri is reaffirming India's alinement with President Tito and establishing guidelines for this policy, including belief in negotiated settlement as a solution to the Vietnam conflict. The redefinition of the Indian-Yugoslav stand on nonalinement rejects the Chinese view that negotiations are valueless, condemns China for its imperialist policies in Southeast Asia, and seeks a more active role for the United Nations and its nonalined members. A proponent of nonalinement since 1956, President Tito remains interested in furthering it in the present decade of U.S.-Soviet détente.

527
Stubbe, Heinrich. [THE ROAD TO CZESTOCHOWA: THE GERMAN BISHOPS ACCEPT THE POLISH INVITATION] Der Weg nach Tschenstochau. Deutsche Bischöfe nehmen die polnische Einladung an. Christ und Welt, 18. Jahrg., 10. Dez. 1965: 11.
BR4. C37, v. 18

The background of the Polish Roman Catholic bishops' message to their German counterparts and the German bishops' answer to that letter. The author criticizes the Polish bishops' stand on the problem of Polish-German boundaries. He argues that, because of the Polish episcopate's conciliatory gesture toward Germans, the Communist government in Warsaw will have to restrict the Church's freedom of movement still further.

II. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

A. MODERN WAR

1. General Analyses

528
Bartenev, S. [MODERN WARFARE AND ECONOMICS] Sovremennaia voina i ekonomika. Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, g. 46, no. 22, 1965: 46-51.
U717.R9A27, v. 46

Studies the economic aspects of modern warfare against the background of modern technology, production processes, and research and development. The author finds that the sophistication of advanced weapons systems occasions both a quantitative and qualitative change in the scientific-technical basis of armaments, requires much larger labor resources in defense industries, and demands great technical skill of those elements supporting the military rear. In a world war the areas where these economic auxiliary forces are concentrated must necessarily become an important sector for military strikes.

529
Champeaux, Ernest. [REMARKS ABOUT MILITARY ART] Propos sur l'art militaire. Revue de défense nationale, 21. année, déc. 1965: 1910-1917.
D410.R45, v. 21

Criticizes strategic doctrines popular in France, the success of which depends on a now impossible Blitzkrieg or on a use of atomic weapons that assumes no atomic retaliation, and derides the "romantic" idea of engaging in a subversive-psychological war. The author suggests that an indispensible strategic doctrine is that of a single front.

530
Elble, Rolf. [THE ROLE OF THE HUMANITIES IN MODERN STRATEGIC PLANNING] Die Rolle der Geisteswissenschaften in einer modernen strategischen Planung (I). Wehrkunde, 14. Jahrg., Nov. 1965: 557-563. U3.W396, v. 14

Today strategy is understood as a total operation encompassing both political and military considerations. Cold war politics and military strategy are identical in the Communist world and interdependent in the west. Despite different political goals there are numerous parallels in the strategic plans of the United States and the Soviet Union. All tools of modern research in all disciplines are brought to bear on the problems of strategic planning. And the role of the humanities in a correct evaluation of the strategic situation is no less important than that of the physical sciences. Without philosophy, manifested in a humanist ethic, the technological balance of terror would not suffice as a deterrent to war. The ideological philosophy of a people--its national will--determines the success or failure of strategic planning. The close relationship of political science to strategy is obvious and the more policymakers understand this the more mistakes will be avoided. History, too, offers an invaluable insight into the interrelationship of strategic factors and into the shape of future developments. The modern strategist must avail himself of knowledge from all these branches of the arts.

531
Hargreaves, Reginald. LIVING WITH STALEMATE. Ordnance, v. 50, Jan./Feb. 1966: 398-401.
UF1.067, v. 50

History teaches us mankind occasionally forgets that the purpose of warfare is not destruction but control and domination. The excesses of the Thirty Years' War illustrate how a conflict can become unsupportable even for the victor. European resentment at the atrocities of this war resulted in the adoption of increasingly less barbarous forms of warfare, until Marshal Saxe could declare that battles were the result of command ignorance, and that the clever strategist could wage war without ever having to engage in a pitched fight. Attainment of a "balance of advantage" was all that a general needed to force his opponents to negotiate a settlement. The 20th century, however, witnessed a resurgence of brutality in war and an all-or-nothing spirit in strategy. But the development of nuclear weapons subsequently paralyzed warfare while doing nothing to eliminate international strife. War was reduced to a circumscribed struggle in pursuit of limited objectives--it became capable of achieving only stalemate. The West must not allow the frustration and fear engendered by the condition of stalemate to sap its resolve in the face of the Communist threat. Deterrence must be improved when necessary to assure that the balance of advantage remains with the West. Communist propaganda and subversion should be forcefully opposed throughout the world. "In taking every precaution not to be smashed down by a single blow of the Bear's paw, we must never neglect those countermeasures which will ensure that in our sleep we are not gnawed to pieces by a thousand rats."

532
Kyria, Pierre. [DEFEAT OF THE IBM'S] La défaite des I.B.M. Nouvel observateur, no 55, 1. déc. 1965: 16-17.
AP20.02, 1965

An interview with Fernand Gigon, a Swiss journalist specializing in Far Eastern questions, on the subject of the war in Vietnam. Gigon believes the Viet Cong will emerge victorious, even if this requires 20 years. The American military is using the war as a pretense for testing new tactics and weapons, which, nonetheless, are proving ineffective in revolutionary war. Asian reality is relative; this reality evades Americans, who depend on the absolute calculations of IBM machines. Any escalation of the war that involves China will doubtless precipitate Soviet intervention and, ultimately, world war.

533
Larrabee, Eric. THE PURSUIT OF PEACE. Atlantic, v. 216, Nov. 1965: 61-65.
AP2.A8, v. 216

The object of war is not to destroy an opponent but to affect his will. Thus the employment

of total force in war has no more meaning than tipping over the board during a game of chess; the outcome has no binding power. In this sense the war of nuclear exchange, counterforce strategies, etc., is not really war at all. Indeed major war is obsolete in principle. Since man has not found a "moral equivalent of war," the dilemma presented to the peaceloving person today is that he must be satisfied with a less than perfect pacifism and study the kinds of war, at least to the point of preferring one to another. Guerrilla war is actually the only weapon that can be wielded with steadiness, justice, and self-respect. "It is our only military means with any just proportion to its ends."

534
Lindemann, Helmut. [IS WAR STILL TO REMAIN? AN ANTHOLOGY OF MILITARY-POLITICAL VIEWS] Ist der Krieg noch zu retten? Eine Anthologie militärpolitischer Meinungen. Hrsg. von Helmut Lindemann; Idee und Bilanz: Golo Mann. [Ungekürzte Ausg. Frankfurt am Main] Fischer Bücherei [1965] 173 p.
U21.2.L52

Contents.--Knowledge creating science, by Helmut Lindemann.--A justification of war, by Maxwell D. Taylor.--Wars are divisible, by Edward Teller and Allen Brown.--Thinking about the unthinkable, by Herman Kahn.--For a catonic strategy, by Robert Strauss-Hupé, William R. Kintner, and Stefan T. Possony.--Europe's defense in an atomic age, by Ferdinand O. Miksche.--Character of modern war, by W.D. Sokolowski.--World policy in an atomic era, by John H. Herz.--War and peace among peoples, by Raymond Aron.--Early warning, by Niels Bohr.--Report to the minister of war, by James Franck.--Is there still any future for man? by Bertrand Russell.--To win the war in peacetime, by Stephen King-Hall.--To invent the peace, by Robert Jungk.--Departure from atomic war, by Golo Mann.

An anthology of writings on the problem of the preservation of peace in the nuclear age. Golo Mann's chapter, "Departure from Atomic War," recapitulates and critically appraises the main lines of thought expressed in the anthology: These include opinions justifying nuclear war, as well as those opposing the waging of it.

535
O'Ballance, Edgar. THE BLUE-PRINT FOR COMMUNIST INSURGENT WAR. Army quarterly and defence journal, v. 91, Jan. 1966: 192-200.
Ul.A85, v. 91

Discusses the progressive phases of Communist revolution: (1) inception, (2) underground phase, (3) guerrilla warfare, (4) protracted warfare, (5) mobile warfare, and (6) conventional battles.

536
Verberie. [WHAT IS IT ABOUT?] De quoi s'agit-il? Revue militaire générale, no 8, oct. 1965: 403-417.
U2.R48, 1965
Includes summaries in English and German.

Nuclear weapons have revolutionized the art of war, and now the principal task of armed forces is deterrence. But we must be aware of the fact that conflict continues and, since any strategy employing maximum violence is absurd in the framework of the nuclear balance of terror, we must adapt ourselves to new forms of war. Nuclear weapons do not exclude the possibility of certain limited wars. "Domination and violence are in human nature; men, while averting the outbreak of the nuclear holocaust, can find violent means of coercion." War is essentially a struggle between two wills. To wage it the combatant must possess a will to win, unity, and the ability to discern between the possible and the impossible. Through a thorough study of political, demographic, geographic, and economic factors the policymaker should reconcile means to ends and determine the boundaries to freedom of action. His goal is to choose a wise strategy. Today freedom of action is greater where the vital interests of the major powers are not involved; internal subversion is still a possible form of violence; and political, ideological, psychological, economic, and military pressures can be applied against another state. Such instances of violence are unlikely to degenerate into absolute wars. "The outcome cannot be sought in the material or psychological destruction of the enemy's army," but in political or psychological approaches to solution, as in Cuba, Indochina, and Korea. The presence of nuclear weapons has limited rational wars to certain forms.

537
WAR AND REVOLUTION [editorial] Political affairs, v. 45, Jan. 1966: 1-12, 34. HX1.P57, v. 45

Lin Piao's recent article, "Long Live the Victory of the People's War," has prompted the Communist Party of the United States to violate its resolution to refrain from public polemics in order to refute the article's erroneous and dangerous contentions. The Chinese Communist Party has long held that there "is no path to victory over imperialism other than the military path." But recent history demonstrates that a country like Ghana can achieve political independence and adopt a socialist socioeconomic structure without having to pass through a period of warfare. Armed conflict need not be resolved only through violent opposition but by a combination of political, diplomatic, and military responses from world anti-imperialist forces. Lin Piao would have the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America challenge the strength of the U.S. military establishment by a "people's war," thereby depriving them of the assistance that combined anti-imperialist action can afford and abandoning them to face the most powerful imperialist military force. Lin's assertion that the United States would not use nuclear weapons against those waging a war of national liberation disregards the fact that the Truman administration seriously considered the use of nuclear force in Korea, that Eisenhower has admitted his determination to use nuclear weapons had not the Korean armistice been achieved when it was, and that Dulles in 1954 twice suggested to the French that nuclear bombs be dropped on Vietnam and southern China. To reject political or diplomatic solutions to the struggle in Vietnam is to invite Lyndon Johnson to escalate the war until nuclear catastrophe does occur. Humanism and concern for the welfare of mankind are guiding principles for every Communist; no true Communist can "subscribe to the concept of a socialism built upon the decimation of mankind." U.S. imperialism has been deterred to date because of a combination of forces that oppose it in the world, ranging from the nuclear weapons of the Soviet Union to the anti-imperialist tendencies of newly liberated countries and to growing peace movements among the American people. "In short, it is the result of the joint struggle of all the anti-imperialist forces on all fronts, which have on more than one occasion compelled U.S. imperialism to back down by confronting it with the one thing it understands: a superior combination of forces."

538
Waterkamp, Rainer. [ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLITICAL ASPECTS OF WAR IN THE NUCLEAR AGE] Ethische, rechtliche und politische Aspekte des Krieges im Atomzeitalter. Gesellschaft, Staat, Erziehung, 10. Jahrg., 5, 1965: 404-411.
JA86.G4, v. 10

Modern times have increasingly manifested an ideological motivation for wars and have widened the impact of these wars on civilian populations. War has ceased to be an exclusive domain of rulers and armies and has become totally oriented toward complete destruction of the enemy. It has lost the traditional, ethical standards of conduct under which it was waged in the past. Despite the present general condemnation of wars they are still considered morally and legally admissible in certain cases, for instance defense against a direct, unjust act of aggression (as allowed under Art. 51 of the U.N. Charter). International law does not explain, however, the exact meaning of "aggression" and does not specify the conditions under which such action may be taken. It may be argued that law without sanction is not law. Nevertheless certain international rules limiting the scope and the conduct of war were observed in the past. There are several international agreements still in force that could be interpreted as prohibiting nuclear war. On the other hand international law gives, in the present political situation, absolutely inadequate protection against nuclear war. Traditionally international law has aimed at limitation of the scope of wars. Today's international legal policy has been preoccupied mainly with finding peaceful solutions for international conflicts. From the strategic viewpoint peace depends on the balance of nuclear terror, on the credibility of deterrence between mutually opposed powers. Within the limits of not violating that balance grow the chances for waging conventional wars and especially guerrilla wars as means of settling international conflicts. The problem of averting these wars belongs to the strategy of peace.

2. Major War

539
Rybkin, E. WAR AND POLICY. Survival, v. 8, Jan. 1966: 12-16. UI62.S9, v. 8

An abridged version of the author's "O sushchnosti mirovoi raketno-iadernoi voiny," in Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, g. 46, sent. 1965: 50-56.
U717.R9A27, v. 46

Development of nuclear weapons has altered the relevance of the Clausewitzian formula, "War is a continuation of policy by other means." Prompted by their desire to avert the destructiveness of a nuclear exchange, capitalist theorists have declared that war can no longer serve as an instrument and a continuation of policy. But nuclear war, if it comes, will certainly be an extension of imperialist policy, the offspring of political and economic policy directed against the Socialist and developing nations. The aggressors would be guilty of an act more reactionary and more unjust than any in history; but what of the Soviet response to this aggression? The great retaliatory blow launched by the Soviet Union against the imperialists could hardly be considered unjust, and the use of nuclear devices in this instance would constitute a justifiable extension of policy. The more rapidly the Soviet Union answered this aggression, the less would be the destructiveness of that war. Soviet military forces should therefore remain at peak combat efficiency. Socialist nations must not be misled by capitalist contentions that there can be no victor in a nuclear war. Denial of the possibility of victory leads to moral disarmament, fatalism, and lethargy. The Soviet Union must implement the party program of averting nuclear war but must also be prepared to launch a counterstrike of such proportions that imperialist aggression will be curtailed and imperialism itself destroyed before further nuclear exchanges produce unacceptable destruction and loss of life.

3. Limited War

540
Badurina, Berislav. LOCAL WARS--A MENACE TO WORLD PEACE. Review of international affairs, v. 16, Oct. 5, 1965: 15-16. D839.R4, v. 16

Attempts to use the threat of nuclear weapons are generally treated as equivalent to proposals of suicide for the world. Those who are convinced that peaceful coexistence is the only means to preserve world peace are also convinced that nuclear war is not the answer. Interdependence and multipolarity--characteristics of the present world that make the threat of nuclear weapons more fearsome--have also led to a belief in the West that local armed conflict can be waged in the non-western world without fear of escalation to nuclear war. While the balance of forces (political and military) in Europe is so ordered that the slightest upset could lead to general nuclear war, Western strategists "have reached the conclusion that the situation in non-European areas (primarily Asia and Africa) is so chaotic that it offers them the opportunity of attaining limited success which would in the final analysis give the West an appreciable advantage without the risk of a general nuclear war." In keeping with this conviction, the United States, along with other Western countries, has participated in "armed interventions" in countries of the non-European world. Apparently these Western countries feel "indirect advances" into the East will not be challenged successfully, even should tactical nuclear weapons be used. As if to emphasize increasing reliance on the strategy of "indirect advance" or "intervention," countries in the West are organizing special forces. Characteristic of this trend is the attempt to "internationalize" interventions such as Vietnam so that they will appear as joint ventures. Armed conflict, even on a local scale, contains the danger of escalating into general nuclear war. This can be avoided only if nations are prevented from interfering in the internal affairs of states.

4. Unconventional War

541
Heilbrunn, Otto. THINKING ABOUT GUERRILLA WAR. In United States Naval Institute, Annapolis. Proceedings, v. 92, Jan. 1966: 36-43.
VI.U8, v. 92

Describes the tactic of guerrilla warfare that allows regular guerrilla forces to gain and hold superiority. This is the tactic of lengthening the field of action into the enemy rear, which requires him to deploy great numbers of his forces outside the original battle area. The technique would be useful to NATO in a nuclear war if it could match the numerical power of the enemy. The belief that NATO can defend an area with a much smaller force than the enemy is becoming outmoded.

542
THE KGB PARTISAN DIRECTORATE. Intelligence digest, v. 27, Nov. 1965: 12-15.
D410.R47, v. 27

Formed in 1933, the Partisan Directorate of the Committee for State Security (Komitet gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti--KGB), which is responsible for partisan training, sabotage, and insurgency operations, has taken on new and dangerous proportions. This new potential involves the use of nuclear devices by Soviet-directed partisan bands such as the manportable Atomic Demolition Munitions (ADM) that are made in two standard forms and specifically designed for guerrilla use. The danger lies in the easy concealment of the smaller ADM's, now stored in Cuba as well as in the U.S.S.R., along with the larger-yield ADM's. The maximum effectiveness of these weapons, according to the Partisan Directorate, is through secret placement. The KGB's major problem lies in deciding whether to attempt a clandestine prewar entry of ADM's into the United States and Western European countries or to wait until hostilities begin. Biological and chemical agents, such as LSD-25 and others delivered through vials, ampoules, capsules, and aerosol bombs, are being readied for sabotage use. Amphibious operations have also been developed, reflecting the shift to an offensive, limited war rather than a massive land-based nuclear war. The KGB Partisan Directorate has a substation in Cuba coordinating its work with Castro's General Directorate for Intelligence, which in turn supervises and coordinates the activities of the Revolutionary Commandos for Latin America. Active interest has been demonstrated by the KGB in the Communist Party of the United States, Negro unrest, and the activities of Cuban-based Robert F. Williams, a "revolutionary" Negro leader in exile.

543
Miller, D. M. O. INSURGENCY: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONTEMPORARY INSURGENCIES. Army quarterly and defence journal, v. 91, Jan. 1966: 161-185. U1.A85, v. 91

Views the theory of insurgent warfare from the standpoint of the guerrilla leader--how an insurgent movement is begun, and what methods should be taken to fight the war. Part 2, dealing with the practical side of insurgency, will appear in the next issue.

544
Millman, H. C. SARAWAK AND CONFRONTATION. Army quarterly and defence journal, v. 91, Jan. 1966: 186-191. U1.A85, v. 91

Discusses the type of confrontation faced by Sarawak: subversion from within and from without infiltration by Indonesia.

545
Washburn, Wilcomb E. A PROPOSAL CONCERNING A WAR GAME INVOLVING GUERRILLAS, COUNTER-GUERRILLAS, AND CIVILIANS. Background, v. 9, Aug. 1965: 147-152. D839.B2, v. 9

Outlines a guerrilla war game that takes account of the civilian population in the battle area, maintaining the interest of its participants by a system of rules and scoring similar to that used in other sports.

546
Weyde, Eugen. [TROJAN STRATEGY: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE] Die Trojanische List: zur Theorie und Praxis der unkonventionellen Kriegführung. Köln, Markus-Verlag [1965] 230 p. U104.W4

The history of "Trojan Horse" tactics used in warfare from ancient times to the present, with a special emphasis on the skillful employment of such methods by the Communist movement. The author concludes that a real peace cannot possibly rest on deceit, but must be based first on truth and consequently on freedom. A reversed order of priorities--peace, freedom, truth--is a hopeless one.

547
Wimmer, Paul. [ESSENTIAL RUDIMENTS OF GUERRILLA WARFARE] Kleinkrieg--wesentliche Grundlagen. Österreichische militärische Zeitschrift, Heft 6, Nov./Dez. 1965: 440-446. P&GP RR

Analyzes the role of guerrilla wars in modern warfare. The author points out the changing character of guerrilla warfare, caused by the development of arms (including nuclear) especially designed for use by underground forces. The value of such warfare for an army in retreat or for a nation losing large parts of its territory may stretch from the demoralization of the enemy's forces, through maintaining the morale of one's own population, to keeping the enemy from full exploitation of the country's industrial resources. The importance of guerrilla war in a major war, as well as the ethical problems involved in conducting such a war, render academic the question of whether initiation, continuation, and cessation of a guerrilla war belong to political or to military authorities. The author describes various tactics employed in guerrilla warfare, discusses the problem of cooperation between the underground forces and the civilian population, and underlines the importance of psychological and ideological factors in military operations of this type.

548
Wolf, Charles. INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY: NEW MYTHS AND OLD REALITIES. [Santa Monica, Calif.] Rand Corp. 1965. 23 p. ([Rand Corporation. Paper] P-3132) AS36.R28, no. 3132

Currently Americans assume that popular support and loyalties play a dominant role in the processes of insurgency and counterinsurgency. The natural corollary of the doctrine of "popular support" is that economic and social reforms are essential for effective counterinsurgency. This premise is based more on sentimentality than on reality, however. Popular support may result from more effective government antiguerrilla activity, rather than the reverse. And it is by no means proven that socioeconomic reforms increase the popularity of a beleaguered government; they may in fact have the opposite effect, since the peasant will have more wherewithal to purchase security from the insurgents. Successful counterinsurgency must reduce the availability of inputs (food, recruits, information, etc.) for the insurgents as well as curtail the insurgents' outputs. The first may be accomplished through any number of combinations of military, social, political, and economic means, while the second is achieved principally through military activity. Deep populist sympathies in the United States create a romantic identification with the insurgent. The doctrine of popular support also provides a scapegoat (the "unpopular" established government) for the failures of the antiguerrilla campaign. The alternative approach, reducing the insurgents' inputs and outputs, no matter how distasteful the means may seem to Americans, allows no excuses for success or failure and can be highly

effective. "Altering loyalties and attitudes is a long-run goal."

B. MODERN WEAPONRY AND RELATED TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS

549
ASTROLOG. Missiles and rockets, v. 17, Nov. 8, 1965: 25-31. UG630.M54, v. 17

Gives the current status of U.S. missile and space programs, including information about contractor, specifications, and cost.

550
Beaufre, André. SPACE: THE SHAPE OF THE RACE TO COME. Réalités [Eng. ed.] no. 182, Jan. 1966: 23-31. AP4.R2164, 1966

Warfare and the military use of vehicles will predominate in the field of space observation and telecommunication. The fear of space "bombing" is unfounded in that space-to-surface (earth) weaponry is impractical in terms of cost and accuracy. A nation possessing an adequate surface-to-surface arsenal would have an advantage over any "space bombs" stockpiled by an adversary power. Satellites can be utilized in a wide variety of communication and observation tasks, providing important information on targets to be destroyed. For instance satellites could observe the launching of enemy missiles. Highly developed satellites will contribute to the sophistication of antiaircraft, antimissile, and antisubmarine defense techniques. With the advent of the antisatellite will come competition for the control of space and the "extrapolation of aerial warfare." The destruction of satellites in space could be achieved by nuclear explosions in an orbit surrounding the enemy satellite. Precision in making contact with the satellite would not be required. The development of space warfare techniques is analogous to trends in naval and aerial warfare over past years. In the context of overall modern strategy, space warfare is but one part. It is a consequence of nuclear warfare and holds a direct relation to the latter. Because a balance--call it deterrence--has been reached between the major nuclear contenders, the "action strategy" that nuclear warfare represents is on the wane. Indirect strategy that emphasizes men's emotions and that employs violence below the threshold of nuclear war predominates. A race for space, however, could be instrumental in upsetting the existing balance. "For if superior defence from space were achieved, then nuclear strategy would come into its own again. From dissuasive and defensive, it could become offensive and decisive."

551
Bertin, Leonard. REACTOR IN ORBIT MAKES SPACE, NUCLEAR HISTORY. Canadian nuclear technology, v. 4, spring 1965: 34-35. illus. P&GP RR

Recounts the progress of the Systems for Nuclear Auxiliary Power (SNAP) program and evaluates the significance of the successful launch of an atomic reactor into orbit (designated SNAP-10A). The author feels that the SNAP-10A project demonstrates the unlimited possibilities still to be realized from nuclear research. Radiation hazards from an orbiting reactor and dangers from accidents are reported and assessed.

552
Breyer, Siegfried. [SOVIET MISSILE- AND ROCKET-CARRYING SUBMARINES] Sowjetische Flugkörper- und Raketen-U-Schiffe. Marine Rundschau, 62. Jahrg., Dez. 1965: 301-311. illus. V3.M3, v. 62

Type and performance of the Soviet missile-carrying submarines. For each boat the author gives the initial year of production and, when possible, the number of units acquired by the Soviet Navy. He concludes by drawing a comparison between similar Soviet and American weapons.

553
Butz, J.S. MOL: THE TECHNICAL PROMISE AND PROSPECTS. Air Force and space digest, v. 48, Oct. 1965: 42-46. UG633.A65, v. 48

"The MOL [Manned Orbiting Laboratory] could have a greater impact on Air Force operations than has any previous system, with the possible exception of the intercontinental ballistic missile." Its reconnaissance, communications, and command and control potentialities will enhance U.S. capabilities for air logistics operations, for conducting limited war, and for supporting strategic weapons systems. The potentialities of the MOL have been obscured by the Government's concern for "not appearing warlike" while "showing the proper determination for self-defense." But when the technical evidence is purged of policy statements, it becomes clear that the MOL project will produce more than a simple one-cannister, 30 day orbiting laboratory designed to unlock the "mystery" of man's role in space. This conclusion is founded on four major points. First, MOL is feasible beyond question. Second, man's capabilities in space are already well researched. Third, simple tasks will have already been accomplished or shown feasible by 1968, leaving to MOL planners complex tasks that require the participation of man. An indication of the complex tasks to be studied is contained in a 1963 Defense Department-Air Force agreement outlining the objectives of a manned military space station. These goals include general, specific, and post-strike reconnaissance; continuous and ocean surveillance; inspection of unknown space vehicles; command and control and operational support of armed forces; and bombardment. Fourth, these complex tasks will require more than a single MOL vehicle and this, combined with the Air Force determination to get the most out of the program while reaching a high level of cost/effectiveness, augurs for the development and use of docking and rendezvous arrangements. "The MOL vehicle will be exploited to its fullest capacity as a building block for sizable platforms from which significant military support operations can be conducted."

554
Ceuzin, Paul. ["STRIDA-II" IS BECOMING OPERATIONAL] "STRIDA-II" devient opérationnel. Air & cosmos, no 131, 18 déc. 1965: 34-35. P&GP RR

Describes the functioning of France's STRIDA-II (Aerial Defense System of Detection and Interception; Système de Détection et d'Interception de Défense Aérienne), expected to be operational in 1970. Completely automated, STRIDA-II will be Europe's most modern and efficient system of aerial defense.

555
Chuev, Iurii V., and others. [FUNDAMENTALS OF THE ANALYSIS OF OPERATIONS IN MILITARY TECHNOLOGY] Osnovy issledovaniia operatsii v voennoi tekhnike. Moskva, Izd-vo Sovetskoe Radio, 1965. 591 p. UF561.C5

Contents.--Some characteristics of armaments.--The method of statistical examination and its application to analysis of operations.--Evaluation of the effectiveness of fire of individual makes of armaments.--Application of methods of the theory of mass services in solving problems of operations analysis.--Mathematical methods of optimization.--Some problems of optimization.--Analytical methods of analyzing battle.--Statistical modeling of battle.

This book examines the fundamental characteristics of technical military pieces, their reliability, effectiveness, economy, etc. Methods are given for evaluating these characteristics in various military and operational situations with the help of analytical methods and the method of statistical modeling. Also examined are the problems of evaluating effectiveness of armaments in various military situations, with regard to their quality, effectiveness, and various forms of enemy counteraction. Information on classical and new methods of optimization as applied to the solution of military-technical problems is included. The method of statistical modeling in electronic computers is set forth in particular detail. The material in this book is illustrated by many examples; an appendix includes tables intended to facilitate calculations. The book is intended for a broad circle of engineers who deal with problems of the elaboration, testing, production, and exploitation of military technology. (Translation of supplied summary)

556
DEEP NUCLEAR BLASTS TAP LODES OF DATA. Business week, no. 1884, Oct. 9, 1965: 134, 137. HF5001.B89, 1965

Examines the major objectives of the underground nuclear test program of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and indicates some of the advances to be realized from the series of tests in weapons development and the use of nuclear power for peaceful purposes.

557
DOUGLAS GETS A JUMP WITH MOL. Business week, no. 1895, Dec. 25, 1965: 50-52. HC431.B87, 1965

Reviews the progress and prospects of the Air Force's manned orbiting laboratory (MOL) program, together with brief comments on the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's manned orbiting research laboratory (MORL) program, both of which are being developed under contracts held by the Douglas Aircraft Co., MOL may be the precursor of a reconnaissance vehicle, an orbiting command post, or, in the nonmilitary field, a weather station.

558
[FROM THE HISTORY OF ROCKET TECHNOLOGY] Iz istorii raketnoi tekhniki. [Redaktsionnaia kollegiia A. A. Blagonravova i dr.] Moskva, Nauka, 1964. 254, [2] p. illus. TL781.8.R9A4

Partial contents.--Projects on rocket technology in Russia from the second half of the 19th century to 1917, by V. A. Tarasova.--Work of native scholars in creating the foundations of a theory of interplanetary communication, by V. N. Sokol'skii.--From the history of the development of jet-propulsion technology in the U.S.S.R. during the thirties, by I. A. Merkulov.

A scholarly history of jet-propulsion, rocket, and missile research and development in the Soviet Union since the 19th century.

559
[THE FUTURE WEAPONS SYSTEMS OF THE WEST GERMAN AIR FORCE] Die künftigen Waffensysteme der Luftwaffe. Flugwelt, 17. Jahrg., Dez. 1965: 1010-1011. TL503.F626, v. 17

Concepts underlying the weapons systems contemplated for use by the German Federal Republic's Air Force. The systems are now taking clear shape in the planning conducted by the operations research group of the West German Air Force. Included in these plans are a light aircraft fighter and a heavier reconnaissance airplane, both with the additional role of nuclear-weapons carrier.

560
Georgiev, Elmir. THE JOINT INSTITUTE FOR NUCLEAR RESEARCH IN DUBNA. Washington, Joint Publications Research Service, 1965. 6 p. (U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. JPRS: 32,486) P&GP RR

CSO: 1880-D
TT: 65-32965

"Translation of a two-part article . . . in the Bulgarian-language newspaper Narodna armiya (People's Army), Sofia, 21 August 1965, p. 2 (Part 1) and 4 September 1965, 1. p. 2 (Part 2)."

Describes the city of Dubna "and the scientific activities taking place in it. The Joint Institute for Nuclear Research (OIYaI) is one of the world centers of nuclear physics in which the scientists from the socialist countries are successfully studying and becoming more and more familiar with the structure of atomic nuclei and elementary particles."

561
Gerasimov, V. [AIRCRAFT CARRIERS--WEAPONS OF AGGRESSION] Avianostsy--oruzhie agressii. Voennye znaniia, g. 41, noiabr' 1965: 44-45. U4.V874, v. 41

Describes the armament, maneuverability, strategic and tactical importance, and future of aircraft carriers in the U.S. fleet. The author concludes that modern advances in defensive weapons have completely destroyed the strategic value of carriers but affirms that they will continue to be an important weapon in the U.S. arsenal because of their usefulness in the "dirty wars" being fought by U.S. imperialism against the peoples of the world seeking national independence.

562
Getler, Michael. AF SEEKS NEW TACTICAL MISSILE. Missiles and rockets, v. 17, Dec. 6, 1965: 14. UG630.M54, v. 17

The Vietnamese War is cited by the Air Force as a reason for increased effort in the development of tactical air-to-surface missiles. The Air Force is ready to ask the Defense Department to initiate a program valued in excess of $100 million for

development of the AGM-65A "Maverick." The Maverick is to be an "electro-optically" guided missile system that will be launched from a variety of Tactical Air Command aircraft. The Air Force program will draw on Navy experience along similar lines of development, primarily the Navy's Walleye TV-guided glide bomb. While the TV-guided missile systems lack all-weather or night capabilities, developers of the systems expect them to yield greater stand-off range, accuracy, and safety for the pilot.

563
Getler, Michael. SOVIET CLAIM COULD SPUR SPACE TRACK. Missiles and rockets, v. 17, Nov. 15, 1965: 14-15. UG630.M54, v. 17

Discusses the military effectiveness of Soviet orbital missiles said to be capable of delivering nuclear warheads to targets from outer space. The author finds that defense analysts regard the weapon "as more effective in a parade than in orbit" and estimates that its greatest impact would be "in the area of increased capability for the U.S. space track system." The sole advantage the Soviets would gain from deploying missiles in orbit is said to lie in elimination of early warning time for U.S. nuclear retaliatory forces; because the Minuteman and Polaris systems are capable of withstanding nuclear attack, this circumstance would raise problems only for SAC aircraft.

564
Gimpel, Herbert J. THE UNITED STATES NUCLEAR NAVY. New York, F. Watts [1965] 199 p. illus., ports. (The Watts histories of the United States Navy) VM317.G5

Contents. --Dawn of the nuclear age. --Prying the lid from Pandora's box. --Operation crossroads. --Underway on nuclear power. --New horizons. --Training our nuclear Navy men. --Living with the atom. --Hunting and hiding below--antisubmarine warfare. --Nuclear combatants on the sea. --The battle between atoms and oil. --From drawing board to shipboard. --Health and safety. --Survival under the nuclear mushroom. --A spectrum of weapons. --Polaris--a weapon of peace. --The world ponders the atom. --Glossary.

Traces those aspects of nuclear power that relate to the history of the United States development of atomic-powered warships.

565
[GREATER STRENGTH THROUGH GREATER MOBILITY] Mehr Kampfkraft durch grössere Beweglichkeit. Wehr und Wirtschaft, 9. Jahrg., 10. Nov. 1965: 602-603. U3.W38, v. 9

In the latest concepts of warfare, with possible use of nuclear or advanced conventional weapons, operational conditions are such that the forces engaged must be highly mobile in order to concentrate sufficient firepower to destroy troops, equipment or militarily important installations. Because of the relatively poor mobility of their heavy weapons and the increasingly complex technical nature of fighting equipment and means of transport, army units are by present concepts too dependent on logistic lines of supply, so that most armies in their present form cannot be utilized to the full in many parts of the world and are in fact sometimes less mobile than the Roman legions of old. The article examines, against this background, the factors, trends and prerequisites affecting the development of future weapons systems to meet the organizational and technical requirements of modern warfare. (Abstract supplied)

566
Haggerty, James J. SOVIET SPACE PROGRAM IS MILITARY ORIENTED. Journal of the Armed Forces, v. 103, Nov. 13, 1965: 8, 12. UI.A66, v. 103

During the celebration of the 48th anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution the Soviets paraded through Red Square a missile said to be capable of delivering a nuclear warhead to a target on earth from an orbit in space. Were such a weapon really perfected, nuclear warfare would be given a new dimension: a reliable defense system against the ICBM would no longer guarantee a nation protection from nuclear attack. "If sufficient maneuvering power were available, these weapons could attack from a number of different directions, rather than along the predictable path of an ICBM." The Soviet weapon, however, is but a crude prototype. More important is how the U.S. Department of Defense will respond to the prospect of space-launched weapons. The Saint project of launching a series of satellites capable of intercepting an enemy spacecraft, examining it by television, and reporting on its warlike or peaceful nature should perhaps be reinstated. The Soviet space threat must be countered by adequate inspection systems, advanced satellite defense systems, and a U.S. offensive space capability. Although the Soviets have not yet broken the U.N. resolution against the orbiting of nuclear weapons, "he who pins his future on a Soviet pledge has a tenuous future indeed."

567
Halkin, Hubert. OPTIMAL AERODYNAMIC STEERING FOR ANTI-ICBM MISSILES. Journal of the astronautical sciences, v. 12, fall 1965: 77-82. TL787.A6A3, v. 12

A moving target such as an ICBM is to be hit by an interceptor missile after the latter has completed its power-flight maneuver. We assume that the only control available for the guidance of the interceptor missile is a normal acceleration due to the aerodynamic lift force. The problem is to find the "best" strategy, i.e., the "best" time history of the normal acceleration. There are, of course, many different criteria with respect to which we could try to find the "best" strategy. In this paper we shall consider the particular optimization problem defined as follows: we assume that we know the future trajectory of the target and that there exists a strategy leading to an interception and we want to find the strategy leading to the earliest interception. In this paper we place some restrictions on the normal accelerations: this acceleration should at all times be no larger than a given fixed maximum $\underline{M}$ and no larger than the maximum acceleration available from the lift forces, this latter maximum varies of course with the density of the atmosphere. A precise statement of the problem is given in Section 1. The results are given in Section 2. The mathematical derivations can be found in Appendix A. The problem considered in this paper could also be treated by some well-known methods in optimization theory, for instance Pontryagin's Maximum Principle with transversality conditions. However we have preferred to give a simple and independent derivation with a clear geometrical and physical interpretation. (Abstract supplied)

568
Hornberger, Michael. BOMBER FORCE OVERHAUL WILL FIRE NEW CONTROVERSY ON CAPITOL HILL. Journal of the Armed Forces, v. 103, Dec. 18, 1965: 1, 19. U1.A66, v. 103

Discusses the probable effects of the proposed FB-111 (the bomber version of the TFX supersonic fighter) on the manned attack elements of SAC and repeats some of the criticism directed by members of Congress toward excessive reliance upon missiles as a deterrent and attack force.

569
HOW TO HIT A BULLET WITH A BULLET IN A BLIZZARD. Fortune, v. 72, Nov. 1965: 134-135. illus. HF5001. F1, v. 72

Describes briefly how the Nike-X antiballistic missile system would go into action to protect a large coastal city from attack by nuclear-armed ICBM's.

570
Kuster, M. [HIGH QUALITY: REMOTELY CONTROLLED WEAPONS, ROCKET ARMED BOATS SET NEW STANDARDS] Hauptkaliber: Lenkwaffen. Raketenschiffe setzen neue Massstabe. Volksarmee [Nr.] 45, 1965: 8. U3.V7, 1965

Emphasizes the superiority of modern Soviet destroyers and speedboats armed with remote control missiles over the latest American and NATO craft of similar usage.

571
Leavitt, William. MOL: EVOLUTION OF A DECISION. Air Force and space digest, v. 48, Oct. 1965: 35-41. UG633.A65, v. 48

The military role in space has been subject to debate since the first Sputnik. The Eisenhower administration opted for civilian control of space activities out of concern for the tradition of civilian supremacy and in hopes that an agreement banning military activity from space could be concluded with the Russians. President Johnson's decision to develop an Air Force Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) was the product of many pressures: his political opposition's charge of neglecting the military role in space, Air Force demands, a potential technological-surprise threat from the Soviets, Communist China's growing menace, Congressional recommendation of such a project, and MOL's arms control potential. "This decision is rooted in realism and is the product of several years of evolution." In reaching it, the confluence of events was a major factor. "We live in a dangerous world and space has now become part of that world. Therefore, it must be put to work in the maintenance of peace. MOL may be expected to show the way." Development of MOL is a highly significant political event for the following reasons: (1) The world has been informed of U.S. intentions to use space for national security purposes in order "to crack the Communist secrecy curtain." (2) If manned reconnaissance is as effective as is now believed the way is open to a "controlled peace" with the Air Force performing an arms control mission. (3) The decision will further enable the Air Force and NASA to function cooperatively for scientific advancement and national security. (4) Antisubmarine warfare tactics and world ocean surveillance will be made more effective. (5) The U.S. Army will perhaps be able to use MOL for tactical observation. (6) MOL offers the potential for improving national command and control systems in crisis or war. (7) It will answer many nonmilitary scientific questions about space.

572
Leavitt, William. WHY THE 'ORBITAL BOMB'? Air Force and space digest, v. 48, Dec. 1965: 62-63. UG633.A65, v. 48

The Soviet foreign policy dilemma--to appear tough in the eyes of the Communist world without damaging relations with the West--may be the political motive for choosing to rattle nuclear space weapons. Even if the Russian's newest claim of an orbital bombing capability is politically inspired, no one should be complacent about the military potential involved. Rapid deployment and detonation of a few orbital weapons over U.S. centers could be "devastatingly effective" and could even signal a break in the nuclear stalemate. And the Soviets have not abandoned the doctrine of preemptive attack.

573
Low, Ian. THE R & D RACE. New scientist, v. 28, Dec. 16, 1965: 817-818. tables. Q1.N52, v. 28

A survey recently made by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development shows a severe gap in research and development (R&D) between Western Europe on the one hand and the United States and the Soviet Union on the other. The authors indicate that if West Europeans chose to pursue the R&D goal they could catch up in outlays for civilian purposes. Closing the military and space research gap is another matter, for here the ratio against West Europe is 4 to 1, or more. Not only do Russia and America far outdistance Europe in money and manpower allocated to R&D, these figures have greatly affected a "technological balance of payments." The United States has "a very large and growing 'favourable balance' while the main European countries have a large 'unfavourable balance.'" Although there are no comparable statistics in regard to the Soviet Union vis-à-vis foreign countries, Russia occupies a position in its relations with East Europe similar to that of the United States with its own European allies.

574
McConnell, J. P. THE ROLE OF AIRPOWER IN VIETNAM. Vital speeches of the day, v. 32, Oct. 15, 1965: 12-15. PN6121.V52, v. 32

Speech delivered before the Dallas Council on World Affairs, Dallas, Texas, Sept. 16, 1965.

U.S. airpower is fulfilling two new functions in Vietnam, "strategic persuasion" and guerrilla warfare. Strategic persuasion is more a flexible instrument of foreign policy, aimed at interdicting the flow of supplies to the Viet Cong from the north and bringing North Vietnam to the negotiating table, than it is an instrument for total military victory. The weapons used for applying this persuasion are conventional, whereas U.S. nuclear capability acts as a deterrent providing "freedom of action in taking whatever military measures are required in Viet-Nam without risking escalation into nuclear war." Airpower has proved useful in guerrila warfare through attacks on the lines, means, and sources of enemy supplies; through defoliation, which denies jungle sanctuary; and through forward observation and attack control. Tactical fighting, evacuation, rescue, and cargo and troop transport are other vital functions of airpower in Vietnam.

575
Mecklin, John. THE BIGGEST CHEAPEST LIFT EVER. Fortune, v. 72, Nov. 1965: 179-180, 268, 273-274, 279-280, 284. HF5001.F1, v. 72

Reports on the U.S. Air Force jet transport, the C-5, which is scheduled to enter service in 1969. It "will put any trouble spot within easy reach of U.S.-based troops and may lead to a new global strategy. Used commercially, the immense jet transport could carry 1,000 passengers at bus fares--or six Greyhound buses as cargo."

576
Miller, Barry. STUDIES SEEK IMPROVED ASM GUIDANCE. Aviation week & space technology, v. 83, Dec. 6, 1965: 77, 79, 81, 83-89.
TL501.A8, v. 83

Reviews guidance-techniques programs undertaken to improve the accuracy of air-to-surface missiles (ASM). Better guidance accuracy is said to be the "sole technological obstacle" to an improved tactical ASM, a weapon that would be particularly useful in limited, nonnuclear conflict.

577
Molter, Günther. [THE NEXT GENERATION] Die nächste Generation. Flug-Revue, Heft 11, Nov. 1965: 16-17, 67. TL503.C524, 1965

The evaluation of the first logistic and operational V/STOL strike fighter concept by the Tripartite Squadron based at West Raynham, Norfolk, has reached its final stage. General Werner Panitzki took the occasion to meet the press for an official announcement of the follow-on developments of the current equipment of the Federal Republic's Air Arm currently operating the Fiat G.91 strike fighters and the F-104 Gs. The replacement for the first is well under way: the VAK 191 B tactical V/STOL strike and reconnaissance fighter jointly developed by the VFW and Fiat. The other manned aircraft, also planned to feature V/STOL capabilities, will be developed in close co-operation between American and German firms, an alliance which can be joined at will by interested countries of the Western Hemisphere. This project, designated Advanced V/STOL, is planned to reach the prototype stage by 1970 and the service evaluation of 12 prototypes from 1971 on. The management of this project will be maintained by a joint system project office already established at Dayton, Ohio. It is hoped that this advanced weapon system will be operational by 1974, providing that all technical problems will have been solved in due course. (Abstract supplied)

578
[NATO's MOST MODERN MINE-SWEEPING FLEET] Modernste Minensucherflotte der NATO. Atlantische Welt, 5. Jahrg., Nov. 1965: 10-12.
V3.A8, v. 5

Discusses the modern West German mine-sweeping fleet, which constitutes part of NATO's naval forces. Types of ships, their specific uses, and efficiency are described.

579
[NUCLEAR EQUILIBRIUM] Équilibre nucléaire. Air & cosmos, no 132, 25 déc. 1965: 35.
P&GP RR

Long-term strategy is a function of economic and technological factors. The United States, always favored in these domains by virtue of its industrial strength, is now rivaled by the Soviet Union in technological progress. In recent years the Soviet Union has turned out three times as many scientists and technicians as the United States. There are 3,625 U.S.S.R. technical institutes attended by 2,981,000 students; and the Soviet Union operates at least 12 scientific institutes unparalleled in the United States, one of which is devoted to cybernetics. By no means has the United States taken second place in basic research and pure science, but "there exists the danger of Soviet supremacy in applied science, applied particularly to security matters." That America's relative missile superiority was diminished in 1965 is not significant in itself, but the scientific evolution in the Soviet Union signaled by this development worries Washington's planners. Many smaller countries are also experiencing this scientific and technological evolution, which will eventually put them in a position to manufacture nuclear weapons.

580
Raser, John R. WEAPONS DESIGN AND ARMS CONTROL: THE POLARIS EXAMPLE. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 9, Dec. 1965: 450-462.
JX1901.J6, v. 9

Announcement of a new weapons system, such as the A-3 Polaris missile, generally calls forth a burst of enthusiasm--new technology! Yet if a more realistic appraisal were made of how the A-3 fits U.S. needs, joy might not be so unbounded. In choosing a weapons system, economic, political, military, and arms control factors are considered. Of systems now in use the Polaris best meets the political and military prerequisites. Conceivably it can, with certain technological innovations, be made more susceptible to arms control. At present, however, "there is no way of demonstrating that the system is not on the point of attacking." Were the following four requirements to be met, the system could be placed on off-station deployment at no cost to invulnerability. First, submarines must be deployed beyond the range of their targets. Also, a method must be devised for knowing that all submarines are outside the established line, perhaps by a system of regular signals emitted by missile-bearing subs. Third, the submarine must become invulnerable in less time than the opponent can strike it after picking up the signal. Finally, missiles should not have ranges above or below 1,200 to 1,500 miles; the old A-2 Polaris has this range, but the new A-3, by virtue of its long range, would be denied many normal cruising waters. While the Polaris system is valuable, reliance on deterrence alone is dangerous. Submarines are anonymous; there is no guarantee that war will not be precipitated between two nations by a third in a crisis. If submarines were made identifiable, however, they could be used to reward, retaliate, or bluff in the chess game of international relations. If they were deployed off-station they could be used to threaten yet would permit withdrawal of such a threat.

581
Rougeron, Camille. [20 YEARS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS] Vingt ans d'armes nucléaires. Forces aériennes françaises, 20. année, nov. 1965: 547-562.
UG635.F8F66, v. 20

For reasons expressed at an October 1949 meeting of the scientific committee of the Atomic Energy Agency U.S. scientific opinion was strongly opposed to the development of the thermonuclear hydrogen bomb: (1) The bomb was immoral. (2) It would cost excessively. (3)

It was not definitely feasible. (4) It was unnecessarily destructive. (5) It had no peaceful applications. Except for the first objection, which is still debated, the scientists' predictions have proved incorrect. The blast, fire and radiation effects of nuclear weapons vary with their power, the height of the explosion, and the radioactive material of the bomb. From what altitude the most damage can be inflicted is still a matter under discussion. Underground thermonuclear blasts are a cheaper and more effective source of power than atomic reactors but to turn these to peaceful uses is a difficult problem, as deadly radioisotopes can easily be saved from these explosions and used to conduct the most economical of conflicts, the radioactive war.

582
Shibaev, Nikolai F. [FIGHTING WITH ROCKETS] Bor'ba s raketami. Moskva, Voen. Izd-vo, 1965. 128 [4] p.
UF767.S42

In simple and popular form the author acquaints the reader with the state of rocketry in foreign countries and the prospects for its development; determines the goals and problems of opposing it; cites information on resolving scientific and technical problems of rocket interception; and demonstrates in this last context the role of radioelectronics and complex automated systems of control. The booklet demonstrates modern scientific approaches to the problem of interdicting rockets, offers a brief analysis of these approaches, and examines some basic tendencies toward perfecting them. All the factual material in the booklet is based upon data found in the foreign press. (Translation of supplied summary)

583
Simmons, Edwin H. THE MARINES AND CRISIS CONTROL. In United States Naval Institute, Annapolis. Proceedings, v. 91, Nov. 1965: 26-35.
V1.U8, v. 91

Describes the recent landing of units of the 9th Marine Expeditionary Force near Danang, Vietnam, and explores the importance of the Marine Corps to counterinsurgency operations. Colonel Simmons argues that almost every crisis since World War II was preceded by a period of rising tension long enough to permit the deployment of seaborne forces near the troubled area and concludes that "an integrated amphibious weapons system" will remain an effective instrument of crisis control for the foreseeable future.

584
Simmons, Henry T. THE SOVIET SPACE PROGRAM. Space/aeronautics, v. 44, Dec. 1965: 54-65. illus.
TL501.A786, v. 44

Traces the Soviet manned and unmanned space programs. It includes information on rocket propulsion and missile development, an account of launchings, and an assessment of the U.S.S.R.'s present position in the space race.

585
SPACEPORT FOR THE MILITARY: CLOSE-UP OF A MAMMOTH BASE. U.S. news & world report, v. 59, Dec. 13, 1965: 42-44, 46. illus.
JK1.U65, v. 59

Discusses Vandenberg Air Force Base, the U.S. military space center. Programs to be carried out at Vandenberg include launching of the Manned Orbiting Laboratory, an increase in manned military launches, and "establishment of regular shuttle service in small rockets to and from large orbiting military spacecraft." The advantage of a West Coast spaceport lies in launch directions: south, to enter a polar orbit and from thence to survey the entire Earth; west and northwest, for possible missile use against Red China or the Soviet Union; and southwest, to test the accuracy of American ICBM's.

586
Thomer, Egbert. [STRATEGY IN SPACE] Strategie im Weltall. Atlantische Welt, 5. Jahrg., Nov. 1965: 1-3.
V3.A8, v. 5

Evaluates American plans to establish permanent space stations with regard to their strategic usefulness in the armaments race with the Soviet Union.

587
Twiss, Robert L. [U.S.A. LEADING IN SPACE-MINDEDNESS] USA führend in "Spacemindedness." Wehr und Wirtschaft, 9. Jahrg., 10. Okt. 1965: 546-548.
U3.W38, v. 9

One of the most significant aerospace developments of the year in the United States took place when President Johnson ordered the Defense Department to proceed with the development of a Manned Orbiting Laboratory. Purpose of the $1,5 billion program is to find out what useful military missions man could perform in space. The first laboratory, to be developed by the Douglas Aircraft Co., will be launched in 1968 by a Titan III.-C rocket, the most powerful booster yet developed in the United States. President Johnson, in approving the Orbiting Laboratory program, stressed the peaceful intentions of the United States in space and again declared the US never would put weapons of mass destruction in orbit. The decision to proceed with the laboratory program marked a major victory for the Air Force, which has been trying for several years to study the question of military man in space. The Air Force will train its own astronauts for the program rather than using astronauts of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Possible military assignments the astronauts could explore are surveillance of earth and ocean, inspection of satellites, possible establishment of a spaceborne command post for control of ground-based strategic forces and whether intercontinental ballistic missiles could be detected and possibly destroyed from above the atmosphere. Meanwhile, the Air Force also has chosen four bidders for six-month studies of the proposed United States-West German advanced V/STOL strike aircraft--McDonnell, Boeing, Republic and Lockheed-Bell. (Abstract supplied)

588
Wolf, John. SOVIET SUBMARINES TODAY. Ordnance, v. 50, Jan./Feb. 1966: 418-420.
UF1.067, v. 50

Traces the development of the submarine in Russia since Czarist times and describes the various types of missile-firing submarines evolved by the Soviets.

C. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES AND MILITARY STRATEGIES OF STATES AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS

1. General Analyses

589
Antipov, V. V., M. D. Nikitin, and P. P. Saksonov. [EN ROUTE FROM THE EARTH TO THE MOON: A BIOLOGICAL EVALUATION OF THE RADIATION DANGERS OF COSMIC FLIGHTS] Na trasse zemlia-luna;

biologicheskaia otsenka radiatsionnoi opasnosti kosmicheskikh poletov. Priroda, g. 54, apr. 1965: 46-53.
Q4.P8, 1965

Evaluates some of the dangers to future astronauts from radiation and describes some of the biological effects of radiation in outer space. The authors report that a great many medical-biological problems connected with space flight have yet to be solved; until research in the cosmos has eliminated the dangers of cosmic radiation, any manned flight to the moon would be premature.

590
Borch, Herbert von. [THE WORLD IN NUCLEAR PERSPECTIVE] Die Welt in nuklearer Perspektive. Aussenpolitik, 16. Jahrg., Okt. 1965: 657-666.
D839.A885, v. 16

Recounts concepts of nuclear strategy and arms control developed at the Hudson Institute, Westchester, N.Y., under the direction of Herman Kahn.

591
Bussey, Donald S. DILEMMAS IN MILITARY STRATEGY. Worldview, v. 8, Sept. 1965: 8-12.
P&GP RR

Modern military strategy often faces the dilemma of choosing between conflicting objectives while maintaining proper balance between desirable ends. The wish to strengthen action policy through implantation of declaratory policy (a strategy always difficult for an open society) sometimes alarms and alienates allies. The desire to avoid a general war impels military thinkers to argue for absolute world stability, even though such stability might lead to instability at the nonstrategic level. The loss of strategic deterrence, for example, would automatically increase the likelihood of limited wars. "The unrelenting pursuit of military advantage may lessen rather than enhance security." Introduction of a massive civil defense program or perfection of an antimissile defense system might destroy strategic parity and "be unacceptably risky because of its destabilizing effect on the strategic environment." While major powers work to secure absolute mutual deterrence in order to preclude the outbreak of a general war, strategists understand that an absolute stalemate might encourage aggression and limited military actions once the fear of igniting a general war were removed. Another category of dilemmas relates to means-ends relationships. At times freedom must be curtailed to defend freedom better. At other times the desire to protect the integrity of nations cannot be fulfilled without direct intervention in their internal affairs. Military strategy must choose the most beneficial and least offensive of these courses in order to preserve and extend human freedom.

592
Chopra, Maharaj K. [THE MEANING OF AIRPOWER IN EAST ASIA] Die Bedeutung der Luftmacht in Ostasien. Wehrkunde, 14. Jahrg., Okt. 1965: 537-543.
U3.W396, v. 14

Drawing on the lessons of the 1941-45 war in the Pacific, the Korean War, and today's battle in Vietnam, evaluates the role of airpower (including H-bombs, long range bombers, and missiles) in the power struggles of East Asia--conflicts that involve 12 countries, over one-third of the world's population, and the special participation of China, the Soviet Union, and the United States. The author concludes that strategic airpower acts as a deterrent to total war and can deter a land power from taking great (but not smaller) chances. Tactical airpower in limited conflict is a useful weapon but is insufficient without the support of ground troops and the population of the war theater.

593
Gretton, Sir Peter. MARITIME STRATEGY: A STUDY OF DEFENSE PROBLEMS. New York, Praeger [1965] 210 p. V165.G7

Contents.--Historical survey to 1945.--Principles of maritime strategy.--Effect of thermo-nuclear weapons on strategic thought.--Other factors affecting the principles of maritime strategy.--The strategic nuclear stalemate.--Communist policies.--Possible future conflicts.--Instruments of maritime strategy.--Some thoughts on environmental warfare.--The shape and size of British maritime forces.--The convoy system.--The naval and air force of potential enemies.--Do the principles of maritime strategy still apply?--Final Reflections.

"Seeks to explain the Principles of Maritime Strategy and to examine their application to the defence problems of modern Britain . . . the book suggests a strategy which will enable this island to resolve its defence problems as simply and as cheaply as possible."

594
Heininger, Horst. [THE ECONOMIC ROLE AND EFFECTS OF ARMS PROCUREMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION IN ARMAMENTS] Rolle und Gewicht der rüstungswirtschaftlichen Nachfrage des Staates und die Bedeutung der internationalen rüstungswirtschaftlichen Zusammenarbeit. Konjunktur und Krise, 9. Jahrg., Heft 3, 1965: 231-247.
HB3711.K768, v. 9

Due to the industrial monopolies' aggressive plans, the armaments of most imperialist countries have in recent years been "significantly more sizable than in the first phase of capitalism's general crisis." The markedly increased outlays for armaments have given the imperialist state even greater control over its national economy than it had before. In the United States the outlays for research and development of new arms have taken a growing share of the armament budget, while the share for arms procurement has steadily diminished. The above picture can be applied more or less accurately to other major imperialist countries, with some important qualifications. Great Britain, for economic reasons, and West Germany, for political reasons, have not "pursued armament to such an extent and with such intensity as the United States," especially in the field of nuclear weapons and missiles. Thus the procurement of arms constitutes a decreasing part of the generally increasing total cost of armament. That cost increase is, in fact, leading to international development of modern weapons by allied nations. International cooperation in all stages of weapons development and production as well as employment may be logical. Strong political and military interests, however, oppose intimate international collaboration regarding nuclear weapons and missiles. The arms race reduces the capitalist countries' capability for economic maneuvering and causes serious neglect in the development of other important areas, such as scientific fields unrelated to armaments.

595
Lepotier, Adolphe. [PROSPECTIVE GEOSTRATEGY] Géostratégie prospective. Revue de défense nationale, 21. année, nov. 1965: 1701-1711.
D410.R45, v. 21

The technological-strategic school of thought sees all other considerations eclipsed by the advent of missile-borne weapons of mass destruction, while the psycho-strategic school feels that the evolution of strategy is dominated by the process of Marxist-Leninist expansion. But geography, in its broadest sense, is the surest base for strategic projections. An effective geostrategy must consider more than physical surface; it must foresee the eventual utilization of all kinds of geographic features. The greatest political and strategic consequences of human geostrategy are those arising from overpopulation that is localized in already unstable regions. This is perhaps the strongest latent cause of conflict in existence. Every country's position is globally peculiar (insular geostrategy) and this should be recognized in order to avoid misunderstandings based on "egocentric" geostrategy. The fact that all nations are insular is infinitely more determinative and lasting than the episodic fact of communism. Allied islanders are each separated from an enemy by different geographic modes (sea, land-line) and distances. How could their strategic views not differ, even while they agreed on the metaphysics of Marxism-Leninism and on the technical potential of various weapons systems? Economic geostrategy measures national autonomy, which no NATO nation can boast. The geostrategist must also consider transportation, its technology and the geography of routes and energy sources. Events since the coming to power of Russian Communism confirm the value of geostrategy. Soviet expansionism has been less ideological than it has been a continuation of the traditional tsarist expansionism. As were Christianity, Islam, the French Revolution, and fascism before it, Communism is the psychological motor of contemporary Russian and Chinese geostrategic expansion.

596
Mosen, Wido. [RATIONALITY AND RELIABILITY OF POLITICAL-MILITARY STRATEGIES] Rationalität und Kalkulierbarkeit politisch-militärischer Strategien. Wehrkunde, 14. Jahrg., Okt. 1965: 514-519. U3.W396, v. 14

Considers the reliability of scientific game theory in developing "rational" political-strategic plans. Strategy is well suited to this new kind of analysis, but the game must be carefully planned and its data based on certain important characteristics of nuclear alliances and nuclear relationships. An adequately organized game, realistically conducted, can indicate political ways for averting international conflicts. Yet with the best use of available military, psychological, and political factors there are still many nontechnical factors that affect rational planning. Irrational and unpredictable considerations (nuclear weapons proliferation, mutual distrust, or prestige considerations) have contributed heavily to the failure of rationally calculated disarmament proposals.

597
Powell, Elwin H. THE FUTILITY OF DETERRENCE. Journal of human relations, v. 13, no. 3: 372-377. H1.J55, v. 13

Throughout history man has deluded himself into believing that amassed military might is the best insurance for peace. History demonstrates, however, that arms races, undertaken for deterrence, inevitably lead to provocation. The Pax Romana, which did secure a few centuries of peace for mankind, and the Pax Britannica, which forestalled a world war for almost a century, were both founded upon an accumulation of armaments; in the end, however, the weapons systems developed for deterrence aggravated the catastrophes that followed. American foreign policy throughout the cold war has been based upon the principle of deterrence and, despite the billions spent upon arms and foreign aid, has merely "increased the probability of disaster." Disarmament now becomes a greater possibility, because neither side in the current East-West conflict can provide for its own defense through the further amassment of weapons. The cold war has thus degenerated into a debate, with the Soviet Union employing a strategy of persuasion under the banner of "peaceful coexistence" to win its objectives. Is it unthinkable that the United States disregard the sloganeers still advocating victory in the cold war and "go a step beyond mere coexistence to cooperation"? Victory is relative only to one's own system of values; thus through cooperation both the Soviet Union and the United States could be victorious.

598
Rosna, Walter. [ATOMIC WEAPONS FOR THE GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC?] Atomwaffen für die Bundesrepublik? Die Zukunft, Heft 22, Nov. 1965: 22-24. H5.Z85, 1965

Chancellor Erhard's recent statement that the German Federal Republic wants "the same weapons with which it is being threatened" expresses West Germany's long-standing political goal of nuclear arms sharing. The German Federal Republic has consistently stood by its old pledge not to produce such weapons on its territory, although now, as the third greatest industrial nation in the world, it is quite capable of doing so. The multilateral nuclear force within NATO, proposed by the United States and Great Britain, is designed to meet part way the West German requests. Both France and the Soviet Union, however, are united in their opposition to any kind of West German nuclear armament. Bonn's long-term political objective--buying reunification from Moscow in return for West German renunciation of nuclear armament--has no real chance of materialization. The marked course of international developments leading toward rapprochement between the United States and the Soviet Union in the field of nuclear nonproliferation, as well as Moscow's vital interests in keeping East Germany in the Soviet bloc run counter to Bonn's plans for reunification. Washington's interests in inhibiting the progress of the French nuclear armament program and Moscow's similar interests in regard to Red China may eventually speed up the Soviet-American accord on nuclear nonproliferation.

599
Weizsäcker, Carl F. von. [WHAT ALTERNATIVES DO WE HAVE? THE BACKGROUND OF THE GERMAN PROBLEM: ARMAMENT PLANNING AND THE WORLD BALANCE OF POWER] Welche Alternativen haben wir? Der Hintergrund des Deutschlandproblems: Rüstungsplanung und Weltgleichgewicht. Die Zeit, 21. Jahrg., 25. Jan. 1966: 3. AP30.Z39, v. 21

West German aspirations for nuclear arms sharing should be held within the bounds of political prudence, dictated by Germany's position in the world. Analysis of any armament concept involves, above all, the examination of feasible alternatives open to a nation on all levels of foreign policy. There are three possible fundamental variants of the world situation in the next decade or two: hostile bipolarity (the cold war), polycentrism, and cooperative bipolarity. The first leads to a multitude of political power centers--a

condition belying the real world balance of military power. This prompts the two main powers to a limited cooperation, aimed at restoration of bipolarity, which, due to the tendency of each side to win an upper hand, may easily become a hostile state. Yet without a certain degree of cooperative bipolarity, which alone offers some prospects for a durable world peace, world war is in the long run almost impossible to prevent. In that state of the world balance of power lie the only chances for a solution to the German problem and German reunification. Hostile bipolarity determined Europe's fate after 1945 and congealed its partition, of which Germany's partition is but a part. De Gaulle's efforts to loosen that system, by speeding up polycentrism and by keeping conditions in Western Europe elastic enough to facilitate future European reunification, have little chance for success. The Soviet Union will eventually realize that stabilization of peace without settlement of the German problem is impossible. A full or loose reunification of Germany as part of a general settlement may be acceptable for both the United States and the Soviet Union as being the least dangerous to peace, provided no German territorial claims are outstanding. Such claims, as well as nuclear armament efforts, can easily create an impression in the world of a nation harboring aggressive plans.

2. Unilateral Policies and Strategies

600
[AERIAL DEFENSE] La défense aérienne. Air & cosmos, no 128, 27 nov. 1965: 34-35.
P&GP RR

Sketches the basic tasks of aerial defense (information gathering and evaluation, and active defense of vital installations) and the means the French Air Force possesses, alone and in conjunction with allied and other national defense systems, to fulfill its duties. The performance of the aerial defense apparatus is the key to credibility on which, in turn, rests the strategy of deterrence.

601
Alsop, Stewart. THE TWIN ILLUSIONS. Saturday evening post, v. 238, Oct. 23, 1965: 18.
AP2.S2, v. 238

Three out of five Americans believe that bombing Hanoi will serve to end the war in Vietnam and contain communism in Asia. To be sure the American people have been sold on the strength of U.S. airpower, but these same people recoil in horror from the suggestion that nuclear weapons be used. Many feel that the President has been indecisive, for airpower can provide a cheap solution to Vietnam. The Communists on the other hand have their own view of the American people and its President and strong feelings as to why they will win in Vietnam. They believe that the American troops will suffer the same kind of defeat that the French suffered in Indochina in 1954. Thus we have the ironic situation wherein the American people are pushing President Johnson to bolder and sterner measures in Vietnam at the same time that the North Vietnamese believe that the Americans are not wholly behind the Vietnam effort.

602
Axelbank, Albert. JAPAN'S 'NON-MILITARY' BUILDUP. Reporter, v. 34, Jan. 13, 1966: 35-37.
D839.R385, v. 34

Since 1945 the Japanese military, objects of public opprobrium because of their blunders and ambitions during the Second World War, have been politically subdued and have enjoyed no participation in government at the cabinet level. In response to the increasing threat posed by China, however, Japanese military leaders have begun to make their presence in national affairs felt throughout the past 2 years. Japan has begun to acknowledge the destructive consequences likely to befall from a Chinese-American conflict; through an agreement with South Korea Japanese leaders have admitted that the line of Japanese defense extends far beyond territorial boundaries. The Socialist and Communist parties of Japan have increasingly deplored what they feel is an attempt to create an anti-Communist axis in Northeast Asia. Some Japanese officials already have begun to speak of acquisition of nuclear weapons as a necessary countermeasure to Chinese might. Robert McNamara has openly proclaimed that Japan must play a larger defense role in Asia than is required to merely maintain its own security. To promote Japanese independence in defense matters joint military exercises are annually held with U.S. forces; already some 250,000 men have been enlisted in the Japanese Self-Defense Forces. "The United States, which played an important role in helping to shape the no-war constitution, keeps in close contact with Japan's still limited military effort, and is solidly behind the present accelerated build-up of the Self-Defense Forces, which are also 'reborn' under U.S. tutelage."

603
Baldwin, Hanson W. WHAT WE MUST DO TO WIN IN ASIA. Reader's digest, v. 87, Nov. 1965: 111-116.
AP2.R255, v. 87

Advocates stronger action in Vietnam in order to achieve victory over the Viet Cong. Massive air attacks and a blockade to cut off external supply lines appear to be acceptable and necessary risks for the United States. The future of the U.S. position in Southeast Asia depends on victory in Vietnam.

604
Beecher, William. RED CHINA'S WAR POTENTIAL. National guardsman, v. 19, Nov. 1965: 2-7.
UA42.N24, v. 19

Red China's strategic nuclear power will be small and crude but potent within a few years. In this period China will develop the long-range missile carrying submarine and accumulate an adequate store of atomic warheads. The idea that within 2 or 3 years Red China might threaten the United States with the destruction of a few large cities in order to gain concessions in Asia is not far-fetched. Most experts estimate that China will not risk a war against the United States in Asia at the present time because of the U.S. air threat to its atomic weapons facilities. Were this judgment wrong the West could expect from the Chinese either the overt movement of large military forces into North Vietnam, or a smaller and covert deployment of antiaircraft and other specialists into both Vietnams. This second strategy would constitute a very ticklish problem for the United States, especially in view of world public opinion in the event Chinese aggression could not be proven. A land invasion of China from any direction would encounter large numbers of prepositioned troops and millions of militiamen, and, even though the army lacks heavy artillery, tanks, and trucks, prospects for success against it would be slim. But the inadequate Chinese air force and weak navy could not effectively counter U.S. air strikes against supply installations and transportation routes in China or North Vietnam. The United States could inflict losses on China heavy enough to deter it from military aggression in Asia if U.S.

bombers were given free rein to attack any military targets within China, and if Russia withheld all but token support to China. "Such a defeat might be enough to discredit the existing gaggle of Chinese leaders and bring to power a group more interested in concentrating Chinese efforts within the borders of China rather than beyond. And even if the same leadership group remained in control, destruction of China's incipient strategic nuclear force would tend to inhibit outside adventures, should the temptation arise soon again."

605
Boehm, George A. COUNTDOWN FOR NIKE-X. Fortune, v. 72, Nov. 1965: 133, 136-137, 192, 194, 196, 198, 200. HF5001.F1, v. 72

The development of multifunction array radar (MAR) and a very fast interceptor missile, the Sprint, has removed major doubt concerning the feasibility of the Nike-X antiballistic missile system. At a cost of $20-30 billion, plus $1 billion per year for maintenance, the United States could construct an antiballistic missile (ABM) system and by 1970 be able to reduce population losses from a Soviet ICBM attack by 50 percent (150 to 75 million people). For about $8 billion the Nation could obtain a more modest ABM giving good protection against a Red Chinese nuclear attack. The smaller ABM deployment would also lessen the dangers and consequences of nuclear accidents, make selective nuclear exchanges more practical, and provide a base from which to proceed if a full-scale ABM program is decided upon later. Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended in early 1965 that a major ABM program be undertaken, Air Force opinion generally holds that the best defense is a good offense. Another objection to ABM deployment is that it would be wasteful, when measured against other equally important national efforts requiring equally large investments of money and scientific manpower. Moreover, the Soviet Union, which may be at least temporarily resigned to accepting second place in ICBM strength, could regard a U.S. ABM system as a "quantum jump" in nuclear weaponry. It might either increase its ICBM force, so that an effective ABM program would cost way above current estimates, or embark on an ABM program of its own. Either way the arms race would spiral. Thus, Oskar Morgenstern and other game theorists propose a Soviet-American treaty freezing all civil defense, shelters as well as ABM systems, and preserving the security of the missile standoff. The treaty they suggest promises no sure way to detect secret preparation of an ABM system. In addition this treaty would eliminate the possibility of and the advantages to be gained from the smaller ABM program now under consideration. Even if an ABM effort is decided upon affirmatively, a number of subsidary issues such as the construction of fallout shelters and improvement of defenses against low-flying missiles will have to be settled before the whole ABM question is successfully resolved.

606
BOMBERS VS. MISSILES: SHOWDOWN AHEAD. U.S. news & world report, v. 59, Dec. 27, 1965: 30-32. JK1.U65, v. 59

Conflict in Vietnam has focused the attention of American legislators on the Nation's defense posture. Many feel that the sweeping cutbacks in defense made by Secretary McNamara have weakened America strategically. The issue has, in a sense, narrowed to the choice between bombers and missiles, expressed by some in terms of McNamara vs. Congress. McNamara's program calls for the gradual phasing out of manned bombers (except for the controversial TFX, McNamara's "personal choice"), and increasing American reliance on missiles. Congressmen fear this dependence on a weapons system that has never been tested under anything even approaching actual combat conditions. They are expected to raise again the question of the TFX, since Air Force and Navy experts continue to doubt its utility. McNamara, on the other hand, is wholly satisfied with both the TFX and increasing missile strength. Missiles, he feels, are growing in importance in the Soviet Union as well. This position rubs against another Congressional sorepoint--the reluctance of the Defense Department to develop an effective antimissile defense system.

607
Brewin, Andrew. THE DEFENCE OF NORTH AMERICA. In his Stand on guard: the search for a Canadian defence policy. Toronto, McClelland and Steward [1965] p. 53-63. UA600.B7

A rational Canadian defense policy must be part of a larger plan providing for the defense of the entire North American continent, for the only conceivable attack liable to fall upon Canada is one that would derive from an all-out nuclear strike against the United States. As part of its contribution to the work of the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) Canada has since 1957 assisted in providing a North American early warning system. It has also positioned squadrons of Voodoo aircraft and Bomarc missiles as an active defense against incoming bombers. An effective early warning system against bombers is absolutely essential--the realization that a bomber attack against North America could be detected with 2-3 hours advance warning (thereby providing more than ample time for SAC to launch a counterstrike) has made the threat of an attack by bombers almost inconceivable. But why retain the expensive Voodoo-Bomarc system? These interceptors would enjoy no efficacy against an I.C.B.M. attack. Scrapping this part of the NORAD system would in no way hinder the early warning defense lines but would allow Canada to remove from its soil the nuclear warheads that "may well inhibit Canada from joining with other countries in political initiatives for the maintenance of nuclear-free zones." Before the NORAD treaty expires in 1967 Canada should secure agreement from the United States that the NORAD active air defense systems are obsolete and that the limited Canadian defense dollar be directed into more useful projects.

608
Burchett, Wilfred. WAR SHADOWS OVER CAMBODIA. New times, no. 4, Jan. 26, 1966: 16-17. D839.N483, 1966

U.S. actions toward Cambodia testify to the American desire to escalate the Vietnam War to all of Southeast Asia. In 1965 the International Control Commission investigated 8 serious incidents on the Vietnamese-Cambodian border and attributed the blame for each to the government of South Vietnam. U.S. charges that the Viet Cong use Cambodia as a sanctuary and a supply center are only a preamble to new acts of aggression against the Cambodian people. Two American correspondents, Seymour Topping of the New York Times and Stanley Karnow of the Washington Post, recently made extensive investigations of the purported Viet Cong activity in Cambodia and found the allegations without basis. If the Pentagon does attack Cambodia the peoples of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia will unite in a coordinated effort against the

United States and, together with "large patriotic sections of the Thai people," will oppose U.S. aggression throughout Indo-China.

609
Chang, Chi Ryang. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ROKAF AS A MATURE INSTRUMENT OF PEACE. Air University review, v. 17, Nov./Dec. 1965: 28-36. illus. TL501.A5574, v. 17

Discusses the organization, mission, logistics, and training of the Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF). General Chang asserts that the Republic of Korea "must continually advocate the strengthening of ROKAF, within the boundaries of economic conditions, in order to match the growth and power of the North Korean Air Force."

610
[CHINA HAS REPLACED THE U.S.S.R. IN AMERICAN PREOCCUPATIONS] La Chine a remplacé l'U.R.S.S. dans les préoccupations des États-unis. Perspectives, no 953, 6 nov. 1965: 1-3.
HC10.P4, 1965

Each article is separately paged.

States that the U.S. military's renewed concern with development of an antimissile system, as reported by Aviation Week and Space Technology (May 31, 1965 and August 23, 1965), indicates a growing fear of Chinese nuclear capabilities and possible offensive use of them.

611
CHINESE COMMUNISTS THREATEN WAR AGAINST THAILAND. Free world, v. 14, Sept. 1965: 24-27.
AP8.F69, v. 14

The remark made earlier this year by China's Foreign Minister, Chen Yi, to the effect that Thailand may experience guerrilla warfare before the end of 1965, has prompted the Thai Government to increase its already strict attention to its economic and social problems. Through the Accelerated Rural Development Program Bangkok is attempting to strengthen its ties with the northeastern provinces of the country. Mobile information teams have been dispatched to the northeast to explain governmental policies in the villages and record villagers' comments. Mobile development units tour the same region, offering assistance to villagers. Thai armed forces have joined with American military units in simulated amphibious operations and antiguerrilla raids. "With the forceful and decisive measures taken by the Thai government, the words of Chen Yi will amount to no more than meaningless threats."

612
Chopra, Maharaj K. THE ART OF LANGUAGE, WEAPONS & LEADERSHIP IN NATIONAL DEFENSE. Forum, v. 22, Aug. 1965: 33, 35, 37.
AP2.F8, v. 22

Advises a cautious approach to utilization of the Western language of defense and to the temptation to develop the sophisticated weapons systems of the West. More important than the language of defense and the "bombast of weapons" is the moral factor of good leadership.

613
Christ, Rolf F. [SWEDEN AND HER AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM] Schwedens Luftverteidigung. Wehr und Wirtschaft, 9. Jahrg., Dez. 1965: 662-670.
U3.W38, v. 9

A study of Sweden's defence in its coordinated political, military and economic aspects reveals that the country has succeeded in bringing her extremely difficult geographical situation into harmony with her economic potential. This presupposes the development of a politico-military concept of purely defensive nature and exactly limited scope. The resulting defence organization is above all impressive because of its markedly humanitarian approach to the defence needs of the population. Civil defense shelters, evacuation plans and installations in Sweden are so advanced as to be an example to the rest of the world. Even the world's greatest military power, the United States, has nothing remotely comparable to offer. Secondly, the Swedish defence effort proves conclusively that an industrial nation which takes the trouble to draw to the full extent on its technical intelligence in the performance of its defence tasks will also enjoy the overall economic advantages of technical and scientific progress in its industry and keeps its products competitive on the world market. An outstanding example of this technical standard is provided by the new Swedish Viggen 37 aircraft, which need fear no comparison with the latest designs of American or European provenance. (Abstract supplied)

614
Chyong, Chung Tkhy and Nguen, Man' De. [ECONOMIC POLICY OF THE AMERICAN NEOCOLONIALISTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM] Ekonomicheskaia politika Amerikanskikh neokolonizatorov v IUzhnom V'etname. Translated from the Vietnamese by I. V. Alekhina and V. D. Vasil'tsov. Moskva, Izdatel'stvo Progress, 1965. 239 p. HF1456.5.V5T777

In this book the neocolonialist economic policy of the American imperialists in South Vietnam is broadly elucidated. As the authors indicate, this policy is directed toward undermining the economy of South Vietnam in order to make it dependent upon the U.S. The allocation of "aid" to South Vietnam is one of the forms taken by this enslavement. The most important branches of the economy are subordinated to U.S. interests and are managed by Americans. The authors cite many examples of the penetration of American imperialism into all levels of life in South Vietnam. The book pays particular attention to the displacement of France from the economy of South Vietnam and the usurpation of its position by American neocolonialists. Indicated in detail are the methods used to displace French capital--high taxing of French enterprises, liquidation of French special tarriff rights and privileges, restriction of the use of French francs in settlements, and others. The book also elucidates U.S. measures to convert South Vietnam into an American military base--construction of new airfields and military ports and the modernization of old ones, building of roads with strategic importance, creation of so-called "strategic hamlets," and other measures. The book is intended for a wide range of readers: propagandists, lecturers, teachers, and all who are interested in questions concerning the policy of American neocolonialists in countries dependent upon them. (Translation of supplied summary)

615
Coffey, Joseph I. THE CHINESE AND BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 21, Dec. 1965: 17-19. TK9145.A84, v. 21

Secretary McNamara's claim that deployment of an antiballistic missile (ABM) system would be effective against a future Chinese missile strike should not be taken to mean that a patent solution has been

found to the problem of preventing a possible Chinese attack upon the United States. Some experts have suggested that the United States partially deploy ABM's (only on the Pacific Coast, for example) with the realization that such a system could not weaken a Soviet attack but would enjoy great success against the less sophisticated missiles likely to be mounted by the Chinese in the foreseeable future. It would seem irrational, however, to expend vast sums on a weapons system so transitory that any significant improvement in the range of Chinese missiles would offset it. China soon will have the capability to attack mainland America by nuclear-carrying aircraft or submarines or by clandestinely introducing nuclear weapons into U.S. cities, thereby depriving U.S. policy toward China of some of the sense of impunity it has enjoyed to date. Aside from technological and strategic considerations a U.S. decision on ABM deployment should avoid "suppositions concerning Chinese behavior, risk-taking propensity, and strategic concepts whose validity is at least questionable." Current Chinese bellicosity may or may not continue; China may regulate its future activities in accordance with the principle that "heavy and disproportionate losses in a nuclear exchange" are insupportable. Arguments for partial ABM deployment are predicated upon the supposition that China, when technologically ready, will engage in a policy of brinkmanship, although China "has shown no propensity to engage in the kinds of military adventures which are implicit in this assessment." To expend vast resources, to risk forcing the Soviet Union to undertake its own ABM deployment, and to escalate the arms race on the basis of questionable suppositions would seem extravagant, if not extreme.

616
Cooper, John C. THE MANNED ORBITING LABORATORY: A MAJOR LEGAL AND POLITICAL DECISION. American Bar Association journal, v. 51, Dec. 1965: 1137-1140. LL RR

President Johnson's directive to the Defense Department to proceed with the Air Force's Manned Orbiting Laboratory falls within the guidelines established by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Act of 1958. The Act allows for the development of projects that, although possessing military significance, clearly fall within the defense needs of the United States but do not violate the basic premise that the peaceful uses of outer space include preparations to defend against violations by an aggressor. While the Act stresses the U.S. objective of nonmilitary ventures into outer space, it provides for a Presidential decision directing the military to prepare means of defense against violations. Both the Act and other U.S. pronouncements come within the United Nations' resolution appealing for the peaceful use of outer space. The resolution, a response to earlier disarmament discussions, accepted the American and Soviet declaration not to station military vehicles in outer space, with the question of a ban to be left for future disarmament discussions. The law governing the use of outer space by military and nonmilitary vehicles will roughly parallel the international law of the high seas. This presently allows for the free use of the seas by any nation, precludes any attempt at claiming sovereignty or abusing the right of other nations to free use of the sea lanes, and allows ships of the armed services of any state, in times of peace, to navigate freely, develop weapons systems and prepare national defenses. Therefore present U.S. policy falls within the scope of established practice and international law.

617
Desbarbieux, R. [THERE IS ONLY ONE FRANCE AND ONE NATIONAL DEFENSE] Il n'y a qu'une France et une défense nationale. Aviation magazine international, no 430, 1. nov. 1965: 38.
TL502.A854, 1965
[Formerly Aviation magazine de l'espace]

Deplores the unfavorable reactions in the south and southwest of France to planned installations of medium-range strategic missiles. With or without these weapons this region would be threatened in eventual war; not to possess strategic arms would be to invite attack.

618
Dulac, Philippe. [A METHOD, A PRINCIPLE, A STYLE: OPERATIONAL TERRITORIAL DEFENSE] Une méthode, un principe, un style: la défense opérationnelle du territoire. TAM; terre, air, mer, no 79, 10 déc. 1965: 16-19. illus.
P&GP RR

France's operational territorial defense (défense opérationnelle du territoire--DOT) signals a new concept in defense organization. Its purpose is to solidify the will of the nation to resist aggression and translate this will into effective action. In providing appropriate military power for different stages and types of conflict situations DOT constitutes a requisite "environment" for the key strategy of deterrence and for the nuclear deterrent forces. The basic principle of territorial defense is close coordination between military and civil authorities on all levels (in the six national defense zones, in the regions, and in the departments). Civil-military authorities control three kinds of forces--purely civilian, purely military, and mixed. The air force and navy are capable of giving support to these DOT forces. This defense structure is designed to operate against "insidious types of action," such as fifth column or paratrooper infiltration. Units are trained in small-group commando style conflict. DOT can adapt according to the circumstances, function in peacetime or war. "In every hypothetical situation--tension, engagement, invasion--it must assure the survival of the nation itself."

619
Dulac, Philippe. [THE MOBILE FORCES] Les forces de manoeuvre. TAM: terre, air, mer, no 75, 10 oct. 1965: 18-21. P&GP RR

Describes the role, composition, equipment, and tactics of the French mobile forces as an integral part of the entire military apparatus. These forces constitute an air-ground complex constructed around nuclear weapons, and in the future will possess a nationally-owned tactical nuclear capability.

620
[EUROPE NEEDS STRENGTH FOR SELF-DEFENSE: THE CORE PROBLEM--THE GERMAN-FRENCH RELATIONSHIP/ THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC SHOULD BE GIVEN EQUAL RIGHTS WITH THE ALLIANCE PARTNERS] Europa braucht die Kraft zur Selbstverteidigung: Kernproblem das deutsch-französische Verhältnis/ Bundesrepublik soll mit den Bundnispartnern gleichberechtigt sein. Parlament, 15. Jahrg., 22. Dez. 1965: 5-7, 10-13.
D839.P3, v. 15

A transcript of German parliamentary debates (November 30, 1965) on the government's nuclear policies. A speech by Christian Socialist Party president Franz Josef Strauss emphasizes a European

approach to the nuclear defense problem. Delegate Helmut Schmidt, a Social Democrat, recommends common planning within NATO, practical contingency planning, and a German veto power over the use of nuclear weapons on its territory. The remaining delegates shift the topic of discussion to financial and economic questions in defense policies.

621
Falcke, Dietrich. [ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF THE ARMAMENT INDUSTRY] Wirtschaftliche Probleme der Rüstungsindustrie. Wehr und Wirtschaft, 9. Jahrg., Dez. 1965: 656-659. U3.W38, v. 9

The poor quality of some foreign arms acquired, or soon to be acquired by the German Federal Republic (e.g., the American 155-mm. howitzer M 109) makes it mandatory for West Germany to develop its armament industry. The costs of remodeling and repairing of foreign-made weapons are often forbidding and would be so even if those weapons were given free of charge. Several other reasons speak in favor of West Germany developing its own armament industry. Only a nation having such an industry can keep its "technical impulses" sensitive enough to realize optimal progress in arms development. The armament industry contributes, as a rule, to the technological progress of the nation. Devoid of its own armament industry the country loses much of its political independence. The official viewpoint of the West German defense ministry that armament firms should have most of their production oriented to other purposes, such as consumption goods, overlooks the fact that it would be completely uneconomical for so oriented firms to produce modern, up-to-date weapons. A closeknit cooperation between the armament industry and the state in all stages of arms development is necessary for both economic and military reasons. Between the two extremes of a state monopoly and a free market economy in the field of arms production there are many intermediate forms from which to select the best for development of the West German armament industry.

622
Forster, Thomas M. [NATIONAL PEOPLE'S ARMY: THE ARMY OF THE SOVIET ZONE] NVA: Die Armee der Sowjetzone [2 verb. Aufl.] Köln, Markus-Verlag, 1965. 287 p.
UA719.3.F66, 1965

Outlines the history, organization, and training methods, including ideological indoctrination, of the East German Army.

623
France. Commissariat à l'énergie atomique. Département des relations extérieures. DEVELOPMENTS & PROGRAMS. [Paris] External Relations and Programs, External Relations Dept., Public Relations Service [1964] 55 p. HD9698.F72A53

Describes the projects and activities of the French Atomic Energy Commission.

624
Gilbert, Marc. [THE MEGATON RACE] La course aux mégatonnes. Nouvel observateur, no 57, 15 déc. 1965: 24-25. AP20.02, 1965

What progress has France made in its 10-year-old decision to build a nuclear force, and what are the prospects? Forty out of an eventual 64 Mirage IVs, having a range of 2,000 kilometers and equipped with 50-kiloton plutonium bombs, are now operable. Bombs with a force of 64 kilotons are gradually replacing these older weapons. But before it is even completed this first generation deterrent force will be obsolete. The setting up of 35 surface-to-surface missiles with warheads of 200 kilotons in hardened sites will lead into the era of nuclear-powered submarines armed with thermonuclear weapons. Between 1965 and 1970 three atomic submarines, each carrying 16 Polaris-type missiles with hydrogen bomb warheads, are scheduled to enter into service. This plan is realistic. The successful launching of "Diamant" has raised hopes for an intermediate range missile, and military researchers in laboratories (Bruyères-le-Châtel, Limeil, Vaujours, Le Ripault) claim that hydrogen weapons are technologically realizable in the alloted time period. Computers verify this optimism. At the Pierrelatte complex the production of materials required for a fusion reaction is proceeding apace. Accordingly, within a few years France will possess the capacity to launch from three atomic-powered submarines "3 x 16" thermonuclear weapons (equal to 48 megatons) with a range of 2000 kilometers. While the two giants will hardly be impressed, Great Britain has just chosen to reconvert its Capenhurst isotope separation factory (the equivalent of Pierrelatte) to the manufacture of enriched uranium for electric energy production.

625
Gosset, Pierre, and Renée Gosset. [THE LATEST VERSION OF PEACE THROUGH TERROR] La dernière version de la paix par la terreur. Entreprise, no 530, 6 nov. 1965: 62-63, 65, 67, 69, 71, 73. HC271.E5, 1965

Thomas S. Power's book, Design for Survival, is an important work, as the author's career in the Strategic Air Command and on the Strategic Target Planning Staff has established his competence in the field of death. His military doctrine contains four requirements: that the United States maintain (1) massive superiority that can inflict (2) unacceptable losses (3) under any conditions of aggression, and (4) that the enemy be convinced that the United States possesses this strength. Power belongs to the school of maximum deterrence, believing that parity is a trap because it can be destroyed by a first strike, and advocating that the U.S. strength must remain technologically and quantitatively superior to that of the Soviet Union. According to Power the threat of a war unleashed by Soviet aggression is real and growing, peaceful coexistence is no more than a means for dulling American will, and disarmament is utopian. He is convinced that U.S. defenses are now sufficient to prevent the enemy from doing the essential, i.e., from destroying U.S. retaliatory power. But it is saturation that provides security; the critics of overkill do not understand the difference between a programed weapon and a weapon that successfully reaches its target. Power's calm discussion of U.S. defenses is followed by an impassioned plea that his successors not allow the deterioration of U.S. superiority. A prime purpose of the book was to persuade the enemy of this superiority.

626
Greene, Marc T. AMERICA AS A WORLD POLICE FORCE. Quarterly review, v. 303, Oct. 1965: 359-369. AP4.Q2, v. 303

The future of America as envisioned by George Washington was to be one of noninvolvement in the affairs of the world, but this role ended with the American war against Spain. While the United States demanded, through the Monroe Doctrine, that Europe stay out of the Western Hemisphere, it followed a contrary course of action in Europe, underscored by its participation in World War I. Since that time

America has multiplied its world interests. A large segment of opinion would say that "America's conduct of foreign affairs is strongly influenced by the effect that conduct is likely to have upon the voters." In their view America should not become a world police force for the purpose of protecting U.S interests in foreign countries, or for furthering U.S. ideas. In areas like the Dominican Republic, for example, the United States has intervened in the affairs of the state, claiming that attempts to constitute a Communist-inspired government in these countries must be thwarted. In the words of Walter Lippmann the United States finds itself in the position of defending its intervention as the "global policeman . . . appointed to halt Communism everywhere." Just how far can it carry this policy? Turning to Southeast Asia, many Americans warn of the danger of escalation of American intervention in Vietnam. As in the Western Hemisphere, the United States uses the excuse of "Communist containment" for its actions in South Vietnam. Public feeling is mounting in the United States to settle the crisis in Vietnam, perhaps by neutralization of North and South Vietnam with guarantees that foreign military troops and advisors will leave; or perhaps by establishment of a United Nations presence along with a closer association between the two Vietnams.

527
Haagerup, Niels J. [POLITICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE FUTURE OF DANISH DEFENSE] Politische Erwägungen über die Zukunft der dänischen Verteidigung. Wehrkunde, 14. Jahrg., Okt. 1965: 532-535. U3.W396, v. 14

In the context of a newly constituted defense policy committee in Denmark, discusses the political and economic factors that make uncertain the future development of internal or external security policies.

528
HEADING THE OTHER WAY [editorial] New republic, v. 153, Dec. 11, 1965: 5-6.
AP2.N624, v. 153

Until now President Johnson and Secretary of Defense McNamara have stressed the necessity of a freeze on costly defensive weapons systems, providing the Russians agree. But the Joint Chiefs of Staff, capitalizing upon the administration's current fear of Chinese nuclear power, are now pushing for the development of an antimissile system. Due to the increasing cost of the Vietnam War, this plan will be either temporarily set aside or begun in only a limited way. Military pressure will continue however. Jerome B. Wiesner, at the recent White House Conference on International Cooperation, predicted that by developing an antimissile system the United States would destroy the possibility of any agreement with the Russians on arms control and might bring about "a violent spasm of procurement." The Conference report also urged the adoption of "a moratorium of at least three years on new deployment of systems for ballistic-missile defense." Other proposals included the establishment of various nuclear-free zones, a nonaggression pact between NATO and members of the Warsaw Pact, and a curb on the traffic in nonnuclear weapons to developing nations. Furthermore, the United States should guarantee aid to countries under threat of attack from China and should instigate new contacts with China itself. Finally, the Conference advised making another attempt at a nuclear test ban treaty that would include underground tests.

629
Hewetson, Sir Reginald. THE BRITISH ARMY IN THE FAR EAST: A KERMIT ROOSEVELT LECTURE. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 45, Oct. 1965: 42-48. Z6723.U35, v. 45

An evaluation, by the Adjutant General of the British Army, of the United Kingdom's military commitments in the Far East. The examination includes strategic tasks, types of operations, organization, and problems of securing the peace.

630
Hirschfeld, Oswald. [THE BUNDESWEHR AFTER 10 YEARS] Die Bundeswehr nach zehn Jahren. Wehr und Wirtschaft, 9. Jahrg., Dez. 1965: 649-650.
U3.W38, v. 9

On November 12 the Bundeswehr celebrated the tenth anniversary of its formation, of the day on which Theodor Blank, the first German Minister of Defence, presented the first hundred post-war German soldiers with their commissions. Since then the hundred have grown into 430,000. How far the programme of those days for a citizens' array and how far the Bundeswehr's original mission have been fulfilled is examined in the accompanying article. The build-up of the armed forces is not yet complete nor the internal stability of the Bundeswehr yet sufficiently firm for it to go forth confidently to meet the storms. Much still remains to be done. Yet the men of the Bundeswehr can point to impressive achievements, which must be rated all the more highly since they have been obtained in the face of an ever-growing shortage of personnel. The merit of these men is also in no way diminished by the fact that successive commanders--i.e., Defence Ministers --have in varying degrees lacked felicity, perspective or moderation. (Abstract supplied)

631
Hitchens, Harold L. OBJECTIVES IN FUTURE STRATEGIC WAR: NATIONAL MILITARY POLICY GOALS AND CONTROLLED CONFLICT. Air University review, v. 17, Nov./Dec. 1965: 43-51.
TL501.A5574, v. 17

In his statement on the military budget for fiscal year 1966 Secretary McNamara set forth the twin objectives of U.S. nuclear strategy as "assured destruction" (the ability to destroy an aggressor even after a successful surprise strike) and "damage limitation" (the ability to blunt the force of an enemy attack by offensive and defensive measures, thereby protecting the U.S. population and industry). But deterrence and damage limitation are concepts applicable only to total war; before that extreme is reached U.S. strategy must be prepared to counter problems throughout the entire spectrum of possible conflict. The United States must maintain the capability to wage controlled strategic war. The enemy must be given to understand that in any crisis he faces the entire U.S. military machine and that the United States will employ as much of the power of that machine necessary to achieve success. Thus the enemy is deterred at the upper level of the spectrum of conflict by the realization that he will suffer unacceptable damage, while his actions at lower levels must be weighed against the possibility that they might escalate conflict to the point where the risk of damage to himself becomes unsatisfactorily great. Under these circumstances, where assured destruction is viewed as "a last-resort measure" and the terminal act of a series of strategic steps, survivability of weapons delivery systems becomes

the most compelling requirement. Damage limitation includes not only active and passive defense measures but the ability to influence the manner in which the enemy employs his forces or structures his war machine. The Soviets, who have traditionally concentrated more on defense, might be compelled to devote even more resources to defensive forces (with a corresponding decrease in offensive forces) were the United States to create "a variety of offensive systems, each of which poses a different kind of threat to Soviet defenses." Damage avoidance can also be realized through technological improvements in weapons systems. "With the employment of manned systems and nuclear weapons of very low yields, nuclear wars can be fought at intensity levels lower than massive conventional wars and with less involvement of noncombat population and neutrals. The logistical advantages are obvious." A strategic force capable of responding at any level of intensity provides the greatest flexibility in the face of aggression and provocation.

632
Höpker, Wolfgang. [THE NAVY--AN EXPENSIVE LUXURY? A CONVERSATION WITH INSPECTOR ADMIRAL ZENKER] Die Flotte--ein kostspieliger Luxus? Ein Gespräch mit dem Inspekteur Admiral Zenker. Christ und Welt, 18. Jahrg., 22. Okt. 1965: 3-4. BR4.C37, v. 18

Interview with Karl-Adolf Zenker, Commanding Officer of the West German Navy. Adm. Zenker speaks on the role of the German Federal Republic's Navy in NATO's defense policy as well as on the need for and the principles of modernization of the navy in its 10th year of existence.

633
Hounau, Général. [THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN NUCLEAR STRATEGY] Évolution de la stratégie nucléaire américaine. Revue de défense nationale, 21. année, nov. 1965: 1762-1768. D410.R45, v. 21

U.S. "grand strategy" has three basic components: deterrence, defense, and long-term research and development. By trying to keep up with the industrially stronger and more flexible United States in this last area the Soviet Union runs into serious economic difficulties. American strategy relies fundamentally on maintaining superior nuclear forces that are capable of making a counterattack under the least favorable conditions. Such superiority weighs heavily in limited war decisions but cannot exercise an absolute role. Dangerous situations in Cuba and Berlin were controllable, as both sides wanted to avoid catastrophe. Now a number of ties between the United States and the Soviet Union exist to safeguard their vital interests: tacit agreements, permanent diplomatic contact, disarmament discussions, and the hot line. In Vietnam the United States is fighting an enemy with different views on atomic weapons and an enemy that could underestimate the danger of escalating the war. The U.S. strategic concept of graduated deterrence and flexible response leaves the decision of crossing escalation thresholds to the weaker enemy. This new American strategy falls short of the "all or nothing" military superiority of the 1950's and is less conventional than the counterforce doctrine of 1963-64. The latter was made obsolete by the decreased vulnerability of Soviet strategic forces. The major task of American military thinkers is to devise the system of deployment and strategy that would best utilize the weapons superiority and economic potential of the United States. Neither Russia nor China appears economically capable, for a long time to come, of imitating the U.S. weapons capability, from which, moreover, America draws the benefits of increased prosperity, heightened economic development, and scientific progress.

634
IS CANADA HELPING RED CHINA TO CONQUER THE WORLD? Canada month, v. 6, Jan. 1966: 26-33. F1001.C1623, v. 6

There can be no reasonable doubt that Red China intends to conquer the world. The war in Southeast Asia is but a dress rehearsal for the eventual attack on Australia. Chinese thrusts against India are designed to remove that country from a position of influence in Asia, leaving China as the Asian superpower, capable of challenging the Soviet Union from a position of strength. Chinese money has been poured into Africa and Latin America in an attempt to create a Peking-oriented alliance widespread enough to circumvent Russian and American isolation tactics. Everything in China, including agricultural labor, is directed toward industrial production and growth. Even during poor harvests the Chinese have exported sorely needed meat and grain to acquire foreign credits essential to industry. Anxious to secure customers for its surplus wheat, Canada has ignored the importance of food products to Chinese industrial and military expansion and has exported wheat to Peking. Canadians have calmed their consciences by arguing that well-fed Reds are likely to become less bellicose, while trade might foster rapprochement. But imports of Western wheat, even when supplemental to the Chinese diet, do not add appreciably to the daily ration of the individual Chinese. The question of whether Chinese soldiers marched into India "with their bellies filled with Canadian wheat" remains to be answered. Does the wheat really feed the population of China or is it stockpiled to serve future strategic needs? Is it used for international barter (as the Chinese use opium) or to free agricultural workers for industrial production, thereby helping to strengthen a regime committed to Canada's destruction? Until Canadians become convinced that wheat does not serve a strategic purpose in the schema of Chinese Communist expansion the wheat trade with China should be terminated.

635
JAPAN: A SENSE OF INDEPENDENCE. Newsweek, v. 66, Dec. 20, 1965: 46, 48-50. AP2.N6772, v. 66

Assesses current relations between Japan and the United States, and points up Japanese dissatisfaction, as reflected in recent opinion polls and official statements. The most immediate cause of this dissatisfaction, the war in Vietnam, has been the catalyst in speeding up Japan's attempt to cease being "a client state of the United States." Revival of Japan's economic fortunes, coupled with national pride and pacifistic inclinations, has spurred many to call for a divorce of Japan from U.S. involvement in Vietnam, Asia, and other world areas. While responsible Japanese decry any radical break with the United States both moderate and leftist elements press for development of an independent Japanese foreign policy. The China problem lurks in the back of many policymakers' minds, along with a tendency to identify themselves with Asian nationalistic feeling. There is little likelihood that any radical break will result between Japan and the United States. But,

because Japan wants a reconciliation with the Soviet Union and would like to steer a more independent course in developing foreign policy, the Japanese will have to loosen their strong ties with the United States.

636
Jen, Ku-ping. JAPANESE MILITARISM ON THE ROAD BACK. Peking review, v. 8, Dec. 10, 1965: 5-8. DS701.P42, v. 8

Maintains that Japan, aided by the United States and by domestic monopoly capital, has embarked on an aggression-oriented course of rearmament, and that it has succeeded in developing an impressive economic and military war potential.

637
Kageneck, August, Graf. [FRANCE FIRMLY MARCHES ON THE ATOMIC ROUTE] Frankreich marschiert entschlossen auf der Atomstrasse. Kampftruppen, Nr. 6, Dez. 1965: 181.
P&GP RR

Contends, on the basis of the French military budget for 1966, that in order to proceed with its ambitious nuclear armament program, France has decided to radically reduce its conventional combat forces, especially tanks. The author expresses the view that the French "Force Nucléaire Stratégique [Strategic Nuclear Force] has for several months been no longer a project in a ministerial drawer, but a reality." The first generation of that force, consisting of 50 Mirage-IV-type bombers, will be ready in the summer of 1966.

638
Katz, Amrom H. THE SHORT RUN AND THE LONG WALK. War/peace report, v. 5, Dec. 1965: 3-4.
P&GP RR

Solution of the Vietnam conflict is urgent, but must take into account less pressing yet more important questions such as China's future, its relations with the Soviet Union, and subsequent "wars of national liberation." The settlement of Southeast Asian problems would have a worldwide effect. Thus far almost all possible proposals have been made to end the Vietnam struggle. Whatever approaches are used, "visible and significant and continuing military success" must accompany them if Hanoi is to negotiate. Support of other nations, whether through the United Nations or informal groups, must be enlisted in the search for peace. Regardless of the outcome in Vietnam, the United States must be prepared for the "wars of national liberation" that are sure to come. Without military success, economic and social projects in Southeast Asia cannot be realized.

639
Kennan, George F. [ILLUSION ABOUT AN EARLY PEACE: COMMENTS ON AMERICAN POLICY REGARDING VIETNAM] Die Illusion vom schnellen Frieden: Bemerkungen zur amerikanischen Vietnam-Politik. Die Zeit, 21. Jahrg., 18. Jan. 1966: 3.
AP30.Z39, v. 21

No one in the United States can sympathize with America's adversaries in Vietnam, who, if they could, would subject the whole country to Communist tyranny. On the other hand it is difficult to expect any South Vietnamese regime to be a guardian and defender of democracy; the understanding of democratic ideas has been spread throughout the world very sparsely. Thinking about Vietnam's future, two questions come to the fore. To what extent will a Vietnamese regime be the political and military instrument of a major Communist power? What impact would the settlement of the Vietnamese question have on neigboring areas? Due to the Sino-Soviet conflict it seems improbable that a future peacetime Vietnamese government would subordinate itself totally to either Red China or the Soviet Union. Even a complete Viet-Cong victory would not necessarily mean an automatic extension of Chinese power. The Vietnamese Communists' present dependence on Peking has been conditioned by the war. The Vietnamese situation is too elusive for consideration under conventional categories of international law. Pledging American obligation to some questionable political entities in South Vietnam in justification of the United States involvement seems to be absurd. In view of the fact that the other side has shown no sign of readiness for a peaceful settlement, however, the United States cannot stop the war instantly. A gradual, unilateral deescalation of war, on the part of both combatants, may eventually end the conflict. Due to local conditions a quick, total military victory by U.S. forces seems improbable. American involvement in the conflict has deferred American achievement of other, far more important foreign policy objectives, such as a détente with the Soviet Union and the settlement of the German problem, the question of nuclear disarmament, the future of the United Nations, and the problem of China.

640
Leites, Nathan C. THE "EUROPE" OF THE FRENCH. [Santa Monica, Calif.] Rand Corp., 1965. 41 p. (Rand Corporation. Memorandum RM-4584-ISA)
Q180.A1R36, no. 4584

Sets forth French reactions to the prospect of European unity, as part of a Rand series devoted to "countries that possess independent nuclear capabilities." Leites takes the view that De Gaulle's popularity among the French people stems not from his foreign policy but from the fact that he has brought and maintained prosperity. The caveat to those who hope to follow De Gaulle is to "emphasize general prosperity rather than national power." French primacy in Europe, then, rests on the default of other nations, and, possessing it, the French have attempted to heighten it (one means being the acquisition of the only nuclear force on the Continent). Despite its rather blatant nationalism France accepts "the Europe of shared facilities."

641
"LET US JOIN TOGETHER TO RESIST U.S. IMPERIALISM." Peking review, v. 8, Dec. 10, 1965: 9-11.
DS701.P42, v. 8

In a November 26, 1965, message to the Solidarity Conference of the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, Bertrand Russell enumerated the means and analyzed the effects of U.S. global imperialism, as follows. In order to control 60 percent of the world's resources the United States has created an "unparalleled war machine": 3,300 military bases; a foreign policy of "paratroop interventions, marine landings, assassinations, coups d'etat and the corrupt bribery of public figures"; and an economy more than half supported by war production. The only solution is for the oppressed peoples to struggle, peaceful coexistence having been proven useless. "Peace cannot be realized by placing hopes on the good-will of those whose power depends on the continuation of such exploitation and

on the ever-increasing scale of military production." If nuclear holocaust is to be avoided U.S. values must be rejected and its policies resisted by the whole world.

642
Lund, Nils. [SWEDISH SECURITY POLICIES UNDER DISCUSSION] Schwedische Sicherheitspolitik in der Diskussion. Wehrkunde, 14. Jahrg., Okt. 1965: 535-537. U3.W396, v. 14

In May 1965 a report on the further development of Sweden's military defense was released by the Swedish supreme commander. Domestic reactions to this paper, entitled "ÖB 65," were noteworthy. The great majority of newspapers favored all its recommendations except one on nuclear weapons research. The report outlined three levels of expenditure. Right wing papers tended to support the higher level while left wing journals opted for the lower defense costs. Most were in agreement with the basic defense objectives publicized by the military. However, feelings ran high over the issue of nuclear weapons research. Fifteen out of 21 Social-Democrat papers rejected the idea completely, typically citing its bad effects on Sweden's public image and disarmament negotiations. Only one Social-Democratic newspaper supported nuclear weapons research; the other five admitted the unhappy possibility that international developments might compel Swedish acquisition of these weapons. Opinion in the opposition press was similarly divided. "ÖB 65" is one of the best available examples of publicizing defense information in a democratic state. It will likely have the effect of easing public acceptance of greater defense efforts and even of nuclear weapons production should disarmament negotiations fail and proliferation continue.

643
Maass, Friedrich. [THE CHINESE DRAGON TODAY: SITUATION REPORT ON COMMUNIST CHINA] Der chinesische Drachen heute: Situationsbericht über das kommunistische China. Wehr und Wirtschaft, 9. Jahrg., 10. Nov. 1965: 590-595. U3.W38, v. 9

For old China Hands, and certainly for the Cabinet in New Delhi, it was in no way surprising that the Chinese People's Republic should sooner or later enter into the Kashmir conflict. The ultimatum to India was issued at the very moment when this country found itself involved in hostilities with Pakistan, which in the present state of gradual economic consolidation must inevitably mean a considerable setback from the long-term economic and social points of view. India can afford even less to embark on hostilities against Red China, which only recently provided it with a display of its military superiority no less than its aggressiveness. Western observers seem to be somewhat inclined to underrate the military and economic potential of the Chinese People's Republic. They regularly point to the relatively under-developed technical standard of the country's economy, in which much effort must be expended on overcoming shortages. The equipment of the Red Chinese divisions with obsolescent conventional weapons is also described as a crippling handicap. Yet it is known that China has been endeavoring to build up an atomic potential and that the weapons and aircraft it has been producing for years under Russian licence are unmistakably of high quality, though perhaps not available in adequate numbers. This analysis of the economic, political and military situation in Red China will provide a useful aid to an understanding of Chinese intentions and of potential developments in the dramatic affairs of Central Asia. (Abstract supplied)

644
[THE MILITARY BUDGET ADOPTED BY THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY] Le budget des armées adopté par l'Assemblée Nationale. Air & cosmos, no 124, 30 oct. 1965: 33, 46. P&GP RR

Information compiled from debates and speeches in the French National Assembly relating to the equipment envisaged in the 1966 budget for future operations of each branch of the armed forces.

645
Millar, Thomas B. AUSTRALIA'S DEFENCE. [Melbourne] Melbourne University Press; New York, Cambridge University Press [1965] 198 p. illus. UA870.M5

Contents.--The defence heritage.--Some strategic considerations.--Threats to Australian security.--Defence agreements and arrangements.--Australia's defence organization and capacity.--Regional aspects of the defence of Australia.--Conclusions and proposals.

Describes the main threats to Australian security and the means of opposing them. Information on Australian defense expenditures, armed forces, and the like is included in a series of appendices.

646
[MISSILES FOR THE ZONE] Raketen für die Zone. Atlantische Welt, 6. Jahrg., Jan. 1966: 15. V3.A8, v. 6

Describes the Soviet-made tactical missiles that at present constitute the standard equipment of the East German army. The article states that the time gap between the introduction of a new weapon model in the Soviet Union and the receipt of that model as standard equipment by satellite armies is usually 2 to 3 years.

647
Monitor, Hans-Jörg. [NATIONAL DEFENSE IN THE GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC--A CRITICAL LOOK] Die Landesverteidigung in der Bundesrepublik--eine kritische Betrachtung. Wehrkunde, 14. Jahrg., Sept.-Nov. 1965: 450-454, 525-529, 586-590. U3.W396, v. 14

Compares and contrasts German national (non-NATO) defense measures with the national defense apparatus of the Scandanavian countries, Switzerland, and Austria. This comparison revolves about major areas of military defense, inculcation and retention of morale in the population and armed forces, civil defense, and economic defense. Several reforms of Germany's defense along the lines of its neighbors' achievements are suggested, e.g., a more even distribution of forces than the present 90 percent under NATO command and 10 percent under national command; a more active reserve policy; greater instruction of the adult and school age population in defense; civil defense education, inspection, and provisioning; and, finally, an honest assessment and fulfillment of the requirements for sustaining the civilian population and defense forces in the event of a war with modern weapons.

648
Morgenthau, Hans J. A BALANCE OF POWER PERSPECTIVE: WHAT ARE U.S. INTERESTS IN VIETNAM? War/peace report, Dec. 1965: 5-6.
P&GP RR

From a rational point of view the U.S. interest in Asia is to maintain or restore the balance of power. As China threatens to upset this balance by political and cultural predominance, the United States responds with a military containment policy that is "irrelevant." Instead the United States should try to keep Asian countries militarily and politically independent of China. That is, the United States should be interested "in the containment of communism per se only insofar as its expansion is tantamount to the expansion of Chinese power." However three irrational past actions prevent adoption of sane policies: the assumption "that the peripheral military containment of China serves our national interests in Southeast Asia, the equating of "the Viet Cong with the communist government of North Vietnam and the latter with the government of China," and the overimportance the United States has attached to the defense of the status quo of 1954 in South Vietnam. General Giap's propaganda statement on the Vietnam Wars has prevented rational consideration of what is actually happening there. In order to attain true objectives in Southeast Asia, America must negotiate to withdraw militarily and should support a stable government in South Vietnam. Both the Soviet Union and the United States should check China's power.

649
[NEW WEAPONS FOR THE AIR FORCE IN THE YEARS 1970-75] Neues Luftwaffengerät für die Jahre 1970/75, by wowa [pseud.] Deutscher Aerokurier, 9. Jahrg., Nov. 1965: 597-598.
P&GP RR

Reports on the press conference given by the Inspector General of the West German Air Force, Werner Panitzki, on the air force's new procurement policy. General Panitzki outlines the chief characteristics of the new weapons systems to be acquired by the air force in the next 5 to 15 years. Some of these systems are to be developed jointly by West Germany and its allies.

650
1965 GREEN BOOK: A STATUS REPORT ON THE U.S. ARMY. Army, v. 15, Nov. 1965: 38-144.
Ul.A893, v. 15

Presents status reports by U.S. Army Commands. A chronology of major events of the past year, photographs of commanding officers, and a directory of conventional and nuclear weapons are given.

651
Okumiya, Masatake. JAPAN'S SELF-DEFENSE FORCES. In United States Naval Institute, Annapolis. Proceedings, v. 91, Dec. 1965: 26-35.
Vl.U8, v. 91

Discusses the history and operation of Japan's Self-Defense Forces, with suggestions for clearer definition of their organization. Charts show the structure of the Defense Agency and Japanese defense spending for the past 7 years.

652
Paltridge, Shane. AUSTRALIA AND THE DEFENSE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA. Foreign affairs, v. 44, Oct. 1965: 49-61. D410.F6, v. 44

Covers Australia's defense policy, military forces, and future developments. Five objectives underlie Australia's policy: defense of its own security; cooperation with non-Communist Asian countries; collective security arrangements with the United States and the United Kingdom for defending Southeast Asia; deterrence of Communist aggression there; and support to projects for making the United Nations an effective instrument of collective security.

653
Pavlenko, N. [COLLOQUIUM IN DRESDEN] Kollokvium v Dresdene. Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, g. 7, dek. 1965: 91-101. DK50.A3, v. 7

Recounts the activities of a meeting of representatives of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, East Germany, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia at the Frederick Engels Military Academy in Dresden, East Germany, Sept. 23-24, 1965. The meeting was called to "disclose the ways and methods of preparing for war used by the West German militarists." Those assembled discussed the manner in which Bonn plans to achieve access to nuclear weapons, the West German conception of the war it intends to wage, West German military doctrine and strategy, and the content of the militaristic propaganda program launched by the West German press, radio, and television. At the final session Professor A. Norden "described the territorial pretensions of the West German imperialists" and disputed the notion that attention to West Germany's future plan is diverting resources from the struggle against U.S. imperialism.

654
Petrov, D. JAPAN AND THE WAR IN VIET-NAM. International affairs (Moscow) Nov. 1965: 36-41.
D839.I465, 1965

As U.S. strategy in Asia continues to deteriorate the United States tries to attract to its Vietnam venture allies who might shoulder some of its humiliation, share some of its moral responsibility, and prevent its isolation. Of all its allies Washington would most like to involve Japan in Southeast Asia. The Japanese Constitution does not allow the use of troops in such an effort, but greater access to Japanese air and naval bases would permit the United States to escalate the war and draw Japan closer to U.S. policy. Such a step might "undermine the improvement of relations between Japan and other Asian countries, which has been giving a headache to Washington politicians." Although Japan remains reluctant to become involved in Vietnam through active support or large loans to Saigon, the United States utilizes Japan's great military-industrial potential as a low-cost source of materiel and armaments for U.S. forces in Asia. Air strikes against North Vietnam from the base at Okinawa draw Japan ever closer to participation in imperialist strategy, for Japan enjoys potential sovereignty over Okinawa. There is always the danger that Japanese policymakers might ignore the protests being voiced by millions of their countrymen (as Washington closes its ears to peace movements and demonstrations in the United States) and allow their country to slide into the Vietnam war. As a highly industrialized Asian power and a military ally of the United States, Japan enjoys a remarkable opportunity to exert great influence upon the course of events in Asia. Japan can realize no greater vocation than that of helping to stamp out the conflagration in Asia by withholding support from U.S. aggression.

655
Pliachenko, P. COSMIC PLANS OF THE AMERICAN MILITARISTS. In U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. Soviet military translations, no. 192, July 27, 1965. (U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. JPRS: 31, 261) p. 22-26. P&GP RR
"CSO: 1850-S."
"TT: 65-31758."
"Following is the translation of an article . . . in the Russian-language periodical Kryl'ya Rodiny (Wings of the Homeland), No. 5, May 1965; pages 28-29."

Acquaints the Soviet reader with various American space programs. Colonel Pliachenko rebukes American militarists for regarding outer space as a prospective arena for military operations and for diverting the U.S. space effort toward military ends.

656
Power, Thomas S. DESIGN FOR SURVIVAL [by] Thomas S. Power with Albert A. Arnhym. New York, Coward-McCann [1965] 255 p.
UA23.P63

Whether the threat confronting the world is Communist aggression, nuclear war, or limited conflict, a policy of deterrence is the "only acceptable solution to the problem of national survival." Military superiority and the ability to negotiate from a position of strength provide the basis for deterrence. Present proposals for arms control and disarmament would negate them. The Strategic Air Command holds the answer to averting national disaster, be it all-out war or a prolonged and debilitating limited conflict. The ultimate weapon, however, is not a sophisticated weapon of the future; it is the interest and dedication of the American people, who, given the awareness of the dangers of the nuclear age, can contribute to the continued effectiveness of the deterrent system.

657
THE POWER IN THE PENTAGON. Newsweek, v. 66, Dec. 6, 1965: 30-34. AP2.N6772, v. 66

Reports on the vast power exercised in military and nonmilitary matters by Secretary of Defense McNamara. Ways in which McNamara's decisions influence national economic life, foreign policy, NATO, and American defense policy are detailed and his strategy and the results of the reorganization carried out within the Defense Department are delineated.

658
Saha, Sisirranjan. A RE-APPRAISAL OF 'NON-ALIGNMENT.' Calcutta review, v. 175, Apr. 1965: 16-23. AP8.C2, v. 175

India's policy of nonalinement was challenged by brutal Chinese aggression in 1962. The policy proved viable, permitting help and sympathy to flow from all quarters. As a nonalined country India has contributed to world peace, and has been able to develop a sound economy and avoid becoming "a target of thermonuclear war even during the critical moments of her war with China." But a new and very disturbing factor came into the international situation with the Chinese nuclear explosion. China's close neighbors may now find it safer to sacrifice some of their freedom of action. India might thus find it necessary either to develop its own nuclear weapons or to seek a British-Soviet-American nuclear guarantee. Both alternatives would compromise its nonalinement--the one by heightening international tension and the other by making India dependent on foreign guarantees. Still, nonalinement can be a successful and vital policy as long as hot war does not break out.

659
Schenke, Wolf. [FOR GERMANY: A STRATEGY OF PEACE] Für Deutschland: eine Strategie des Friedens. Neue Politik, 10. Jahrg., 7. Aug. 1965: 3-4; 14. Aug.: 8-9; 28. Aug.: 3-4.
H5.N377, v. 10

Proliferation of nuclear weapons can be prevented only if the nuclear powers renounce their own arsenals, because no state willingly submits to a monopoly of power. Yet this is an age of nihilism where self-restraint has no place; thus the United States and the Soviet Union will continue their insane striving after power. They have overlooked the fact that while their ability to destroy has increased enormously, their influence in the world and their capabilities to resolve political and social problems peacefully have declined. Bonn's nuclear policies are unrealistic, because participation in a multilateral nuclear force would provide West Germany no greater degree of security. Moreover its demands for such participation are unattainable in that the United States is mostly interested in Soviet agreement to a nonproliferation treaty. Why then does Bonn not voluntarily renounce nuclear weapons? It can expect no immediate compensation, but the long-run consequences would be greater freedom and therefore greater strength. This path requires a reversal of old thought patterns. Any war, offensive or defensive, would spell Germany's extinction. The belief that a victim of aggression must defend himself is no longer valid for the German Federal Republic. Its policy must be to provide for peace rather than prepare for war. This involves forward-looking and aggressive policies that can make good neighbors out of potentially aggressive ones, to insure that Germany will never be attacked.

660
Schreiner, Egon. [THE NEW (OLD) NATIONALISM] Der neue (alte) Nationalismus. Marxistische Blätter, 3. Jahrg., Sept./Okt. 1965: 30-35.
P&GP RR

Examines the origins and character of contemporary nationalism, with particular reference to West Germany. The author contends that the West German "imperialistic nationalism" has aggressive aims in regard to Slavic and Communist nations. He emphasizes the difference between "imperialist" and "progressive" nationalism, the latter being a movement of the oppressed peoples opposed to colonialism and imperialism.

661
Sedin, Lev. THE WASHINGTON "PEACE OFFENSIVE." New times, no. 2, Jan. 10, 1966: 14-15.
D839.N483, 1966

Surveys the reaction of the international press to the U.S. peace offensive and the pause in U.S. bombing of North Vietnam. Mr. Sedin declares world opinion supports the belief that these diplomatic maneuvers are but a cover for increased military operations in Southeast Asia.

662
Senter, Raymond D. NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN ORBIT. New republic, v. 153, Nov. 27, 1965: 11-12.
AP2.N624, v. 153

The Russians' boast that the three-stage rocket paraded in Moscow Nov. 7 "can deliver [its]

surprise blow on the first or any other orbit around the earth" may have launched an even costlier arms race--one in space. Previous objections to certain features and dangers of orbital weapons made it easy, 2 years ago, for the United States and the U.S.S.R. to reach agreement on banning bombs in orbit. Nevertheless, concern that the Soviets might use a space weapon for blackmail during an international crisis led the United States into the development of an antisatellite weapon. There is some feeling that the recent Soviet announcement indicates their fear that the Manned Orbital Laboratory (MOL) is really intended to be a bombardment satellite, as an article in the October 1965 issue of Air Force Magazine would lead one to believe. "It would be unfortunate, but certainly understandable, if articles such as these provided ammunition which enabled the Soviet military to gain financial support for an expanded military space effort."

663
Sokolovskii, Vasilii D., ed. [MILITARY STRATEGY] Militär-Strategie. Hrsg. unter der Redaktion von W.D. Sokolowski. Deutsche Übersetzung aus dem Russichen der 2. verb. und ergänzten Aufl. Deutsche Einleitung und Anmerkungen von Uwe Nerlich. Frauenfeld, Schweiz, Huber [1965] 574 p.
U162.S615

Contents.--General principles.--The imperialist states' military strategy and preparation of new wars. --The development of Soviet military strategy (1917-45).--The character of modern war.--Questions about building up the armed forces.--Methods of warfare.--Preparing the country to ward off aggression.--Leadership of the armed forces.--Bibliography.

A comprehensive Soviet study of the subject in modern terms. The bibliography was prepared at the Research Institute of the [West] German Foreign Policy Association and includes both Communist and non-Communist sources. The introduction, by Uwe Nerlich, discusses divergencies in Western appraisals of Soviet foreign policy as well as the development of East-West relations, and critically evaluates the concept of Soviet military strategy.

664
Sommer, Theo. [MISPLACED COMPLAINTS: BONN'S CONFUSED NUCLEAR POLICY] Bellen vor dem falschen Baum: Bonns unklare Atompolitik. Die Zeit, 20. Jahrg., 21. Dec. 1965: 1.
AP30.Z39, v. 20

Contrary to Chancellor Ludwig Erhard's expressed belief, the postwar period has not yet ended, as evidenced by the continued partition of Germany, the lack of action by West German allies toward changing that situation, and their reluctance to admit the German Federal Republic to nuclear arms sharing. Since its establishment NATO has embodied, two qualities for Germans: the security of and discrimination against their nation. This explains the dropping of the MLF project and similar ideas by the allies. Unfortunately the West German government has formulated no clear policy on these matters, and government officials are widely split in their views. In fact these views stretch from the idea of joint atomic arms projects by "the nuclear have-nots" to the concept of West Germany sharing in NATO's nuclear strategy without actually exerting physical control over the weapons. A similar split of opinion has come about in the opposition party. Nuclear arms sharing by the German Federal Republic is not, as some mistakenly believe, "a question of justice or injustice, but, quite simply, a problem of security." West Germany's security requires (1) that without Bonn's consent no nuclear arms be withdrawn from West Germany, (2) that West Germany participate "in target and strategic planning concerning the West's entire atomic potential," and (3) "that the German Federal Republic not be excluded from international 'crisis management,'" should such crises involve Germany. Most importantly, West Germans should change their "wailing wall" attitude in matters of nuclear policy, especially regarding the proposed nuclear nonproliferation treaty.

665
[STAGNATION BUDGET] Keine Budgetaufstockung. Wehr und Wirtschaft, 9. Jahrg., 10. Nov. 1965: 572-573.
U3.W38, v. 9

The French defence Budget 1966, obviously designed primarily as a brake on inflation, is so restricted as to create serious problems in certain fields. Of the total appropriations of 22014 million francs, 2910 million are for the Air Force, 1755 for the Army, 1612 for the Navy, and 4989 for common expenditures. The major portion of the total goes to the strengthening of the French nuclear effort (Mirage 4 and its atom bombs, SSBS and MSBS missiles, nuclear submarines, tactical weapons, nuclear research centre in the Pacific). The Air Force budget includes 560 million francs for research, development and prototypes, 230 for equipment already in quantity production, 280 for new or already initiated development, and 1392 for manufacture. On the civil aviation side, expenditure on the Concorde takes 370 of the total 397 million francs, leaving very inadequate funds for such items as personnel and maintenance of the ground organization. In the civil space field the total for 1966 is 386 million francs, of which 140 million are for international projects and 220 million for the Guiana rocket range.
(Abstract supplied)

666
Tarr, David W. THE AMERICAN MILITARY PRESENCE ABROAD. Orbis, v. 9, fall 1965: 630-654.
D839.068, v. 9

Considers the functions of U.S. forces and bases overseas to determine whether recent developments in strategy, armaments, and technology have removed their usefulness. The author examines seven primary functions of overseas bases: "(1) direct and explicit strategic nuclear deterrence; (2) indirect and implicit deterrence; (3) alliance cohesion; (4) local defense; (5) military display and demonstration; (6) intervention; and (7) control over the resources and dimensions of conflict." Mr. Tarr concludes that strategic deterrence of the Soviet Union and Red China can now be accomplished without the services of overseas bases but observes that a U.S. military presence in Europe and Asia will remain an integral part of U.S. policy so long as the political and military purpose of U.S. armed forces is containment of communism.

667
Thomer, Egbert. [NINTH YEAR OF THE BUNDESWEHR] Neun Jahre deutsche Bundeswehr. Revue militaire générale, no 8, oct. 1965: 379-385.
U2.R48, 1965

Includes summaries in English and French.

Describes the buildup of men and weapons in the German armed services from 1955 through 1964.

668
$20 BILLION QUESTION. Newsweek, v. 66, Dec. 13, 1965: 60, 62. AP2.N6772, v. 66

Describes the Nike-Sprint antiballistic missile (ABM) system now capable of development and deployment and questions whether the $20 billion program will ever be completed. The argument that ABM deployment would lead to an upward spiral in the arms race and result in less security for both the Soviet Union and the United States is contrasted with the statements of "some Pentagon strategists" that ABM deployment is intended not to defend against a Soviet attack but as insurance against the day when China acquires nuclear missiles.

669
Verteidigungspolitischer Kongress der CDU, Kassel, 1964. [PEACE AND FREEDOM . . .] Frieden und Freiheit . . . Bonn, Presse- und Informationsdienste der Christlich Demokratischen Union Deutschlands [1965] 324 p. UA710.V45, 1964

Minutes of the West German Christian Democratic Union's Congress on the German Federal Republic's defense policy. The report includes, interalia, papers by West German Defense Minister Kai Uwe von Hassel ("The Tasks of German Security Policy"), Gen. Adolf Heusinger ("The Atlantic Aliance"), Prof. Gerhard Möbus ("Ideological Principles of the West German Armed Forces"), and Dr. Georg Kliesing ("The Christian Democratic Union's Policy Regarding National Defense").

670
Waskey, Donald R. CHINA'S PRESENT ATOMIC CAPABILITY. Minority of one, v. 8, Jan. 1966: 13-15. AP2.M55985, v. 8

Speculates on China's nuclear power and possible strategy. The American people have been informed that "many years" and "great efforts" remain before China can be a threat. Yet the yield and complex nature of its first and second nuclear tests suggest that China may have already developed and stockpiled usable weapons. Nuclear information found in the literature today nets a much shorter and easier path to an explodable bomb than that followed by the United States. Although China may not possess the air or rocket strategy for the conventional delivery of an atomic bomb, if China has a stockpile of dispersed and hidden nuclear weapons it is capable of retaliation against the United States and American bases in Asia. Instead of seeking a confrontation with China, a nuclear threat "many years" and "great efforts" away, the United States must seek coexistence with China, perhaps already a great nuclear power.

671
Waterkamp, Rainer. [CHINA'S MILITARY STRATEGY] Chinas Militärstrategie. Atomzeitalter; Information und Meinung, 10. Okt. 1965. P&GP RR

A well documented history of the development of Red Chinese military doctrine up to the present. The author points out the existence of 2 schools of thought in Peking toward China's nuclear strategy. He concludes that China's main strategic weapon lies in the propagation of a fear psychosis among neighboring nations, a phenomena difficult for the United States to counteract.

672
Zitzewitz, Horst von. [NORWEGIAN TOTAL DEFENSE] Die Gesamtverteidigung Norwegens. Wehrkunde, 14. Jahrg., Sept. 1965: 459-465. U3.W396, v. 14

Sketches Norway's national defense efforts--the organization, size, and duties of military and civilian defense services; expenditures; NATO ties; and the country's unfavorable geomilitary position. Norwegian defense is complicated by a strong pacifist current and opposition to atomic weaponry. Its NATO commitment thus stipulates that in peacetime allied troops will not be stationed in Norway and national troops will not be integrated with NATO forces until war breaks out. The Soviet Union is campaigning with some success to gain Norwegian and Danish support for a slightly revised version of the Rapacki Plan, which would include both these nations in a denuclearized central Europe. A serious threat stems from the positioning of eight Soviet divisions on Norway's northernmost border, ready to seize ice-free ports on the Norweigan coast for wartime fleet support. Norway spends relatively little on active defense, but it possesses an excellent civil defense apparatus and a program that physically and psychologically prepares the population and economy to resist aggression.

3. Bilateral and Multilateral Policies and Strategies

673
Arzinger, Rudolf. THE POTSDAM AGREEMENT AND EUROPEAN SECURITY. German foreign policy, v. 4, no. 5, 1965: 368-379. P&GP RR

Explains the system of European security outlined by the Potsdam Agreement. The author asserts that although the present situation in Europe in no way corresponds to that foreseen by its framers, the principles expressed in the Agreement--eliminating nazism and fascism, preventing the unleashing of another war by Germany, and maintaining peace in Europe--are still valid.

674
Atlantic Council of the United States. POLICY STATEMENT OF THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL. Atlantic community quarterly, v. 3, winter 1965/66: 419-424. P&GP RR

Vigorous U.S. leadership to meet the impending crisis in NATO, and specific developments in the fields of foreign, defense and economic policy, are advocated in this statement approved by the Officers and Directors of the Council. It asks for a clear declaration that a major goal of U.S. policy is a true Atlantic Community, for an invitation to our Allies to explore with us means of developing it, and for demonstration of U.S. willingness to participate fully in its development. (Abstract supplied.)

675
Beaufre, André. THE SHARING OF NUCLEAR RESPONSIBILITIES--A PROBLEM IN NEED OF SOLUTION. International affairs (London) v. 41, July 1965: 411-419. JX1.I53, v. 41.

The transformation of the strategic situation in the last 15 years has made necessary a revision of NATO concepts. New thinking must emphasize deterrence rather than defense and peacetime rather than war. Because nuclear war has become unthinkable, nuclear deterrence is losing its credibility. This credibility can be restored by the creation of a minimum of "spontaneous risk" to potential aggressors or, in other words, by a system according to which the enemy remains uncertain of the response. Now there exists an "excess

of stability at the nuclear threshold." Any solution to the problem of the sharing of nuclear responsibilities must involve coordination rather than integration of deterrent strategies, for integration stabilizes the nuclear situation. At present NATO planning deals only with possible war. The alliance could usefully form a committee for considering eventual peacetime crises, a crisis management committee. Even though several nuclear decision centers are required to maintain uncertainty, NATO still needs to continue planning for war and, especially, to predetermine a command system for wartime nuclear forces.

676
Belot, Raymond de. [SINGAPORE AND THE INDIAN OCEAN] Singapour et l'océan Indien. Revue politique des idées et des institutions, 54. année, août/sept. 1965: 178-183.
H3.R38, v. 54

Foresees a growing strategic importance for Western bases from the Cape to Aden, from Aden to Singapore, and in Australia, and contrasts this need with national threats to the Cape-to-Australia bases similar to the restrictions recently placed by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew on Britain's military installation at Singapore. In minor conflicts aeronaval fleets provide the requisite strength; all-out war will be fought with long-range and Polaris missiles; however the likely increase of large-scale conventional conflicts similar to Vietnam will require strategic use of advance area bases in the Indian Ocean area.

677
Bromke, Adam. POLAND'S ROLE IN THE LOOSENING OF THE COMMUNIST BLOC. International journal, v. 20, autumn 1965: 484-509.
D839.15, v. 20

Draws a comparison between the political developments in Poland and those in other Central and East European Communist countries during recent years. The author concludes that Poland has ceased to be a model of reform for satellite nations and is in danger of becoming instead "a retrogressive force in the Communist orbit--her policies checking rather than advancing the spread of polycentrism in Eastern Europe."

678
Brosio, Manlio. THE FUTURE OF NATO. Atlantic community quarterly, v. 3, winter 1965/66: 442-450.
P&GP RR

"Excerpt from address to the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference, New York, October 4, 1965."

NATO Secretary-General Manlio Brosio explains why the Atlantic Alliance is as necessary as ever. The military balance and unity of political action must be maintained. While Europe has recovered, the gap in military capabilities between the U.S. and Europe has not narrowed. An effective alliance requires military organization in peacetime, a clear view of political objectives, and firm will to achieve them. (Abstract supplied.)

679
Burns, Arthur L. AUSTRALIA'S LONG-TERM STRATEGIC SITUATION. International journal, v. 20, autumn 1965: 443-462.
D839.15, v. 20

Examines Australia's strategic situation in relation to the growing threat from Red China. The author analyzes American and British commitments in Asia; dismisses the possibility of Australian neutrality, armed or unarmed, as too risky; and gives reasons for the country's continued alliance with the West for common defense of Southern and Southeast Asia. Should the New Zealand-Australia cooperation to prevent nuclear proliferation among their nearest neighbors fail, or should Red Chinese missile strength directly threaten Australia by the late 1970s, "perhaps the best of several bad alternatives" would be an invulnerable Anglo-Australian ICBM force located in Australia.

680
Case, Frank B. THE CONTINUING NEED FOR NATO. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 45, Oct. 1965: 61-67.
Z6723.U35, v. 45

Reduced East-West tensions and the world's changed strategic situation in recent years (the increase of West Europe's military capability, the erosion of the postwar bipolar strategic structure, etc.) explain a growing trend within the Atlantic Alliance toward some radical changes in its common defense system. NATO's original role, to prevent Western Europe from being overrun by the Soviet Union, seems to be fulfilled, and some believe there is no need for its continuation. The apparent effectiveness of the American-Soviet nuclear stalemate in preserving world peace gives rise to the optimistic position that peace can be secured by complete nuclear disarmament. This view ignores the fact that growing population pressure and resource depletion might lead to an increasingly tense international situation, in which "the prospect of general disarmament will remain remote far into the future." American economic and military commitments throughout the world, especially in Latin America, Asia and Africa, would have to be widened to enhance "the peaceful resolution of conflicts in the developing areas." This in turn would call for a reduction of U.S. military commitments in Europe once West European self-defense capabilities were fully exploited to countervail--with U.S. help--the still-potential threat from the Soviet Union. Therefore the continuation of NATO in its undiluted form is of utmost importance for the stabilization of world peace. French failure to participate in NATO "would not necessarily impair its viability." Some changes in its organizational structure and activities might be needed, but the revised system should provide for: a) continued reliance on the American nuclear deterrent, b) "commitment of substantial first-line defense forces by the European nations to a combined command," c) credible mechanisms for rapid U.S. reinforcement of European ground forces, and d) "a ready command and control system."

681
Cleveland, Harlan. [AN ACTION PROGRAM FOR NATO] Un programme d'action pour l'O.T.A.N. Informations & documents, no 221, 1. nov. 1965: 10-17.
P&GP RR

Speech given before the American Club of Paris, October 21, 1965.

Discusses the hope for the world implied in the auspicious changes that have come about in international relations and within individual states since World War II; warns against euphoria; credits the present East-West détente to the strength of the Atlantic Alliance; and highlights some of the most pressing problems with which the Atlantic nations must come to grips, e.g., nuclear weapons proliferation, crisis management, NATO evolution, and peace in the world.

682
CONTRARY TO WILL OF THE PEOPLES, by Commentator. Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 17, Jan. 19, 1966: 18-19.
D839.C87, v. 17
Reprinted from Pravda, Dec. 30, 1965, p. 3.
Newsp

Accuses the NATO powers of masking their intention to arm West Germany with nuclear weapons by an antiproliferation treaty, thereby attempting to escape the condemnation of international public opinion. The author warns that the Warsaw Pact nations "will be forced to take the necessary defensive steps if the NATO countries take the path of satisfying Bonn's nuclear pretensions."

683
Fontaine, Andre. REBUS SIC STANTIBUS. Survival, v. 7, Dec. 1965: 334-335. U162.S9, v. 7
Reprinted from Le Monde, Oct. 19, 1965.
Newsp.

Argues that the growth of German power is hastening the day when the solution to German reunification must be found. The author, the political editor of Le Monde, feels that Germany should be incorporated into a United States of Europe, with other European nations making "the progressive sacrifice of their sovereignty," before Germany attains a position of domination on the Continent and forces a solution that might again rely upon military action.

684
Frank, Henning. [RED "OCTOBER ASSAULT": THURINGIA MANEUVER DEMONSTRATES THE FORWARD STRATEGY] Roter "Oktobersturm": Manöver in Thüringen demonstriert Vorwärtsstrategie. Christ und Welt, 18. Jahrg., 29. Okt. 1965: 7.

Stresses the fact that the Warsaw Pact military exercises held in October 1965 in Thuringia were the first to take place since the recent modernization of East Germany's military equipment along lines standard for Soviet, Polish, and Czechoslovak armies. The author points with alarm to the recent acquisition by the East German Army of missiles that can be armed with atomic warheads.

685
Goodwin, Geoffrey. MUST THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE BE REFORMED? European review, v. 16, winter 1965/66: 8-9. AP4.E78, v. 16

Commentary on the article "Faut-il Réformer l'Alliance Atlantique?" by XXX, which appeared in Politique Étrangère (30. année, no 3, 1965), pp. 230-244, and was abstracted as item 193 of this bibliography, v. 2, no. 1.

Although the unsigned article in a recent issue of Politique Étrangère proposing NATO reforms was probably not directly inspired by General De Gaulle, it does "broadly reflect" his opinions. The author appears to be more interested in demolishing the irrelevant and confusing integrated command structure of NATO than in shelving the entire treaty organization. But his criticisms, based on changes in the world since 1949, go deeper than this. His basic point seems to be that NATO's sole function is deterrence of a nuclear holocaust, so that planning for lesser contingencies is pointless. Surely, though, a limited military situation requiring coordinated planning and control can be envisaged (such as a crisis over Berlin access routes). Because Europe is stronger than it was in 1949, and because the United States is preoccupied with internal and extra-European problems, the author argues for an integrated Europe that copes with military threats itself and for a relationship of equality, rather than dependence, between the United States and Europe. In truth, as De Gaulle asserts, the German problem can only be solved by Europe. NATO statesmen have consistently ignored the difficulties of German reunification, which is the key to European stability. The author skillfully diagnoses NATO's malaise and constructively publicizes what has "for long lurked beneath the surface in the minds of many good 'Europeans.'"

686
Guénolé, Jean. [DEFENSE BEGINS IN PEACETIME] La défense commence en temps de paix. Informations & documents, no 221, 1. nov. 1965: 6-9.
P&GP RR

Throughout the history of international relations the concept of alliance has been a constant. Especially in diplomacy and defense, autarky is a temporary phenomenon. History cannot demonstrate the inevitable triumph of coalitions, but no real security exists today except in collective security. The idea of national independence must be judged in terms of the world situation and the exigencies of collective security--not in terms of a moral absolute justified by history or sentiment. The world has changed since the NATO treaty was signed in 1949, but the legitimacy of this Western alliance remains evident. The weaknesses demonstrated by the 1914 and 1939 coalitions give proof that this form of international organization cannot shoulder the burden of deterrence in the nuclear age. What is needed is a structure and command organization reflecting allied cohesion and the indissolubility of NATO's common defense. This organization must meet the technical imperatives of all forms of aggression and the psychological imperative of convincing any potential enemy that every member is determined to stand fast in the face of danger. The essential necessity is preparation of the collective defense organization in peacetime.

687
Heusinger, Adolf. [SECURITY PROBLEMS OF THE WESTERN WORLD] Sicherheitsfragen der westlichen Welt. Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 6. Jahrg., Sept. 1965: 246-269. JA14.P63, v. 6

The most important strategic objective for the West is not war but the preservation of peace. An adequate strategy to this end must take into account the full spectrum of the existing international situation and its potentialities. The Communist bloc's ideology profoundly influences its policies and tactics. Since communism cannot endure without using offensive tactics, it continues to support revolutionary and "national liberation" wars in order to undermine the West's position in the nonalined world. This has been countered by the West's basically defensive policy. The future fate and behavior of the now nonalined world may be decisive for the outcome of the East-West struggle. In a military sense no real world peace exists today, but neither is there much chance for world war III, due to the general realization that such a war could not be won. It is difficult to foresee whether a "healthy coexistence" between East and West will ever materialize. Given NATO's own strength and West Europe's economic and political growth, however, the Soviet threat to European peace is smaller now than it was 15 years ago. NATO's present dilemma is an outgrowth of the need to choose between integration and a coalition of the traditional type. The United States involvement in NATO is no more indispensable to European security than the German Federal Republic's

membership. Due to its strategic geographical position the West German territory cannot and should not be considered as perimetric to NATO's defenses, but as constituting their core.

688
Holifield, Chet. NUCLEAR CONTROL IN NATO. Atlantic community quarterly, v. 3, winter 1965/66: 496-498. P&GP RR

"Excerpts from an address to the American Nuclear Society, Washington, D. C., November 15, 1965."

The Chairman of the [U.S.] Joint Committee on Atomic Energy discusses the extent of Germany's present situation with respect to NATO's nuclear weapons and advocates a larger role for Germany in connection with coordination and strategy concerning them. (Abstract supplied)

689
Hooson, Emlyn. THE REFORM OF NATO--PRELIMINARY REPORT. Atlantic community quarterly, v. 3, winter 1965/66: 456-463.
P&GP RR

"Summary of a Preliminary Report by Mr. Hooson, Rapporteur of the Parliamentarians' Working Party, which was approved by the [NATO Parliamentarians'] Conference."

A preliminary report from the NATO Parliamentarians' Working Party discusses three possibilities: major changes in its present structure; a "two tier" approach in which those countries wishing further integration would have it while those wishing less would have a second type of membership; and the "two pillar," equal partnership approach. The report was received as the basis for further study looking toward a final report to the 1966 Conference. (Abstract supplied.)

690
[IS IT NECESSARY TO REFORM THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE? A CRITICAL EXAMINATION] Faut-il réformer l'alliance atlantique? Examen critique, by **[pseud.] Politique étrangère, 30. année, no 4-5, 1965: 324-329. JX3.P6, v. 30

The anonymous essay appearing in the previous issue of Politique étrangère (item no. 193 in Arms Control & Disarmament, v. 2, no. 1) contained some valuable and incontestable observations, but failed to show the real reasons why some structural change must be brought about in NATO and why relations between its members must be modified. Europe's autonomy, which is sought by the author(s), is based on the political calculation that the United States will not allow the European bastion to collapse. This may be true, but Europe cannot demand a formal commitment without participating in an integrated organization that can facilitate defense. The article states the need for a unified Europe--a strong and independent partner of the United States. But the authors do not specify through what form Europe could achieve this unity. Certainly periodic meetings would not suffice. The suggested reform would require Germany both to accept a weakening of the American guarantee and to renounce participation in nuclear strategy discussions, in exchange for which it would receive a (credible?) French nuclear guarantee. That the stronger and more populous Germany would thus subordinate itself to its neighbor is inconceivable. There is a conflict of interests within the alliance, but to undermine the technical security arrangements in the name of political slogans is to risk bypassing the real difficulties and necessary reforms.

691
Knorr, Klaus. FRANCE AND EUROPEAN SECURITY. In Fisher, Sydney, ed. France and the European community. [Columbus] Ohio State University Press [1965] p. 37-58. HC241.25.F8F5

NATO, seriously challenged by De Gaulle's far-reaching criticisms, is suffering from basic and growing disagreement over how European security and international relations should be organized. Until recently Europe has made little effort to escape its at first inevitable condition of military dependence on the United States, probably because of the availability of NATO and U.S. protection, and the ease with which this protection is obtainable. Four points of Europe's dissatisfaction are particularly relevant to NATO's troubles: doubts as to the reliablity of the American nuclear umbrella; alarm over the U.S. shift from primary reliance on massive nuclear retaliation; conflicts with the United States over foreign policies; and pride. Unitary control of nuclear weapons and the controlled response made possible by massive U.S. military strength (but denied to small national nuclear deterrents, which must aim at population centers in order to gain credibility) are sound policies. But European and U.S. interests do conflict and any "country that has alternatives would be imprudent if it staked its survival squarely on any alliance among sovereign states." If De Gaulle succeeds in building a militarily and diplomatically useful nuclear force European security may be jeopardized. French policy positions could divide Europe, keep NATO in disarray, and anger the United States into reducing its European commitment. The French vision of a European confederation under French leadership will not materialize; European political unification is hardly imminent; and a West European military alliance without the United States could not become sufficiently strong for many years. The only alternative at present is a North Atlantic solution to security; and for this to be viable some European criticisms must be met. Two improvements would be allied participation in the management of strategic deterrence and establishment of an independent multilateral nuclear force. British and French national nuclear forces would probably not be abandoned. European initiative is healthy and security will best be served by an arrangement in which Europe no longer buckles under to U.S. domination.

692
Lavergne, Bernard. [NATO'S HARMFULNESS] La nocivité de l'OTAN. Année politique et économique, 38. année, oct. 1965: 397-401
D410.A6, v. 38

Presents the view that NATO functions as an instrument of American domination in Europe and as a support for German territorial and atomic demands, which are bound to detonate a world nuclear war if heeded.

693
McElheny, Victor. FRANCE IN SPACE: COLLABORATION WITH BOTH U.S. AND U.S.S.R.? Science, v. 150, Dec. 24, 1965: 1700-1701.
Q1.S35, v. 150

Reviews the progress of the French satellite program, stressing the usefulness of France's cooperation with the United States. France is also considering collaboration with the Soviet Union to obtain its greater-thrust rockets. Whether this move would injure its "much-prized" relationship with the United States is of major interest to the French.

694
Martin, Robert P. WHERE DANGER GROWS ON A 4,500-MILE BORDER. U.S. news & world report, v. 59, Dec. 6, 1965: 44-47. JK1.U65, v. 59

If armed conflict arises between China and the U.S.S.R. the wastes of Soviet Central Asia will provide the battleground. Here lies the Sino-Soviet border, scarcely an inch of which is not in dispute. Tension is already evident. Peking lays historic claim on many Soviet areas, while the Russians have supposedly attempted to stir up trouble in Sinkiang, now a Chinese territory. Yet no troops have been mobilized along the border, and Soviet opinion makes little of the possibility that the tension may erupt into war. Russians seem, in fact, somewhat surprised by the intensity of anti-Soviet feelings in China and have tended to discount the importance of China's development of a nuclear bomb. Central Asia, however, is a prize much desired by Peking. Its immense resources have not begun to be tapped, and its population is scanty. So far Moscow has not been able to mobilize the personnel or the industry to take advantage of its Central Asian holdings. Moreover, Chinese leaders feel they have been treated badly by their Communist ally for the past 20 years. An explosion somewhere along the border seems inevitable. If war does come, the Soviet Union will probably not hesitate to use its nuclear arsenal, since it would be impossible to win a ground war against the Chinese hordes in this area.

695
Miksche, Ferdinand O. [THE KREMLIN BETWEEN PEKING AND WASHINGTON] Der Kreml zwischen Peking und Washington. Wehr und Wirtschaft, 9. Jahrg., 10. Okt. 1965: 519-524.
U3.W38, v. 9

Points out the similarity of Soviet and American interests in preventing Red China from becoming a full-scale atomic power. The author discusses alternatives to the present Soviet-Chinese and American-Chinese conflicts, including a war in which the United States "would bleed to death for Russia in endless wastes of the Chinese mainland." He concludes that the present American-Chinese conflict "may not enter its decisive phase until around 1970."

696
Montmoreau, Alain. [PROBLEMS OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE]. Les problèmes de l'alliance atlantique. Revue militaire générale, no 9, nov. 1965: 431-445.
U2.R48, 1965
Includes summaries in English and German.

A report, presented to the fall 1965 Congress of Atlantic Associations by the French Association for the Atlantic Community, which describes the difficulties of NATO's functioning and suggests some bases for overcoming them. NATO's problems, the report asserts, stem from political disagreements and can best be met through effective political coordination; a multilateral force operating under a more equitable system of voting than so far proposed could solve the problem of nuclear sharing. NATO's prime mission is to deter aggression, and its credibility would be enhanced by a treaty clause stipulating atomic intervention to aid an allied victim of aggression and by the prior determination of actions to be taken against any defined form of aggression.

697
Nerlich, Uwe. [NUCLEAR DILEMMAS OF THE GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC] Die nuklearen Dilemmas der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Europa-Archiv., 20. Jahrg., 10. Sept. 1965: 637-651.
D839.E86, v. 20

Both the United States and the small member nations display a common interest in the preservation of the present NATO structure, which was formed at a time when questions of nuclear armament and strategy were of necessity confined to the American nuclear deterrent. West Germany's unilateral renunciation of production of nuclear arms had at that time minor practical significance in terms of the nation's interests and potential. Soon, however, problems of sharing in nuclear strategy and arms arose quite sharply in German and international politics, due to the sudden change in NATO's strategy and its impact on the question of German reunification. De Gaulle's policy, aimed at gaining for France political hegemony and nuclear monopoly in Europe, complicated those problems still further. Sudden changes in U.S. strategy caused serious political troubles for the Bonn government, at home and abroad. It is, among other reasons, to avoid the impact of such sudden changes on Germany's national interests that the Bonn government strives for the creation, within NATO, of a common strategy planning body in which it would have an equal voice. West Germany's strategy rests on the doctrine of first-line defense. While realizing the political importance of nuclear arms sharing, it has no clear-cut concept as yet of the role of tactical nuclear weapons in its own and Europe's defense. For Bonn, direct access to nuclear weapons would greatly impede reunification. Yet all efforts, De Gaulle's for instance, aimed at de facto or de jure "denuclearization" of the German Federal Republic must be strongly opposed by Bonn, because of their discriminatory character and the fact that their realization would practically mean "the formalization of Germany's partition." The question of the German Federal Republic's authority over the use of nuclear arms has become, owing to French policy, of fundamental importance to problems of European unification and the U.S. involvement in Europe.

698
Pringsheim, Klaus H. CHINA'S ROLE IN THE INDO-PAKISTANI CONFLICT. China quarterly, no. 24, Oct./Dec. 1965: 170-175.
DS701.C472, 1965

Pakistan's foreign policy is guided by fear of potential Indian aggression and internal pressures for a Kashmir solution. The only powerful external support it has found for its objectives is from the Chinese. After the Sino-Soviet war of October 1962 relations between Pakistan and China grew progressively closer. At least at first, Pakistan's intent was "not the achievement of a full-scale alliance with China but rather the obtaining of leverage which might dissuade the other Powers from their pro-Indian policies." What occured during the Kashmir war is still difficult to determine, but it seems there was "Sino-Pakistani co-ordination at the beginning as well as at the end of the affair." Pakistan's motives for accepting Chinese support are expediency and a respect for the latter's military power. China's reasons are more complex and include a desire to undermine Western alliances, integrate Pakistan as a satellite, eventually destroy India, gain a foothold in the Moslem world, and mobilize Pakistani support for Chinese policies. But China's prestige suffered in its heavy-handed diplomacy in this latest Kashmir crisis and thus, for a while, its foreign policy may become more cautious. "Under the circumstances both India

and Pakistan may have one more chance to settle their differences peacefully if they so desire."

699
THE REFORM OF NATO--DEBATE. Atlantic community quarterly, v. 3, winter 1965/66: 464-478.
P&GP RR

"Excerpts from debate in the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference concerning the Report on 'The Reform of NATO,' New York City, October 8, 1965."

The views of France, Germany, Britain, the United States, and other countries. Although agreement was expressed as to the desirability, even the necessity, of maintaining the Atlantic Alliance, the ways in which it must be altered in order to remain viable were hotly debated. In the German view, NATO's and Europe's current situation is stable; reform can be postponed. The French, however, desired to see the defense of Europe placed in the hands of Europeans. The British representative took issue with this view, stating that no European nation can have a truly effective nuclear deterrent in the near future, and that NATO must continue to depend on the United States for its deterrent capability.

700
Robertson, Terence. GEORGE IGNATIEFF'S HARRIED LIFE ON THE BRINK OF CRISIS. Maclean's, v. 78, Dec. 15, 1965: 14-15, 38-40, 42.
AP5.M2, v. 78

"Third of a series: Our Man in NATO."

A look at the NATO decisionmaking process and at the basic problems facing the alliance through the eyes of Canada's ambassador to NATO, George Ignatieff. The ambassador describes the unfolding of the 1961-62 Berlin crisis, in which war was averted by NATO assurances that the allies were willing to undertake a test of military strength. NATO's chief task is to deter war, a task greatly complicated by the French force de frappe and rigid view of the nuclear threshhold.

701
Robison, David. A EUROPEAN COORDINATED FORCE. Orbis, v. 9, fall 1965: 655-676.
D839.068, v. 9

A joint European nuclear force is militarily ineffective and politically infeasible so long as member nations retain a veto. A more realistic European nuclear force might be structured in compliance with the following conditions: The force must not be intended as an antiproliferation device. Its command structure must be coordinated, not integrated. Member nations objecting to strategic decisions determined by the majority must be free to withdraw. Finally, when any member comes under nuclear attack and the joint force is not activated, that member must be allowed use of the European nuclear weapons controlled by its military services. Were Britain a member of this force, the affirmative vote of two of the major European nations (Britain, France, and Germany) would suffice to activate the force; were Britain not a member, affirmative votes by either France or Germany and by either Italy or the Benelux countries would be required. Were the proposed force to be an Atlantic system, it should ensure that the United States alone could not veto its activation; members' right of withdrawal should also be retained. Voting on the use of the force should require affirmation by three of the five major powers (the United States, Britain, France, Germany, and Italy). Thus the United States and Britain could not act in unison to deprive continental powers of use of the system. A politically independent and militarily strong Europe would probably emerge as a serious rival to U.S. power and influence throughout the world. In return the United States would be rid of the obligation to become involved in a nuclear war, likely to cost as many as 150 million American lives, to protect its interests in Europe. "The development of a large European nuclear force protecting Europe and remaining in at least residual alliance with the American nuclear force would have considerable political influence in our times. One day, we might need its aid."

702
Roschlau, Wolfgang. [FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF WEST GERMANY INTO NATO'S MOST IMPORTANT BASE FOR ROCKETS AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE] Der weitere Ausbau Westdeutschlands zur wichtigsten Raketen-Kernwaffenbasis der NATO in Europa. Zeitschrift für Militärgeschichte, 4. Jahrg., Heft 6, 1965: 733-737.
P&GP RR

Contends, on the basis of the 1962-65 build up of weapons systems located in West Germany, that the German Federal Republic is becoming NATO's main nuclear warfare bastion in Europe. The article contains statistical tables of the numbers and specifications of various weapons systems and reports on West Germany's efforts to increase its military capability.

703
Sandoz, Gerard. [ERHARD WON'T HAVE HIS CHRISTMAS PRESENT] Erhard n'aura pas son cadeau de Noël. Nouvel observateur, no 55, 1. déc. 1965: 18.
AP20.02, 1965

The West German government is making little headway in its quest for a share in nuclear decisionmaking. When sharing proposals are mentioned, London is hesitant, Paris remains opposed, and Moscow threatens. Washington opinion varies from the "hard" supporters of an MLF plan (usually high Pentagon officials) to those who are more willing to frustrate German designs than to further antagonize the Soviet Union. In Bonn the sources of a November 22 New York Times story revealing the presence of American nuclear warheads in German rockets and planes were said to be U.S. State Department officials willing "to sacrifice the requirements of an efficacious Atlantic defense on the altar of 'coexistence' with Moscow." Despite the barriers Germany has not relinquished its search for a nuclear partnership, and certain new proposals, such as a "select committee" for allied nuclear consultations, may someday become widely acceptable.

704
A SHARE IN A BOMB, PLEASE. Economist, v. 217, Nov. 13, 1965: 704-705.
HG11.E2, v. 217

West German Foreign Minister Schröder, it is said, intends not only to discuss the refurbishment of NATO but also to turn the Atlantic Alliance to the dubious purpose of aiding Bonn's revenge against the German Democratic Republic. Whether this accusation be true or not, it is clear that West Germany wants to play an active role in nuclear weapons policy, and it is with this in mind that Schröder will negotiate the "business of trying to put the western alliance in better order." Chancellor Erhard recently clarified Bonn's desires by affirming that NATO remains indispensable

and that Germany believes firmly in the principles of nonproliferation. But until Germany is reunited, it is "only fair that members of the NATO alliance should be allowed to participate in nuclear defence in proportion to the threat to their security and to their contribution to the common cause."

705
Torcy, Camille. [IF THE CHINESE DON'T CHANGE THE GLOBAL FACTS OF WAR AND PEACE, WESTERN EUROPE WILL BE MOST THREATENED IN CASE OF CONFLICT] Si les Chinois ne modifient pas les données mondiales de la guerre et de la paix, l'Europe occidentale reste la plus menacée en cas de conflit. Charivari, n.s., no 4, jan. 1966: 5-6.
P&GP RR

Quantitatively and qualitatively compares the strength of Eastern and Western bloc armed forces--land, air, naval, and atomic. The Warsaw Pact countries dispose of superior land forces in the important Central European war theatre while American naval and aerial weaponry is vastly superior to the Communist arsenal. But Western Europe, toward which most of Soviet offenses are aimed, is tragically disarmed. It could not hope to compete in a conventional war except with American nuclear intervention. The vital question is whether the United States would risk destruction to save Europe.

706
Trager, Frank N. THE UNITED STATES, SEATO AND THE DEFENCE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA: A FORWARD LOOK. United Asia, v. 17, July/Aug. 1965: 278-286.
DS1.U55, v. 17

Since its formulation in 1954 SEATO has fostered divisive trends within the area it intends to assist. The three most populous and militarily powerful states of non-Communist Asia (Japan, India, and Indonesia) have decided to remain aloof from its activities, at times with expressions of vigorous disapproval. In some cases SEATO has alienated member nations from their neighbors, thereby militating against the development of free political Asian regionalism. "SEATO qua SEATO does not provide an adequate political base for strategic deterrence." As a military measure SEATO has been, as the Vietnam experience testifies, much less effective than U.S.-Asian bilateral defense treaties. All Asian and non-Asian nations responding to Saigon's call for assistance have done so on a bilateral basis. Thus SEATO adds little if any military resources to the defense of Asia and definitely acts as an impediment to the implementation of regional policies. U.S. policy in South and Southeast Asia might secure its objectives more easily were SEATO to be abandoned and "a tested network of bilateral treaties and agreements" substituted. "And, to the extent that a genuine Asian regional pattern emerges, the U.S. could support or join it as a Pacific power--whatever seems best at the time."

707
Ulbricht, Walter. [THE WORLD'S MOST POWERFUL MILITARY COALITION PROTECTS THE SOCIALIST STATES] Mächtigste Militärkoalition der Welt schützt die sozialistischen Staaten. In Volksarmee. Dokumentation: Manöver "Oktobersturm." Berlin [1965] p.7-9.
U3.V7, 1965

Loose insert in Volksarmee, 45, 1965.
U3.V7, 1965

Speech delivered before the "Brotherhood in Arms rally" at the conclusion of the Warsaw Pact maneuver held in October in East Germany.

Stresses the importance of the Warsaw Pact Organization in protecting the territorial integrity and political system of the Socialist nations from the Bonn government's aggressive plans. The author describes the German Democratic Republic's peaceful policy and its opposition (together with the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries) to the proliferation of nuclear arms, especially to West Germany's plans to acquire nuclear weapons. Ulbricht expresses his support for French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville's recent declaration in the French National Assembly that the German problem must be solved within the scope of European security and in an atmosphere of East-West détente. As a prerequisite, Ulbricht requests diplomatic recognition of the German Democratic Republic by West European nations and normalization of relations between the two German states.

708
Van Cleave, William R. CHALLENGES FOR THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. In U. S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Military review, v. 45, Oct. 1965: 3-10.
Z6723.U35, v. 45

The international conditions under which NATO flourished have changed drastically. Most future trouble will occur outside the European arena, and NATO can remain viable only if it is able to formulate a global policy. But the Alliance probably cannot express coherent goals in its present form. Indeed its very usefulness has been called into question. Eliminating the Atlantic organization, however, assumes the complete absence of a Soviet threat that does in fact exist. Thus NATO must be reorganized, particularly in the areas of policymaking and control over nuclear forces. The European members of the Alliance must be granted a greater share in strategic planning, and American strategic forces should be integrated into the organization to a greater degree. The multilateral nuclear force was proposed to alleviate the control problem, but the thought of nuclear weapons in West German hands causes great concern. The United States has not objected to a British nuclear force, but has vociferously opposed French nuclear development. This has not alleviated the strains within the Alliance. If totally uncoordinated national nuclear forces are to be avoided the United States must make concessions. Ultimate control over Western nuclear power rests with the President of the United States, but some middle ground must be sought. British and American plans for multinational forces, while not justifiable for solely military reasons, may provide partial answers.

709
Wegner, Rudi. [DEVELOPMENT OF CLOSE-KNIT COMRADESHIP IN ARMS BETWEEN THE GERMAN PEOPLE'S NAVY, THE BALTIC RED BANNER FLEET, AND THE POLISH NAVY] Zur Entwicklung der engen Waffenbrüderschaft der Volksmarine mit der Baltischen Rotbannerflotte und der Polnischen Seekriegsflotte. Zeitschrift für Militärgeschichte, 4. Jahrg., Heft 6, 1965: 710-711.
P&GP RR

Discusses the coordination of the East German, Soviet Baltic, and Polish Navies in tactical naval operations as well as in military and political training of cadres.

4. Related Policies and Problems

710
Cabiac, Roger. [A REORGANIZATION WITH REPERCUSSIONS] Eine Aufsehen-erregende Umbildung. Wehr und Wirtschaft, 9. Jahrg., 10. Okt. 1965: 510.
U3.W38, v. 9

The recent reorganization of the Délégation Ministérielle pour l'Armement in France is likely to have far-reaching repercussions. The eight directorates hitherto forming the DMA have been replaced by three (Personnel and General Armament Affairs; Programmes and Industrial Affairs; International Affairs), and the five traditional technical sections have been renamed. In the process it is clear that the powers of the DMA as a whole have been appreciably reinforced at the expense of the technical sections. Reactions to these measures have naturally been mixed. Certain quarters see in them a further threat to the already uncertain future of the aviation side, since the aerospace industry will now find itself subordinate to a body not necessarily composed of aviation experts. The Government claims that the measures are necessary to eliminate once and for all the inter-service rivalries that are out of place in an age when atomic weapons have overturned traditional notions of defence. The logical outcome - unless the ruling Government team is overthrown at the next Presidential elections or powerful opposition is offered by all who disapprove of the present trends - will be a reorientation of the technical sections, together with the Government establishments and arsenals, towards industrial and commercial activities, with part Government, part private capital. This in turn would lead to a complete reorganization of the armament industry. (Abstract supplied)

711
Chapuis, Robert. [THE END OF MILITARY SERVICE] La fin du service militaire. Esprit, 33. année, déc. 1965: 1175-1183. AP20.E78, v. 33

The military reform law of July 9, 1965, spelling the end of universal military service, is a political move incompatible with a democratic organization of society. The law advances the government's goal of a professional, career army. Through the development of military schools, pressure to increase enlistment, greater material and psychological rewards to military men, and only temporary maintenance of conscription, the backbone of the military will soon be a new brand of enlisted men. Not only the face of the army but also the concept of national defense is changing, and it is on this level that the new law must be judged. Arguments of decreased costs and better training are easily rebutted. What threatens is a separation of the military from national life; it will possess its own schools, materiel, and barracks and will not be able to involve the entire population in national defense efforts. If nuclear arms were not used would a recall of only enlisted men suffice in a major conflict? The national defense is being confided to three armies unable to coordinate with one another--the army of research and rockets, the army of commandos and heavy divisions, and local army units. If conscription and the principle of universal military service were maintained, these armies would be linked by interpenetration. The determinant factors in the July reform were political-Gaullist rather than military. The new professional army promises to guard nationalism zealously (l'Europe des patries); it will endow the state with formidable power; and its existence will allow the man who is both chief of state and commander in chief to impose his will.

712
Cockrill, James T. THE VALIDITY OF WAR GAME ANALYSIS. In United States Naval Institute, Annapolis. Proceedings, v. 92, Jan. 1966: 45-53.
V1.U8, v. 92

Describes and illustrates the basic principles of analyzing military conflicts by computer techniques. Although the results of analysis by gaming are far from infallible, the process will bring to the strategist a clearer view of the problems to be met with each planned maneuver.

713
Eliot, George F. POLITICO-MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS IN THE NUCLEAR AGE. National guardsman, v. 19, Dec. 1965: 18-20. UA42.N24, v. 19

The most significant factor in U.S. military affairs is the provision of the Constitution that names the President of the United States Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Presidents may delegate some of this authority to others, but they cannot diminish their responsibility to the American people for the conduct of military operations. Pressures of the nuclear age have increased this responsibility. Presidents Kennedy and Johnson have delegated authority to military commanders reluctantly, retaining in their own hands even minor decisions and operating a "battle headquarters" in Washington, lest decisions made at a lower level lead to escalation and the use of nuclear weapons. The Cuban invasion and the Cuban missile crisis illustrate the control of military actions being maintained by the President. The war in Vietnam, however, by its very complexity and length has forced President Johnson to delegate to military men some of the decisionmaking he had originally assumed himself. If the war develops further the President will find it necessary to appoint a battlefield commander fully responsible for the conduct of field operations. Military leaders are becoming increasingly anxious to see the day when "operations will be guided by practical military logic and only secondarily by political finesse." President Johnson, as he feels his way over unfamiliar ground, will recognize the continuing importance of political finesse; but he will also know from history that the American people during wartime seem to need a military commander they can trust. Thus "the time may be at hand when the public should hear a good deal more from the men in uniform to whom the President must increasingly delegate authority for the conduct of hostilities."

714
Garvey, Gerald. ANALYSIS, TOOL FOR DECISION-MAKING. Air University review, Jan./Feb. 1966: 7-14.
TL501.A5574, v. 17

A detailed account of analysis as it is presently applied in the formulation and development of American defense policy. The author discusses the following points: "requirements of strategic analysis," "analysis as an institution," "what is analysis?" "why do analysis?" "what analysis won't do," and "is the human factor neglected?".

715
Hanning, Hugh. THE PEACEFUL USES OF MILITARY FORCES. Survival, v. 8, Jan. 1966: 28-32.
U162.S9, v. 8
Reprinted from Statist, v. 188, Oct. 1, 1965.
P&GP RR

Largely unnoticed in the world press is the program recently initiated in Iran whereby high school graduates facing military service are allowed to fulfill their obligation by serving in an Education Corps (teaching

reading and writing and basic skills to inhabitants of primitive villages) or a Health Corps (rendering similar services). The project has been highly successful and suggests principles applicable to all developing nations. Many of the educated and skilled members of underdeveloped societies emigrate to or congregate in urban areas; a system of conscription would divert their services to neglected regions and support nationwide development. Much of the waste inherent in modern defense budgets could thus be avoided. Governments unable to reduce their armed forces because of political considerations would find peaceful use of military forces a feasible and economical alternative. Discharged servicemen would apply their acquired skills to the civilian sector of the economy and enhance their own prestige among civilians. Prerelease vocational training could disperse skilled workers throughout a country quickly and efficiently. In India, where great numbers of peasants serve in the army, this training would disseminate skilled farmers throughout the rural areas. The dilemma of "guns or butter" might be resolved in developing countries without sacrificing either of its horns.

716
Kintner, William R., and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff. THE PROSPECTS FOR WESTERN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY. Orbis, v. 9, fall 1965: 565-586.
D839.068, v. 9

Contends that the relative decline of Western European technology underlies the strategic controversies threatening to divide the Atlantic Alliance, and affirms that, unless the nations of Western Europe achieve a level of technological proficiency sufficient to insure their own security in the face of increasing Soviet achievements, the United States will have to assume an even greater role in the defense of the West. Mindful of the indispensable contributions that can be made to U.S. military technology by pure scientific research in Europe, the authors urge greater technological collaboration between America and Europe.

717
Kolodziej, Edward J. STRATEGIC POLICY AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: STRUCTURAL CONSTANTS AND VARIABLES. Review of politics, v. 27, Oct. 1965: 465-490.
JA1.R4, v. 27

Nowhere in the American Constitution is the principle of separation of powers seen more clearly than in the formulation of military-strategic policy. Both the President and Congress share important responsibilities, and even the states have retained a certain amount of authority, primarily in the realm of the militia. The exercise of U. S. military power "almost always requires the cooperation and coordination of at least two agencies of governmental authority." This compartmentalization, which is based not only on function but also on electoral base, renders even more strained the difficult business of building consensus on strategic policy. The logic behind Constitutional provisions was rooted in the deep-seated apprehension of the Founding Fathers toward a standing army of any kind. Thus the Army was placed firmly in civilian hands, but at the same time precautions were taken to insure against civilian misuse of military power. All through the 19th century these mechanisms functioned nicely. With American entry into World War I and subsequent international developments America's world role and military needs altered drastically. A small standing army is a thing of the past, and military policy for the first time in American history profoundly affects the entire nation, even during peacetime. Continuation of civilian control has been called into question and conceivably undermined. In order to adapt American institutions to modern exigencies constitutionally granted roles must be reformulated. The part played by Congress, for example, has changed radically, but is still highly important. The military presents no active threat to civilian control, as has often been suggested. The effective cooperation of President, Congress, and the military must be achieved if communism is to be successfully combated. The informed and intelligent consent of the people cannot be ignored, nor can the imperatives of strategy.

718
Lapp, Ralph E. THE NEW PRIESTHOOD: THE SCIENTIFIC ELITE AND THE USES OF POWER. New York, Harper & Row [1965] 244 p.
Q127.U6L3

Warns that increasing reliance upon scientists in matters of national security, strategy, and the application of technology threatens to destroy the dialogue necessary to a democratic society. The author feels that the scientist-politician is an approaching probability; he argues that scientists must be subjected to some sort of control "not only to protect society against the ravages of deleterious forces, but also to achieve the full benefits of science." The efforts of nuclear scientists to acquaint the American public with the effects of nuclear war, atmospheric nuclear testings, and the proliferation of nuclear weapons are treated.

719
Lepotier, Adolphe. [ON WHAT TO BASE NATIONAL DEFENSE DECISIONS] Sur quoi baser les décisions de défense nationale. Revue militaire générale, no 9, nov. 1965: 500-515. U2.R48, 1965

Includes summaries in English and German.

Theoretically strategy can be determined on the basis of predetermined long-range foreign policy goals and weapons systems can be developed in accordance with this strategy. But this simplicity is deceptive. Multiple subfactors of varying importance open many alternative choices. Yet the decision taken on today's complicated weapons systems can commit not only a nation's armed forces, but also its scientific and technological research and education and its industrial complex, to a certain path for periods as long as 20 years. It is over the method of decisionmaking and the weight assigned to different sources of opinion that a controversy has developed in the United States between Secretary McNamara on the one hand and military officers and congressional committees on the other. McNamara relies on computer programed mathematical analysis and the concept of cost-effectiveness. But, in regard to weapons systems, the computer cannot calculate such factors as precision, vulnerability, deterrent credibility, or the psychological reactions of the enemy. Relative values are best determined by human judgment, and military judgment in the case of weapons systems. If technological, economic, and financial factors are given priority over strategic and tactical factors, the technologically perfect and cost-effective weapons developed may be unsuited to the strategy and tactics the military deems necessary to fulfill its tasks. The consequence could be inability to act or even national catastrophe. The proof of these

contentions is the computer based decision not to develop a nuclear surface fleet. The mathematical estimates of cost have been demonstrated erroneous; the great strategic, tactical, and political advantages of nuclear powered ships were not computed because they are not amenable to data processing. It is precisely these unconsidered advantages that would justify higher investments.

720
McConnell, J. P. STRATEGY AND ANALYSIS. Air University review, v. 17, Jan./Feb. 1966: 3-6.
TL501.A5574, v. 17

The increase in application of technically oriented analytical techniques to the task of updating and refining national strategy is of concern and under study by all those involved. Recent refinements in methods used in analysis have increased the opportunity to participate in the formulation of national strategy. This refinement allows for greater latitude in developing the technical and procedural techniques to fit national policy. Prior to World War I military formulas were relatively stable, as technical limitations precluded strategy from imposing heavy claims on a nation's resources. The period between the First and Second World Wars saw a further refinement in the management of manpower and utilization of material resources to meet military requirements. Since World War II the development of complex, long-range nuclear bomber forces and missile systems has imposed a burden on the strategic analyst never before imagined. Newly developed weapons systems have often become outmoded before they are ready to be used in battle. Thus analysts lean upon the process of gaming analysis in which the large variety of variables can be tested under simulated war conditions. This, in turn, has caused the evolution of "a technical or quantitative approach to analysis," vitalizing "the interaction between decision-makers at the highest levels of government and the operating elements of the military."

721
McGillivray, Peter C. FIRE STORMS NOT LIKELY IN THE UNITED STATES. International civil defence, no. 121/122, July/Aug. 1965: 3-4.
UA926.I488, 1965

Critics of civil defense sometimes allege the futility of a shelter program on the basis that fire storms similar to those experienced in Japanse cities during U.S. bombing raids will incinerate everyone seeking protection during a nuclear attack. It has been found, however, that fire storms are possible only when "building density" is "at least 30% in areas of more than one mile square." Except possibly for several very old, large, eastern cities, municipal areas of the United States do not possess this characteristic. Frightening the public with the fear of fire storms "is a familiar tactic of the civil defense critic who overdramatizes the hazard in an attempt to promote a spurious criticism of the shelter program."

722
Marx, Wesley. THE MILITARY'S 'THINK FACTORIES.' Progressive, v. 29, Nov. 1965: 22-26.
AP2.P8655, v. 29

Examines the nonprofit research organizations (RAND, Aerospace Corp. Jet Propulsion Lab., etc.) created by branches of the armed services and the Government as an "end-run around government bureaucracy." The author feels that these organizations are sheltered from public accountability and at times are guilty of "fiscal promiscuity" in the use of Government funds. The Federal Government is urged to adjust to the special professional needs of scientists and to grant them increased autonomy in administration and the utilization of resources.

723
Nifontov, Boris I. [UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS: PROBLEMS OF INDUSTRIAL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS] Podzemnye iadernye vzryvy: problemy promyshlennykh iadernykh vzryvov. Moskva, Atomizdat, 1965. 159 p. illus.
TA748.N5

Summarizes and systematizes information from the foreign press on the experimental underground nuclear explosions carried out in the United States from 1951 to 1962 and reproduces U.S. theories concerning the application of nuclear energy to industrial purposes. Five chapters deal with the achievements of the Plowshare program. In a foreword the authors contend that the stated industrial purpose of the extensive series of underground nuclear explosions performed by the United States is but a cover for carrying on the weapons testing that the United States refused to prohibit completely in the Moscow treaty of 1963.

724
Oehman, Gunnar. LINUS PAULING AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS. International civil defence, no. 123, Sept. 1965: 3-5. UA926.I488, 1965

Disputes the statements on civil defense made by Linus Pauling in Copenhagen, 1964, to the effect that shelters offer no real protection against nuclear explosions and that civil defense is a form of militarism, which increases the danger of war. The author feels that Pauling unwarrantably dealt with political, not scientific, matters, was guilty of generalization, and made "the thankless work of those responsible for Civil Defence even more difficult."

725
Piatier, Henri. [NUCLEAR REACTORS AND FUELS] Réacteurs et combustibles nucléaires. Sciences; revue française des sciences et des techniques, 6. année, juil./août 1965: 18-25. P&GP RR

Economics and technology of present and projected nuclear means of producing energy discussed in view of the world's rising energy needs and its less rapidly growing supply of raw materials that can be devoted to energy production.

726
Possony, Stefan T. U.S. INTELLIGENCE AT THE CROSSROADS. Orbis, v. 9, fall 1965: 587-610.
D839.O68, v. 9

If a modern state is to survive, accurate intelligence must lie at the root of its foreign and defense policies. The most important question facing U.S. intelligence today concerns the willingness of the Soviet Union to risk nuclear war, should it acquire the requisite capabilities to win such a war. Essential to the resolution of this problem is a correct evaluation of the aims of Soviet leadership. Has the Kremlin called off the world Communist revolution and suppressed its desire to achieve global mastery, or has another breathing-space been declared, until the Soviets can gain the weapons and technological superiority needed to win a war with the West? U.S. analysis of the Soviet Union has largely been directed by Russian Mensheviks who fought the Bolsheviks until 1917, gradually made their way to the United States, and acquired influence as politico-military advisers in Washington. Devoted to the ideals of peace and

influenced by the ideals of the socialism they once advocated in Russia, these men cannot appreciate the "power psychology and conflict management techniques" in which the Bolsheviks excel; they fail to understand "a mind that could coolly calculate the advantages or disadvantages of nuclear war." Thomas W. Wolfe's recent work, Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads, shows that the Menshevik mentality has become so prevalent among U.S. scholars of communism that even an American-born expert on Soviet affairs can succumb to its assertions. Wolfe thinks Soviet leaders believe that war must be rejected because the victory to be won through nuclear weapons is meaningless, that problems of war and peace have evoked grave doubts concerning Lenin's thesis on the inevitable Communist victory, and that the "fruits of Soviet-American collaboration taste so sweet that the Soviet leaders may decide to call off the communist revolution." But those responsible for U.S. intelligence estimates should remember the Soviet teaching that world revolution ebbs and flows, that the current ebb in revolutionary vigor is matched by a strategy of procuring weapons of greater quality and quantity necessary to defeat the United States. How can the West be sure that some day a Napoleon or another Stalin will not gain control of the Soviet war machine? The Soviet Union may never see the day when it achieves a "war-winning posture"; improper evaluation of Soviet intentions and capabilities, however, may cause that day to dawn.

727
Rabinowitch, Eugene. OPEN SEASON ON SCIENTISTS. New republic, v. 154, Jan. 1, 1966: 20-22. AP2.N624, v. 154

Since the Cuban missile crisis the feeling has grown that the nuclear arms race has reached a stalemate, that nuclear war has become quite improbable, and that individual nations can revert to the tradition of international anarchy. With this shift in perspective the influence of atomic scientists in American politics has decreased, while many who have in the past expressed concern over the role of scientists in public life now realize an opportunity to extirpate this involvement by questioning the validity of scientists' warnings that man must end war or suffer a universal catastrophe. But scientists are men who possess information important to the future course of world affairs; this information must be placed at the service of governments. Economists, lawyers, political scientists, and theologians are too unfamiliar with the changes caused by science to account for these changes in public administration. Scientific proposals relevant to the resolution of international problems (such as the Lower Mekong Plan developed by Gilbert White) should not be submitted in an ad hoc manner whenever specific questions are posed to scientists by men trained in other disciplines. Scientists themselves must formulate the vital questions bearing upon science in the service of international relations, economic development, and the like. "A new breed of scientist may be growing up, young men and women studying science with the deliberate intention of applying what they learn to public administration and political life, rather than to research and teaching. Meantime, however, the voice of science in public affairs should not become silent."

728
Raser, John R. THE NEW CHINESE LEADERS: POWER AND PERSONALITY. Journal of social issues, v. 21, July 1965: 118-135. HN51.J6, v. 21

This is a proposal to study the men who are most likely to be in top leadership positions in Communist China during the 1970 to 1980 decade. The study falls into two parts. 1. An attempt to generate accurate information about cognitive processes, decision-making styles, and personality profiles of six to eight of the top leaders using structured evaluations by Sinologists who have made a speciality of studying these men. 2. The construction of a simulation along the lines of the "Inter-Nation Simulation" which would embody the major economic, military, political, and alliance patterns of the 1970-80 decade. Subjects selected on the basis of similarity to the Chinese leaders will be placed in decision-making roles, constrained by appropriate organizational structures and goals. Modes of communicating with and influencing these subjects will be evaluated, with the findings checked against the literature of psychology, cultural anthropology, and sociology. (Abstract supplied)

729
Schneyder, Philippe. [FROM CONAKRY TO LEOPOLDVILLE: SOLDIERS TO THE RESCUE] De Conakry à Léopoldville: les militaires à la rescousse. France Eurafrique, 17. année, déc. 1965: 8-9. JV1801.U53, v. 17

Observations on African armies. Domestically these armies are tending to establish themselves as judges over caste or tribal quarrels and are not playing a fruitful role in national development. On the international plane they are too weak to constructively intervene in inter-African conflicts.

730
Schwartz, David C. PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL GAMING. Orbis, v. 9, fall 1965: 677-693. D839.068, v. 9

Examines the methodological problems of gaming in political science and offers for consideration a framework of alternative gaming methods. Related problems of modeling, strategy analysis, orientation to games, personality and involvement biases, and general research techniques are dealt with. The author concludes that the application of games to political study "requires, for its fulfillment, a greater appreciation of the relationship of gaming to the epistemology of political analysis, of the character of the models used in games, and of the processes or inner-dynamics of the game itself."

731
Tsimanovich, K. U.S. ATOMIC INDUSTRY MONOPOLIES. International affairs (Moscow) no. 1, Jan. 1966: 72-76. D839.I465, 1966

Describes state and private control of the U.S. atomic industry and lists the electrical and chemical "monopolies" and other financial groups that finance the production of nuclear weapons in the United States. The author asserts that atomic production is particularly profitable to the businesses regulating it. The state guarantees them against all possible losses, trains personnel for the atomic plants at the taxpayers' expense, grants the monopolists equipment and materials at contract prices, exempts businesses from large portions of taxes on profits, and assures them an unfluctuating market for their products. "Here lies the reason why the monopolies concentrate the atomic industry on producing mass destruction weapons, prevent the large-scale peaceful uses of atomic energy and raise obstacles to a complete ban on nuclear weapons tests."

732
U. S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Subcommittee for Special Investigation. THE AEROSPACE CORPORATION: A STUDY OF FISCAL AND MANAGEMENT POLICY AND CONTROL. Report, 89th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1965. 62 p.
UG633.A412, 1965a

Examines the workings of a "nonprofit" corporation set up by the U.S. Air Force "to help it manage its missile programs." The Aerospace Corp. was judged to have been guilty of violating Government contract policy and wasting millions of dollars of public funds.

733
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Government Operations. Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations. THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL: JACKSON SUBCOMMITTEE PAPERS ON POLICYMAKING AT THE PRESIDENTIAL LEVEL, edited by Henry M. Jackson. New York, F. A. Praeger [1965] 311 p. (Praeger paperbacks, P-195)
UA23.A41656, 1965b

Under the guiding principle of Congressional surveillance of executive machinery, examines the national security policymaking process. Testimony before Senator Jackson's subcommittee, statements and analyses selected from various subcommittee reports, and official documents such as the National Security Act of 1947 are collected herein. The analysis concludes that executive national security machinery is highly valuable but should be strengthened, and that the U.S. Congress should make adjustments in its own methods of dealing with national security issues.

734
Winterhager, Herbert P. [AMERICAN STRATEGY AND MILITARY INTELLECTUALS] Die amerikanische Strategie und die militärischen Intellektuellen. Wehrkunde, 14. Jahrg., Okt. 1965: 508-514.
U3.W396, v. 14

The United States operates the world's greatest research and development program dedicated to military (and space) strategy. The ground rules of this strategy have been greatly altered by the "new frontier" military intellectuals, who emphasize flexibility, stability, arms control, and errorless calculation. They are civilian theoreticians who believe it possible to construct systems that submit the destructiveness of nuclear weapons to the control of reason. They are a product of the "other America," the pragmatic America that views truth as a dynamic process and the world as a brave experiment. They have chosen a road different from those of the pacifists and the weapons builders; they attempt to reconcile disarmament and security. In the era of massive deterrence the pressure of reason led them to seek a technical-rational system that could serve as an alternate means to a peaceful world, since worldwide disarmament was not feasible. The new civilian strategists have left no area of politics, strategy, or weapons development unresearched, and they have mastered the complex relationships between these areas. Not only have the cold war politicians and military men been antagonized, but the radical-liberals have felt their disarmament goals betrayed. The means the theoreticians have adopted for their analyses have been enormously fruitful. Mathematical game theory allows thinking about the unthinkable in terms of abstractions, hypotheses, and theories. Concepts evolved by this method--stability, balance, symmetry--have changed the rules of war, and no one has developed alternatives to these new theories. In the United States today, politics and science, political humanism and humanitarian rationalism are taking the lead in shaping future strategy.

735
Zilbert, E. R. THE CHINESE NUCLEAR EXPLOSION, N-NATION NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT AND CIVIL DEFENSE. [Santa Monica, Calif., Rand Corp.] 1965. 26 p. ([Rand Corporation. Paper] P-3074)
AS36.R28, no. 3074

Two decades of concern over nuclear attack have not yet produced sufficient stimulus for constructing an adequate civil defense establishment in the United States. Even the revelation of Chinese nuclear capabilities produced little overt worry. Public apathy stems from ignorance of the situation's seriousness and of the means available for mitigating the horrors of nuclear war. It has kept appropriations low. Events in 1961 stimulated the civil defense effort, but initial progress soon deteriorated into public debate over the wisdom of a shelter program, producing a confusion that allowed the public to return to its state of not thinking about the problem at all. The present program is primarily shelter-oriented. The National Fallout Shelter Survey (NFSS) notes the existence of nearly 127 million shelter spaces having a calculated protection factor (PF) of 40 or more (i.e., the radioactivity level would be not more than one-fortieth of that outside the shelter), and of these about one-fourth are stocked for long-term use. Moreover, the unwillingness of the Government or the public to adopt a comprehensive shelter program affects military defense policy--officials concede that a proposed anti-ballistic-missile defense system without an accompanying shelter program would be senseless, given the ability of an enemy to frustrate missile defenses by firing upwind of the target in order to kill by fallout. "At present . . . 19 years after the beginning of the nuclear age, in the country where nuclear warfare originated, we are superbly equipped to wage an atomic war and ill prepared to survive one." A fresh evaluation of nuclear realities is necessary. Of the infinite variety of forms nuclear warfare could assume, an all-out bipolar war may be the least likely. With rapid nuclear weapons proliferation it is perhaps more realistic to prepare against "limited exchanges," which would not require the possession of advanced missile delivery systems on the part of the attacker. In the event of such increasingly feasible exchanges the provision of shelters against fallout effects would save thousands of lives.

D. CONSEQUENCES OF NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICIES AND WAR

1. General Analyses

736
Casamayor. [THE DEFENSE OF FRANCE] Défense de la France. Esprit, 33. année, déc. 1965: 1165-1174.
AP20.E78, v. 33

Measures taken in the name of defense risk backfiring. Newly assumed governmental powers may undermine popular confidence and interest, which are the true bases of national defense. In time of war the government may order a general mobilization of all resources. Under such circumstances this is necessary, but, when the government defines mobilization as the "activation of the totality of well-prepared defense measures" one can legitimately question the nature of the machine that is set in motion and the location of the "button-pressing"

authority. The government may take measures, in the name of preparation, to insure its freedom of action, to diminish human and industrial vulnerability, and to guarantee the future security of mobilization operations. The power exercised here is at once "too precise and too vague." The Council of Ministers has recently been enabled to use wartime powers for dealing with any limited threat affecting a portion of the national life, territory, or population. Rather than a declaration of the rights of man this constitutes a declaration of the rights of government. Certainly there are ways to guard against war that do not destroy the benefits of peace. The present situation resembles a forest where the goals and the objectives to be defended disappear like fugitive game in the thick foliage. National defense can be used to further internal political goals, instead of defense of the motherland. The dangers of subversion or even propaganda are overestimated and dealt with too powerfully. To endow government functionaries and technicians with powerful weapons is a dangerous move. The government acts as if France is a "sick man"; but if the regime requires an organization designed for fighting aggression in order to ensure its own continuation, then it is the regime that is ailing. Instead of exploiting popular apathy the government should seek positive methods for bringing the people to a consciousness of their rights and duties. Only then can the nation fight enslavement coming from within or without.

737
Djerdja, Josip. IN EXPECTATION OF A FAR-REACHING UNITED NATIONS DECISION. Review of international affairs, v. 16, Oct. 20, 1965: 7-9.
D839.R4, v. 16

The effect of the arms race on international relations makes disarmament the basic problem of our times. Power politics and the concept that might makes right derive their impulse automatically and without cessation from armament policies. The arms race, itself a product of world disorder, is an ever more influential and independent factor in the creation of antagonisms. Its continuation paralyzes the relaxation of tensions and obstructs the completion of anticolonial emancipation. The nonalined forces have realized the full significance of this problem and are therefore pressing for a general disarmament conference. If, through this conference, they succeed in breaking the deadlock all spheres of international relations and all regions of the world will feel the positive effects. "There is of course no room for illusions about extensive or quick success" but skepticism cannot justify hesitation or postponement of efforts to confront the problem.

738
Hammes, John A., Thomas R. Ahearn, and James F. Keith. A CHRONOLOGY OF TWO WEEKS' FALLOUT SHELTER CONFINEMENT. Journal of clinical psychology, v. 21, Oct. 1965: 452-456.
RC321.J742, v. 21

Chronicles a fallout shelter occupancy simulation conducted by the University of Georgia in order to "appraise minimal survival conditions in public fallout shelters as presently equipped and stocked with emergency supplies." The shelter conditions were much more austere than in previous such experiments; however no deleterious psychological or physiological effects resulted from the confinement test.

739
Heer, David M. AFTER NUCLEAR ATTACK: A DEMOGRAPHIC INQUIRY. New York, Praeger [1965] 405 p. illus. (Praeger special studies in international politics and public affairs)
HM36.5.H4

Analyzes the demographic consequences of nuclear war as part of a larger study concerning the social and psychological effects of nuclear attack. The present work envisions the impact of two specific hypothetical attacks: the Holifield attack and the Spadefork attack. "The Holifield attack is directed both at military targets and at major industrial centers," and results in an American fatality rate of 30 percent. Spadefork is primarily an attack upon military targets and is responsible for an 18 percent fatality rate. The composition of postattack population, potential advantages of migration in the aftermath, population projections for 20 years following the attack, and manpower organization in the postattack society are considered.

740
Jacobs, Hayes B. TAHITI LEARNS ABOUT THE BOMB. New York times magazine, Dec. 5, 1965: 46-47, 163-164, 166-169, 171-172.
AP2.N6575, 1965

The merits and ills of the civilization that was brought to the once-idyllic Tahiti when that island was made headquarters for French nuclear testing in the Pacific.

741
[JORDAN TRIPLES ITS MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT: A SAUDI ARABIAN AIR BASE ON ISRAEL'S FRONTIER] La Jordanie triple ses effectifs militaires: une base aérienne séoudite aux frontières d'Israel. Observateur du Moyen-Orient et de l'Afrique, v. 9, 19 nov. 1965: 6-7.
DS41.02, v. 9.

Throughout the Arab world the great powers are vying in the weapons market. Most disturbing are not the quantities of arms sold but the effects these sales have on the Arab-Israeli strategic balance. At present Israel can easily compensate for its neighbors' increases in armed power, but bleak uncertainty arises from the indefinite extension of this selling rivalry and from political instability in such countries as Jordan and Saudi Arabia. One hears more and more of an Arab "Pearl Harbor" against Israeli strategic centers or an Israeli preventative action against the growing military potential of the Arab countries.

742
Kuzin, Alexander M. FALL-OUT HAZARDS. Student, v. 9, Apr. 1965: 14-15. LB3602.S78, v. 9

Compares the levels of radioactive carbon, strontium-90, and cesium-137 in 1962 with their lower levels in 1964 after a year of the test ban treaty (but before the Chinese nuclear tests).

743
Lorry, J. [NUCLEAR WEAPONS] Armes nucléaires. [Paris, Éditions Gédalge, [1964?] 73, [3] p.
UF767.L6

Discusses nuclear bombs and the gigantic destruction they can cause. Lorry concludes that war, which is not a law of nature, can be avoided by the refusal of those who desire peace (the majority of people) to participate in preparations for war.

744
Marquand, Carl B., and William J. Sparks. CBN WARFARE RESEARCH . . . AND HUMAN WELFARE. Ordnance, v. 50, Jan./Feb. 1966: 402-406.
UF1.067, v. 50

Enumerates some of the numerous products and devices beneficial to mankind that have resulted from research in the chemical-biological-nuclear area. Chemical warfare research and development, the authors testify, has made significant contributions to the fields of bacteriology, embryology, epidemiology, pathology, physiology, immunology, entomology, animal husbandry, agriculture, and other sciences, with laboratories of the U.S. Chemical Corps publishing more than 100 scientific papers important to the general welfare each year.

745
Oregon. State Board of Health. REGULATIONS FOR CONTROL OF RADIATION. [Portland, Oregon State Board of Health, Radiological Health Section] 1965. 78 p. LL RR

Contains the State's regulations concerning the control of sources of ionizing radiation and radioactive materials.

746
U.S. Library of Congress. Aerospace Technology Division. RADIATION EFFECTS: COMPREHENSIVE REPORT. [Washington] 1965. 103 l. (Surveys of Soviet-bloc scientific and technical literature) P&GP RR

Its ATD report P-65-12.

Recounts recent studies on "radiation damage to electronic components and materials as reported in the Soviet open literature during the period 1960-1963."

747
U.S. National Resource Evaluation Center. NREC PROGRAMS FOR GAMING THE LOGISTICS OF NATIONAL SURVIVAL. [Washington] 1965. 51 p. UF767.U5377

"Four articles based on papers presented . . . at a session on 'The logistics of national survival' in the Fourth Symposium on War Gaming of the East Coast War Games Council . . . at McLean, Virginia, on March 25 and 26, 1965."

Presents four programs developed for gaming the logistics of survival and recovery after a nuclear attack. The first three papers discuss gaming the effects of potential attacks on American resources, the logistic support of survival, and the postattack economy during its recovery. The fourth and final paper deals not with single solutions but the whole spectrum of solutions required for pre-attack contingency planning and preparedness.

748
U.S. Office of Civil Defense. BASIS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FALLOUT SHELTER PROGRAM. [Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.] 1965. 21 p. illus. UA927.A5, 1965

Illustrates graphically the justification for a national fallout shelter system by charting the effects of various sizes of nuclear blasts, the contour of fallout patterns, the areas and populations affected by a hypothetical attack, and the lifesaving potential of a strategic defense system that consists of improved shelters and an antiballistic missile system.

2. Political

3. Military

4. Economic

749
Aldea, Dan. OUR FRIEND, THE ATOM. Rumania today, Oct. 1965: 1-4. DR201.R78, 1965

Surveys the application of atomic energy to the construction and timber industries, agriculture, and medical science of Rumania. Accomplishments of the Bucharest Institute of Atomic Physics during its 8-year history are included.

750
Berge, Pierre. [ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE MILITARY BUDGET] Implications économiques du budget militaire. Économie, 20. année, 29 oct. 1965: 7-9. HC10.E42, v. 20

Forecasts that the unprecedented high percentage (51.8) of the French 1966 military budget devoted to materiel (research and production) will have important economic consequences. Many enterprises will face conversion problems due to changes in the structure of resource allocation, while enterprises specializing in information processing and automation will be most favorably affected. Technological developments under the new military program are bound to improve conditions of production and administration in all French industry and will make France into an exporter of technology.

751
Brandwein, Robert. THE DYNA-SOAR CONTRACT CANCELLATION--A STATISTICAL SUMMARY. University of Washington business review, v. 25, Oct. 1965: 5-16. HC107.A19A25, v. 25

This article is a statistical summary of some information obtained in a survey of displaced defense workers; it is a report on what happened to workers discharged as a result of the Dyna-Soar contract termination. A great deal of geographical, occupational, and industrial mobility is revealed. Salaries were close to previous levels, and in cases of professionals, even higher; and the discharged worker was found to be generally successful in finding employment on his own. The study is based on tabulation and interpretation of questionnaires by the State of Washington Employment Security Department under a contract sponsored by the Department of Defense and the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. It is anticipated that publication of greater statistical detail and analysis of the material for manpower policy implications will be possible later this year. Similar research studies on defense layoffs are under way in the Long Island, New York and Denver, Colorado areas. (Author's summary, modified)

752
Kunze, Heinrich. [EUROPE SHOULD PAY MORE: THE UNITED STATES STILL IS FINANCING TWO THIRDS OF THE WESTERN MILITARY POTENTIAL] Europa muss mehr zahlen: noch immer finanzieren die USA zwei Drittel des westlichen Militärpotentials. Die Zeit, 21. Jahrg., 11. Jan. 1966: 15. AP30.Z39, v. 21

The United States share in NATO's defense costs has during the past 4 years (1962-65) decreased from 72.9 to 69.4 percent, while the share of European NATO members increased from 24.7 to 28.4 percent with a simultaneous increase of NATO's total defense costs by 4 percent. The annual outlays of European NATO members for defense purposes jumped in that time by 19.5 percent as compared to a 1 percent decrease in U.S. defense expenses. Italy showed the sharpest increase (35 percent nominally and 13.1 percent actually). In comparing these figures several adjustments are to be made, due to the vague distinction made between expenses for civilian or military research and development, and also due to different purchasing powers of currencies, as well as different tempos of inflationary

developments in member countries. After necessary adjustments are made it becomes evident that the United States succeeded markedly in enlarging its European allies' share "in carrying the financial burden of the common defense."

753
Lall, Betty (Goetz) CONVERSION OF DEFENSE RESOURCES. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 22, Jan. 1966: 46-48. TK9145.A84, v. 22

As part of a project carried out by the School of Industrial and Labor Relations at Cornell University, representatives of 15 firms among the 100 leading defense contractors were interviewed to determine their attitude toward certain aspects of reduced defense programs. All of the businessmen related that their companies fully appreciated the necessity of entering more fully into the nondefense sector of the economy, although most firms preferred a Government-supported nondefense program over entry into the consumer sector. Problems of adaptation seemed considerable. Engineers and scientists engaged in defense activities were said to experience difficulty in adjusting to a different area of activity, while companies accustomed to defense contract work lacked the cost consciousness necessary for success in the private sector. Most companies expressed willingness to enter the three suggested alternative outlets for defense spending: mass transportation, urban development, and water resource management. Industry spokesmen felt that the Government should reveal how much would be spent upon these projects during the next decade and which agencies of the Government would be the consumers. Government and industry personnel levelled upon each other the responsibility for research and development spending and capital outlay costs. All agreed that economic planning should no longer be regarded as Communist or Socialist and that the U.S. Government should do more to create conditions favorable for the diversion of resources to nondefense fields.

754
LOCKHEED TOPS DOD CONTRACTOR LIST. Missiles and rockets, v. 17, Nov. 29, 1965: 14. UG630.M54, v. 17

Lists the 100 top contractors in 1965 for the Department of Defense (DOD), giving the total value of the contracts, the percentage each company received of all DOD contracts, and their percentage of the U.S. total. Lockheed received awards totaling 7.1 percent of the U.S. total with $1.715 billion. A fiscal year 1965 decrease of $1.6 billion in missile and aircraft contracts was reflected in a decline of 4.7 percent from 1964 of all U.S. contracts awarded the first 25 contractors on the list.

755
Mornand, Jacques. [THE REARMAMENT GOLDMINE] Le pactole du réarmement. Nouvel observateur, no 57, 15 déc. 1965: 15-16. AP20.02, 1965

The European does not generally realize how great is the role of the "war economy" in determining the United States present economic situation. A dossier just prepared by the French consul in Washington is revealing. He emphasizes that improvization characterizes the rearmament effort. Because the tropical and guerrilla war theater of Vietnam is unsuited to U.S. conventional equipment it was necessary to improvise, reopen Korean War factories, and pay high prices for quick deliveries. Orders for helicopters, Phantoms, F5's, C54's, special antiguerrilla planes, and converted B52's have boosted the sales of aeronautics corporations. An additional $300 million worth of munitions, bomb, and rocket orders have especially benefited U.S. Steel, General Electric, and Raytheon Corp. Some electronics firms are drawing unimaginable profits from the war. Similar sales increases have affected the naval construction, chemical, automobile, textile, and leather industries. The effects of the war spill over into the whole American economy, and have even led the Government to restrictive measures for dealing with a boom. "The militarization of industry seems now irreversible," and Moscow has been obliged to take a parallel course in increasing its military budget. The war itself may be confined to Vietnam but it creates repercussions in the form of a brutal intensification of the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union.

756
Mosbaek, E. J. INFORMATION ON THE IMPACT OF REDUCTIONS IN DEFENSE EXPENDITURES ON THE ECONOMY. Quarterly review of economics and business, v. 5, fall 1965: 47-67. illus. HC10.Q33, v. 5

Actual or potential reductions in defense spending can lead to sizeable costs to society. Knowledge about changes in defense procurement can help minimize these costs. This article describes the types of information on the economic impact of defense spending that are presently available. It also outlines the types of information that could be made available as a result of research projects that are underway. The article begins by presenting a framework for assessing the cost and value associated with providing information and ends with suggestions as to how to proceed and who should proceed in providing more data. (Summary supplied)

757
Nicholson, Howard. WILL DEFENSE BUILD-UP PROVIDE FRESH IMPETUS FOR SECOND-HALF 1965 INTO 1966? Magazine of Wall Street and business analyst, v. 116, Aug. 21, 1965: 532-535, 570. HG4501.M3, v. 116

Normally, the data on durable goods manufacturers' new orders, shipments, and unfilled orders furnish a fairly reliable guide to the future course of general economic activity, since the durable goods area is the most dynamic and cyclical. Recent indications of a cyclical peak in new orders, coupled with prospects for reduced steel and auto production, are somewhat ominous. But, the escalation of the war in Viet Nam is cutting directly across this situation with its stepped-up demands for military hardware, rendering conclusions difficult. This feature tells why the Viet Nam situation should not be emphasized to the exclusion of all normal economic factors and analysis. (Abstract supplied)

758
Perlo, Victor. THE U.S. BOOM: VIET-NAM WAR PHASE. International affairs (Moscow), Dec. 1965: 11-16. D839.I465, 1965

Analyzes the recent upsurge in U.S. business against the background of the war in Vietnam. The author feels that while Lyndon Johnson escalates military spending and the Pentagon takes advantage of increasing war fever to win acceptance for favorite programs unrelated to Vietnam (such as the Nike-X antimissile missile system and space militarization projects), economic, social, and cultural contradictions within the United

States will be temporarily assuaged. In the long run, however, the Vietnam phase will aggravate the U.S. economy.

759
Walsh, John. OAK RIDGE: 20 YEARS AFTER, DIVERSIFICATION IS THE GOAL. Science, v. 150, Nov. 12, 1965: 863-865. Q1.S35, v. 150

This city, constructed solely for the production of the atomic bomb, has survived the termination of the initial project. Although its main business still is the U.S. nuclear energy program, Oak Ridge is looking toward diversification of its industry and purpose. Some defederalization over the past 20 years has brought professional people to Oak Ridge whose careers are not bound to the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). One of the reasons for not having more new industry is the reluctance of the AEC to make its land available for commercial use. Also some citizens complain that the scientific community that dominates the population is not interested in the economic well-being of the city. Union Carbide, the principle contractor for the AEC in Oak Ridge, does, however, play a big part in the life of the community. While the continued development of nuclear weapons and missiles has kept Oak Ridge a busy place, the completeness of the nation's arsenals has caused cutbacks in production and professional personnel. Research and development projects now occupy more than 50 percent of the work force, particularly at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory.

760
Yarmolinsky, Adam. THE DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT AND THE DOMESTIC ECONOMY. Vanderbilt law review, v. 18, June 1965: 911-924.
LL RR

At a time when defense expenditures consume about fifty percent of the federal tax dollar, the question arises as to how the Department of Defense can provide the required defense without adversely affecting the people and institutions it is to protect. In response to the question, Mr. Yarmolinsky examines three problem areas: the effects of defense procurement policies, the effects of research and development policies, and the effects of defense spending generally on the health of the American economy. The author's main point is that the responsibility for absorbing the impact of defense spending must be shared by private industry as well as by all departments of government. (Summary supplied)

5. Ethical and Social

761
Valaire, Guy. "THE BALANCE OF TERROR WON'T PROTECT US FROM THE BOMB." Réalités [Eng. ed.] no. 181, Dec. 1965: 27-29.
AP4.R2164, 1965

An interview with Karl Jaspers, the German existentialist philosopher who received the 1965 International Peace Prize for his book The Atomic Bomb and the Future of Mankind. The discussion includes the question of political morality and the existence of nuclear weapons, the value of these weapons as preservers of peace, and the extent to which nations should run the risk of nuclear annihilation to preserve national values. Dr. Jaspers believes that a balance of terror cannot guarantee man security against nuclear warfare; "faith in a transcendental principle, no matter what its nature," is prerequisite to the spiritual evolution of mankind that is necessary for the preservation of human existence.

762
Weischedel, Wilhelm. [PHILOSOPHY ON THE THRESHOLD OF THE ATOMIC AGE] Die Philosophie an der Schwelle des Atomzeitalters. Neue deutsche Hefte, [Nr.] 108, Nov./Dez. 1965: 25-53.
AP30.N437, 1965

Discusses the dilemma faced by the modern philosopher, to hope for or despair of man's future in view of the nuclear-age threats to human civilization. The author refers, among others, to positions taken by Theodor W. Adorno, Ernst Bloch, Martin Heidegger, and Karl Jaspers.

6. Biological

763
Auerbach, Charlotte. GENETICS IN THE ATOMIC AGE. 2d ed. New York, Oxford University Press, 1965. 111 p. illus. QH431.A8

In layman's terms explains "mutation and its connection with radiation and nuclear fission." Included are radiation effects in general, mutation and its mechanics, the detection and transmission of mutations, their role in evolution, and the "genetically permissible" radiation dose.

764
Crook, Samuel L. TACTICAL RADIATION EXPOSURE GUIDE. Infantry, v. 55, May/June 1965: 22-23.
P&GP RR

Details the varing degrees of radiation danger. A new guide is proposed that will allow a battlefield commander to assess the radiation exposure of his troops at any given time in order to determine if they would still be capable of undertaking a mission or stay in action. Unit doses are only approximate indicators that ignore individual exposure variation. Three factors--whole body dose, time span of dose, and radio-sensitivity of personnel--determine an individual's effectiveness after radiation exposure. The proposed guide will enable a commander to decide whether to commit a unit without having to guess how much the unit will receive in its next action.

765
Holsten, R. D., M. Sugii, and F. C. Steward. DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS OF RADIATION ON PLANT CELLS: THEIR RELATION TO GROWTH AND GROWTH INDUCTION. Nature (London) v. 208, Nov. 27, 1965: 850-856.
Q1.N2, v. 208

Reports the discovery of indirect and potentially deleterious effects of radiation on plant cells. Irradiated sugar products appear to be involved, although at present very little is known about the "chemical consequences of submitting sugar to radiation."

766
Kalaydzhiev, V1., and Iv. Popov. STANDARDS OF RADIATION SAFETY. Washington, U.S. Joint Publications Research Service, 1965. 22 p. (U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. JPRS: 31,646)
P&GP RR

"Following is a translation . . . promulgated by the State Committee on Science and Technical Progress of the Ministry of Public Health and Social Welfare . . . published in the Bulgarian-language periodical D"rzhaven Vestnik (State Gazette), No. 59, Sofia, 27 June 1965, pages 2-6."

Sets forth the "maximum permissible doses (MPD) of external and internal irradiation and maximum permis-

sible concentrations (MPC) of radioactive substances in the water and in the air" as determined by the Council of Mutual Economic Cooperation (COMECON) in 1964. "The Standards are binding on all laboratories, institutions and enterprises where work is done on, or use made of radioactive substances and sources of ionizing radiations."

767
Kobler, John. FOUR DEADLY MINUTES. Saturday evening post, v. 238, Nov. 6, 1965: 42-44.
AP2.S2, v. 238

Describes the radiation accident that occurred Oct. 15, 1958, at the Boris Kidrič Institute of Nuclear Sciences, near Belgrade, Yugoslavia, and the medical effects on the six researchers exposed to the lethal rays.

768
Kuroda, P. K., Y. Miyake, and J. Nemoto. STRONTIUM ISOTOPES: GLOBAL CIRCULATION AFTER THE CHINESE NUCLEAR EXPLOSION OF 14 MAY 1965. Science, v. 150, Dec. 3, 1965: 1289-1290. Q1.S35, v. 150

Strontium-89 and strontium-90, released into the atmosphere by the Chinese nuclear device on 14 May 1965, circled the world in less than a month and caused a sharp peak in the Sr^{89}/Sr^{90} ratio in rain at Tokyo on 12 June. (Author's abstract)

769
Lindop, Patricia J., and Joseph Rotblat. LIFE-SHORTENING IN MICE EXPOSED TO RADIATION: EFFECTS OF AGE AND OF HYPOXIA. Nature (London) v. 208, Dec. 11, 1965: 1070-1072.
Q1.N2, v. 208

Interim investigation of the ways in which age and hypoxia modify the lifespan-shortening effect of ionizing radiation. Based on the small-scale study reported here (a fuller investigation is anticipated), the life-shortening effect appears to decrease with increasing age at exposure. The absence of oxygen also seems to offer some protection from the shortening of life.

770
Symposium on Personnel Dosimetry for Accidental High-Level Exposure to External and Internal Radiation, Vienna, 1965. PERSONNEL DOSIMETRY FOR RADIATION ACCIDENTS: PROCEEDINGS OF A SYMPOSIUM . . . HELD JOINTLY BY THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY AND THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION IN VIENNA, 8-12 MARCH 1965. Vienna, International Atomic Energy Agency, 1965. 714 p. RC93.S9, 1965

Assesses methods of determining the radiation dose received by victims of accidental high-level exposure.

771
Wellmann, Henry N., and others. IODINE 131 IN CHILDREN'S THYROIDS FROM ENVIRONMENTAL EXPOSURE. A REPORT OF A COOPERATIVE STUDY CARRIED OUT BY THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, THE ST. LOUIS COUNTY HEALTH DEPT., AND NEW YORK UNIVERSITY. Washington, U.S. Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare, Public Health Service, Division of Radiological Health [1965] 24 p. (Environmental health series. Radiological health.) QP535.I5W4
Public Health Service publication no. 999-RH-14.

Balance studies of environmental iodine 131 over a period of 30 days are reported in children ranging from 1 to 6 years of age. Calculations of expected thyroidal accumulations of iodine 131, based on accepted exponential models and thyroid function factors, are compared with thyroidal iodine 131 measurements performed in a low-background facility. The measured values were lower by a factor of 2 than the calculated accumulation of iodine 131, suggesting a lesser uptake and/or more rapid turnover in children. The difficulties involved in this type of environmental study and recommendations for improved methodology are discussed. (Abstract supplied.)

III. INSTITUTIONS AND MEANS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE

A. INTERNATIONAL LAW

1. Pacific Settlement

2. Adjudication

772
Anand, R. P. THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. International studies, v. 7, Oct. 1965: 228-261. JX18.I55, v. 7

Discusses the principles of international law that serve as sources for decisions of the International Court of Justice. Anand describes historically the reliance of the International Court on these various sources and traces the role of the Court in the formulation of international law while pointing out the inherent limitations of the judicial process in law-making. He concludes that in the absence of codification of international law the Court must be both cautious and progressively realistic and that states must use it more frequently.

773
Bulajic, Milan. WORLD LAW: A YUGOSLAVIAN VIEW. War/peace report, v. 5, Oct. 1965: 11. P&GP RR

Excerpt from an address delivered before the World Conference on World Peace Through Law, Sept. 12-18, 1965, Washington, D. C.

Asks whether international law as it has developed over the past two centuries is applicable to contemporary problems. Bulajic emphasizes an important dichotomy facing mankind: "whether international law is going to be promoted on the basis of internationally accepted norms and rules of behavior, equally binding on every one," or continue to lose prestige among the developing nations.

774
Douglas, William O. THE RULE OF LAW IN WORLD AFFAIRS. Washington law review, v. 40, Oct. 1965: 673-684. LL RR

Many lawyers and political scientists have come to think of "the Rule of Law in world affairs in terms of a consensus that crosses ideological lines and provides means of settlement of disputes, big and small, between the great powers as well as those with lesser stature." As the Pugwash series has demonstrated, understanding between the citizens of opposing regimes can be achieved once participants in international dialogue eschew propaganda and explore compromise solutions on vital issues. Dialogue between nations can result in a consensus on the rule of law. The International Court of Justice has operated objectively and generally in the interests of the world community. The nuclear test ban treaty, the executive agreement between Washington and Moscow to establish the "hot line," and the Soviet-American promises to ban nuclear weapons from outer space and reduce production of fissionable material, fragile as these arrangements are, "continue the mosaic in international law that has been building for centuries." The international lawyer must labor not only at the summit but at the regional level as well; the local problems of Asia and Latin America might require the services of a generation of international lawyers. Nuclear disaster cannot be avoided through unilateral action. A consensus of mutual accommodation, broad enough to encompass all ideological groups, must be secured on a wide range of problems, including disarmament. The "wide spectrum in Communist ideology, extending today from Peking on the extreme left to Belgrade on the right," evinces the actuality of change in modern ideologies and affords new hope for the realization of the rule of international law.

775
Falk, Richard A. THE SHIMODA CASE: A LEGAL APPRAISAL OF THE ATOMIC ATTACKS UPON HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI. American journal of international law, v. 59, Oct. 1965: 759-793. LL RR

On December 7, 1963, the District Court of Tokyo delivered its decision on the Shimoda case, the attempt of five individuals injured in the atomic raids on Japan to recover damages from the Japanese Government. The Court ruled that the United States had violated international law by the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki but denied the claimants legal basis for recovery of damages. The claimants had held that individuals can petition for compensation for injuries received from actions undertaken against international laws; but a waiver in the Peace Treaty precludes Japanese claims against the U.S. Government. Because the Japanese Government agreed to this waiver and in so doing violated the rights of its citizens, it could have been deemed responsible for the claimed damages. The Court decided that international law outlaws "an indiscriminate or blind attack upon an undefended city" and allows indiscriminate bombing of a defended city only when military necessity warrants. Because there were no concentrations of military objectives in the two Japanese cities and because international law bans weapons producing "unnecessary and cruel forms of suffering," the United States was said to have acted in violation of that law. The case will probably not exert much influence upon world military policy, but it could create a climate of opinion that "may eventually insinuate itself into governmental policy-making process." The Shimoda decision repudiates the concept of total war, voids the traditional ban on attack against any inhabited city, states that new weapons are not to be considered legal when not covered by express prohibitions, and rejects U.S. vindication for the bombings on the grounds that they avoided even worse sufferings. Although the Court views the legality of nuclear bombings in the context of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, "it does not exclude an intrinsic pronouncement on the issue of legality." Followed to their logical conclusions the findings of the Japanese Court seem to support "virtually unconditional prohibition" of nuclear weapons. But

fear of retaliation, not legal restraints, will continue to regulate the use of nuclear arms by world powers, while world opinion will continue to inhibit "all but the most callous belligerent." Against this background the Shimoda case is worthy of serious study.

776
Friedmann, Wolfgang. UNITED STATES POLICY AND THE CRISIS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. American journal of international law, v. 59, Oct. 1965: 857-871. LL RR

Since the end of World War II international law has passed through a period of experimentation in which it has had to resolve problems unique in its history. Three major challenges have been posed for the community of nations: the emergence onto the international arena of new nations culturally incompatible with the Western-Christian foundations of international law, the introduction of problems of economic development into the law of nations, and the conflict between the ideologies of communism and the West (paralleled by economic differences between Socialist and non-Socialist systems). Although the family of nations has enjoyed considerable success in overcoming these difficulties, the recent crisis in the United Nations poses problems even more threatening to the future of international law. Because the cold war has intensified and is being waged with new tactics, the United States has had to question the principle of the "sovereign equality" of all states and to challenge the traditional distinction between international war and civil war. The United Nations has shown that it cannot regulate certain situations affecting war and peace--conflicts between major member-nations, acts of aggression by nonmembers that are major powers, and the like. In particular civil wars constitute one of these situations. The increasing importance of the outcome of civil wars "forms the background for the recent United States actions in Viet-Nam and in the Dominican Republic, and for their theoretical justification." U. S. intervention in the Dominican Republic clearly demonstrates that the legal distinction between civil war and international war has lost its meaning. The United States, traditionally the champion of international law, has discovered that it cannot defend the existing international order against nations motivated by revolutionary ideologies and still abide by international law. If "international tensions have become too great to make the observance of international law compatible with elementary interests of survival," lawyers and policymakers should acknowledge this new state of affairs and thereby retain their intellectual independence.

777
HOW FAST IS WORLD LAW GROWING? War/peace report, v. 5, Oct. 1965: 6-9. P&GP RR

Excerpts of addresses delivered by U.S. Chief Justice Earl Warren and Sir Percy Spender of Australia at the World Conference on World Peace Through Law, Washington, D. C., Sept. 12-18, 1965. Chief Justice Warren indicated that the achievement of an effective international rule of law is within the reach of the present generation. Several factors illustrate his thesis. "The international law that exists already is a force for peace, and as we strengthen and expand it the occasions for disputes leading to war will lessen." The rule of law is the "only provable harness" of nuclear power possessed by the world. Sir Percy takes the position that many generations will pass before an effective rule of law is established in international relations. Whereas it takes only one aggressive nation to create turmoil and conflict in the world, it takes many nations to establish and maintain peace. Settlement of disputes is possible under existing institutions, provided states consent to "judicial adjudication in matters affecting their interests." Unfortunately many states are unwilling to submit to a court decision. An immediate impediment to the achievement of peace is the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

778
Hughes, Sarah T. WORLD PEACE THROUGH WORLD LAW. National business woman, v. 44, Nov. 1965: 14-16. HD6050.N3, v. 44
Reprinted from the Texas Observer.

The report of a leading woman jurist on the World Conference on World Peace Through Law, held in Washington, September 1965.

779
Johnson, Lyndon B. L.B.J. ON THE RULE OF LAW. War/peace report, v. 5, Oct. 1965: 4-5. P&GP RR

Address before the World Conference on World Peace Through Law, Sept. 12-18, 1965, Washington, D. C.

The United States is dedicated to the rule of law as the surest road to world peace. Achievement of world peace through law will be a very slow process that requires three conditions: justice, institutions, and acceptance. There can be no real or lasting attempt to attain law and order in the world as long as injustice and despair exist. The United Nations has given law force and meaning through its peace-keeping functions. The United Nations also can aid in the achievement of arms control and disarmament. Treaties to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons and extend the limited nuclear test ban, controls on the production and use of fissionable materials and strategic delivery vehicles may be realized in that forum. The third condition, acceptance, will be fulfilled when mankind as a whole understands and accepts its duty to respect the obligations and rights of others in the pursuit of peace. For peace "is the framework for the fulfillment of human possibility." While most human inventions give man mastery over the world, "law gives him mastery over himself."

780
Kempski, Jurgen von. [WAR AS A PUNISHABLE ACT] Krieg als Straftat. In his Recht und Politik: Studien zur Einheit der Sozialwissenschaft. Stuttgart, W. Kohlhammer [1965] p. 109-120. Law

Since the pronouncement in 1946 of the Nuremberg verdict against the persons responsible for the outbreak of World War II much has been said about the verdict's importance for the development of international law. Very little has been said, however, about the theoretical premises of that verdict, which more than anything will determine the future course of international law in regard to war as a punishable act. The absence of positive laws gave rise, in the period between the two World Wars, to a number of demands for outlawing war. But with the problem of sanctions unresolved, any measure outlawing war would jeopardize some important institutions of international law (rules on the conduct of war, neutrality); more importantly it would undermine the system of international law itself if it allowed, as it would have to, coexistence of mutually contravening

institutions. Positive law, as it existed prior to the Nuremberg verdict, did not provide for punishment of persons responsible for the act of war. The question, then, is whether natural law did so. Having considered the character of natural law, and given the interaction of certain institutions of natural law and positive law we conclude that only since the time of the League of Nations, and especially of the Kellogg Pact, has it been possible to construe a valid concept of aggressive war as a punishable crime under international law. The transposition of that norm into a punitive legal measure against persons responsible for staging such a war (as was done at Nuremberg) might be interpreted as a violation of the principle "no crime without an enacted law, no punishment without an enacted law." That principle has had, however, only rudimentary application in international law. The Nuremberg verdict constituted an act of justice under international natural law. At the same time, and herein lies its significance, it transposed the problem of punishment from the realm of international natural law into the realm of international positive law.

781
Klafkowski, Alfons. [THE POTSDAM AGREEMENT OF AUGUST 2, 1945] L'accord de Potsdam du 2 août 1945. [Traduit par Jadwiga Filipowska] Warszawa, Instytut Wydawniczy Pax, 1964. 374 p.
JX1549.Z7P644

Discusses the Potsdam Agreement as an international legal accord. Such questions as the role of the great powers and of the United Nations in the formation of international law and the dissolution or denunciation of an international agreement are treated in this context. The author deals with Poland's and Germany's relationship to the decisions made at Potsdam and the preparation of a peace treaty with Germany.

782
Rhyne, Charles S. THE WASHINGTON WORLD CONFERENCE ON WORLD PEACE THROUGH LAW. New York State bar journal, v. 37, Dec. 1965: 485-492.
LL RR

A review and evaluation, by the president of the World Peace Through Law Center, of the Second Conference, held in Washington, D.C., Sept. 12-18, 1965.

783
Rusk, Dean. INTERNATIONAL LAW AGAINST AGGRESSION. Free world, v. 14, Sept. 1965: 22-23.
AP8.F69, v. 14

"Excerpts from a speech delivered by Mr. Rusk in Washington to the American Society of International Law."

American foreign policy is often criticized for being too legal and too severe, for sacrificing national interests to international interests and striving to make other nations do likewise. U.S. foreign policy is based upon the assumption that the United Nations Charter should regulate the behavior of states, that the world should become a community of independent states with domestic institutions subject to international law. But the concepts expressed by the U.N. Charter are opposed by Communist powers determined to achieve world communization through world revolution. The Czech proposal offered to the U.N. Special Committee meeting at Mexico City (that the use of force be tolerated by international law when such force is directed against colonial domination) was another attempt to gain legal approval for the Communist tactic of "wars of national liberation." Unwilling to assume the risks that overt aggression entails in the nuclear age, Communist powers use this term to cloak their efforts to overthrow non-Communist governments. International law has nothing to say about revolution truly internal to a state or about the use of force against colonial domination. "But international law does restrict what third powers may do in support of insurrection. It is these restrictions which are challenged by the doctrine, and violated by the practice, of 'wars of liberation.'"

B. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

784
Beebe, George A. INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES FOR THE REGULATION OF CONFLICT. Journal of human relations, v. 13, no. 3: 332-338.
HI.J55, v. 13

Examines the United Nations and other agencies regulating conflict and explores the sociology of law and order in international relations. The author finds that the U.N. disarmament talks have "helped to whet the world's appetite for real progress in this field" by emphasizing the favorable economic consequences of disarmament.

785
Bennett, A. Leroy. THE REJUVENATION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL--EVIDENCE AND REALITY. Midwest journal of political science, v. 9, Nov. 1965: 361-375.
JA1.M5, v. 9

After a period of inactivity the United Nations Security Council appears to be resuming a more active role in problems facing the world community. This can be an asset, since reliance on the General Assembly has not worked well in situations requiring prompt action. The General Assembly is a useful forum for controversies that fare well in, and need, lengthy discussion. As a consequence the list of questions to be discussed therein remains generally the same. The Security Council, in contrast, reflects changes made in East-West relations, a power that continues to lie with states. Normal diplomatic channels outside the United Nations will still be used, as before, but the U.N. agencies can continue to play a flexible role in the reconciliation of international disputes. Table 1 gives the number of meetings of the Security Council, 1946-1964; table 2, the substantive political issues considered by the Security Council and General Assembly, and Table 3, the votes taken on resolutions in the Security Council on substantive political questions, 1954-1964.

786
Cherkasskii, V. IU. [THE CRISIS OF THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION] Krizis organizatsii ob"edinennykh natsii. Parizh [Dom knigi] 1965. 110 p.
JX1977.C498

Urges the peoples of the world to depose the "slaves of political doctrines, dealers in international capital, rapacious nationalistic fanatics, gross lovers of power, and soulless clerks" who have insinuated themselves into the leadership of the world masses and perverted the ideals of the United Nations. The United Nations should not be a union of peoples but a society of individuals who have freely accepted citizenship in a supranational organization and submitted themselves to the humanistic, moral, and transcendental values supported by that organization. Motivated by the highest concepts of the Church and humanism, the United Nations should nevertheless maintain armed forces in a disarmed world to prevent aggression anywhere in the world and to defend all men in accordance with the declaration of universal human rights.

787
Emel'ianov, V. HEADQUARTERS OF THE PEACEFUL ATOM. Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 17, Oct. 6, 1965: 26. D839.C87, v. 17
Condensed from Izvestiia, Sept. 11, 1965, p. 3. Slav Rm

Argues that representatives of Western countries occupy the higher levels of the International Atomic Energy Agency and bar citizens of Socialist nations from appointment to staff positions. The author finds it strange that the United States consistently sends administrators, not scientists, to the IAEA, thereby imposing upon the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America the obligation to fill scientific positions in the agency with scientists sorely needed in their native lands. Western countries are criticized for establishing bilateral agreements on nuclear cooperation (contrary to the IAEA charter), and then working for IAEA financing of this cooperation.

788
Juyal, Shreesh. UNITED NATIONS: CRISIS AND ACCOMPLISHMENT. Student, v. 9, Aug./Sept. 1965: 17-21. LB3602.S78, v. 9

Views the United Nations in terms of its crises --loss of confidence by some in the utility of the organization, problems of financing peacekeeping operations, Indonesia's withdrawal; its achievements --maintenance of peace in many areas, creation of a forum for diplomatic contact and negotations, the nuclear test ban, work in economic and social fields; and its needs--better representation from the developing countries, greater strength and vigor.

789
Kahng, Tae Jin. LAW, POLITICS, AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL; AN INQUIRY INTO THE HANDLING OF LEGAL QUESTIONS INVOLVED IN INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES AND SITUATIONS. The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1964. 252 p. JX1977.K25, 1964

Contents. --Introduction. --Nature of legal questions and problems of handling them. --Questions relating to the competence of the Security Council. --Questions relating to procedure of the Security Council: voting. --Questions relating to substantive rights and duties of parties. --Conclusions and suggestions.

"Undertakes a clarification of the practice of the Security Council in the handling of legal questions," reviews specific cases in detail, and makes suggestions for future handling of legal questions.

790
Richet, Charles. [A EUROPEAN PEACE PARLIAMENT] Un parlement de la paix européenne. Revue politique et parlementaire, 67. année, nov. 1965: 54-58. H3.R4, v. 67

Violent inter-European conflict could be avoided by the establishment of a West European peace parliament, joining all those states willing to submit disputes to compulsory arbitration. An agreement eliminating the possibility of war between the West European states might now seem redundant, but it must be recalled that 10 European wars were fought between 1850 and 1950. The realization of peace requires preparation, fairly simple in this geographic area because of Western man's sharing of three complementary ideals: peace, love of country, and Europe. While Europeans unite in their hate for war this unity is of little avail without unity of action. The proposed peace parliament would centralize, coordinate, and effectuate the efforts and aspirations of 300 million West Europeans. After the Euro-Americans had managed to settle their petty quarrels, the advance toward an "ecumenical" peace would be easier. The parliament would constitute the first stage in escalation toward peace. Recruitment would be from among the elite of many vocations and members would have to be free of indifference, skepticism, xenophobia, partisanship, and like qualities. However such characteristics as religion, nationality, or political persuasion would not enter into the selection. "Chimera yesterday; partial utopias today; realities tomorrow. Here lies progress."

791
Singh, Baljit, and Harold S. Johnson. COLLECTIVE SECURITY WITHIN THE UNITED NATIONS. United Asia, v. 17, May/June 1965: 170-180. DS1.U55, v. 17

For half a century the principle of collective security has filled the place in international relations once reserved for the concept of balance of power. A world community is thus presupposed, where no nation may assist only countries in which it has national interests lest the balance of power principle be restored. Although the United Nations can hardly be cited as an implementation of the concept of collective security, it has progressed further toward the realization of this concept than did its predecessor, the League of Nations. In focusing the force of world opinion on issues such as the British-Palestine struggle, in mediating in troubled areas such as Kashmir, in attempting to moderate the clash of the two world superpowers in Berlin, and in intervening militarily in Korea, Suez, and the Congo, the United Nations "has taken decisions which have often met the objectives of collective security." Most recently, during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, the U.N. Secretary General helped to achieve a U.S.-Soviet compromise of great importance to world security. Defeatists may argue the ineffectiveness and weakness of the United Nations, but other men understand that the world cannot solve all its problems through one agency and that the United Nations may be merely the beginning of a system of collective security. Wars have traditionally been initiated only by despots who drove the masses to slaughter. "It may be that for any security system to be in reality collective, it must be prepared to balance the power of the world community at a level below the existing nation-states."

792
Stošić, Borko D. [NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE UNITED NATIONS] Les organisations non gouvernementales et les Nations Unies. Genève, Librairie Droz, 1964. (Travaux de droit, d'économie, de sociologie et de sciences politiques, no 28) 367 p. JX1977.3.A2S7

A general study of international nongovernmental organizations and of their considerable influence on international relations, with particular emphasis given to their relations with the United Nations.

793
Tewary, I. N. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY: PEACE AND SECURITY, 1951-1960. International studies, v. 7, Oct. 1965: 337-353. JX18.I55, v. 7

With five examples--Korea (1950-51), Suez (1956-57), Hungary (1956), Lebanon (1958), and the Congo (1960-63)--reviews the growing influence of the U.N. General Assembly and its achievements in preserving peace. The power of the Assembly in conflict situations has proven to be more than "preventive diplo-

macy" or a "diplomatic consensus." This power involves "employment of specific procedures for recommending measures for the maintenance of international peace and security." It is sanctioned by world public opinion and has its own operational efficacy.

794
Tiwari, S. C. THE UNITED NATIONS: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS. International studies, v. 7, Oct. 1965: 135-168. JX18.I55, v. 7

Discusses the discrepancies between the hopes expressed in 1945 in San Francisco and the actual achievements of the United Nations; the techniques of diplomacy evolved by the United Nations and its varied peacekeeping operations; and the different positions taken in the debates over financing, the role and office of the Secretary General, and the composition of the Secretariat. Tiwari concludes that the world body will continue functioning even though faced with tensions and disorder from within and without.

795
Weill-Tuckerman, Anne. UN POWER SHIFTS: DECLINE OF THE UNALIGNED. Nation, v. 201, Dec. 20, 1965: 488-490.
AP2.N2, v. 201

The African members of the United Nations recently argued in vain for drastic Security Council action against the white minority government of Rhodesia and Portuguese colonial policy. These events demonstrate a basic trend in the world organization toward a decline in influence of the newly independent states and a resumption of control by the big powers. Having won their independence, the new countries are now forced to desist from ideological battles. They must meet more urgent needs. In addition the emergence of China as a distinct Communist force has been a disrupting element in the Afro-Asian world. When joined with the erosion of Indian influence and the partial Soviet-American hegemony (motivated primarily by mutual concern over China), the net impact of these factors is a narrowing of the role ideology plays in international relations. The East-West conflict as such has disappeared, except on specific issues like Germany. Intimidated by Soviet-American-British unity, the nonalined have failed to bring before the Security Council the most serious war of the decade. If they really wanted to be the conscience of the United Nations, they would not share "in the voluntary blindness of the international organization toward the Vietnam conflict."

796
Wittig, Peter. [THE UNITED NATIONS CRISIS] Die Krise der Vereinten Nationen. Zeitschrift für Politik, 12. Jahrg. (n.F.) Dez. 1965: 309-318.
JA14.Z4, v. 12, n.s.

Considers the United Nations peace maintenance role as being limited to areas not involving the vital interests of the United States and the Soviet Union. This is due mostly to the anachronistic character of the U.N. Charter. Comparing the United Nations to the League of Nations, the author contends that the present organization, due to its semi-universal character, represents an indispensable propaganda forum, a quality the League of Nations lacked. In the present, increasingly polycentric world the stability of world peace is still being decided outside the United Nations under the bipolar system. Polycentrism may, however, effect some changes in the United Nations role. The very fact that in the basic dilemma of world politics, negotiations vs. violence, the United Nations has always been on the side of the former, may have important bearing on the development of the future world order.

797
Wright, Quincy. PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS. International studies, v. 7, Oct. 1965: 169-204. JX18.I55, v. 7

U.N. accomplishments can be judged by the hostilities that have erupted and by the handling of the disputes the United Nations has taken up. Out of 31 serious hostilities (each involving at least 334 deaths and collectively accounting for 2 1/2 to 3 million lives) since 1945, the United Nations participated slightly or not at all in 19. U.N. contributions to the ending of hostilities in the remaining cases probably prevented serious international escalation, but in only three cases was a satisfactory and permanent solution reached in accord with U.N. principles. Its record in stopping hostilities has been better than its record in settling the 78 more-or-less threatening controversies that appeared on the agenda from 1945 to mid-1965 (47 recommendations and only 18 of these accepted). U.N. methods of handling conflict have evolved since 1945, but they must be further developed to cope with vast changes in the world. The body needs to institute a better balance between law and politics in its operations--legal clarification of, say, the distinction between aggression and the legitimate use of force, and more reliance on adjudication. Its membership should be universalized. The organization also needs an improved international atmosphere in which to function. Conflicts and hostilities will flourish as long as half the member states are unstable and inexperienced. Great powers cannot pursue ideologically inspired interventionist policies without undermining the United Nations. "A balance of power world, regulated by the Great Powers, has to some extent come into competition with an international world regulated by the United Nations with the support of the smaller Powers." Most importantly, perhaps, the Charter's international image of the world must be substituted for today's very divergent images--nationalism, imperialism, cosmopolitanism (universal ideology). Regional organizations must be subordinate to the United Nations--a hegemonial arrangement dominated by a great power complicates the U.N. task of controlling local incidents. In civil strife any intervention other than U.N. intervention must be prevented.

798
Yalem, Ronald J. REGIONALISM AND WORLD ORDER. Washington, Public Affairs Press [1965] 160 p.
JX1979.Y3

Regionalism, as it has developed and been institutionalized during the last 20 years, has not produced a secure and peaceful world order. When the United Nations was formed it was hoped that the concept of universalism would prevail in the conduct of international affairs. Regional organizations, however, have proliferated. Whether this situation is the result or cause of international disorder and whether regionalism contributes to the establishment of world order are two of the major questions investigated in this study. The introduction of nuclear weapons as a major factor in regionalism, particularly with regard to the maintenance of security, has had a disruptive influence on the achievement of world order. Although it is claimed that organizations were formed to provide collective security, they cannot, for collective security presupposes universal cooperation or action. "World order is conceived

as an ideal condition of the international system of sovereign states in which relations between states are governed on the basis of law and noncoercive procedures rather than power politics and force." The nations of the world have divided themselves into regional alliances based on similar interests. It appears fairly certain that the diffusion of nuclear weapons to blocs and individual countries will exacerbate regional differences and hence detract from security. Disarmament, as sought by the present nuclear powers, is very unlikely. The alternative is a proper mix of regionalism and universalism unhindered by the presence of nuclear power. If some disarmament is attained, universalism as it might be practiced by the United Nations would hold an increased position in the new world order. Regionalism, to some degree, discourages the settlement of conflict among blocs.

C. INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY FORCES

799
Bishop, Peter V. CANADA'S POLICY ON THE FINANCING OF U.N. PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS. International journal, v. 20, autumn 1965: 463-483.
D839.15, v. 20

Reviews Canada's policy toward financing U.N. peacekeeping operations--a policy that has had bipartisan support. The author concludes that since such operations were of negligible financial cost to Canada, the country may have been "overzealous" in its pursuit of the fair-share principle.

800
Firmage, Edwin B. A UNITED NATIONS PEACE FORCE. Wayne law review, v. 11, summer 1965: 717-737.
LL RR

The history of United Nations peacekeeping efforts begins with the 1946 Baruch Plan, which, in its acceptance of the application of sanctions by the Security Council free of the veto, reflects some of the same issues and positions that divide the major powers today. By the 1960's both the American and Soviet positions had softened. Although the U.S. desire for a permanent U.N. force still remained, the United States no longer insisted on a force capable of handling confrontations between Security Council members. Since the underlying reasons behind the Soviet and the U.S. proposals during the Baruch Plan negotiations have long since vanished, the United States should aim for "an agreement whereby some latitude is given to the General Assembly or the Secretary-General to initiate and direct the use of the U.N. forces, with the approval of a preponderant number of states permanently represented on the Security Council." Although Marxist dogma and Russian nationalism combine to influence the Soviets against such a proposal, the realistic mutual need to avoid thermonuclear war may eventually lead to agreement. At the last meeting of the General Assembly's 19th Session a committee to study the problem of U.N. peacekeeping was approved. Perhaps with the present distribution of power and the nature of weaponry, a realization of the goals originally set out for the United Nations can be more nearly fulfilled now than at its founding. Because the United States and the Soviet Union have more common goals and characteristics, in view of their nuclear power and modern means of delivery, than in 1945, they are within negotiating distance on the key issues of disarmament, war and peace, and economic and social development through the U.N. organization. The hope for better relations with the Soviet Union may well result from a genuine attempt on the part of the United States to revitalize the Security Council as a permanent, high-level negotiating body.

801
Frydenberg, Per, ed. PEACE-KEEPING, EXPERIENCE AND EVALUATION: THE OSLO PAPERS. Bjøren Egge, editorial adviser. Per Frydenberg, editor-in-chief. John C. Sanness, editorial adviser. Oslo, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 1964. 339 p.
JX1981. P7F73

Papers of an international conference held in Feb. 1964 by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs.

Studies the requirements for international peacekeeping forces from the standpoint of the military personnel who have actually participated in U.N. peacekeeping operations. Many of the political, legal, and operational problems involved in establishing such forces are debated, and recommendations are made accordingly.

802
Goldberg, Arthur J. PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS: IMPROVED GROUND RULES NEEDED. Vital speeches of the day, v. 32, Jan. 1, 1966: 167-170.
PN6121.V52, v. 32

Enumerates 7 principles held to be of essential importance to the authorizing, supervising, and financing of United Nations peacekeeping operations. Ambassador Goldberg also suggests that military units be earmarked for the United Nations and that the Secretariat request of member nations specific personnel, equipment, and services likely to be required for future peacekeeping emergencies.

803
Mehta, Swadesh. THE ORGANIZATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE: THE INDIAN VIEW. International studies, v. 7, Oct. 1965: 205-227.
JX18.I55, v. 7

Because the political assumptions that underlay the international force conceived in the U.N. Charter never materialized, the establishment of such a permanent force became impossible and unwise. Rules for the employment of a U.N. force would have to be defined in advance, be above national laws, and be equally acceptable to all. Its composition would pose a similarly difficult problem. Its loyalty would be uncertain, its cost excessive, and its ability to act effectively doubtful. Not until disarmament renders a U.N. force stronger than the forces of a great-power bloc, until aggression and states' obligations to meet it are adequately defined by international law, and until a "sovereign authority" can enforce sanctions will the world be ripe for a permanent international force. Still, precedents for effective U.N. action are extant (Korea, Suez, Lebanon, the Congo). "Unless the Great Powers decide to establish the force envisaged by the Charter, the United Nations should rely upon ad hoc forces raised within the broad constitutional framework." India believes the General Assembly should depend upon observer and quasimilitary operations and refrain from authorizing military action without great-power consent. No U.N. military personnel should come from great-power states. Financing must be voluntary. A plan such as that proposed by the Scandanavian countries to earmark national troops permanently available for U.N. use could be made compatible with these conditions.

804
Wise, Raymond L. VETO CANNOT BAR U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY FROM ESTABLISHING A PEACEKEEPING FORCE. In American Bar Association. Journal, v. 51, Dec. 1965: 1169-1172. LL RR

The United Nations Charter allows for action by the organization when the peace is threatened. The veto power vested in the Security Council's five permanent members should not prevent the General Assembly from assuming responsibility for maintaining the peace by establishment of a police force under its own authority. Even though "primary" authority is vested in the Security Council, the General Assembly can step into a crisis situation because Article 12 of the Charter infers that the General Assembly "has the power and duty to act where for any reason the Security Council is unable to do so" as well as to negotiate for developing such a force. The "doctrine of paramount purpose," requiring the feasible implementation of powers granted by the Charter, is relevant and should be applied in crisis situations that threaten the peace of the world.

D. OTHER PROCESSES, PLANS, AND PROPOSALS

805
Adler, Renata. THE PRICE OF PEACE IS CONFUSION. New Yorker, v. 41, Dec. 11, 1965: 195-202. AP2. N6763, v. 41

Profiles the American peace movement, with special attention to the meetings held in Washington, D. C., Thanksgiving weekend, 1965. Dissension, discord, and disunity, leavened with sincerity, are held to charactarize this movement.

806
Alcock, Norman Z. THE MEANING AND PURPOSE OF PEACE RESEARCH. Gandhi marg, v. 9, July 1965: 204-214. DS481. G3G22, v. 9

Have scientists the right to pursue knowledge as they please and to explore nature free of restraint? To answer this question the field of science must be split in two. Pure science--the search for truth and the discovery of new facets of reality--is obviously amoral. Applied science, because it is used for man introduces an element of responsibility and ethics. It might result in great harm to mankind, and therefore should be subject to some restraint. Science in the service of defense is a point in question: it should be provided with a "feedback mechanism" to warn man when scientific applications threaten to involve him in disastrous conflict. Peace research is the logical feedback mechanism for scientific military development. The Canadian Peace Research Institute has attempted to unite a number of research specialists in various disciplines in projects related to the study of war and peace. The Peace Research Abstracts project produces about 800 abstracts of world literature on war and peace each month. An attitude study attempts to determine Canadian opinions on defense, disarmament, and similar problems. A study of the economic consequences of disarmament was initiated to explore problems of economic conversion and to prompt governments to begin their own examinations of this question. Variables of social change are analyzed to ascertain their value in predicting attitudes toward defense policy and disarmament. Experiments at the Peace Research Institute have shown that tension might be reduced throughout the world if wealthy nations jointly offered a common program of foreign aid sufficient to massively improve the standard of living in troubled areas. This could be accomplished only if contending factions in those areas were to bury their differences and unite in the implementation of such a program. If scientists and scholars descend from their ivory towers to struggle with the problem of eliminating war, science may possibly be redirected to solve problems of its own making.

807
Beller, William S. GREATER JOINT SPACE EFFORT ENDORSED. Missiles and rockets, v. 17, Dec. 6, 1965: 15. UG630. M54, v. 17

Reviews several of the findings and recommendations of the National Citizens' Commission that were presented to the White House Conference on International Cooperation (Nov. 28-Dec. 1, 1965). Reports on space, arms control and disarmament, and peaceful uses of atomic energy are singled out; peaceful vs. military implications of the manned orbiting laboratory being developed by the Air Force are also mentioned.

808
Blume, Isabelle. THE PERSPECTIVE FOR PEACE. World Marxist review, v. 9, Jan. 1966: 26-30. HX8. P723, v. 9

An interview with Isabelle Blume, acting Executive president of the World Peace Council, which touches upon the group's recent congress at Helsinki and its attitude toward the war in Vietnam, issues of disarmament, activities of the United Nations, and activities planned by the World Peace Council for the coming months.

809
Bristol, James. ALTERNATIVES TO MILITARY DEFENCE: A REPORT ON TWO CONFERENCES. Gandhi marg, v. 9, Oct. 1965: 324-333. DS481.G3G22, v. 9

An evaluation by the Director of the Program on Nonviolence of the American Friends Service Committee of two meetings he attended in 1964. The international Peace Bureau Conference (held near Oslo, Norway, August 23-27, 1964) investigated primarily "alternatives to violence in national and international conflicts with particular reference to nonviolent peace brigades and international police forces." The Civilian Defence Study Conference (held from September 6-13, 1964, at Oxford, England) dealt with defense of a nation without resort to arms.

810
Dirks, Walter. [THE CHURCH INTERVENES: THREE 1965 PATTERNS OF POLITICAL WARNINGS] Die Kirche greift ein. Drei 1965er Modelle politischer Mahnungen. Frankfurter Hefte, 20. Jahrg., Dez. 1965: 819-826. AP30. F555, v. 20

Considers the Church's growing political role in the contemporary world on behalf of peace and friendship among nations and the Church's occasional intervention in the nation's internal politics. The author discusses the West German Evangelical Church's recent memorandum on Germany's relations with its eastern neighbors, as well as Pope Paul's peace pronouncements and the Vatican Council's negative stand on nuclear arms.

811
[DOCUMENTS OF THE WORKING COMMITTEE OF THE CHRISTIAN PEACE CONFERENCE] Dokumenty rabochego komiteta khristianskoi konferentsii mira. Bratskii vestnik, no. 2, 1965: 9-12.
BX6310.R9B7, 1965

At the invitation of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church and its Patriarch, the Working Committee of the Christian Peace Conference met in Sofia from March 2-5, 1965. The committee reviewed the problems facing the achievement of disarmament and concluded that existing methods of seeking to negotiate general and complete disarmament are progressing slowly and without vigor. New ways must be sought to attain security and peace through the prohibition of weapons. The committee found that the universal desire for peace is increasing and exerting considerable influence upon the conduct of world affairs. Cold war tensions in Europe have relaxed to the extent that real cooperation between nations is becoming possible. But in other parts of the world colonialism and racism still threaten world peace. The Christian Peace Conference therefore demands immediate cessation of the bombings and colonial war in Vietnam, recourse to the Geneva agreements of 1954, and creation of normal living conditions for the Vietnamese people. Aggressors are warned that violence cannot destroy movements toward national independence and may lead to terrible consequences for all nations. The crisis in the United Nations is particularly bothersome to the Conference. All Christians should lend their support to the United Nations in its struggle to overcome divisive elements and lead all nations to peaceful coexistence. The Working Committee was very disturbed by the report that the Federal Republic of Germany intended to grant an amnesty to Nazi war criminals not yet apprehended. The Committee reminds the Bundestag that time cannot erase the guilt of those who terrorized the peoples of Europe. West Germany should remember that this matter cannot be decided by Germans alone; all who suffered under Nazism must be given a voice in this decision.

812
Dodd, Stuart C., and Stefan C. Christopher. A FAR GOALS STRATEGY TOWARD RESOLVING DEADLOCKS AND REDUCING CONFLICT. Journal of human relations, v. 13, no. 3: 320-331.
H1.J55, v. 13

A strategy for achieving international peace and harmony according to the following principle: "If people or nations disagree on near goals, B, then seek their agreement on greater and longer-range goals, A, first, and thereafter treat the clashing goals B as among the alternative and partial means to those greater goals, A, and try to guide social action and national decisions increasingly in the decades ahead by experiments wherever possible to measure which of the alternative means seems likely to work best, thus social science can gradually help to save us from cold war deadlocks." A research design for testing the validity of this strategy is also presented.

813
Ebert, Theodor. PREPARATIONS FOR CIVILIAN DEFENCE. Gandhi marg, v. 9, Oct. 1965: 280-285.
DS481.G3G22, v. 9

Occupation of a country by enemy troops does not signify that a war has been won; on the contrary, civilian defense can then be applied. Gandhi developed the theoretical bases of nonviolent resistance, and recent history has provided examples of it. The organization and strategies of civilian defense may be explained in military terms, and it must be based on voluntary mass participation. The Ministry of Defense would thus be the correct body to formulate a nonviolent strategic policy, to provide advice, and to coordinate the resistance groups. Strategic policy would include alternative timetables for the achievement of objectives. Maneuvers and "war games" should be conducted prior to an anticipated invasion to prepare the population for the occupation. If publicized, these maneuvers could be effective propaganda tools.

814
Frankel, Charles. THE SCRIBBLERS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. Foreign affairs, v. 44, Oct. 1965: 1-14. D410.F6, v. 44

Intellectuals ("scribblers") exercise considerable influence over international relations, an influence that deserves more attention than it has received. For example they can "create, dignify, inflate, criticize, moderate or puncture" the abstractions and stereotypes that color the conduct of international affairs. This influence derives from the prominent role intellectuals play in modern societies. A major nation's foreign policy will not succeed, therefore, without the understanding and sympathy of foreign and domestic intellectuals. The United States must strive to achieve "good cultural relations" with other countries. In contrast to Americans the intellectuals of most other countries tend to think in ideological and abstract terms; they tend to be politically leftist; they are more likely to be aristocratic in their educational, aesthetic, and cultural ideals; they often exist as a separate social class; and, largely because they are averse to being identified with power, they are "negatively predisposed toward American society and American policy." Yet there is common ground for interchange between American and foreign intellectuals--the existence of shared problems in need of solution. "Responsive discourse" between intellectuals can do much to resolve international conflict. It can temper and subvert stereotypes, more realistically define international complexities and change, and develop a neutral vocabulary for international communication. If men fail to talk about the issues dividing them "they are not likely to understand each other very well. And this causes trouble when they turn to the more practical matters on which international accommodation depends."

815
Freund, Hugo. [THE UNITED NATIONS PLANNING FOR A DECADE] Die Dekadeplanung der Vereinten Nationen. Aussenpolitik, 16. Jahrg., Dez. 1965: 843-848. D839.A885, v. 16

Reviews the results of the so-called U Thant Plan, adopted in 1962 by the United Nations, which gives a long-range program for international cooperation in various fields. The adverse effects of international conflicts (Congo, Cuba, Vietnam) on the realization and further development of the program are pointed out.

816
Galtung, Johan. ON THE MEANING OF NONVIOLENCE. Journal of peace research, no. 3, 1965: 228-257.
AS9.J6, 1965

Two different ways of studying nonviolence are distinguished, depending on whether one uses explicit or implicit definitions of nonviolence used by others, whether writers on the subject or people who say they have practiced nonviolence, or one tries to develop one's own definition. The second approach is followed in this

article in order to avoid ritualistic repetition of what others have regarded as nonviolence. Nonviolence is seen as an effort to influence, and a typology of influence techniques is developed, based on a simple model of how human actions are decided upon. This typology has as its main axis a distinction between positive and negative techniques of influence, i.e., the distinction between techniques that facilitate the execution of positive actions and techniques that impede the execution of negative actions. Nonviolence is then defined in a negative and a positive sense: negative nonviolence would include all possible techniques of influence short of 'deprivation of biological health' (called violence in the narrow sense) and positive nonviolence would exclude all negative techniques of influence (called violence in the broad sense). Current forms of nonviolent resistance or intervention are then examined in this perspective, and five main types are distinguished: a symbolic form that aims at pointing out to the adversary what are positive and what are negative actions; the use of physical means such as nonviolent sabotage, emigration, escape and their positive counterpart: close social contact; the use of positive and negative sanctions; the use of positive and negative 'amplification' (a way of increasing the impact the adversary's actions have, whether they are good or bad) and role-playing which includes such techniques as noncooperation and civil disobedience. In this final evaluation it is pointed out that adherents of nonviolence should do more to develop positive techniques of influence, and that many of the negative techniques differ little from biological violence. (Abstract supplied)

817
Hsinhua News Agency. FOR LIQUIDATION OF FOREIGN MILITARY BASES. Peking review, v. 8, Nov. 5, 1965: 16-19. DS701.P42, v. 8

A report on the International Conference for the Liquidation of Foreign Military Bases (Djakarta, Oct. 17-20, 1965), including portions of speeches strongly criticizing U.S. foreign military bases and imperialism. In the words of President Sukarno of Indonesia, foreign military bases are "to maintain the domination of imperialism, to contain us, and if necessary, to crush us." Tang Ming-chao, leader of the Chinese delegation, declared: "The U.S. imperialist policies of aggression and war are the root cause of all the troubles of the world today. Therefore, the struggle against U.S. military bases must be closely linked up and coordinated with the struggle against U.S. acts of aggression and war. . . ." Vietnam is cited as the ideal example of such imperialism and aggression.

818
Isorni, Jacques. [PAUL VI BEFORE THE GATHERED NATIONS] Paul VI devant les nations réunies. Écrits de Paris, no 242, nov. 1965: 21-26. AP20.E355, 1965.

Praises the symbolic value of Pope Paul VI's speech at the United Nations and criticizes its ambiguity resulting from his attempt to meet simultaneously the demands of religion, politics, and diplomacy. Paul VI spoke too simply of the control of offensive weapons; the Vatican Council's later declarations that the theory of just wars is inapplicable today pay no heed to the Gospel's command to fashion peace by waging war against evildoers.

819
Levi, Werner. THE CONCEPT OF INTEGRATION IN RESEARCH ON PEACE. Background, v. 9, Aug. 1965: 111-126. D839.B2, v. 9

Peace research focuses too much on abolishing the causes of war and not enough on establishing the prerequisites for peace. A promising area of investigation is integration--what social behavior must be integrated and how should the process be organized and supported? Integrated behavior is essentially end-oriented and the problem is, therefore, to orient the actors toward the goal of the peaceful survival of international society. It is the political system that produces integration; malintegration of the political system directly threatens the overall end of a society. Today's international society is gradually integrating its political and other subsystems toward specific but limited ends. But "the political system of the international society, instead of maintaining first and foremost a peaceful international society, has as its end the maintenance of national societies [as recognized in the U.N. Charter] and is therefore not geared to preventing violence." Personal involvement in international peace should develop as citizen involvement in national preservation has developed, i.e., through habit, material reward, and emotional satisfaction. International institutions are now taken for granted. People recognize that material benefits derive from international cooperation, but there exists no basis for the most vital prerequisite of integrated behavior toward peace--widespread emotional support for the overall end of an international society. Peace research, then, instead of concentrating on social environment or systemic influences, should investigate people and "the conditions under which emotional support of a peaceful international society can be obtained."

820
Malex, Ivan. A REPORT ON THE PUGWASH MOVEMENT. Gandhi marg, v. 9, July 1965: 236-239. DS481.G3G22, v. 9

Reviews the agenda of the 13th Pugwash Conference, held at Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia, and restates the general aims and purposes of the Pugwash series. The author calls for closer relations between scientists of Socialist and capitalist countries and intensified efforts by all scientists to impress upon governments their appreciation of the need for peace and general and complete disarmament.

821
Mialet, Jean. [AID OR THE BOMB?] L'aide ou la bombe? Paris, Éditions du Centurion [1965] 175 p. HC60.M42

Partial contents. --Less expensive than bread. --Cooperation benefits us too. --To save the species: America and China; renunciation of aid to underdeveloped countries; the atomic bomb. --The role of the soul.

Argues that the developed countries (and especially France in view of its historic mission) must increase and improve their aid programs to less developed countries if the single alternative to humanistic practice--the nuclear bomb--is to be avoided.

822
Naess, Arne. GANDHI AND THE NUCLEAR AGE. Totowa, N. J., Bedminster Press, 1965. 149 p. B133.G4N313

Delves into the Gandhian ethic and its implications for an era in which weapons possess destructive powers of an unparallelled potential. Parts one, two, and three deal with Gandhi the man, his ethics, and his

political morality in comparison with that of Luther, Hobbes, Nietzsche, and Tolstoy. In the fourth and final part Naess fits Gandhi's teachings into the context of today's international conflicts. According to this teaching nonviolence, which goes far beyond mere passive resistance, can only replace military defense if all national ends are approached on a moral basis. Nonviolent power can be built through international service, improving internal society, nonmilitary resistance, research, and through clarifying national commitments.

823
National Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. General Board. THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES SPEAKS ON VIETNAM. Christianity and crisis, v. 25, Dec. 27, 1965: 282-284.
UA42.N24, v. 25

The full text of a policy statement giving the National Council's argument for opposing U.S. involvement in the Vietnamese conflict.

824
Oppenheimer, Martin. THE DIRECTIONS OF PEACE RESEARCH: CONFLICT OR CONSENSUS? Journal of human relations, v. 13, no. 3: 314-319.
H1.J55, v. 13

The "peace research movement" that has attracted much attention from social scientists in recent years has become so bureaucratized and institutionalized that "the overwhelming bulk of published materials in this field suffer from the same inherent ills as the dominant trend of academia in this country." Peace researchers have avoided the conclusion that social systems, by influencing decisionmaking, may determine the prospects for arms control and disarmament. Thus peace research assumes "that no fundamental changes need to be made within either the United States or the Soviet social systems in order to achieve peace." At a time when members of society engaged in the public peace movement are becoming aware of the connection between the achievement of peace and such issues as civil rights, the war on poverty, and political action, peace researchers threaten to diminish this awareness. Their contention that conflict control can be realized by influencing the elite responsible for the creation and implementation of national policy ignores C. Wright Mills' assertion that this course of action is too utopian to succeed. It may, in fact, reduce the peace protestors to the status of technicians, whose efforts will be used by the elite only wherein they serve the purposes of powerful social groups.

825
Preobrazhenskii, S. [WORLD CONGRESS FOR PEACE, NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE AND GENERAL DISARMAMENT] Vsemirnyi kongress za mir, natsional'nuiu nezavisimost' i vseobshchee razoruzhenie. In Orthodox Eastern Church, Russian. Patriarch. Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii, no. 10, 1965: 34-38.
BX460.07, 1965

Recounts the program of the World Congress for Peace, National Independence and General Disarmament held in Helsinki, Finland, July 10-15, 1965. The Congress is lauded as the most impressive event to appear in the history of the international peace movement. The gist of remarks made by the Soviet and American delegations to the Congress are presented.

826
Roberts, Adam. ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES IN CIVILIAN DEFENCE. Gandhi marg, v. 9, Oct. 1965: 274-279.
DS481.G3G22, v. 9

Four civilian defense strategies have been advocated. The first, nonviolent resistance by the people at the frontier, is a strategy aimed at the moral conscience of the invader. This oversimplified analogy to military defense has several defects, including assumptions that all appropriate borders could be manned, and that invasion by air and infiltration over a period of time would not occur. The advantages of the second strategy, a general strike, are that it applies coercion to the enemy and shows the determination of the people to resist invasion. However the striking population may be more seriously affected than the invader, because he could rely on help from his homeland. The third, total lack of cooperation with the invader, may be impossible, because it goes against the principle of opposition to the invader's policies but respect for the humanity of those who implement them. Fourth, selective resistance to invasion has the advantages of flexibility and adaptability. Any civilian defense policy allows for the application of pressure in a variety of ways.

827
[ROME JOURNEY FOR THE CAUSE OF PEACE: INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S FORUM IN THE ITALIAN CAPITAL] Rom-Fahrt für den Frieden: Internationales Frauen-Forum in der italienischen Hauptstadt. Deutsche Volkszeitung, 13. Jahrg., 29. Okt. 1965: 2.
P&GP RR

Report on the International Women's Forum on Peace, held in October 1965 in Rome, giving the names of speakers and the titles of papers delivered. The adopted resolution calls, among other things, for outlawing chemical, biological, and radiological weapons as a first step toward general and complete disarmament.

828
Roszak, Theodore. BRITISH PEACE MOVEMENT: LOOKING FOR THE MARCHERS. Nation, v. 201, Oct. 25, 1965: 273-277.
AP2.N2, v. 201

Peace movements and the "cause journals" that speak for them are ephemeral and delicate blossoms. They germinate rapidly in an atmosphere of crisis and wither quickly when they fail to develop their fragrant promises into solid fiber. The major obstacle to any peace movement is that, unlike many movements dealing with bread-and-butter grievances of majority groups or at least large minorities, it may have to demand highly principled, altruistic sacrifices from those to whom it appeals. In Britain neither the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament nor the Committee of 100 has anywhere to go unless it takes up a broad program incorporating a number of domestic and foreign issues. No group of this type can compete against the major political parties for mass support, since both Labour and the Tories endorse welfare-state policies directed at the most obvious problems of British society. But the peace movement could undercut the Labour Party and find the allies it needs by supporting causes that benefit disadvantaged groups of people whose lives cannot be touched or whose lot cannot be improved by the engineers who run the welfare state. With race relations, for example, the peace movement could aim toward rooting out violence nearest at hand in order to test and perfect the methods of nonviolent problem solving. Across such bridges the peace movement in Britain as

well as in America can further the goal of international conciliation.

829
Smolik, Josef. [THE CHRISTIAN PEACE CONFERENCE] La conférence chrétienne pour la paix. Christianisme social, 73. année, mai/juin 1965: 307-315.
HN30.C53, v. 73

A statement of the history and purpose of the Christian Peace Conference, a forum in which Christians can work toward world peace.

830
Sombart, Nicolaus. [PLANNING AND PEACE] Planung und Friede. Frankfurter Hefte, 20. Jahrg., Sept. 1965: 626-636. AP30.F555, v. 20

The possibility of mankind's collective suicide is not necessarily limited to the threat of atomic war. Worldwide famine, food contamination, water shortage, and air pollution, if not averted in time, will constitute equally grave dangers to the survival of man. They can be warded off only by the concerted effort of all mankind, through global policy and long-range planning. From the technical viewpoint at least, the one-world concept has already become a reality, as an artificial extension of the human habitat into the communications net around the globe. This artifical and highly differentiated "second world" of human endeavors accumulates destructive power in proportion to the tensions generated by keeping the system coherent. World peace in this new evolutionary stage of man's development cannot be a mere interval between wars. It must be the permanent peace envisioned by Kant, who believed in the final elimination of war after its value to man's vital needs and interests had diminished to the point of contradicting them. This point has already been reached. A permanent, universal peace would be dynamic as contrasted to the traditional one, which lacks the element of careful planning. It would rest on a constantly improving, nonaleatory policy that would make the best use of properly processed and optimally evaluated information data pertinent to the benefit of mankind. A new mode of international cooperation, supranational in character, has already developed in quite substantial measure, despite the continued existence of sovereign states. The fully mature one-world political system will probably rest on interdependence among local, regional, and global organizations.

831
Tinbergen, Jan. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND COEXISTENCE. Review of international affairs, v. 16, Sept. 20, 1965: 10-12; Oct. 5: 6-7; Oct. 20: 13-14.
D839.R4, v. 16

A series of three articles: "Improving International Development Policies," "Ideologies and Scientific Development: the Optimal Order," and "Discussion on the Organization of Coexistence."

Attempts to achieve international cooperation can begin in the economic sphere with an international development policy designed to establish a better world order. Secondly, scientific research can direct itself to undermining the two ideological elements involved in the East-West controversy. The contests of socialism vs. capitalism and "the communist party dictatorship" vs. "parliamentary democracy" are not as pure and clear-cut as leading politicians suggest. The task of scientific analysis is to point out similarities between the two systems and to indicate the existence of common problems that can be treated mutually. But, while disagreement still surrounds the collective decisionmaking and socio-economic processes, the world must devote its energies to coexistence, "the real issue of life and death." To be secure coexistence must be organized and explicit; its most likely nucleus is a strengthened United Nations. A beginning can be made with comprehensive discussions on the rules needed to govern the authority of the United Nations and the use of a U.N. force. While the world continues to "muddle through with the present two-pole system of force," international economic and scientific cooperation must strive to create a climate in which organized coexistence is possible.

832
Vaussard, Maurice. [PAUL VI AT THE UNITED NATIONS] Paul VI aux Nations Unies. Revue de défense nationale, 21. année, nov. 1965: 1669-1671.
D410.R45, v. 21

Points to a tradition of papal support for international organizations that would be likely to reduce the chances of war. Vaussard maintains that John XXIII in his Pacem in Terris encyclical and Paul VI in his U.N. speech have placed a new emphasis on this tradition by paying homage to a secular initiative, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

IV. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A. GENERAL STUDIES

833
Gillett, Nicholas. MEN AGAINST WAR. London, V. Gollancz, 1965. 144 p.
JX1962.A2G5

Brief biographies of the Indian Emperor Asoka, William Penn, John Bright, Leo Tolstoy, Mahatma Gandhi, Jan Smuts, Dag Hammarskjöld, and Pierre Ceresole. These men are presented as great peacemakers, who have rallied mankind against the danger, absurdity, and inhumanity of war.

834
Wright, Quincy. A STUDY OF WAR. 2d ed., with a commentary on war since 1942. Chicago, University of Chicago Press [1965] 1637 p. illus.
U21.W7, 1965

An edition of the classic study that has been "corrected for typographical and factual errors." The text was left unchanged, in the view that to have incorporated the radical changes that have taken place in the nature of war since the book was written would have been impossible. The original analysis stands, then, as a commentary on war as it was before the nuclear age.

B. THE BACKGROUND UP TO WORLD WAR I

C. THE INTERWAR PERIOD AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

835
Rasch, Harold. [THE TREATY OF RAPALLO AND GERMAN-SOVIET RELATIONS TODAY] Der Vertrag von Rapallo und das deutsch-sowjetische Verhältnis heute. Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, 10. Jahrg., Nov. 1965: 941-950.
D839.B57, v. 10

Describes the background of the 1922 Rapallo Treaty and compares Germany's situation then with its present one. The author contends that current West German-Soviet relations are, on the Germans' part, filled "with protest against the past and the present and with fear of the future." He appeals for improvement of the German Federal Republic's relations with the Soviet Union and with East Germany.

D. THE POST-WORLD WAR II PERIOD AND THE UNITED NATIONS

836
Dmitriev, Bor, and Bor Pavlov. [THE U.N.--20 YEARS OLD] OON--20 let. Moskva, Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1965. 58 p.
JX1977.D55

Partial contents.--Saving future generations from the calamities of war.--Reaffirming faith in the basic rights of man.--The U.S.A. against the U.N.

Reviews Soviet efforts in the United Nations to avert nuclear war and to help developing nations "throw off the yoke of colonial domination" during the past 20 years. The authors describe right-wing opposition in the United States to the United Nations and past U.S. attempts to secure control of the U.N. apparatus in order to use the organization as an instrument for prolonging the life of the imperialist-colonialist system.

837
Eichelberger, Clark M. DISARMAMENT. In his UN: the first twenty years. New York, Harper & Row [1965] p. 53-68.
JX1977.E393

Summarizes the role and participation of the United Nations in the search for disarmament during the past 20 years. A comparison is made of the importance attached to disarmament in the Charters of the League of Nations and the United Nations. Some emphasis is given to the 14th General Assembly's unanimously accepted resolution urging general and complete disarmament under international control, the Soviet-American Joint Statement of Agreed Principles, and the convening of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament. The year 1963, with its major accomplishment the limited nuclear test ban treaty, is singled out as a productive arms control year.

838
Fedorov, Vladimir N. [PROBLEMS OF DISARMAMENT AND THE CREATION OF ARMED FORCES WITHIN THE SECURITY COUNCIL] Voprosy razoruzheniia i sozdaniia vooruzhennykh sil v sovete bezopasnosti. In his Sovet bezopasnosti OON. Moskva, Mezhdunarodyne otnosheniia, 1965. p. 139-149.
JX1977.F34

A brief, historical account of the work of the U.N. Security Council in the field of disarmament since 1946. Particular attention is given the efforts of the Security Council to create effective peacekeeping forces and to employ these forces in times of international crisis.

839
Giovannitti, Len, and Fred Freed. THE DECISION TO DROP THE BOMB. New York, Coward-McCann [1965] 348 p.
UA23.G62
Bibliography: p. [336]-339.

Chronicles the when, how, and why of the decision to employ the first atomic bomb against Japan. The result of research for a television documentary of the same title, the book focuses on the critical period from April 12, 1945, when Harry S. Truman became President, to the actual dropping of the bomb.

840
Scheinman, Lawrence. ATOMIC ENERGY POLICY IN FRANCE UNDER THE FOURTH REPUBLIC. Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1965. 259 p.
HD9698.F72S3
Bibliography: p. 224-244.

Contents.--Background and structure of the CEA.--The formative years: 1946-1951.--The first five year plan: option for the future.--The basis of the French bomb.--Euratom and the French atom.--The road to Reggane.--The Fifth Republic and the atom.

Describes the atomic policy of the Fourth Republic and follows the policymaking that resulted in the development of the French bomb. The French experience is unique in the author's view. A small cadre of politically unaccountable individuals, based in the largely autonomous Atomic Energy Commission (CEA), shaped atomic policy. Small groups reached a consensus on military applications and then communicated this to the public. Political arguments (an "inclination toward grandeur") were more decisive than military justifications. De Gaulle's use of the force de frappe is much more extensive than was intended by the Fourth Republic, but a reversal of course by post-Gaullist leadership cannot be expected. While pruning the scope of French ambitions, leaders will probably seek "to use French nuclear capability as a lever to obtain both increased security and political advantage in the Atlantic and world arenas." Because the French case is unique--because a major stimulus to its decision to join the nuclear club was psychological frustration stemming from the gap between its theoretical status and its actual postwar standing--one cannot use it to predict the course of other nations that are technologically and economically capable of building atomic weapons.

841
Styron, Mary-Alice. A HIDDEN CHAPTER IN THE FIGHT AGAINST WAR. Young socialist, v. 9, Nov./Dec. 1965: 12-21. P&GP RR

Traces the causes and events of the massive 1945-46 U.S. "Bring the Troops Home" movement ("the greatest troop revolt that has ever occurred in a victorious army") and concludes that the prospects for a similar movement against the war in Vietnam are promising and should be encouraged in order to end the war and "shake the very foundations of American foreign policy and the American military machine."

842
THREE BAN-THE-BOMB RALLIES. Japan quarterly, v. 12, Oct./Dec. 1965: 430-433.
DS801.J274, v. 12

Reports the disintegration of the ban-the-bomb movement that began in Japan when a fishing vessel was contaminated by fallout from a U.S. nuclear test at Bikini Atoll in 1954. The movement, which has attracted many Communists, Socialists, democratic Socialists, and other members of political parties, is said to have degenerated into "wrangling and feuds among the political parties selfishly vying for leadership of the movement." To accommodate differences in political orientation three distinct ban-the-bomb rallies were held on August 6, 1965, the 20th anniversary of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima.

V. GENERAL ANALYSES AND BASIC APPROACHES

A. GENERAL ANALYSES

843
Bobrow, Davis B. CHINESE AND AMERICAN INTERESTS IN ARMS CONTROL. Background, v. 9, Aug. 1965: 91-110. D639.B2, v. 9

Communist China and the United States may have common interests in certain arms control measures. What China would prefer are arrangements that would place restraints on Washington, for example: confine U.S. military efforts in Asia to sublimited wars in which China feels itself superior. Peking would accept controls on the size of regular armed forces, on the use of sophisticated weapons (nuclear arms, airpower, artillery), on the presence of official armed forces in foreign countries, and on the geographical extent and continuity of particular conflicts. Washington might be able to accept these measures and turn them to U.S. advantage. This would be possible if the United States could increase its guerrilla war capability while reducing its conventional war capacity, if it could use Chinese-preferred interruptions in conflict to the benefit of the target society, or if it could offset equipment restrictions by increases in friendly guerrilla forces. Even if U.S. sublimited war capacities can thus be improved, Chinese-preferred arms control arrangements are not of central interest to the United States unless they induce the Chinese to decrease the severity and incidence of guerrilla wars. Choosing not to implement a successful arms control policy in Southeast Asia leaves the United States with three alternatives: to initiate major escalation, to change its foreign policy objectives, or to accept setbacks until American capabilities can survive the restraints imposed by Chinese-preferred arms control measures.

844
Burhop, Eric H. TWENTY YEARS AFTER. Scientific world, v. 9, no. 4, 1965: 17-20.
Q1.S8415, v. 9

Over the past 20 years the growth of the field of nuclear energy has had both beneficial and destructive consequences. The concentration of effort in the development and production of nuclear weapons has been of grave concern to scientists around the world. The World Federation of Scientific Workers, which was founded in 1946, has directed its energies and interests to the problems of nuclear weapons and disarmament, believing that the world will never feel secure nor the full potential of nuclear science be realized until these weapons are disposed of. Despite all the efforts of world groups and official consultations, only one concrete arms control measure has emerged--the partial nuclear test ban treaty of 1963. No substantial progress toward disarmament followed the test ban, and little is expected from the resumption of the disarmament negotiations in Geneva. One reason is obvious. When powerful nuclear countries like the United States undertake aggressive policies in removed areas of the world--in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic--the sincerity of their intentions regarding nuclear disarmament is challengeable. World public opinion against U.S. action in Vietnam should become intense enough to force the American imperialists out before they threaten the use of nuclear weapons and risk escalation to a general nuclear war. Given U.S. superiority, the alternative left to the Vietnamese is to accept American terms of settlement. Such action, however, would not eliminate U.S. ability to undertake nuclear blackmail in the future. The "Nth country problem" is another major world concern. The West's concern over proliferation is questionable in view of American and British campaigns for an allied nuclear force and a multilateral nuclear force (MLF). The MLF is designed to satisfy Germany's ambitions for a share in nuclear policymaking and in nuclear power. An effective deterrent to continued proliferation would be the achievement of comprehensive and concrete disarmament measures among the nuclear powers. Extension of the test ban to include underground nuclear tests could be an immediate step in the right direction.

845
Clark, Joseph S. DISARMAMENT AND WORLD LAW. War/peace report, v. 5, Oct. 1965: 9-10.
P&GP RR

Address delivered at the World Conference on World Peace Through Law, Sept. 12-18, 1965, Washington, D.C.

The key to peace, defined in terms of effective "war prevention, is disarmament, general and complete, established by treaties carefully drafted by lawyers, and it must be enforced through the judicial process by some sort of peacekeeping police force with a monopoly of the weapons of war." Contrary to today's belief that peace can be based on mutual deterrence, security is not gained through a continued arms race. World law and disarmament are inseparable and necessary components of world peace. The enforcement of international disarmament would require the establishment of a veto-less International Disarmament Organization, an adequate World Police Force, and international tribunals of mediation, conciliation and adjudication. It is the responsibility of all nations to heed the words of U Thant in working toward establishing the legal foundations for peace.

846
Erler, Fritz. ON PROBLEMS OF SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT. News from Germany, v. 18, Feb./Mar. 1965: 1-2. DD257.N518, v. 18

Defense and disarmament are but the two sides of the security coin. Disarmament negotiations can be successful only when a nation is sure of its own security. Likewise disarmament and related measures (such as the control of nuclear proliferation) will make the world more secure. Thus all nations have an interest in disarmament, both in order to secure peace and to lessen the tensions inherent in our age. The arms race is both symptom and cause of these tensions. For example the German question is "closely linked to the security problem," but disarmament or arms control arrangements will not necessar-

ily entail a German solution. Such agreements possibly would be based "on the false conviction that disarmament and détente could be founded on a continuance of Germany's division." West Germany, then, must attempt to influence disarmament negotiations in areas relevant to the German question. To this end research, conducted and coordinated by a commissioner for disarmament, should be undertaken by the government of the German Federal Republic.

847
Gorden, Morton, and Daniel Lerner. THE SETTING FOR EUROPEAN ARMS CONTROLS: POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC CHOICES OF EUROPEAN ELITES. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 9, Dec. 1965: 419-433. JX1901.J6, v. 9

Survey data from panel interviews among the elite structure in Great Britain, France, and Germany outlines salient attitudes toward arms control in Europe. Almost the entire panel in each country regarded the Soviet threat as a major factor in international relations even though they differed as to the nature of the threat. British and German panels were almost unanimous in considering the menace as long-term. The French for the most part agreed, although a fairly large fraction saw it as a short-term danger. Deterrence was not seen as guaranteeing Western power, and disarmament took priority over deterrence in the minds of the three elites. This attitude is extremely complex, however, and many panelists felt that in the near future a strong deterrent might be necessary to create the preconditions for détente and disarmament. They have very little hope for immediate success in achieving disarmament. In the light of this pessimism the United States is held the best guarantor of European security. NATO, as the expression of the American guarantee, was highly regarded, but in no country did a majority believe NATO to be strong enough actually to defend Europe in the event of a Soviet attack. To a limited extent the elites were willing to give up national armies to NATO, although not for international police functions. British elites firmly favored national production of thermonuclear weapons, and the French approached a majority; German elites were decidedly against national manufacture. Most panelists viewed the nation-state as an obsolescent entity and favored international association, with, however, important national differences in the areas favored for cooperation. The United Nations was considered useful by all, primarily in halting the spread of conflicts. Essentially, then, Europeans seem to want both deterrence and disarmament. "Statesmanship is necessary to find the proper formulae which will at once gratify both desires."

848
Halperin, Morton H., and Dwight H. Perkins. COMMUNIST CHINA AND ARMS CONTROL. New York, F. A. Praeger [1965] 191 p. JX1974.H26, 1965a

Contents.--China's foreign policy: goals and perceptions.--Domestic politics and foreign policy.--The economics of foreign policy.--Nuclear strategy.--Proliferation.--Conventional war.--Arms control and war.--Arms control and insurgency.--The Chinese public record on arms control.--The Chinese attitude toward arms control.--Chinese attitudes toward international agreements, organizations, and inspection.--Making China arms control minded.--The impact of arms control on china.

A comprehensive study of Chinese attitudes toward arms control. Considerations of Chinese foreign and domestic policy are introduced as they relate to this problem. How future Chinese attitudes toward arms control might evolve and how China would probably react to formal control agreements and their implementation are assessed. The authors find that China's interest in arms control is very limited "and that there are formidable barriers to any enhancement of this interest. If China's interest is to increase, part of the responsibility will lie with what American policy makers and others interested in arms control can do to educate Peking about the potential significance of arms control for China."

849
Horowitz, Irving L. UNILATERAL INITIATIVES: A STRATEGY IN SEARCH OF A THEORY. Diogenes, no. 50, summer 1965: 112-127. AS4.D5, 1965

Disarmament and deterrence are opposite theories based on differing conceptions of the world; unilateralism and multilateralism are only different strategies ideologically founded on the common theory of disarmament. There is no arguing the ethics of unilateral initiatives that attempt to fuse morality and practicality. Unilateralism is "a noble position, one based on the ideas and ideals that the conscience of free men can never be bought or bartered--even if a nation is invaded and is subject to direct military peril." Unfortunately the strategy of unilateral initiatives is politically unrealistic. An intelligent strategy for peace must deal with complexities ignored or underestimated by the unilateralists, who assume the need for a world psychological overhaul but maintain that peace can be attained without revision of the "technological, military, and economic thinking that went into the creation of a world at war." Unrealistically and uncritically they embrace the philosophy that altruism is as powerful a motive for human behavior as egoism. Unilateral moves can be useful after some pressing political conflicts have been settled. In the meantime bilateral agreements to reduce tensions and avert war are politically feasible goals worthy of effort. The necessary basis for a successful disarmament strategy is political realism. "It becomes increasingly difficult to moralize over the strategy which should be employed, and it becomes increasingly necessary to politicalize the concept of disarmament." Until disarmers address themselves to fundamental questions about the international environment, "unilateral and bilateral approaches will be stalemated strategies in search of a general theory of politics."

850
Lall, Betty (Goetz) NOTES FROM ASIA AND GERMANY. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 21, Nov. 1965: 33-35. TK9145.A84, v. 21

Describes the feelings of Asia and West Germany toward disarmament, as observed on a recent tour. India, the Asian country closest to becoming a nuclear power, contains elements both for and against weapons production. Most other Asian nations are neither very interested in nuclear weapons nor worried about China's emerging nuclear status. They are most concerned about the "rising power of China in general" and its conventional military power. In addition the author reviews the U.S. presence in Asia and Vietnam, the need for Asian regional security against China, the need for settlement of territorial and border disputes, and the role the United Nations might play in these settlements. Turning to another

part of the world, she points out that West Germany is not as concerned with U.S. arms control considerations as might be expected. Bonn does recognize, however, the political benefits it might derive from arms control agreements in Europe. West Germany does want to improve its relations with Eastern Europe.

851
Pilisuk, Marc, and Thomas Hayden. IS THERE A MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX WHICH PREVENTS PEACE? CONSENSUS AND COUNTERVAILING POWER IN PLURALISTIC SYSTEMS. Journal of social issues, v. 21, July 1965: 67-117.
HN51.J6, v. 21

A social system as pluralistically oriented as our own is likely to conceal the basic assumptions which underlie its diversity. These assumptions, however, define constraints upon policy alternatives which the system can tolerate or consider. When these constraints are examined and matched against the social requisites of enduring peace, it becomes clear that American society, with its present core assumptions, cannot accommodate to peace. Peace will be possible only if institutions which maintain the diffuse constraints are obliged to yield to other centers of political power. Peace research by the social scientist has a role in this transition if the researcher can help to identify the military, industrial, and governmental institutions which are most in need of change and/or most amenable to it and if its findings are passed along to social protest movements which have a positive stake in the transition. (Abstract supplied)

852
Rudder, Earl. WHAT PRICE DISARMAMENT? Ordnance, v. 50, Nov./Dec. 1965: 288-290.
UF1.O67, v. 50

Presented before a "Symposium on Arms Control, cosponsored by TRW Space Technology Laboratories and the American Ordnance Association, in cooperation with Texas A&M University," Mar. 1965, in Los Angeles.

Recent history indicates that Western military forces and nuclear capabilities are the best preservatives of peace and that the show of force has served as the best deterrent to Communist aggression. U.S. armed forces have done more to ensure peace than any other contemporary factor. So long as Communist power remains bent on achieving world revolution, disarmament can be achieved only when it simultaneously resolves the problem of the Communist threat. An international meeting of the world's best minds and leading policymakers must be convoked to settle both questions--the arms race and the Communist menace--at the same time. The prospects for arms control (as evinced by the "rather dismal record" of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency) do not seem good. Civilized man may express a desire for disarmament but "still draws more incentive from a basic desire to fight than to disarm." As a nation, the American people have yet to agree on what they really want from arms control programs. Realization of any disarmament program would impose national obligations, pose certain risks, and necessitate concessions. Would the United States be willing to achieve such a program at the expense of some loss of national prestige and international influence, or agree to scrap and scuttle the military hardware produced at great expense, or accept subjugation of national sovereignty to a world control organization? Until we have answered these questions we cannot assume that the Communists are the sole obstacle to world disarmament. The task of solving the many problems of arms control will require the services of a great many specialists in many different fields. Until more disarmament specialists are produced we might best rely upon a military man to direct our arms control effort. His experience with weapons would provide stability for the specialists, and his realistic attitude toward international military problems would "keep us out of trouble . . . away from the pitfalls of overenthusiasm, an excessively impractical idealism, and the dangers of actual war."

853
Shestov, V. DISARMAMENT PROBLEMS TODAY. International affairs (Moscow) Nov. 1965: 53-58.
D839.I465, 1965.

Supports the thesis that disarmament is the ideal of socialism by sketching the history of disarmament proposals and unilateral steps toward disarmament made by the Soviet Union in the postwar period. The draft treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control, which the U.S.S.R. presented to the first session of the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee in 1962, is compared to the counterproposal made by the United States. The author feels that the United States is blocking acceptance of any real disarmament measures by refusing to consider a proposal that will not result in strategic or tactical improvement of the Western position; however he cites the Moscow treaty of 1963 as evidence that hard work and international cooperation can lead to real successes.

854
Stone, Jeremy J. WHITHER THE ARMS RACE? Correspondent, no. 35, autumn 1965: 11-13.
P&GP RR

The necessity for general nuclear disarmanent has lost its urgency for many Americans. The possibility of China bombing Moscow, or Moscow crippling the United States, has lost any power to instill fear. Americans feel the arms race no longer deserves attention; they have lost conception of its progress. The war in Vietnam has also diverted their interest. Should concern for arms procurement diminish universally, could it be that the race would eventually die? Although a moratorium would be welcome, the fact is that nations have found improved procurement opportunities through technical advances and are taking full advantage of them. The nuclear race is not over, but has taken on changed political, social, and strategic aspects. New concern for stockpiles and for the dangers of either reducing or increasing them has resulted in a confusion and unwillingness to face the problems of arms control. Some analyze the problems one way and find one solution, some another way, for another solution. But more than answers are needed; man needs a foundation, attained through intelligent leadership, for a lasting plan of agreement and action.

855
Thant, U. THE PROBLEMS OF PEACE-MAKING. UN monthly chronicle, v. 2, Oct. 1965: 118-122.
JX1977.A1U564, v. 2

"Address . . . given at the 54th Conference of the Inter-Parliamentary Union in Ottawa, Canada, on Sept. 9, 1965."

Cause for pessimism is found today in the apparent inadequacy of peace diplomacy compared to the increase of tension and the spread of anarchy. Peril inheres in the possibility that "familiarity with the dangers of conflict in the nuclear age may dull our capacity for shock." But public servants cannot yield to cynicism--progress breeds progress and peace moves can come to fruition

in the midst of international rivalries. A new disarmament effort must now be made to extend the partial ban treaty to underground testing and to frame a nonproliferation treaty. A concrete step may demonstrate to the world that peaceful coexistence is feasible; the nuclear arms race provides an opportunity for such constructive action. The major powers are largely responsible for the progress that can be made, but the United Nations can provide a negotiating framework, a scientific staff, and moral support. The participation of all states in a future world disarmament conference would be "a significant step forward in the relaxation of international tension and the reduction of the feeling of insecurity which prevails in various parts of the world."

856
TWENTIETH U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY, by Commentator [pseud.] International affairs (Moscow) no. 1, Jan. 1966: 59-61. D839,I465, 1966

Reports the preoccupation of the 20th session of the U.N. General Assembly with problems of disarmament. The Soviet delegation is lauded for having supported the proposals deemed most important by the majority of delegates: (1) convocation of a world disarmament conference; (2) prohibition of the proliferation of nuclear weapons; (3) prohibition of underground nuclear testing; (4) denuclearization of Africa.

B. APPROACHES AND PROPOSALS

1. Comprehensive Measures and Proposals

857
Evgen'ev, I. FOR GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT [Translated from the Russian by Violet Dutt] Moscow, Progress Publishers [196-] 62 p. JX1974.E813

Sets forth the Soviets' position on general and complete disarmament primarily in terms of the draft treaty they submitted to the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament. The author presents their arguments for staged disarmament and for strict international control, their plans for guaranteed security during the process of disarming, and their position on the nuclear test ban treaty.

2. Noncomprehensive Measures and Proposals

858
U. S. Dept. of State. Historical Studies Division. UNITED STATES POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN ANTARCTICA. MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING SPECIAL REPORT ON UNITED STATES POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN ANTARCTICA. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1964. 56 p. (88th Cong., 2d sess., House document no. 358) JX1393.A5U53

Summarizes American policy in Antarctica, with particular reference to international cooperation and the formulation and implementation of the Antarctic Treaty.

a. REGIONAL

859
DENUCLEARIZATION OF AFRICA. UN monthly chronicle, v. 2, Dec. 1965: 70-72. JX1977.A1U564, v. 2

Summarizes the discussion within the U.N. Committee I on a proposal by the 34 African states to convene an international conference for the purpose of concluding an agreement on the denuclearization of Africa.

860
Foster, William C. THE DENUCLEARIZATION OF AFRICA. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 54, Jan. 17, 1966: 103-105. JX232.A33, v. 54

Tentative views of the United States regarding a draft convention to establish Africa as a denuclearized zone. Mr. Foster made this statement on Dec. 1, 1965 to Committee I (Political and Security).

861
Glick, Edward B. THE FEASIBILITY OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT IN LATIN AMERICA. Orbis, v. 9, fall 1965: 743-759. D839.068, v. 9

Like most militarily weak states, Latin American nations consider disarmament and arms control feasible and desirable until their own interests are affected. Like all developing nations they favor reductions in world arms expenditures in anticipation of increased foreign aid funds, but refuse to divert more of their own resources from military budgets to internal development programs. Considerations of sovereignty, international prestige, and hemispheric rivalry seem to dispel hope for significant reductions in conventional armaments and military forces in Latin America. Steps toward denuclearization appear more feasible, for no Latin nation expects to acquire nuclear capabilities in the foreseeable future. Denuclearization, however, could probably not be extended to the entire area. "The most likely agreement would include South America and exclude the Caribbean." Paradoxically a disarmed Latin America "might make it more difficult for the United States to disarm significantly. For if the Latin American countries disarm, they will become more, not less, dependent upon the United States for their security against external aggression." It is therefore axiomatic that an effective security system must precede disarmament, regional or otherwise. Disarmament becomes desirable only when it promises to decrease the chance for war or lessen the ills of militarization; yet Latin America (with the exception of Cuba) has long been one of the most pacific areas of the world. Latin armed forces refrain from aggression and in many instances perform social and economic activities highly important to national welfare (medical work in Mexico, colonization in Bolivia, meteorological services in Chile, and the like). Complexity, size, and diversity do not make Latin America an especially favorable subject for the pursuit of a regional approach to arms control and disarmament.

862
Hoagland, John H., and John B. Teeple. REGIONAL STABILITY AND WEAPONS TRANSFER: THE MIDDLE EASTERN CASE. Orbis, v. 9, fall 1965: 714-728. D839.068, v. 9

"Based on a paper presented at the Oslo Conference on Economic Aspects of World Disarmament and Interdependence, August 29-September 1, 1965."

Studies the transfer of weapons from industrialized nations to Egypt and Israel since the 1950's in the hope that the Middle Eastern experience might suggest valid inferences for other regions. The author finds that the diffusion of sophisticated military hardware and related technology is

usually justified on the grounds that dangerous military imbalances in the underdeveloped world are thus corrected, support for major powers is cultivated, and trade balances are bolstered. In the Middle East, however, "acquisition of sophisticated weaponry has not lessened the discord or provided regional stability"; to the contrary, the buildup of sophisticated systems has assured that the destructive effects of a regional war will be greater.

863
Kuby, Heinz. [EUROPE AS A PROVOCATION: CONDITIONS FOR ITS POLITICAL SURVIVAL] Provokation Europa: die Bedingungen seines politischen Überlebens. Köln, Kiepenheuer & Witsch [1965] 391 p.
D1058.K8

Two mutually opposed social-political systems bordering each other in the most heavily populated and industrialized area of the world make Europe a threat to world peace. Some relaxation of tensions has occurred between the United States and the Soviet Union, however, and is manifested by the growing trend toward national independence. Specifically, aspirations for greater independence were what motivated Poland to submit the Rapacki Plan. The plan's weakness was that it saw in European division only a problem of old-style power politics and consequently mistook German reunification policy for a scheme of the German "expansionists." The Rapacki Plan, like some Western ones, called for complete German disarmament. Political and economic conditions preclude the possibility of a viable neutralized Central Europe and also of a viable reunified Germany as a national state. Establishment of a European order of fully sovereign national states would mean the restoration of the prewar system of everchanging alliances with their known consequences to world peace. Within the Atlantic Alliance the leadership crisis has been deepened by the conflicting political, economic, and strategic interests of both continents. Still these differences do not exceed their mutual interests in interdependence. Only through cooperation can Western Europe play fully its role as an equal partner in policy, strategy, and trade and thus contribute to world peace. The best solution therefore, would be a federation of West European states. Such a federated West Europe would have to choose between nuclear interdependence with the United States and the chance of becoming an independent nuclear power of the first rank.

864
LATIN AMERICANS TAKE NEXT STEP TOWARD A NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE. War/peace report, v. 5, Oct. 1965: 15. P&GP RR

The Latin American countries have succeeded in drafting a preamble to a treaty that would denuclearize the "Western Hemisphere South of the Border." A complete draft treaty will probably be ready for consideration by spring. The present draft states that the Latin American countries will "maintain their territories free permanently, as they have been until now, of nuclear arms and delivery vehicles." The agreement's fulfillment will be verified by safeguards based on those used by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Nuclear development in several of these countries is a possibility in the near future, hence the urgency to complete and achieve a denuclearization agreement. Cuba remains outside the negotiations and probably will not sign the treaty unless there is a marked change in Cuban-American relations. The United States is willing to include its Guantánamo and Canal Zone bases, but not those in Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands.

865
Schenke, Wolf. [THE WAY OUT OF THE ATOMIC DILEMMA] Der Weg aus dem atomaren Dilemma. Neue Politik, 10. Jahrg., 11. Dez. 1965: 3-4.
H5.N377, v. 10

Maintains that in any future nuclear war East and West Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia will be sacrificed through a U.S.-Soviet agreement to limit the battlefield to this area. The only way for Central Europe to escape this fate is to establish a nuclear-free zone as recommended by Rapacki.

b. OUTER SPACE

866
FALSE DOUBTS, by Commentator [pseud.] Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 17, Dec. 29, 1965: 21-22.
D839.C87, v. 17

American observers claim that the display of orbital rockets at the military parade in Moscow on Nov. 7, 1965, is indicative of Soviet intentions to violate the 1963 U. N. General Assembly resolution on nuclear weapons in outer space. Since the resolution does not prohibit the construction of orbital rockets, American indignation on this point is obviously an attempt to divert world attention from U.S. preparations for military activities in the cosmos. Soviet policy will continue to support the liquidation of nuclear-rocket weapons of all types and "the implementation of general and complete disarmament, which would ensure the utilization of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes."

867
SYMPOSIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE: SPECIAL INTERNATIONAL LAW ISSUE. JAG law review, v. 7, Sept./Oct. 1965: 1-45. LL RR

Contents.--Judge advocates and the law of outer space, by Robert W. Manss.--Government regulation of space activities, by Martin Menter.--Contiguous zones in aerospace--preventive and protective jurisdiction, by John Cobb Cooper.--"Innocent passage" in the international law of outer space, by Carl Q. Christol.--Liability for damages from space activities and the need for domestic legislation, by Alfred P. Rubin.--Self defense--a right in outer space, by Hamilton DeSaussure and Walter D. Reed.

An issue devoted to the law of outer space. Professor Cooper suggests that a contiguous zone be established between the upper boundary of territorial airspace (in which the subjacent state maintains preventive and protective jurisdiction) and the lower boundary of free outer space, wherein nonmilitary rights of passage and national rights of protective and preventive jurisdiction would be combined. Professor Christol discusses the problems of determining where in space the law of "innocent passage" can be applied, the purposes for which this right may be guaranteed or denied, and the need for a doctrine of innocent passage for spacecraft through nonnational airspace in order to permit the most beneficial use of outer space. Col. DeSaussure and Lt. Col. Reed cite some of the laws pertaining to the right of national self-defense in general and to this right in outer space specifically. They mention the technological problems involved in applying this right to the area of outer space and suggest guidelines for nations planning self-defense in outer space.

868
Wilson, Eugene E. WHY NOT . . . A U.N. SPACE FORCE? Ordnance, v. 50, Jan./Feb. 1966: 416-417.
UF1.067, v. 50

On March 12, 1959, the Detroit Space Law Forum met under the auspices of the American Bar Association to consider some of the legal aspects of space research and exploration. Among the opinions expressed by panel members were the following: (1) that national sovereignty should not be projected into space; (2) that conventions designed for the regulation of international civil aviation be terminated at a determined altitude boundary, with space considered free to all beyond that point; (3) that "all craft engaged in orbital or superorbital trajectories must be exempt from jurisdiction by sovereign national states regardless of altitude"; and (4) that all craft should "be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of an international space agency in whose flag they should be deemed invested." The problem of regulating space activities and objects should not be considered part of the broader area of arms limitation, in the forum's view, lest this enterprise flounder upon lengthy diplomatic negotiations. An international space authority under the jurisdiction of the United Nations could license, monitor, and classify spacecraft and detect and dispose of craft engaged in illegal activities. A U.N. space force could thus guarantee to all lawful vehicles free passage through space while denying that privilege to outlaws.

869
Zhukov, G. [FOR THE PURITY OF OUTER SPACE: ON THE PREVENTION OF POTENTIALLY NOXIOUS EXPERIMENTS IN OUTER SPACE] Za chistotu kosmosa; o predotvrashchenii potentsial'no vrednykh eksperimentov v kosmose. Aviatsiia i kosmonavtika, g. 48, noiabr' 1965: 39-42.
TL504.V45, v. 48

The Institute of International Law has suggested--and Soviet legal specialists have agreed--that an international agreement be concluded to regulate activities in outer space. Already some 140 large objects are in orbit around the earth. Many of these no longer serve scientific purposes; some of them hinder accurate tracking of orbiting material still of interest. To prevent contamination and to preclude collision with important space vehicles all nations should equip their space objects with instruments capable of returning them to the atmosphere or destroying them in orbit. Radio transmission from orbiting objects should be terminated as soon as its function has been fulfilled. Propaganda relayed through outer space should be considered a form of contamination and should be prohibited. All nations conducting space experiments should be required to guarantee that objects placed in orbit do not cause biological, radioactive, or chemical contamination of outer space. Researchers should be aware of the possibility that returning space vehicles might introduce into the atmosphere bacteria capable of "occupying within several days or weeks a nutritive medium the size of the earth." Nations responsible for fouling outer space should be required to pay damages, even as the U.S. Government indemnified Japan for injuries suffered by Japanese citizens in 1954 because of U.S. thermonuclear tests. The Soviet Union agrees with the United Nations that states should undertake questionable activities in space only after international discussions have ascertained their safety and their compatibility with international law.

c. OTHER MEASURES AND PROPOSALS

870
Baukloh, Friedhelm. [THE MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF PAUL VI'S PEACE POLICY: REMARKS ON THE POPE'S SPEECH TO THE UNITED NATIONS] Grundzüge der Friedenspolitik Paul VI: Zur Rede des Papstes vor den Vereinten Nationen. Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, 10. Jahrg., Nov. 1965: 935-940. D839.B57, v. 10

Pope Paul's peace policy follows the spirit of John XXIII's encyclical "Pacem in terris," a policy that has encountered strong opposition in certain Church circles and also among some Catholic political leaders in West Germany and elsewhere, who would prefer a militant policy similar to that conducted by Pope Pius XII. The policy initiated by John XXIII and continued by Paul VI, with its "open door to the left" and emphasis on active peace efforts, clearly refutes any charge that it is immersed in power politics. By no means was the Pope's U.N. speech an exercise in bloc partisanship, but rather a sincere appeal to the world for global disarmament.

871
Foster, William C. COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY STRONGLY RECOMMENDED BY U.S. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 54, Jan. 17, 1966: 99-103.
JX232.A33, v. 54

The texts of statements made in U.N. Committee I (Political and Security) on Nov. 25 and 26, 1965.

872
Foster, William C. U.N. CALLS FOR RENEWED EFFORTS ON NONPROLIFERATION TREATY. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 53, Nov. 29, 1965: 873-884.
JX232.A33, v. 53

Includes three statements made in U.N. Committee I (Political and Security) on the subject of U.N. and American efforts to achieve a nonproliferation treaty. The text of a resolution concerning nonproliferation adopted by the Committee on November 8, 1965, is appended.

873
Goldstein, Walter. KEEPING THE GENIE IN THE BOTTLE: THE FEASIBILITY OF A NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AGREEMENT. Background, v. 9, Aug. 1965: 137-146.
D839.B2, v. 9

Myopia and cynicism characterize today's policymaking. Short-run diplomatic and procedural issues are deemed more important than the problems of the coming decade, one of which is nuclear weapons proliferation. The choice now is to do nothing and wait for nuclear anarchy or to curb proliferation immediately because the time is ripe. If the nuclear powers do not soon take the initiative "it is all but inevitable that the arms race will enter into a nuclear phase." On the other hand general agreement exists that an acceptable political "package" could be designed that would inhibit proliferation and decelerate the arms race. Such a package might include: (1) the extension of the test ban treaty to France and China; (2) a stronger International Atomic Energy Agency; (3) nuclear-free zone agreements in Africa, Latin America, and perhaps Central Europe; (4) a multilateral guarantee by the nuclear powers protecting nonnuclear states from the threat of atomic attack together with a "no first use" pledge; (5) unilateral pledges not to disseminate nuclear weapons. Perhaps a treaty such as this would be a symbolic gesture; it would nonetheless have a great impact on allaying the distrust of the nonnuclear nations, on the success of other disarmament attempts, and on international relations generally.

874
Korotynski, Henryk. POLAND FOR PEACE. Radar [international ed.] v. 6, no. 33: 2-3.
P&GP RR

Cites the initiative of the Polish Government in offering concrete peace proposals in recent years (the Rapacki and Gomulka plans and the call for a conference on European security). "The idea is to make concrete efforts in the field of disarmament and for an easing of political tension as well as in the sphere of economic cooperation." Polish foreign and commercial policy, the author contends, has the prime objective of achieving a permanent European peace and rapprochment between peoples.

875
Krüger, Joachim. THE STRUGGLE OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC FOR DISARMAMENT. German foreign policy, v. 4, no. 6, 1965: 430-438.
P&GP RR

Disarmament has been one of the main goals of the German Democratic Republic's (GDR) foreign policy since its inception. West Germany is very strongly opposed to disarmament on any but its own terms, since it is more than anxious to get its finger on the nuclear trigger. The West German arms buildup represents a threat to German reunification. It violates the decree that Germany shall never again be permitted to unleash aggressive war, a dictum conceived in the spirit by which the GDR and the other members of the Warsaw Pact live. In the East German declaration to the 18-nation disarmament committee a renunciation by both German states of any production, acquisition, or use of nuclear weapons was the main proposal. By this means the GDR hopes to forestall the maniacal nuclear ambitions of the Bonn regime. This nuclear desire on the part of West Germany is coming closer and closer to fruition through the complete cooperation of the United States. For any effective disarmament agreement to be reached, therefore, both Germanies must participate. Such joint efforts would not necessarily alter relations between East and West Germany, for the signing of a treaty or declaration "is not tantamount to the recognition of all partners." Other GDR proposals in Geneva include a ban on conventional armaments in the Germanies and a nonaggression treaty between the Warsaw Pact and NATO members.

876
Margolis, Howard. FROM WASHINGTON: NOTES ON GAS AND DISARMAMENT. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 21, Nov. 1965: 30-32.
TK9145.A84, v. 21

Reports on the limited use of tear gas in the Vietnamese war and its implications for U.S. military policy. Although limited use of tear gas in guerrilla wars seems reasonable, the danger "of an erosion of inhibitions against gas, and possibly even bacteriological warfare" puts the United States in danger of compromising the fine line between "all or none." The author also reports on two recent proposals made by the United States to the U.N. General Assembly. The first is a nuclear weapons cutback through diversion of weapons-grade fissionable materials to peaceful uses along with a cutback of any additional production of fissionable materials for weapons. Adoption of this measure might be almost as significant as the limited nuclear test ban. The second proposal involves security guarantees for the nonnuclear nations, which the United States sees as urgent, although it would prefer the initiative to come from other nations.

877
Polianov, N. IS EUROPE A CRADLE OF PEACE OR OF WAR? Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 18, Jan. 26, 1966: 23-24. D839.C87, v. 18
Reprinted from Izvestiia, Jan. 4, 1966
Slav Rm

Europe has come to the crossroads of its destiny. In 2-1/2 years the member nations of NATO must decide whether or not to remain participants in its program. The nations of Europe will thus have an opportunity to declare their willingness to seek new paths to peace and security or their reluctance to destroy old hostilities and tensions. Now would seem the time for the Soviet Union, the United States, and the countries of NATO and the Warsaw Pact to exchange guarantees of nonaggression, with their bilateral and multilateral pledges then submitted to the United Nations. Now all nations should explore the possibility of establishing nuclear-free zones in Europe. The Scandinavian nations have already declared that they wish no nuclear weapons on their territories. Were this desire to be incorporated into a document establishing the first European nuclear-free zone in Scandinavia, other areas of Europe might agree to follow this example.

878
REFLECTIONS ON THE QUARTER: NONPROLIFERATION AND THE FUTURE OF NATO. Orbis, v. 9, fall 1965: 539-542. D839.068, v. 9

The benefits and liabilities of a nonproliferation pact with the U.S.S.R. should be carefully weighed by U.S. policymakers. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have evinced so strong a reluctance to share nuclear weapons with other nations that a formal treaty on the matter might be unnecessary. To induce the Soviet Union to sign a nonproliferation agreement the United States would have to abandon all plans for a multilateral nuclear force, a measure certain to elicit increased disintegrative tendencies within NATO. The agreement might secure a goal central to Soviet foreign policy for 15 years--destruction of NATO--by impelling the Federal Republic of Germany to disassociate itself from the Atlantic Alliance in favor of a Rapallo-type entente with its Eastern neighbors. "Why should the United States sign a treaty that may be unnecessary, that will increase rather than decrease worldwide security obligations, and that might weaken NATO?"

879
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. TEST BAN TREATY: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS. [Rev. Washington, For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1965] 24 p. (Its Publication 18) JX1974.A1U52, no. 18, 1965

In dialogue form explains the partial nuclear test ban treaty, and gives (pp. 18-23) the full text of the "Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water." Questions relating to testing by nonsignatory countries, restrictions against development of antiballistic missile systems, provisions for withdrawing from the agreement, and the treaty's implications for American national security and the development of peaceful uses of nuclear explosives are answered.

880
Women Strike for Peace, Washington, D. C. THE GERMAN PROBLEM: ROADBLOCK TO DISARMAMENT. Washington, Disarmament Committee of Washington, D. C. Women Strike for Peace, 1964. 48 p. DD257.25.W725

Explores the German question, which, the Committee believes, "is actually the very cause of the Cold War in Europe." The division and occupation of Germany is chronicled, as is the emergence in West Germany of many of the spectres that have haunted the German nation--renazification, remilitarization, and rearmament. The Committee also finds democratic influences at play in West Germany. In sum, however, the Berlin problem, the refusal of Bonn to officially accept the existence of the German Democratic Republic, and the militaristic and revanchist aims of West Germany are judged to be serious sources of tension in Europe. Absolute denial of nuclear weapons to Bonn, the negotiation of a treaty or agreement between the two Germanies and the Allies, and German reunification are necessary to remove this roadblock to disarmament.

VI. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS AND RELATED MEASURES

A. NEGOTIATION OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT MEASURES

881
Foster, William C., and Arthur J. Goldberg. U.S. AGREES TO DISCUSS HOLDING OF WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 53, Dec. 27, 1965: 1029-1034. JX232.A33, v. 53

American statements to U.N. Committee I on the proposed world disarmament conference, presented along with the General Assembly resolution on the conference that was adopted November 29.

882
Fraleigh, Arnold. HOW TO FAIL IN NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT REALLY TRYING. New republic, v. 154, Jan. 1, 1966: 9. AP2.N624, v. 154

There is a very simple formula for assuring the failure of peace negotiations while convincing the public that everything is being done to achieve success: "(1) make clear that what is at stake is not a comparatively simple local issue but rather a virtually insoluble global issue; (2) draw into the negotiations as many protagonists of the global issue as possible, while excluding the parties directly involved in the local issue; and (3) allow no role for nonaligned states." The formula is easily applied to Vietnam. One must simply ignore the local issue (how to establish a government in South Vietnam acceptable to the people), exclude the government of South Vietnam and the National Liberation Front from peace negotiations, emphasize that the question here is one of democracy versus communism, and prohibit nonalined nations from negotiating a settlement. Nonalined parties will certainly demand the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Vietnam, leaving the local issue to be resolved. "And, as already explained, you should avoid concentration on the local issue."

883
Nogee, Joseph L. THE NEUTRALIST WORLD AND DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS. In American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia. Nonalignment in foreign affairs. Special editor: Cecil V. Crabb, Jr. Philadelphia, 1965. (Its Annals, v. 362) p. 71-80. H1.A4, v. 362

The involvement of eight nonaligned nations in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) is the culmination of a growing neutralist influence in the United Nations and a strong desire among the nonaligned nations to curb the arms race. Three years of negotiations in the Disarmament Committee affords an opportunity to analyze the role of the neutralists on the Committee and their effect on the outcome of the talks. The major neutralist efforts involved attempting by various diplomatic techniques to pressure the nuclear powers into reconciling their differences. Although each of the eight reacted differently to various elements in United States-United Kingdom and Soviet Union proposals, they all avoided outward partisanship toward either East or West. A neutralist compromise proposal of April 1962, suggesting a system of "inspection by invitation," failed to bridge the Soviet and American differences on the problem of inspection. While the neutralist presence at Geneva reduced the degree of polemics in the talks and forced the nuclear powers--particularly the Soviets--to use more reasonable arguments, they did not substantially affect the outcome of the Committee's work. Both the "hot line" agreement and the partial-test-ban treaty in 1963 were negotiated by the nuclear powers on their own and without an audience. (Abstract supplied)

884
NUCLEAR TESTS SUSPENSION. UN monthly chronicle, v. 2, Dec. 1965: 66-70. JX1977.A1U564, v. 2

Recapitulates the discussion within Committee I (Political and Security) that led to the adoption of a resolution "urging suspension of all nuclear tests, calling on all countries to respect the spirit and provisions of the Moscow test-ban treaty," and requesting the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee to continue it's efforts to develop a treaty banning all tests in all environments.

885
WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE. UN monthly chronicle, v. 2, Dec. 1965: 46-52. JX1977.A1U564, v. 2

Reports the adoption by the United Nations General Assembly of a resolution suggested by the First (Political and Security) Committee calling for a world disarmament conference to be held before 1967. Contains the text of the Secretary General's statement advocating a stronger U.N. role in the area of disarmament negotiations; a summary of the views of the delegations who spoke on the proposal; and the text of the Resolution as passed by the General Assembly.

B. REDUCTION OF THE RISK OF WAR

1. Escalation

886
Badurina, B. ESCALATION--A ROAD LEADING UP TO TOTAL WAR. Review of international affairs, v. 16, Dec. 20, 1965: 20-22. D839.R4, v. 16

Discusses the origins and purposes of the theory of escalation as it is understood by U.S. journalists, diplomats, and military men. Colonel Badurina warns that escalation cannot be planned at all times; that a conflict of such proportions as now rages in Vietnam might go beyond the limits set by military strategists and lead to a worldwide war.

887
Luu-guy-Ky. ESCALATION WAR AND SONGS ABOUT PEACE. Hanoi, Foreign Pub. House, 1965. 78 p. DS557.A6L85

Contents. -- The real nature of Johnson's speech on April 7, 1965 and the reasons leading the White House to an adventurous military policy with camouflaged political manoeuvres.--The U.S. "escalation" war in Vietnam and its unavoidable consequences.--The attitude and stand of the

Vietnamese people and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

Sets forth the arguments of North Vietnam for the support of the South Vietnam Liberation Front and for its attitude toward U.S. Southeast Asian policy.

888
VIETNAM: THE BREAKING POINT. New statesman, v. 70, Dec. 17, 1965: 957-958.
AP4.N64, v. 70

Although Lyndon Johnson and Dean Rusk continue to talk about "unconditional negotiations," America is becoming more enmeshed in military operations in Southeast Asia. American belief that greater military commitment will cause Viet Cong capitulation is not supported by the bombing experiences in the Korean War or in the present Vietnamese conflict. Likewise, increased land involvement does not seem to have any effect on the strength of the Viet Cong. The American effort in Vietnam is causing repercussions both in the States and abroad. The restraint practiced by Russia and China may be nearing an end. In Britain, Mr. Wilson has supported U.S. policies, a commitment that may threaten "the continuance of a Labour government."

889
Wright, Quincy. THE ESCALATION OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 9, Dec. 1965: 434-449. tables.
JX1901.J6, v. 9

Proposes a formula for measuring the "probability that international conflicts will escalate or terminate rapidly, and tests it by application to a number of conflicts since 1914." Applied to those conflicts that have already come to an end the formula appears to show predictive value. Analysis suggests that factors promoting escalation are "perceptions of vital national interests by both parties, relative equalities in forces immediately available, and belief by each party that superior forces will eventually be available to it from its own efforts or from allies, rendering its opponent more vulnerable to unacceptable losses and costs." Factors tending to militate against escalation are the converse of these. Other antiescalation factors are: "comparative equality and great capability for destruction; high costs in proportion to the state's economy; and particularly a strong world opinion, manifested in international organization, demanding a ceasefire, negotiation, or renunciation of its cause by one party." Intense world opinion is likely to develop against a party that is making demands or taking action in clear violation of international law, but the law needs clarification.

2. Miscalculation and Accidental War

890
Guelzo, Carl M. TRANSPORTING NUCLEAR MATERIALS SAFELY. National defense transportation journal, v. 21, Nov./Dec. 1965: 24, 26, 35-36.
U1.A88, v. 21

Enumerates some of the safety measures undertaken by the U.S. transportation system for carrying nuclear materials, and considers the problems of contamination, criticality, and maintenance of a permissible level of radiation as they apply to transportation. The author feels that the public exaggerates the hazards of radiation and argues that "a calm appraisal of the true extent of the hazard removes the fear of the unknown and the far more serious danger of panic and ill-considered preventive actions."

3. Surprise Attack

4. Proliferation

891
Albinski, Henry S. AUSTRALIA AND NUCLEAR AFFAIRS. Pacific affairs, v. 38, spring 1965: 32-46.
DU1.P13, v. 38

Despite official assurances to the contrary some observers have noted a drift toward nuclear weapons acquisition in Australia. In 1963 the Liberal-Country Party government signed an agreement with the United States permitting the latter to establish a naval communications center on the North West Cape. This agreement was thought by some to be "a wedge, a first step eventually leading to American nuclear bases on Australian terrain," and the opposition Australian Labor Party (ALP) criticized it as meaning automatic involvement in a U.S. war. Prime Minister Menzies, considering the agreement on bases a means for increasing U.S. interest in Australian security concerns, was unconvinced by these arguments. The controversy over the pact with the United States was coupled with a debate over nuclear-free-zone proposals. The government argued that such plans would upset the regional balance of power and thus jeopardize Australia's security. "An exposed and vulnerable Australia cannot afford to foster schemes which, in the face of an established Soviet, and a forthcoming Chinese, nuclear armory, and particularly on the Chinese side no visible hope for agreement to stay out of the southern hemisphere or to accept any reasonable form of inspection or verification, would weaken America's deterrent potential." At first in favor, the ALP now admits that were its neighbors to acquire nuclear weapons, "probably Australia would have to match them." Menzies' refusal to a 1962 request by U Thant to pledge not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons has been taken as another step in the direction of nuclear weapons acquisition. Also in 1962, journalist Alan Reid predicted that Australia's fear of being abandoned by the West would force Australian nuclear weapons acquisition when China developed the bomb. Still, chances are slim that the present government will seek these weapons on its own initiative. The government is genuinely interested in halting proliferation; it fears that an Australian decision would start the nuclear bandwagon rolling in Asia; and it trusts in the efficacy of conventional weapons for handling local conflicts.

892
ATOMIC DANGER ON THE MIDDLE EAST HORIZON. New outlook, v. 8, Sept. 1965: 54-57.
DS41.N5, v. 8

"Extensive summary" of an article by Muhammad H. Heikal that appeared in Al-Ahram, Cairo.

Heikal believes the evidence is clear that Israel is within 2 or 3 years of an atomic armaments capability and that she is likely to feel that possession of an atom bomb is essential. To Heikal, "Israel lives in a continual awareness of her material, moral, and military isolation" and thus desires a strong deterrent. Israel wishes not only to preserve her borders but also to expand within the bounds of the Promised Land--from the Nile to the Euphrates. Since Egypt will soon have military superiority, according to Heikal, Israel must obtain nuclear weapons in order to maintain a power

balance. Israel's government is now dominated by a ruling clique of European-descended security specialists who need the bomb to keep Israel from melting "into the Oriental sea which surrounds her on all sides." Lastly, Heikal fears Israel will acquire atomic weapons to gain stature among the community of nations. Israel is fully capable of manufacturing a bomb, and her leaders have made no bones of the fact that in the event of a confrontation with the Moscow test ban treaty facts come before laws. What Israel will probably do in order to justify a weapons test, Heikal warns, is propose to Egypt an agreement banning nuclear arms, which Egypt would of course refuse to sign. The insidious Israeli propaganda machine will then go into operation, alleging that Cairo's refusal is a clear sign of an Egyptian bomb. Israel would vow that she "could not stand by and await the outcome, and that the world would surely appreciate her good intentions and the fact that Egypt's obstinacy--and one knew what that implied--was to blame."

893
Bloomfield, Lincoln P., and Amelia C. Leiss. ARMS CONTROL AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. World politics, v. 18, Oct. 1965: 1-19.
D839.W57, v. 18

A program of arms control capable of suppressing the spread of nuclear weapons to smaller nations must be conceived within a broader political and strategic context than that envisaged thus far. Application of security and arms control policies toward regions disparate in their problems and needs necessitates distinctions; an inflexible course of action toward Latin America, the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, and Asia cannot survive the divisive power of regional problems. Arms control policies toward Latin America should emphasize retaining strong internal security forces and scrapping the conventional armed forces Latin states maintain for prestige. Through the Organization of American States or an ad hoc forum the Latin states should agree to renounce their right to construct or import weapons of massive destruction and sophisticated armaments systems not essential to internal security. The United States would have to convince these nations that its nuclear power would be sure protection against Cuban or extrahemisphere aggression. In the Middle East (where the Arab-Israeli struggle militates against disarmament) no internal initiative toward arms control can be expected; external measures must be adopted. Nations supplying arms could pledge not to introduce nuclear weapons into the area and to take whatever steps are possible to preclude their introduction. In sub-Saharan Africa, where "what could be the most portentous racial struggle of the epoch" is building, no arms control agreements can be reached until collective African security measures are substantial enough to thwart direct and indirect aggression, including subversion. In Asia the United States would not want to expose nations to Chinese domination by limiting armaments. But a U.S. guarantee to oppose aggression against any state might prompt Asian countries to forego expensive and dangerous armament programs and to renounce deployment of nuclear weapons within their territories. Supplying nations could again agree not to provide sophisticated weapons systems. Two overall objectives should govern arms control policies toward developing nations: (1) a nonproliferation pledge governing all weapons of massive destruction to be undertaken by all nations, and (2) an agreement from arms suppliers that only weapons necessary for internal security will be provided to developing nations.

894
Bobrow, Davis B. REALISM ABOUT NUCLEAR SPREAD. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 21, Dec. 1965: 20-22.
TK9145.A84, v. 21

"To prevent nuclear diffusion, the American government either has to deny other countries the capability to produce nuclear weapons, or demonstrate that acquiring an independent nuclear force will not be rewarding." But the nonproliferation proposals submitted to date all contain major defects and afford little likelihood of success. America must prepare to accept nuclear proliferation as a reality and consider ways of coping with it. A policy of enhanced inequality (widening the gap between the U.S. nuclear might and that of other states) will discourage attacks by equating them with suicide. Extended deterrence (the guarantee that attacks by new nuclear powers on nonnuclear nations will be answered by the United States in kind) can be combined with enhanced inequality. A policy of compensatory diffusion (supplying nuclear weapons to countries threatened by a nuclear power) might restore the distribution of power in areas of imbalance and lessen the likelihood of regional wars escalating into world wars, although here the probability of accident, misidentification of purpose, and suicide attack would increase. A policy of deliberate equality (reducing existing nuclear forces to the level of new nuclear owners) would make all states equal in power and security and would tend to discourage preemptive or preventive attacks; accident and misidentification would be less likely, but projection of this strategy of finite deterrence to a multiplicity of states would multiply the disadvantages of that strategy. How these policies might succeed in practice and whether they might be implemented is problematic. If efforts to control nuclear diffusion fail, however, the United States has no choice but to seek measures enabling it to live in a world of nuclear powers.

895
Buchan, Alastair. THE SECURITY OF INDIA. World today, v. 21, May 1965: 210-217.
D410.W63, v. 21

Troubles beset India from all sides. Internally economic problems and strains on national unity have resurfaced after having been carefully submerged by Nehru. Even so security from external threats seems to represent the greatest Indian need. China, expanding its influence everywhere in Asia, looms as a menace on India's border. New Delhi's sometimes vacillating policies have alienated many Afro-Asian nations, leaving only Malaysia and the United Arab Republic as cordial friends of India. Now China has exploded its first nuclear device, and, although this event has no immediate implications for India, those of a few years hence (given a continuation or exacerbation of Sino-Indian tensions) "might force some diplomatic humiliation on India that would be far harder to accept than the reverses of 1962." India has also lost the single-minded attention of the major powers, and even a guarantee of nuclear protection would leave India in the rather ambiguous position of being their "nursling." Thus the nuclear option, left open by Nehru, becomes highly tempting. India could probably explode its first nuclear device within 12 months of making the choice, but its delivery vehicles leave much to be desired. At this point India is closer to developing nuclear weapons than ever before, at least insofar as it no longer rejects the idea and merely holds it in abeyance. Among national leadership groups there are two schools: "doves" and "hawks." The doves--who still control

business and government for the most part--feel the threat to Indian security is real, but can be held back by efforts to neutralize the Chinese threat and promote a nondissemination pact. Only if the Western powers will not make any move in this direction is an Indian nuclear capability necessary. A strong Asian policy is also urged for India. The hawks--some of the younger members of Indian bureaucracy--argue strongly for an Indian bomb on the basis of the great powers' lack of interest in India, the threat of China, the military necessity, and the great power status of India itself. In any case, no decision is likely before the 1967 election.

896
CONSTRUCTIVE PROGRAMME FOR STRENGTHENING PEACE: NEW SOVIET PROPOSALS IN THE UNITED NATIONS. International affairs (Moscow) Nov. 1965: 3-6. D839.I465, 1965

Presents the provisions of the two proposals submitted by the Soviet Union to the 20th U.N. General Assembly regarding interference in the internal affairs of states and proliferation of nuclear weapons. The author feels that checking the spread of nuclear arms throughout the world is a necessary first step toward disarmament. The Soviet draft treaty on nonproliferation should therefore not be made conditional upon the resolving of other disarmament problems.

897
Delmer, Sefton. KLAUS FUCHS TALKS OF W. GERMAN ATOM BOMBS. Democratic German report, v. 14, Nov. 26, 1965: 163. DD261.D3, v. 14
Reprinted from the Sunday Telegraph, Nov. 14, 1965.

Newsp.

Interview with Klaus Fuchs, deputy director of the German Democratic Republic's Central Institute of Nuclear Research. He warns that by 1968 the German Federal Republic will "be in a position to produce enough plutonium for six atom bombs a year." Fuchs outlines the present state of nuclear research and programs in East Germany as well as the prospects for future development, expresses his belief in the possibility of preventing nuclear proliferation, and criticizes Red China for having started nuclear weapons production of its own.

898
Foster, William C. ARMS CONTROL: A NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY. Vital speeches of the day, v. 32, Jan. 15, 1966: 199-202. PN6121.V52, v. 32

"Delivered before the 15th Semi-Annual Meeting and Midyear Conference, Manufacturing Chemists' Association, Incorporated, New York City, November 23, 1965."

The U.S. policy of sharing peaceful nuclear technology with other nations has necessitated the creation of a system of safeguards able to forestall malignant use of this technology. Because other nations also disseminate nuclear technology, these safeguards have not been imposed on a worldwide scale. The United States has therefore placed some of its reactors under the authority of the International Atomic Energy Agency, is transfering its bilateral agreements to that Agency, and has proposed a draft nonproliferation treaty that urges other nations to do likewise. The very fact that the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva can now discuss both a Soviet and an American draft treaty on nonproliferation is an achievement in itself. But the Soviets flatly refuse to consider any draft so long as the concept of a multilateral or Atlantic nuclear force remains possible in Western planning. The Soviets seem genuinely fearful that West Germany will acquire its own nuclear force, but their spoiling operations against NATO during the past 16 years should not be allowed to vitiate a nonproliferation agreement. If the Soviet Union insists upon predicating acceptance of such a pact upon whatever security arrangements might be determined for NATO, the negotiations at Geneva will be long and difficult. "The collective defense of Western Europe is not up for negotiation."

899
Frank, Lewis A. NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 22, Jan. 1966: 12-15. TK9145.A84, v. 22

A brief history of the Chinese program to develop a nuclear capability. The author asserts that the Chinese experience "should prove to be an important object lesson to those who naively hope to control the spread of nuclear weapons through sole reliance on incantation, nuclear umbrellas, test bans, or solemn pronouncements on the peaceful character of large atomic programs."

900
Goldstein, Walter. DEADLOCK AT GENEVA. Correspondent, no. 35, autumn 1965: 8-11. P&GP RR

No consensus or plan of action for curbing nuclear proliferation came out of the 17 nation disarmament conference at Geneva, even though there was agreement that such a deterrent was necessary for world peace. Why was the conference even called when everyone knew a stalemate would result? Perhaps it was simply an attempt to relieve tensions between the great powers. Neither China nor France was present, so an effective nonproliferation treaty could hardly have come from the conference. Perhaps Russia felt the United States would advocate a curb on nuclear dispersion, effectively keeping West Germany out of the race. Whatever the reasons, the conference failed to reach agreement. Should the 20th General Assembly of the United Nations also be stymied in its efforts to effectively block an anarchical acceleration of the nuclear race, only the great powers would be left to assume the leadership. The world powers will most likely continue to bicker over Vietnam and other tension spots, however, so perhaps the fatalists have the only tenable position. Nuclear proliferation is becoming critical, and no world policymaker talks about controlling the spread of the "fissionable futility."

901
Green, J. H. THE AUSTRALIAN ATOM BOMB. Australian quarterly, v. 37, Dec. 1965: 36-44. DU80.A95, v. 37

Sketches the economic and technological problems Australia will face if it decides to build atomic bombs. "Yes, we could set out and make a few atom bombs a year, with additional know-how from Britain and Canada, probably in four years from now with a capital outlay of about £ 45, 000, 000 and operating costs totalling about £ 12, 000, 000. No great diversion of technical persons or disruption of the economy would occur unless emergency measures were taken to complete the programme."

902
Griffiths, Franklyn. PREVENTING THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. International journal, v. 20, autumn 1965: 524-529. D839.15, v. 20

The prospects for the prevention of nuclear arms dissemination have been meager thus far, despite

the continued interest of the United States and the Soviet Union. Among factors inhibiting progress are escalation of the Vietnamese conflict, West Germany's obstructionism, discord among Soviet leaders on nuclear policies and programs, unresolved economic problems in the U.S.S.R., and the Sino-Soviet feud. Until the latter two are worked out "it is difficult to imagine Moscow engaging in the high degree of co-operation with the United States required for an effective non-proliferation agreement." Again American-Soviet cooperation on antiproliferation may have an adverse influence on the coherence of the Western alliance, which is Washington's major concern. Moscow and Washington reportedly have reached a tacit understanding on certain aspects of nonproliferation policy and have unilaterally undertaken a number of declared measures in that respect. It is possible that in the interlacing of their conflicting and common interests both nations will eventually find some basis for the conclusion of a formal agreement.

903
INDIA SUGGESTS NEW APPROACH FOR NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. Nuclear India, v. 4, Oct. 1965: 4-5, 7.
TK9103.A3, V.4

Points to India's role in the ninth General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, held in Tokyo, September 1965. India's Ambassador to Japan Shri Badru-ud-Din emphasized the need to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In his view, the question on nonproliferation "is not so much one of stopping more countries from making nuclear weapons but one of reversing what has already taken place. If the latter is achieved, the first will follow naturally."

904
Kasliwal, N. C. THE CASE AGAINST INDIA'S 'BOMB.' Socialist congressman, v. 5, Nov. 5, 1965: 9.
JQ298.S6A35, v. 5

Recounts India's support of movements to prohibit nuclear weapons and argues that its production of atomic arms would offend its neighbors as much as the Chinese have provoked India by their nuclear program. Were India to join the nuclear club, the author warns, all foreign aid would probably end, India would lose all its prestige, the Indian economy would be injured, and no real defensive advantages would be realized.

905
Kaysen, Carl, and Jeremy J. Stone, KEEPING THE LID ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS. New republic, v. 154 Jan. 15, 1966: 13-14. AP2.N624, v. 154

Roger D. Masters, in his article "What about a nuclear guarantee for India?" (New Republic, Dec. 25), argued that a nuclear buildup in India would be the best means of controlling China without U.S. intervention. However able a fully armed India might be to check Chinese expansion in India, how could India assume U.S. commitments to Vietnam, Japan, and the Philippines. Another consideration is that nuclear weapons could devastate the economic and industrial expansion of India. U.S. problems in maintaining a consistent policy toward world politics would be infinitely multiplied if India, West Germany, Israel, and others possessed nuclear weapons; a sanctioned nuclear buildup in India would be the first step in this direction. No good reason exists for America to encourage proliferation, even if it is inevitable.

906
Krusche, Heinz. WEST GERMAN AGGRESSIVE COURSE IN NATO. German foreign policy, v. 4, no. 5, 1965: 344-356. P&GP RR

Having arrogantly set itself up as world gendarme, the United States is now conspiring with West German imperialists to exacerbate the international situation. The "forward strategy" to which Bonn wants NATO committed will result in nothing less than a nuclear war of aggression against the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and other Socialist states. The Federal Republic is further attempting to turn NATO to its own advantage by acquiring nuclear arms through the alliance. Obviously the United States approves heartily of Bonn's aspirations. Washington has repeatedly urged that NATO members be granted "a larger degree of participation in nuclear defence." The major portion of American nuclear rockets located in Europe is in West Germany, and apparently more and more tactical and strategic weapons will be placed at the disposal of the Bonn revanchists. West Germany is also embarking on a program of producing its own nuclear weapons. Plutonium manufactured in the Federal Republic "would suffice to manufacture one hundred atomic bombs per year." Bonn has, of course, pretended for years that it has renounced nuclear weapons completely, and yet when the United States gave indications of dropping the proposed multilateral nuclear force in favor of antiproliferation measures West German leaders became highly alarmed. Under the Potsdam Agreement West Germany does not have the right to nuclear weapons that it claims under NATO. A new agreement, stipulating that neither of the two Germanies may manufacture, store, import, or station nuclear weapons on their territory, is imperative.

907
Lall, Betty (Goetz). NEXT: A PROLIFERATION BAN. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 22, Jan. 1966: 42-45. TK9145.A84, v. 22

Compares the text of the Soviet and U.S. draft treaties on the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation and finds that, despite divergence of concept and language in Articles I and II, agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States should not be too difficult to secure.

908
Lvov, M. A TIME OF CHOICE. Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 17, Nov. 10, 1965: 21-22.
D839.C87, v. 17

Condensed from an article in Izvestiia, Oct. 21, 1965, p. 2. Slav Rm

Expresses alarm at the dangers to peace posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons and urges acceptance of the Soviet draft treaty on nonproliferation. Western determination to construct a multilateral or Atlantic nuclear force is assailed as an open invitation for other states to initiate their own nuclear development programs. "The struggle revolving around the problem of proliferation or nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is becoming more acute. Much in future world developments will depend on its outcome."

909
Maratov, M. NON-PROLIFERATION AND NATO NUCLEAR PLANS. International affairs (Moscow) no. 1, Jan. 1966: 18-23. D839.I465, 1966

Peoples and governments of the world have agreed that halting the spread of nuclear weapons is the most important business now facing international statesmen.

Particularly alarming is the realization that of the 13 states most likely to acquire independent nuclear capability, several (West Germany and Japan foremost) have exhibited past proclivities toward militarism and aggression. Proliferation of nuclear weapons automatically escalates the arms race, reduces the likelihood of achieving disarmament--even nuclear disarmament--and increases geometrically the probability of nuclear war. Despite these dangers the United States has pursued an ambivalent policy toward nuclear armament, on the one hand fearing the consequences of nuclear dissemination, on the other all but offering West Germany full access to nuclear weapons in order to consolidate NATO. Public opinion in the United States, recently expressed by Robert Kennedy, has begun to pressure the Johnson Administration to abandon the idea of a multilateral nuclear force in order to be able to devote full attention to the problem of nuclear proliferation. The American press has shocked the U.S. public by reporting that NATO nuclear weapons maintained on German soil are so slackly guarded that they can hardly be considered under U.S. control. To avoid offending its Bonn allies and to maintain the possibility of bringing West Germany into eventual nuclear cooperation, the recent draft treaty on nonproliferation offered by the U.S. delegation at Geneva contains a loop-hole obvious to all who have studied it. The counterproposal offered at Geneva by the Soviet Union clearly precludes all dissemination of nuclear weapons--and is purposely directed against the establishment of any type of multilateral force. As Foreign Minister Gromyko has affirmed, the Soviet draft treaty is the one best in keeping with the interests of the people.

910
Masters, Roger D. WHAT ABOUT A NUCLEAR GUARANTEE FOR INDIA? New republic, v. 153, Dec. 25, 1965: 9-10. AP2.N624, v. 153

Granting nuclear guarantees to India is purported to be a way of balancing the power of China without giving India nuclear weapons of her own. But Andrew Martin and Wayland Young, in a recent article in the British journal Disarmament and Arms Control, maintain that such guarantees to India might encourage the diffusion of nuclear weapons. Both these points of view ignore the fact that the spread of nuclear weapons is practically certain in the next few decades and that the real problem lies in channeling this proliferation into useful areas. Common sense dictates that the power of an aggressive second-rank nation, China, be balanced by a nation of similar strength, India. After India has a nuclear force, the United States could guarantee to protect her against an attack by two or more powers. Nor is it likely that Pakistan, in retaliation, will develop a nuclear force; rather an Indo-Pakistani defensive alliance may even result. Should Pakistan ally with China, however, China would stand revealed as the imperialistic power she is.

911
NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. UN monthly chronicle, v. 2, Nov. 1965: 18-23. JX1977.A1U564, v. 2

Summarizes the discussions on nonproliferation of nuclear-weapons that were held by the First Committee (Political and Security) of the United Nations, Oct. 18-21, and 25-29. Complete texts of the Soviet and American draft treaties are presented.

912
NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. UN monthly chronicle, v. 2, Dec. 1965: 62-66. JX1977.A1U564, v. 2

Reports on the General Assembly resolution, adopted on November 19, 1965, asking the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee to draft a treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and submit it to the General Assembly for consideration. A summary of the Secretary General's statement, discussion in the First Committee, and points made during debate are included. The text of the resolution [p. 65-66] cites the need for a treaty devoid of loopholes and urges the members of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference to consider the question of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, within the outline proposed by the resolution, and to present a draft of the treaty at the earliest time.

913
NUCLEAR ARMS AND WEST GERMANY, by Quaestor, [pseud.] Labour monthly, v. 47, Dec. 1965: 548-551, 554-557. HD4805.L25, v. 47

Although the United States and the Soviet Union have recently supported a nuclear nonproliferation treaty, they are divided on what might constitute loopholes in such a treaty. Nuclear sharing with West Germany, the Soviets maintain, would be a "gaping hole, and would make any treaty impossible," while the United States, intimidated by the new belligerency of the Bonn imperialists, refuses to consider any solution that would deprive its German ally of control over nuclear weapons. After 20 years the "Nazi-ridden" government of West Germany has found it can remove its mask of peacefulness and speak frankly. Once again the world is beginning to notice the stirrings of German militarism and imperialism. The recent statement by Strauss, that Germany must acquire control over nuclear weapons before "a new Fuhrer type" promises the German people he will rectify this new Versailles, clearly foretells the trend of German policy. The Soviet draft treaty on nonproliferation offers the best guarantee that Germany will not again be able to launch a war of revenge against the other nations of Europe.

914
Rewal, M. K. HALF-DEAD WAR AND THE BOMB. Caravan, no. 323, Oct. 15, 1965: 11-12. AP8.C25, 1965

Pakistan accepted a cease-fire in its war with India from a position of diplomatic and military weakness, and it may merely be restlessly waiting for a new invasion opportunity. The chance can present itself within the next decade when China possesses enough nuclear weapons to share them with its allies. India, without a joint nuclear guarantee from the major powers and with little hope of obtaining a reliable one if the Anglo-American stance during the last crisis is any yardstick of future intentions, must undertake a nuclear weapons program immediately. Up to now sentimental and psychological adherence to Nehru's categorical ban and the fear that other nations would follow suit have deterred India from launching such an effort. Events have proved that India's actions will not be the decisive factor in Indonesia's determination to build a nuclear force or in Pakistan's ability to borrow from China. History has shown that nuclear arms are dangerous enough to be safe, and today's situation indicates that they alone can guarantee India's security.

915
Robertson, Terence. THE GENERAL WHO'S FIGHTING FOR PEACE. Maclean's, v. 78, Dec. 1, 1965: 16-17, 39-41, 43-44.
AP5.M2, v. 78
"Second of a series: Our Man in Geneva."

Relates the work of Eedson Louis Millard Burns, a Canadian peacemaker and disarmament negotiator, toward a halt in nuclear proliferation. The fact that East and West will still sit down at the conference table and talk Burns finds encouraging, even though frustrations often mark the discussions. But the more that weapons are scattered about the world, the more difficult disarmament becomes. A nonproliferation treaty is therefore urgent, he feels.

916
Schorr, Daniel. THE DISPIRIT OF GENEVA. New leader, v. 48, Aug. 16, 1965: 3-4.
HX1.N37, v. 48

The tactical maneuvering that characterized the opening of the 218th session of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee reflects "The Dispirit of Geneva." Chairman Semyon Tsarapkin took advantage of his position and, in an "objective" public statement, damned the "imperialists" for intervention in Vietnam, the Congo, and Latin America. Chief U.S. Delegate William C. Foster, in a well publicized, closed-session speech, scolded the Soviets in softened tones. The shadow of Vietnam hangs too heavily over the Conference to allow any new Soviet agreement at this stage. On the other hand, Britain's new disarmament minister, Lord Chalfont, sees an urgent need for East-West agreement to check the spread of nuclear weapons. This theme of urgency has also been taken up by the Western side, with President Johnson citing nonproliferation as the first disarmament objective. The irony in the matter is that the specific objective being pursued--an agreement in which the nuclear powers would pledge not to pass on their secrets, and non-nuclear powers promise not to acquire them--has little relevance to the stated reasons for urgency. These are borne out by the facts that: a tacit dissemination agreement now exists; the most immediate danger is not that nuclear weapons will be given, but that they will be gotten. Actually the pursuit of a non-dissemination treaty was a hangover from the 1963 post-Cuba period, when easy agreements with Russia were being sought. But now, in the mid-Vietnam period, a study of the Soviet press and Tsarapkin's statements shows no urgency toward a nonproliferation treaty, because Moscow feels that there is no great danger of dissemination by the existing nuclear powers. This has led the Western powers into a divisive internal debate on policies to govern the Allied nuclear force, a debate stimulated by the pressure to take a position at Geneva. "Thus there is a debate on the momentarily hypothetical question of nuclear control within the alliance in an attempt to achieve an even more hypothetical non-proliferation agreement with the Soviet Union."

917
Stone, Jeremy J. ON PROLIFERATION: WHERE'S THE DANGER? Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 21, Nov. 1965: 15-18. TK9145.A84, v. 21

The proliferation of nuclear weapons has emerged as one of the major arms control problems of the 1960's. The proponents of a nonproliferation treaty represent one position; a second group views the efforts devoted to solving the problem as incommensurate with its danger. The present level of debate--"in which the initial fears are overstated, the countervailing arguments just appearing, and the subtler costs of proliferation yet to be established"--must be raised if a stronger case against proliferation is to be made. In time the proliferation problem will merge with the problem of the control of strategic weapons systems. An important part of the nonproliferation effort will be preventing the smallest and most unstable nations from acquiring nuclear weapons. While additional countries will very probably join the nuclear club, efforts to impede or contain proliferation should continue. The emergence of Asian nuclear nations may encourage efforts to obtain a Latin American nuclear-free zone. Time and economics--two vital concerns of the developing countries--are often overlooked. Yet these two factors may well represent the difference between not doing anything about the proliferation of nuclear weapons and "containing" it, the most one can expect to do at the present time. Unfortunately many of the dangers of proliferation are probably still unperceived, as well as the costs of nonproliferation and the time "required to cope with nuclear dangers which, whether or not they ever arise, will channel the energies of many into trying to prevent them." The United States will be confronted with many problems: "choosing sides," "paying the bills for little arms races," "nuclear involvement in every crisis," "who's got the button--possession of nuclears and recognition," "messy political interactions," "encouraging aggression," "some darn fool," "Chinese troublemaking," "effects on international order." Even if the proliferation of nuclear weapons does not result in nuclear war, the struggle contending with it will be long and the choices hard.

918
10 MORE COUNTRIES THAT CAN MAKE NUCLEAR BOMBS. U.S. news & world report, v. 59, Dec. 6, 1965: 50-51. JK1.U65, v. 59

Warns that although in Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, and West Germany the present emphasis of nuclear programs is on peaceful uses, all of these countries have or will soon have the ability to manufacture nuclear weapons. Of this group India has both the immediate motivation and capability, and may be the next nation to enter the nuclear club. It is feared that the trend toward "flooding the world with nuclear reactors for 'peaceful purposes' may boomerang," for it provides an increasing number of nations with the means of producing atomic arms.

919
Vernant, Jacques. [TOWARD NUCLEAR ANARCHY?] Vers l'anarchie nucléaire? Revue de défense nationale, 21. année, déc. 1965: 1954-1960.
D410.R45, v. 21

Not to combat nuclear weapons proliferation, to let time take its course, "this is, in reality, to accept the multiplication of nuclear powers." Three questions reveal the core of the problem: (1) Are nuclear weapons bound to lose their "aristocratic" character? (2) If so, which nations will acquire them? (3) How is nuclear weapons proliferation to be judged, and, if unfavorably, how can it be avoided? In 1965 the society of nations is more comprehensive and more interdependent (in spite of contradictions and conflicts)

than ever in history. At this stage all possible means must be applied to the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation. Given certain circumstances, e.g., those surrounding India, some argue that nuclear weapons acquisition can be a stabilizing factor. But the primary consideration is that "the accession of India or of any other new country to a nuclear capability would have the effect of opening the road to proliferation and nuclear anarchy." The greatest concern surrounds the future course of India and Israel, but Sweden, Japan, and any other countries possessing peaceful nuclear installations that can be converted to military purposes pose the threat of proliferation. Whether other states strive to develop their own nuclear weapons is largely dependent on the pace set by Israel and India. The proliferation problem is also raised by nations (Germany, in particular) not wanting to produce nuclear weapons but wanting to control them by means of institutions modeled after the multilateral or Atlantic nuclear force. Such a force would constitute dissemination, which, in turn, encourages proliferation. On the one hand nonparticipants would feel pressure for acquiring their own weapons, and on the other hand participants would quickly demand increased control over the use of available nuclear forces. The five members of the nuclear club are endowed with special responsibilities. These responsibilities should be brought up to date with the present world situation. To organize international society in the image of the U.N. Charter becomes progressively more difficult and the way to nuclear anarchy is being blindly followed.

920
Viorst, Milton. THE NUCLEAR CLUB: WHY THE OUTS WANT IN. Nation, v. 201, Oct. 18, 1965: 235-239. AP2.N2, v. 201

The treaty on proliferation proposed by U.S. representatives at the Geneva disarmament conference forges no link between halting the spread and preventing the use of nuclear weapons. As things stand it is largely the nonnuclear states that inhibit the consummation of a nonproliferation treaty, an impediment that would be largely removed if the "haves" could agree on terms governing the employment of their weapons. Several different types of international agreements could be structured in recognition and support of this truth. As an alternative to nuclear disarmament, the realization of which seems unlikely in the predictable future, the United States could unfold nuclear umbrellas that would protect nonnuclear states against both nuclear and conventional attacks. Such agreements would have to contain mechanisms guaranteeing that nuclear decisions are so "democratized" that nuclear as well as nonnuclear partners can influence policies affecting their fate. Another alternative way the nuclear powers could retard proliferation would be to limit the use of their weapons to very specific circumstances. The least they could promise, in return for states committing themselves to nonacquisition, would be never to use nuclear weapons against those states. The nuclear powers could go a step further and promise not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. These pledges would not require inspection, and they would not impose disarmament on suspicious nuclear powers. To be sure pledges of this type would not satisfy a nonnuclear state that seeks a nuclear deterrent in conventional attack. Yet they would reduce the have-nots' fear of their nuclear neighbors, thereby eliminating a strong incentive to proliferation.

5. Communication

6. Command and Control of Weapons

921
FINALLY--AN ATTACK-PROOF CENTER FOR U.S. DEFENSE. U.S. news & world report, v. 60, Jan. 24, 1966: 54-57. illus. JK1.U65, v. 60

Pictures America's new hardened defense center. The complex, operated by the North American Air Defense Command, is buried 2,500 feet below Colorado's Cheyenne Mountain. In the event of attack, radar data on incoming missiles or bombers will be flashed to the center, where the information will be analyzed and interpreted and relayed to the President. The Cheyenne Mountain Complex is considered "close to indestructible."

922
Mock, John E. HIGH-ALTITUDE NUCLEAR EFFECTS. Air University review, v. 17, Jan./Feb. 1966: 27-31. TL501.A5574, v. 17

Communications systems can be disrupted by high-altitude nuclear explosions. The phenomenology of these blasts is understood, and the vulnerability of communications to an aggressor's attack introduces new factors that must be weighed in both offensive and defensive strategies.

C. VIOLATIONS OF AGREEMENTS AND RESPONSES

1. Violations, Inspection, and Verification

923
Billik, B. H., and H. L. Roth. ON THE LOGICAL ESTABLISHMENT OF GLOBAL SURVEILLANCE AND COMMUNICATION NETS. Journal of astronautical sciences, v. 12, fall 1965: 88-99. TL787.A6A3, v. 12

This report establishes criteria for the formation of global surveillance and communication nets and synthesizes some practical examples of these nets. Four properties are postulated which define the necessary conditions for the formation of nets. Certain lower bounds are obtained for the numbers of satellites and/or ground stations in a net in order to establish a worldwide surveillance and communication capability. It is shown that nets can be obtained which are competitive with orbital systems providing only surveillance of the globe. Trade-offs between the number of ground stations and the number and altitude of satellites in a net are discussed at length. (Abstract supplied)

924
Chevallier, Raymond. [THE PEACETIME ROLE OF AERIAL INTELLIGENCE] Rôle du renseignement aérien en temps de paix. Force aériennes françaises, 20. année, nov. 1965: 540-546. UG635.F8F66, v. 20

Maintains that the multiple possible forms of modern war and the essential role played by surprise make information a crucial factor. In particular aerial photography, in conjunction with traditional information sources, can provide vital peacetime intelligence. The author suggests further study for improving photographic techniques and accuracy of interpretation.

925
Fischerhof, H. [ATOMIC ENERGY LAW 1965--ANNUAL REVIEW] Atomenergierecht 1965--ein Jahresrückblick. Atomwirtschaft, [10. Jahrg.] Dez. 1965: 667-669. TK9001.A97, v. 10

Reviews proposed or recently enacted changes in British, French, West German, American, and international law on peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The author outlines, inter alia, the proposed revision of the International Atomic Energy Agency system of security controls against the military misuse of installations and fuels.

926
Heroy, William B. EARTHQUAKES, EXPLOSIONS . . . RESEARCH, AND PREDICTION. Geotimes, v. 10, Dec. 1965/Jan. 1966: 14-15. QE1.G56, v. 10

Reproduces a seismogram showing the onset of wave trains from the Operation Longshot underground nuclear explosion on Amchitka Island in the Aleutian chain, which was detonated October 29, 1965, at a depth of over 2,000 feet. The seismogram was made by the University of California (Berkeley) and its network of 10 seismographic stations in central California. This network is described very briefly.

927
Johnson, Philip L. RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION TO VEGETATION. Photogrammetric engineering, v. 31, Nov. 1965: 984-990. TA593.A2P5, v. 31

"Presented at the Annual Convention of the American Society of Photogrammetry, Washington, D. C., March, 1964."

Gamma radiation is an important consequence of our nuclear technology. Aerial photography was obtained of an experiment conducted to assess plant responses to various dosages of gamma radiation on Long Island. Panchromatic, infrared, color and false color films were studied and subjected to microdensitometry to provide quantitative expressions of the photographic image as a function of the gamma gradient, film type, leaf development, and species. Aerial monitoring of radiation damage to vegetation has the possibility of detecting this kind of disturbance. (Abstract supplied)

928
Kolde, H. E. QUALITY CONTROL OF RADIOACTIVITY-COUNTING SYSTEMS. Washington, U.S. Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare, Public Health Service, Division of Radiological Health [1965] 18 p. (Environmental health series. Radiological health.) QC795.K65

Public Health Service publication no. 999-RH-15.

Techniques for obtaining satisfactory performance from radioactivity-counting systems are described. Acceptable performance is maintained by routine tests of background and standards combined with the application of statistical criteria of acceptability. The use of control charts in conjunction with the test data is recommended to facilitate determination of satisfactory instrument and sample measurements. Corrective adjustments are made when necessary to assure continuity of reproducible results, which is particularly important for long-term studies. Methods of chart application and interpretation of plot patterns are outlined. Requirements for the design of counting laboratories, suitable performance standards, and associated control measures are also discussed. (Abstract supplied)

929
Mallory, William R. REFLECTIVITY OF ATMOSPHERIC SHOCK WAVES. Nature (London) v. 209, Jan. 8, 1966: 175-177. Q1.N2, v. 209

Reports experiments in which a laser rangefinder was used to determine the reflectivity of shock waves produced by the detonation of an explosive charge.

930
Resta, Paul E. IMAGE INTERPRETATION IN A SPACE ENVIRONMENT. Photogrammetric engineering, v. 31, Nov. 1965: 1010-1017. TA593.A2P5, v. 31

"Presented at the Annual Convention of the American Society of Photogrammetry, Washington, D. C., March 1965."

Potential problems of image interpretation in manned space surveillance systems include the unique physiological, psychological, display and information-processing variables affecting interpretation performance under the unusual conditions of space. The interpretation task and training requirements are anticipated including suggestions for needed research. (Abstract supplied.)

2. Enforcement

a. BY INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

b. BY OTHER MEANS

D. CONSEQUENCES OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

1. General Analyses

931
Coughlin, William J. THE HOGWASH CONFERENCE [editorial] Missiles and rockets, v. 17, Dec. 6, 1965: 46. UG630.M54, v. 17

A 3-year moratorium on deployment of antiballistic missile (ABM) systems was recommended by the "so-called blue ribbon panel on arms control" reporting to the White House Conference on International Cooperation (Nov. 28-Dec. 1). Members of the panel included some U.S. Pugwash participants, as well as Chairman Jerome B. Wiesner, former science adviser to the President. The panel's suggested moratorium, if undertaken by responsible defense policymakers, will hardly be beneficial to the Nation. The Wiesner report questions the political value of the system and states that the political consequences of deploying ABM's have not been explored thoroughly. For example the effects such defense systems would have on U.S. and Soviet deterrent forces could be destructive to present Moscow-Washington relations. However the committee must remember "that the best interests of the U.S. lie in protecting itself, not in worrying about the effect of such protection on Soviet policy." A safe assumption is that the Soviet Union will continue to attempt to close the intercontinental ballistic missile gap between the United States and itself. Moscow will hardly accept inferiority or postponement in this race. It is "hogwash" to believe that ABM deployment would automatically cause the Soviets to increase their offensive missile force, and thus absurd to recommend for serious consideration a 3-year moratorium on deployment.

932
Hirschfeld, Oswald. [NUCLEAR PROTECTION AGAINST NUCLEAR THREAT] Atomschutz gegen Atom-

drohung. Wehr und Wirtschaft, 9. Jahrg., 10. Okt. 1965: 517-518. U3.W38, v. 9

Although the arguments used in the [West German] election campaign were concerned with anything but foreign or military policies, the Geneva disarmament conference surprisingly succeeded in puncturing party agreements. In particular the inconvenient activity of former Chancellor Adenauer uncovered differences in the old government camp, above all as distrust of American assurances to provide atomic cover for the Federal Republic had never been expressed so undisguisedly in either official or semi-official quarters. Adenauer had taken the American draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the Canadian government's statement and the re-equipment of the British Army of the Rhine as excuse to talk about a threatened nuclear dilution in Central Europe. In fact, of course, the outcome of so many modification proposals at one time cannot help but affect the Federal Republic's legitimate security needs. West Germany sees herself threatened by some 700 medium-range missiles, which could destroy every corner of the land. The scant attention paid to the German question during the Geneva talks must cause concern in Bonn. Cooperation in a treaty to prevent the proliferation of atomic weapons takes little account of Germany's desire for atomic protection of her territory by means of American weapons and for a limited say in target planning, which certainly does not mean that the German Defence Minister wants to have his finger on the atomic trigger. On the other hand participation in a non-proliferation treaty would also mean that the Federal Republic would have to forfeit a means of defence without in return receiving compensation in, say, the central question of German reunification. Russia's delegate brusquely swept away any suggestion of a package deal, but it is still not clear how far the Americans are anxious to accommodate their Ally in this matter. Thus whether Under-Secretary of State Ball's goodwill visit had any serious alternative to offer for the oft-condemned MLF is no longer really a matter of doubt. German participation in such a scheme, apart from apparently gigantic costs, would be restricted to a more or less academic advisory function, which would still leave the question of German security open. (Abstract supplied)

933
PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: TO BE OR NOT TO BE. Worldview, v. 8, Nov. 1965: 1-2. P&GP RR

Discusses the dangers posed by proliferation of nuclear weapons and indicates some of the possible problems that a nonproliferation treaty would raise. "In the face of the increased Soviet-U.S. cooperation demanded by any of the recommended plans, the problems of holding NATO together would mount. Nor would the Soviet Union find her role among the Communist countries of the world more comfortable. The world could, possibly, become a less orderly place than it is now."

2. Military

934
Witze, Claude. AIRPOWER IN THE NEWS. Air Force and space digest, v. 48, Dec. 1965: 14, 17-18. UG633.A65, v. 48

While the Soviet Union is developing a mobile ICBM (Scamp) and a missile capable of orbiting its warhead (Scrag), the United States has abandoned its mobile-missile programs and has devoted scant research to orbital bombardment. Conditions today make the orbiting bomb an effective weapon for several reasons. Time lapse between the command to fire and detonation would be only about 5 minutes. Weapons poised in space have so high a credibility that their political and psychological effects can influence government decisions. They even preempt present deterrent power. The debate over nuclear weapons proliferation hovers in the background of Soviet missile advances. A branch of this debate is the current effort to extend the partial test ban treaty to include all nuclear testing. Such a ban would violate four conditions deemed essential to security by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff: (1) the ability to continue underground testing for the purpose of increased knowledge and weapons improvement; (2) the maintenance of theoretical nuclear laboratory facilities; (3) the keeping of atmospheric testing facilities in readiness; and (4) the improvement of capabilities to verify the terms of the test-ban treaty and to monitor Soviet nuclear progress. Senator Robert Kennedy's proposal that the Chinese Communists be invited to the Geneva disarmament talks because they "may be persuaded that their long-run interest . . . lies not in the spread of nuclear weapons but in their strict control" should be viewed with skepticism.

3. Political

4. Economic

935
Glagolev, Igor' S. [THE IMPACT OF DISARMAMENT ON ECONOMICS: MILITARIZATION AND THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF DISARMAMENT] Vliianie razoruzheniia na ekonomiku; militarizatsiia i vozmozhnye posledstviia razoruzheniia. Moskva, Nauka, 1964. 126, [2] p. HD9743.A2G5

Partial contents.--Criticism of the theories of economic stimulation through the arms race.--The stimulating effect of disarmament on economics.--Consequences of disarmament for developed capitalist countries.--Consequences of disarmament for developing countries.--Disarmament, conversion, and the development of Socialist countries (with the U.S.S.R. as an example).--Economic importance of the successive stages of peaceful coexistence and disarmament.--Methods of economic control of disarmament.

Armaments and defense expenditures are decidely not economically beneficial to capitalist, underdeveloped, or Socialist nations and militarization will have no effect on the cyclical nature of capitalist development. Disarmament would have a stimulating effect on the economies of all nations, regardless of their social structure. Tax revenue in a disarmed world could be partly allocated to the populace to inspire peaceful production and partly alloted by the state to national socio-economic programs, grants to developing nations, and international development of science and technology. Labor forces, scientific institutions, and factories could be converted to projects that would increase industrial and agricultural production on a colossal scale (peaceful uses of atomic energy, control of climate, and the like). Disarmament must be controlled, but control at the national level would be so expensive that the financial benefits of disarmament would be dissipated. International control would be more effective and much less expensive. More attention should be given the improvement of national methods of gathering information on foreign countries. World organizations

could assume these functions and through analysis (largely economic) determine each nation's compliance with disarmament legislation. When needed, a small inspection force could enter a country to make physical verification. Effective control would eliminate the need for large national or international security forces (removing another source of nonproductive expenditure), though smaller peacekeeping forces would remain feasible.

936
Kean, David W. FEATHERBEDDING AND OVERKILL. Frontier, Jan. 1966: 5-7.
P&GP RR

Maintains there are gross inconsistencies in America's philosophy of work. Military spending acts as a subsidy for millions of people, and many are growing fearful for their jobs and families in the face of disarmament. While the Government continues to encourage economic waste and to boost the economy by spending millions for defense, almost nothing is being done to change the American economy or job market, which depend so much on spending and waste, and ready them for peace.

937
Leontief, Wassily, and others. THE ECONOMIC IMPACT--INDUSTRIAL AND REGIONAL--OF AN ARMS CUT. Review of economics and statistics, v. 47, Aug. 1965: 217-241.
HA1.R35, v. 47

Statistical computations to determine what effect a hypothetical 20 percent reduction in military demand accompanied by an equivalent compensating increase in nonmilitary demand would have on industrial composition and regional distribution of employment in the continental United States. The major findings include: (1) Of 56 sectors of the economy listed, only 10 would experience a reduction in total output and employment. (2) Of the 19 geographical regions delineated, employment could be expected to contract in 10 and expand in the remainder.

AUTHOR INDEX

[Numbers refer to entries.]

**, pseud., 690

A

Adler, Renata, 805
Africanus, pseud., 491
Ahearn, Thomas R., 738
Albinski, Henry S., 891
Alcock, Norman Z., 806
Aldea, Dan, 749
Alsop, Stewart, 601
The American Behavioral Scientist, 434
Anand, R. P., 772
Antipov, V. V., 589
Arnhym, Albert A., 656
Arzinger, Rudolf, 673
Atlantic Council of the United States, 674
Auerbach, Charlotte, 763
Axelbank, Albert, 602

B

Babaa, Khalid I., 514
Badurina, Berislav, 540, 886
Baldwin, Hanson W., 603
Bartenev, S., 528
Bateman, Don, 475
Baukloh, Friedhelm, 870
Beaufre, André, 550, 605
Bebler, Ales, 435
Beebe, George A., 784
Beecher, William, 604
Beller, William S., 807
Belot, Raymond de, 676
Bennett, A. Leroy, 785
Benson, Ivor, 436
Berge, Pierre, 750
Bertin, Leonard, 551
Billik, B. H., 923
Bishop, Peter V., 799
Bloomfield, Lincoln P., 893
Blume, Isabelle, 808
Bobrow, Davis B., 843, 894
Boehm, Eric H., 437
Boehm, George A., 605
Borch, Herbert von, 590
Brandwein, Robert, 751
Brewin, Andrew, 607
Breyer, Siegfried, 552
Bristol, James, 809
Bromke, Adam, 677
Brosio, Manlio, 678
Buchan, Alastair, 895
Bulajic, Milan, 773
Burchett, Wilfred, 606
Burhop, Eric H., 844
Burns, Arthur L., 679
Bussey, Donald S., 591
Butz, J. S., 553

C

Cabiac, Roger, 710
Casamayor, 736
Case, Frank B., 680
Catholic Church in Poland. Bishops, 515
Ceuzin, Paul, 554
Champeaux, Ernest, 529
Chandrasekhar, Sripati, 465
Chang, Chi Ryang, 609
Chapuis, Robert, 711
Chen, Yi, 476
Cherkasskii, V. IU., 786
Chevallier, Raymond, 924
Cho, M. Y., 477
Chopra, Maharaj K., 592, 612
Christ, Rolf F., 613
Christol, Carl Q., 867
Christopher, Stefan C., 812
Chuev, IUrii V., 555
Chyong, Chung Tkhy, 614
Clark, Joseph S., 845
Clark, Robert A., 438
Cleveland, Harlan, 681
Cockrill, James T., 712
Coffey, Joseph I., 615
Commentator, pseud., 682, 856, 866
Cooper, John C., 607, 867
Coughlin, William J., 931
Coulmas, Peter, 439
Crabb, Cecil V., 478
Crook, Samuel L., 764

D

De Gaulle, Charles, 479
De Grazia, Alfred, 449
Deimer, Sefton, 897
Delcour, Roland, 480
DeSaussure, Hamilton, 867
Desbarbieux, R., 617
Dirks, Walter, 516, 810
Djerdja, Josip, 737
Dmitriev, Bor, 836
Dodd, Stuart C., 812
Douglas, William O., 774
Dulac, Philippe, 618-619

E

Ebert, Theodor, 813
Egorov, Valerii N., 466
Ehrhardt, Carl A., 483
Eichelberger, Clark M., 837
Elble, Rolf, 530
Eliot, George Fielding, 713
Emel'ianov, V., 787
Eren, Nuri, 481
Erhard, Ludwig, 482
Erler, Fritz, 846
Etinger, Iakov Ia., 467
Evgen'ev, I., 857

F

Falcke, Dietrich, 621
Falk, Richard A., 775
Fedorov, Vladimir N., 838
Firmage, Edwin B., 800
Fischerhof, H., 925
Flechtheim, Ossip K., 468
Fleming, D. F., 484
Fontaine, Andre, 518, 683
Forster, Thomas M., 622
Foster, William C., 860, 871-872, 881, 898
Fraleigh, Arnold, 882
France. Commissariat à l'énergie atomique. Département des relations extérieures, 623
Frank, Henning, 684
Frank, Lewis A., 899
Frankel, Charles, 814
Frederik, Hans, 469
Freed, Fred, 839
Frenzke, Dietrich, 486
Freund, Hugo, 815
Friedmann, Wolfgang, 776
Frisch, Alfred, 487
Frydenberg, Per, 801
Fucks, Wilhelm, 440

G

Galtung, Johan, 816
Ganovski, Sava, 441
Garvey, Gerald, 714
Georgiev, Elmir, 560
Gerasimov, V., 561
Getler, Michael, 562-563
Gilbert, Marc, 624
Gillett, Nicholas, 833
Gimpel, Herbert J., 564
Giovannitti, Len, 839
Glagolev, Igor' S., 935
Glick, Edward B., 861
Goldberg, Arthur J., 802, 881
Goldstein, Walter, 873, 900
Golikov, V., 519
Goodwin, Geoffrey, 685
Gorden, Morton, 847
Gosset, Pierre, 625
Gosset, Renée, 625
Granger, Clinton E., 488
Green, J. H., 901
Greene, Marc T., 626
Gretton, Sir Peter, 593
Griffiths, Franklyn, 902
Gross, Johannes, 520
Guelzo, Carl M., 890
Guénolé, Jean, 686

H

Haagerup, Niels J., 627
Hagemann, Max, 442

Haggerty, James J., 566
Halkin, Hubert, 567
Halperin, Morton H., 848
Hammes, John A., 738
Hammond, Kenneth R., 443
Hanning, Hugh, 715
Hargreaves, Reginald, 531
Hassel, Kai Uwe von, 669
Hayden, Thomas, 851
Heer, David M., 739
Heikal, Muhammad H., 892
Heilbrunn, Otto, 541
Heininger, Horst, 594
Henle, Hans, 489
Heroy, William B., 926
Heusinger, Adolf, 669, 687
Hewetson, Sir Reginald, 629
Hirschfeld, Oswald, 630, 932
Hitchens, Harold L., 631
Hoagland, John H., 862
Höpker, Wolfgang, 632
Holifield, Chet, 688
Holsten, R. D., 765
Holzheimer, Hermann, 490
Hooson, Emlyn, 689
Hornberger, Michael, 568
Horowitz, Irving L., 849
Hounau, Général, 633
Hsinhua News Agency, 817
Hughes, Sarah T., 778

I

Isorni, Jacques, 818

J

Jackson, Henry M., 493, 733
Jacobs, Hayes B., 740
Jen, Ku-ping, 636
Johnson, Harold S., 791
Johnson, Lyndon B., 779
Johnson, Philip L., 927
Juyal, Shreesh, 788

K

Kageneck, August, Graf, 637
Kahng, Tae Jin, 789
Kaiser, Karl, 470
Kalaydzhiev, Vl., 766
Kasliwal, N. C., 904
Katz, Amrom H., 638
Kaysen, Carl, 905
Kean, David W., 936
Keith, James F., 738
Kempski, Jürgen von, 780
Kennan, George F., 639
Kertzscher, Gunter, 494
Kintner, William R., 716
Klafkowski, Alfons, 781
Kliesing, Georg, 669
Knorr, Klaus, 691
Kobler, John, 767
Kolde, H. E., 928
Kolodziej, Edward J., 717
Korolev, B., 495
Korotynski, Henryk, 874
Krippendorff, Ekkehart, 444
Krüger, Joachim, 875
Krusche, Heinz, 906
Kuby, Heinz, 863
Küster, M., 570
Kunze, Heinrich, 752
Kuroda, P. K., 768
Kuzin, Alexander M., 742
Kyria, Pierre, 532

L

La Dany, L., 496
Lall, Betty (Goetz), 753, 850, 907
Lambilliotte, Maurice, 497
Lapp, Ralph E., 718
Larrabee, Eric, 533
Lavergne, Bernard, 498, 692
Leavitt, William, 571-572
Lehmann, Hans, 499
Leiss, Amelia C., 893
Leites, Nathan C., 640
Leontief, Wassily, 937
Lepotier, Adolphe, 595, 719
Lerner, Daniel, 847
Levi, Werner, 445, 819
Lindemann, Helmut, 534
Lindop, Patricia J., 769
Lorry, J., 743
Low, Ian, 573
Lund, Nils, 642
Luu-guy-Ky, 887
Lvov, M., 908

M

Maass, Friedrich, 643
McConnell, J. P., 574, 720
McElheny, Victor, 693
McGillivray, Peter C., 721
McWhinney, Edward, 471
Malewsky-Malevitch, S. de, 521
Malex, Ivan, 820
Mallory, William R., 929
Manelis, B. L., 446
Manss, Robert W., 867
Maratov, M., 909
Margolis, Howard, 876
Marquand, Carl B., 744
Martin, Robert P., 694
Marx, Wesley, 722
Masters, Roger D., 910
Mecklin, John, 575
Mehta, Swadesh, 803
Meier, Dorothy L., 447
Melchior de Molènes, Charles, 448
Melikian, Ovanes N., 467
Menter, Martin, 867
Merkulov, I. A., 558
Metron, inc., New York. Universal Reference System, 449
Mialet, Jean, 821
Middleton, Drew, 450
Miksche, Ferdinand O., 451, 695
Millar, Thomas B., 645
Miller, Barry, 576
Miller, D. M. O., 543
Millman, H. C., 544
Miyake, Y., 768
Mock, John E., 922
Modrzhinskaia, Elena D., 452
Möbus, Gerhard, 669
Molter, Günther, 577
Monitor, Hans-Jörg, 647
Montmoreau, Alain, 696
Morgenthau, Hans J., 453, 648
Mornand, Jacques, 755
Mosbaek, E. J., 756
Mosen, Wido, 596
Muller, Steven, 522

N

Naess, Arne, 822
National Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. General Board, 823
Nemoto, J., 768
Nerlich, Uwe, 697
Nesmelov, Oleg V., 472
Nguen, Man' De, 614
Nicholson, Howard, 757
Nicholson, Michael, 455
Nifontov, Boris I., 723
Nikitin, M. D., 589
Nixon, Richard M., 523
Nogee, Joseph L., 883

O

O'Ballance, Edgar, 535
Oehman, Cunnar, 724
Okumiya, Masatake, 651
Oppenheimer, Martin, 824
Oregon. State Board of Health, 745

P

Paltridge, Shane, 652
Panitzki, Werner, 649
Pavlenko, N., 653
Pavlov, Bor, 836
Perkins, Dwight H., 848
Perlo, Victor, 758
Petrov, D., 654
Pfaltzgraff, Robert L., 716
Philip, André, 456
Piatier, Henri, 725
Pilisuk, Marc, 851
Pliachenko, P., 655
Poeggel, Walter, 500
Polianov, N., 877
Popov, Iv., 766
Possony, Stefan T., 726
Powell, Elwin H., 597
Power, Thomas S., 656
Preobrazhenskii, S., 825
Pringsheim, Klaus H., 698

Q

Quaestor, pseud., 913

R

Rabinowitch, Eugene, 501, 727
Rajan, M. S., 473
Rasch, Harold, 835
Raser, John R., 580, 728
Reed, Walter D., 867
Reshetar, John S., 502
Resta, Paul E., 930
Rewal, M. K., 914
Rhyne, Charles S., 782
Richet, Charles, 790
Roberts, Adam, 826
Robertson, Terence, 700, 915
Robison, David, 701
Rondot, Pierre, 503
Roschlau, Wolfgang, 702
Rosna, Walter, 598

Roszak, Theodore, 828
Rotblat, Joseph, 769
Roth, H. L., 923
Rougeron, Camille, 581
Rubin, Alfred P., 867
Rudder, Earl, 852
Rusk, Dean, 783
Rybkin, E., 539

S

Saha, Sisirranjan, 658
Saksonov, P. P., 589
Sandoz, Gerard, 703
Sauldie, Madan M., 504
Scheinman, Lawrence, 840
Schenke, Wolf, 659, 865
Schneyder, Philippe, 729
Schonwandt, Max, 505
Schorr, Daniel, 916
Schreiner, Egon, 660
Schütz, Wilhelm W., 506
Schwartz, David C., 730
Schwarzkopf, Dietrich, 507
Schweitzer, Wolfgang, 525
Sedin, Lev, 661
Senter, Raymond D., 662
Shestov, V., 853
Shibaev, Nikolai F., 582
Simmons, Edwin H., 583
Simmons, Henry T., 584
Singh, Baljit, 508, 791
Slater, Jerome, 457
Smolik, Josef, 829
Sobakin, Vadim K., 458
Sokolovskii, Vasilii D., 663
Sokol'skii, V. N., 558
Sombart, Nicolaus, 830
Sommer, Theo, 664
Sparks, William J., 744
Steiniger, Peter-Alfons, 509
Steward, F. C., 765
Stone, Jeremy J., 638, 854, 905
Stošić, Borko D., 792
Strohm, Carl G., 510
Stubbe, Heinrich, 527
Styron, Mary-Alice, 841
Sugii, M., 765
Symposium on Personnel Dosimetry for Accidental High-Level Exposure to External and Internal Radiation, Vienna (1965), 770

T

Tammelo, Ilmar, 459
Tarasenko, N., 460
Tarasova, V. A., 558
Tarr, David W., 666
Taylor, George E., 511
Teeple, John B., 862
Tewary, I. N., 793
Thant, U, 855
Thomer, Egbert, 586, 667
Tinbergen, Jan, 831
Tiwari, S. C., 794
Torcy, Camille, 705
Trager, Frank N., 706
Tsimanovich, K., 498
Twiss, Robert L., 587

U

Ulbricht, Walter, 492, 707
United States
  Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 879
  Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Subcommittee for Special Investigation, 732
  Congress. Senate. Committee on Government Operations. Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, 733
  Dept. of State. Historical Studies Division, 858
  Library of Congress. Aerospace Technology Division, 746
  National Resource Evaluation Center, 747
  Office of Civil Defense, 748
  Office of Emergency Planning. See Office of Civil Defense

V

Valaire, Guy, 761
Van Cleave, William R., 708
Varga, Eugen, 461
Vaussard, Maurice, 832
Verberie, 536
Vernant, Jacques, 462, 919
Verteidigungspolitischer Kongress der CDU, Kassel (1964), 669
Vinacke, Harold M., 512
Viorst, Milton, 920

W

Walsh, John, 759
Warren, Roland L., 463
Washburn, Wilcomb E., 545
Waskey, Donald R., 670
Waterkamp, Rainer, 538, 671
Wegner, Rudi, 709
Weill-Tuckerman, Anne, 795
Weischedel, Wilhelm, 762
Weizsäcker, Carl F. von, 599
Wellmann, Henry N., 771
Weyde, Eugen, 546
Wilson, Eugene E., 868
Wimmer, Paul, 547
Winterhager, Herbert P., 734
Wise, Raymond L., 804
Wit, Daniel, 474
Wittig, Peter, 796
Witze, Claude, 934
Wolf, Charles, 548
Wolf, John, 588
Women Strike for Peace, Washington, D. C., 880
Wright, Quincy, 797, 834, 889

Y

Yalem, Ronald J., 798
Yarmolinsky, Adam, 760

Z

Zagoria, Donald S., 513
Zenker, Karl-Adolf, 632
Zhukov, G., 869
Zilbert, E. R., 735
Zitzewitz, Horst von, 672

SUBJECT INDEX

[Numbers refer to entries.]

A

ANF. See Atlantic nuclear force
ACCIDENTS, NUCLEAR. See Nuclear accidents
ADORNO, THEODOR W., 762
AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY, 924
AEROSPACE CORP., 732
AEROSPACE INDUSTRY, Government-industry relations, 732
AFRICA
  armed forces, 729
  Chinese Communist influence in, 504
  nonalinement, 467
  nuclear-free zone, 859-860
AFTER TWENTY YEARS: ALTERNATIVES TO THE COLD WAR IN EUROPE [RICHARD BARNET AND MARCUS RASKIN], 522
AGGRESSION, 459
  See also Conflict; Violence
AGREEMENTS. See Treaties, agreements, etc.
AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS
  France, 600
  NORAD, 607
  STRIDA-II, 554
AIRCRAFT
  carriers, role in national liberation wars, 561
  future role, 575
  V/STOL, 577
  See also Bombers
AIRPOWER
  United States, in Vietnam, 574, 601
  use in Southeast Asia, 592
ALLIANCE NUCLEAR FORCE, 522
  See also Atlantic nuclear force; Multilateral nuclear force
ALTERNATIVE TO PARTITION: FOR A BROADENING CONCEPTION OF AMERICA'S ROLE IN EUROPE [ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI], 522
ANTARCTIC REGIONS, international cooperation, 858
ANTARCTIC TREATY, 858
ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS
  civil defense, 748
  deployment, 615, 668, 931
  development, 567, 569, 628, 879
    Soviet view, 582
    U.S. reaction to Chinese nuclear program, 610
  effect on strategic parity, 591
  Nike-Sprint, 668
  Nike-X, 758
  U.S. policy, 605
ANTIPROLIFERATION TREATY (PROPOSED). See Proliferation of nuclear weapons--nonproliferation treaty (proposed)
ANTISATELLITE DEFENSE SYSTEMS, 550, 566, 662
ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE. See Submarine warfare
ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE
  military balance, 741
  nuclear weapons development, 892
ARBITRATION, INTERNATIONAL, Western Europe, 790
ARMAMENTS INDUSTRY. See Defense industry
ARMED FORCES
  France, reduction, 637
  nonmilitary uses, developing countries, 715
ARMED FORCES--Continued
  operational requirements, change in, 565
  See also Peacekeeping and security forces; Peacekeeping and security forces (proposed); also under NATO; specific countries
ARMS AND ARMAMENTS
  economic aspects, 528
  France, 644
  reduction or elimination
    Communist China, 848
    developing countries, 893
    Latin America, 577
  regulation, 580
  research and development
    future requirements, 565
    vs. procurement, 594
  trade and dissemination, 862
    See also Arms Traffic
  U.S.S.R., 555
  U.S. Army, 650
  West Germany, 621
  See also Chemical and biological weapons; Military balance; Missiles; Nuclear weapons; Space weapons
ARMS RACE, 854
  effect of Vietnamese war on, 755
  effects, 594, 633, 737
  Near East, 741, 892
  regulation, 873
  Soviet-U.S. relations, 659
  tension, 846
  See also Space race
ARMS TRAFFIC
  U.S.S.R., to nonalined countries, 502
  See also Arms and armaments--trade and dissemination
ASIA
  Chinese Communist expansion in, 474, 490, 895
  disarmament policy, 850
  Indian policy in, 465
  instability in, 462
  nonalinement, 467
  See also Southeast Asia
ASOKA, 833
ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization
ATLANTIC COMMUNITY, 450, 674
ATLANTIC NUCLEAR FORCE, 701
  See also Alliance nuclear force; Multilateral nuclear force
ATOMIC. See entries beginning with Nuclear
AUSTRALIA
  defense policies and programs, 645, 652
  nuclear policies and programs, 901
  nuclear weapons acquisition, 891
  strategic position of, 679

B

BALANCE OF POWER
  changes in, 440
  effect on German reunification, 599
  Europe, 470
  Southeast Asia, 648

BASES. See Military bases
BIBLIOGRAPHIES
international relations, 437, 449
social and behavioral sciences, 434
strategy, 663
U.S.S.R., 466
BILATERAL SAFEGUARDS, 898
See also International Atomic Energy Agency--safeguards system
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. See Chemical and biological weapons
BIPOLARITY, 473, 599
BLOCH, ERNST, 762
BOMB SHELTERS, 721
See also Fallout shelters
BOMBERS
reduction or elimination, 568, 606
See also Nuclear delivery vehicles
BRIGHT, JOHN, 833
BUCHAREST INSTITUTE OF ATOMIC PHYSICS, 749
BULGARIA, nuclear research and development, 560
BURNS, EEDSON L.M., 915

C

CAMBODIA, Vietnamese war, 608
CANADA
disarmament conferences, participation in, 915
foreign policy, U.S.S.R., 471
NORAD, 607
trade policies, Communist China, 634
U.N. peacekeeping operations, 799
CANADIAN PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, 806
CENTRAL EUROPE, nuclear-free zone, 672, 865
CERESOLE, PIERRE, 833
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, 827
development, peaceful applications, 744
U.S.S.R., 542
U.S. policy, 876
CHINA, COMMUNIST
decisionmaking, 728
defense policies and programs
"wars of national liberation," 511, 537
See also Strategy
disarmament policies and proposals, 843, 848
economic policies and programs, 634
expansion in Africa, 504
expansion in Asia, 474, 490, 523
expansion in Thailand, 611
foreign policy, 465, 476, 485, 513
nonalined countries, 512
Pakistan, 698
U.S.S.R., territorial claims against, 486
United States, 501
West German view, 496
Western Europe, 510
nuclear forces, 604
nuclear policies and programs
international implications, 489
U.S. reaction, 610, 615, 735
West German view, 671
nuclear weapons development, 670, 899
East German view, 897
Soviet-U.S. efforts to prevent, 695
nuclear weapons tests, 768
war potential, 491, 643
world role, 497
See also Sino-Soviet dispute
CHRISTIAN PEACE CONFERENCE (1965), 811, 829
CHRISTIANITY
peace, 810, 818, 829, 832, 870
Polish-German reconciliation, 515-516, 527
view of Vietnamese war, 823
CIVIL DEFENSE
criticism, 724
effect on strategic parity, 591
Norway, 672
policies and programs, 735
requirements, 748
shelter program, 721
Sweden, 613
West Germany, 647
See also Bomb shelters; Fallout shelters; Survival
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
African countries, 729
Communist China, 491
France, 618
Japan, 602
role of the President, 713
United States, 717, 719
West Germany, 647
See also Scientific-military relations
CIVIL WAR, international law, 776
CIVILIAN DEFENSE STUDY CONFERENCE (1964), 809
COEXISTENCE. See Peaceful coexistence
COLD WAR
changing nature of, 444, 501, 795
East-West relations, 597
U.S. policy, 484, 493
COLLATERAL MEASURES. See Limited measures
COLLECTIVE SECURITY. See Security, international
COLONIALISM, 452
COMMAND AND CONTROL
civil-military relations, 713
NORAD defense center, 921
nuclear weapons, NATO. See NATO--control of nuclear weapons
COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS, MILITARY
vulnerability to nuclear explosions, 922
COMMUNISM
aggressiveness, 521
and geostrategy, 595
evolutionary trends, 468
insurgency, 535
revisionism, 524
COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
polycentrism, 677
See also Central Europe; Eastern Europe; Sino-Soviet dispute; Warsaw Treaty Organization
COMPULSORY MILITARY SERVICE. See Military service, compulsory
CONFERENCE ON LAW AND WORLD AFFAIRS (1964), 471
CONFERENCES
Christian Peace Conference (1965), 811, 829
Civilian Defense Study Conference (1964), 809
Conference on Law and World Affairs (1964), 471
Detroit Space Law Forum (1965), 868
General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (1965), 903
International Conference for the Liquidation of Foreign Military Bases (1965), 817
International Peace Bureau Conference (1964), 809
International Women's Forum on Peace (1965), 827
proposed: world disarmament conference, 737, 855-856, 881, 885
Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, 820
West German military colloquium (Dresden), 653
White House Conference on International Cooperation (1965), 628, 807, 931
World Conference on World Peace Through Law (1965), 778, 782
World Congress for Peace, National Independence, and General Disarmament (1965), 825
See also Negotiations

CONFLICT
behavioral analysis, 463
effect of nuclear weapons on, 536
escalation, 886-887, 889
Vietnamese war. See Vietnamese war--escalation
legal principles, 797
protracted conflict, 513
resolution, 443, 596
cultural relations, 814
institutions, 784
interdisciplinary approach, 455
international law, 538
peace research movement, 824
U.N. role, 797
See also Arbitration, international
See also Aggression; Violence; War
CONTROL. See Command and control; Inspection and verification
CONVERSION. See economic conversion under Defense industry
COOPERATION, INTERNATIONAL, 831
Antarctic Regions, 858
arms and armaments, 594
promotion of world peace, 830
U.N. role, 815
COUNTERINSURGENCY, 548, 583
See also Guerrilla warfare; Insurgency
CRISES, control of, 583

D

DAMAGE-LIMITING STRATEGY, 631
DECISIONMAKING
moral and ethical aspects, 445
NATO, reorganization, 675, 700
role of the military in, 719
simulation, 728
strategic analysis, 714
See also Nuclear decisionmaking
DEFENSE BUDGETS AND EXPENDITURES
contributions to NATO, 752
economic effects, 760, 936
effect of Vietnamese war on, 755, 757-758
France, 637, 665, 750
reductions. See Defense cutbacks
See also under specific countries
DEFENSE CONTRACTS, 732
leading U.S. contractors, 754
reduction, 753
DEFENSE CUTBACKS
adjustment measures, 751
Congressional concern, 606
economic effects, 756
regional impact, 937
See also Economic effects of disarmament
DEFENSE INDUSTRY
economic conversion, 753
France, 710
See also Aerospace industry; Military-industrial complex; Nuclear energy industry
DEFENSE POLICIES AND PROGRAMS
formulation, 657, 719, 732, 734
France, domestic politics, 457
role of military intelligence, 726
strategic analysis, 714, 720
"territorial defense," France, 618
See also Mutual defense; Nonmilitary defense; Strategy; also under specific countries
DEFENSE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
cost-effectiveness, 719
design requirements, 580
East-West balance, 573
research organizations, 722
DEFENSE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT--Continued
U.S.S.R., 555
DELIVERY VEHICLES. See Nuclear delivery vehicles
DENMARK, defense policies and programs, 627
DENUCLEARIZED ZONES. See Nuclear-free zones
DESIGN FOR SURVIVAL [THOMAS S. POWER], 625
DETERRENCE
"assured destruction," 631
balance of terror, 530, 538
credibility, 600, 675, 696, 699
futility of, 597
maximum deterrence, 625
mutual deterrence, 531, 591
Polaris role, 580
role in GCD, 847, 852
role of airpower, 592
role of foreign military bases, 666
role of NATO, 685
theories of, 894
U.S. military power, 488
U.S. view, 656
See also Strategy
DETROIT SPACE LAW FORUM (1965), 868
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
armed forces, 715
defense policies and programs, 893
economic assistance, 451, 821
economic effects of disarmament, 935
U.N. role, 435
DISSEMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. See Proliferation of nuclear weapons
DOCUMENTS, international relations and law, 458
DUBNA, JOINT INSTITUTE FOR NUCLEAR RESEARCH, 560

E

ENDC. See Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament
EAST-WEST RELATIONS, 495
détente, 471, 680, 795
developing countries, 435
effect on nationalism, 439
effect on nonproliferation treaty, 902
Europe, 517
European unification, 522
future, 440
peaceful coexistence, 687
"Third World," 511
U.N. Security Council, 785
See also Soviet-U.S. relations
EASTERN EUROPE, West German relations with, 525
ECONOMIC CONVERSION. See under Defense industry
ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION. See under Nuclear energy industry
ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF DISARMAMENT, 756, 936
adjustment measures, 751, 753
world situation, 935
See also Defense cutbacks
EGYPT. See United Arab Republic
EIGHTEEN NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT, 435, 884
East German policies and proposals, 875
lack of agreement, 916
nonalined countries, 883
nonproliferation treaty discussions, 900, 912
U.S. policies and proposals, 920
West German policies and proposals, 932
Soviet policies and proposals, 853, 857
ENGLAND. See Great Britain
ESCALATION. See under Conflict; Vietnamese war
EUROPE
arms control in, 847, 850
conventional defense of, 705
defense policies and programs, 620

EUROPE--Continued
joint nuclear force, 701
peace parliament (proposed), 790
Potsdam Agreement, 673
scientific-technological development, 716
tension reduction in, 877
unification, 456, 483, 518, 683, 690
effect on NATO, 685
French view, 640
relation to defense problems, 863
U.S. role in, 522
See also Central Europe; East-West relations; Eastern Europe; Western countries
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, French view, 483
EUROPEAN NUCLEAR FORCE. See Europe--joint nuclear force
EUROPEAN-U.S. RELATIONS
defense policies and programs, 456, 678, 690, 701
effect of science and technology on, 716
European security, 685, 691
U.S. policy, 493
U.S. role, 522
See also Atlantic community; North Atlantic Treaty Organization

F

FALLOUT. See Radioactive fallout
FALLOUT SHELTERS, 735, 738, 748
See also Bomb shelters
FAR EAST, British policies in, 629
FIRE STORMS, 721
FISSIONABLE MATERIALS, peaceful uses, 876
FOREIGN POLICY. See under specific countries
FRANCE
armed forces, 711
defense budget and expenditures, 665, 750
defense policies and programs, 529, 600, 710
effect of politics on, 711, 736
"territorial defense," 618
weapons development, 644
See also Strategy
developing countries, 821
European unification, 483
foreign policy, 498
German reunification, 470
MRBM installations, 617
NATO policy, 479, 699
nuclear forces, 619, 840
nuclear policies and programs, 624, 697
Atomic Energy Commission, 623
effect on European unification, 640
"Force Nucléaire Stratégique," 637
history, 840
nuclear weapons tests, 740
space policies and programs, 693
view of Europe, 691

G

GCD. See General and complete disarmament
GAMING. See War games and gaming
GANDHI, MAHATMA, 833
GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT
Asia, 850
cold war effects, 846
deterrence, 852
economic effects. See Economic effects of disarmament
feasibility, 597, 798
German reunification, 880
legal aspects. See Legal aspects of disarmament
GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT--Continued
nonalined countries, 883
political aspects. See Political aspects of disarmament
problems of achieving, 852, 854
religious view, 810-811, 818, 870
role in achieving peace, 680
rule of law, 774
social aspects. See Social aspects of disarmament
Soviet policies and proposals, 856-857
U.N. role, 837, 855
world disarmament conference (proposed). See World disarmament conference (proposed)
See also Arms and armaments--reduction or elimination; Limited measures; Nuclear weapons--reduction or elimination; Regional disarmament; Unilateral disarmament
GENERAL CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (1965), 903
GENEVA DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE. See Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament
GEOSTRATEGY. See under Strategy
GERMAN PEACE TREATY. See under Treaties, Agreements, etc. (proposed)
GERMANY
East-West policies toward, 469
Potsdam Agreement, 781
reunification, 469-470, 487, 505
East German view, 492, 500
effect of nuclear weapons on, 697
effect on disarmament, 880
effect on European security, 685
European-U.S. relations, 522
French view, 683
West German view, 499, 506-507, 598-599
GERMANY, EAST
armed forces, 646, 684
Army, 622
disarmament policies and proposals, 875
foreign policy, 707
nuclear policies and programs, 897
relations with West Germany, 500
U.N. membership, 509
view of West Germany, 492
West German nuclear weapons acquisition, 906
GERMANY (FEDERAL REPUBLIC)
Air Force, 559, 577, 649
armed forces, 630, 667
defense industry, 621
defense policies and programs, 647, 653, 669, 932
disarmament policies and proposals, 846
foreign policy, 482
East European countries, 494, 525, 850
"Hallstein Doctrine," 505
public opinion, 480
reunification, 487, 499, 506
U.S.S.R., 835
nationalism, 660
Navy, 578, 632
NATO policy, 664, 697, 699, 704
nuclear forces (NATO), 702
nuclear policies and programs, 620, 659, 664, 704, 897
nuclear weapons acquisition, 598, 682, 692, 697, 703, 909, 913
East German view, 707, 875, 906
effect on reunification, 599
relations with France, 690
relations with Poland, 520, 527
religion and politics, 810
GREAT BRITAIN
defense policies and programs
Far East, 629

GREAT BRITAIN--Continued
See also Strategy
German reunification, 470
Navy, 593
NATO policy, 699
GUARANTEES. See Nuclear guarantees
GUERRILLA WARFARE, 543, 547-548
Chinese Communist program, 513
civilian population's role, 545
Communist strategy, 535
Indonesia, 544
NATO, 541
U.S. program, 843
See also Counterinsurgency; Insurgency

H

"HALLSTEIN DOCTRINE," 505
HAMMARSKJÖLD, DAG, 833
HEIDEGGER, MARTIN, 762
HIROSHIMA, nuclear bombing, 775, 839

I

INDIA
Chinese Communist aggression against, 490
defense policies and programs, 612
foreign policy, 465, 508, 895
nonalinement, 526, 658
nuclear policies and programs, 895, 904-905, 910, 914
U.N. peacekeeping and security forces, 803
See also Indian-Pakistani conflict
INDIAN OCEAN, military bases, 676
INDIAN-PAKISTANI CONFLICT, 462
Kashmir war, 643, 698
INDUSTRIAL CONVERSION. See economic conversion under Defense industry
INSPECTION AND VERIFICATION
nuclear weapons tests, 934
peaceful uses of nuclear energy, IAEA safeguards, 925
satellite reconnaissance, 930
techniques, 935
See also Reconnaissance
INSURGENCY, 535, 543, 548
See also Counterinsurgency; Guerrilla warfare
INTELLIGENCE
effect on deterrence, 726
role in peacetime, 924
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION. See Arbitration, international
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
safeguards system, proposed revision, 925
Soviet criticism, 787
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE FOR THE LIQUIDATION OF FOREIGN MILITARY BASES (1965), 817
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION. See Cooperation, international
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, international law, 772
INTERNATIONAL LAW
application to space, 616
changing nature of, 776
conflict resolution, 784
disarmament, 774, 845
documents, 458
German reunification, 500
intervention. See Intervention
nuclear weapons use, 775
peaceful coexistence, 471
peacekeeping role of, 797
Potsdam Agreement (1945), 781
role in achieving peace, 777
INTERNATIONAL LAW--Continued
role of International Court of Justice, 772
sovereignty. See Sovereignty
war, 538, 780
"wars of national liberation," 783
Yugoslav view, 773
See also Rule of law; Space law
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
Chinese Communist view, 848
nongovernmental, 792
Paul VI on, 832
INTERNATIONAL PEACE BUREAU CONFERENCE (1964), 809
INTERNATIONAL POLICE FORCE. See Peacekeeping and security forces (proposed)
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
culture, 436
documents, 458
East-West détente, 471
effect of arms race on, 737
effect of nonproliferation treaty on, 873
effect of nuclear weapons on, 453
moral and ethical aspects, 497
mutual interests, 445
nonalined countries, 514
"political realism," 849
role of intellectuals, 814
role of international nongovernmental organizations, 792
role of science and technology, 727
simulation, 447
Soviet threat, 847
U.N. role, 785
See also Peaceful coexistence; World order
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. See Security, international
INTERNATIONAL SPACE AGENCY (PROPOSED), 868
INTERNATIONAL TENSION. See Tension
INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S FORUM ON PEACE (1965), 827
INTERVENTION, 626, 797
ISRAEL, nuclear policies and programs, 892

J

JAPAN
armed forces, 651
defense policies and programs, 602, 654
foreign policy, 477, 635
rearmament, 636
See also Hiroshima; Nagasaki
JASPERS, KARL, 762

K

KAHN, HERMAN, 590
KASHMIR WAR. See under Indian-Pakistani conflict
KOREA (REPUBLIC OF), Air Force, 609

L

LATIN AMERICA
disarmament in, 861
nuclear-free zone, 864
LAW, RULE OF. See Rule of law
LEGAL ASPECTS OF DISARMAMENT, 845
LENIN, VLADIMIR IL'ICH, 519
LIMITED MEASURES
Chinese Communist view, 848
effect of Soviet and U.S. strategies on, 501
moratorium on antimissile defense systems, 931
White House Conference on International Cooperation (1965), 628, 807

LIMITED MEASURES--Continued
See also Arms and armaments--reduction or elimination; Nuclear-free zones
LIMITED WAR, nuclear weapons, 540, 631
"LONG LIVE THE VICTORY OF THE PEOPLE'S WAR," [LIN, PIAO], 511, 513, 537

M

MLF. See Multilateral nuclear force
MCNAMARA, ROBERT S., 657, 719
MANNED ORBITING LABORATORY, 553, 557, 571, 587
legal aspects, 616
military implications, 807
MANNED ORBITING RESEARCH LABORATORY, 557
MAVERICK MISSILE. See under Missiles
MAXIMUM DETERRENCE. See under Deterrence
MEDIUM RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE (MRBM). See under Missiles
MIDDLE EAST. See Near East
MILITARISM, Japan, 636
MILITARY BALANCE
developing countries, 862
East-West powers, 454, 705
Near East, 892
U.S.-Communist China, 604
U.S.-U.S.S.R., 552, 570, 579
See also Nuclear parity
MILITARY BASES
elimination of foreign bases, 817
Indian Ocean, 676
United States, 666
MILITARY BUDGETS AND EXPENDITURES. See Defense budgets and expenditures
MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX, 851
France, 710
MILITARY PARITY. See Military balance; Nuclear parity
MILITARY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. See Defense research and development
MILITARY SERVICE, COMPULSORY, France, 711
MILITARY STRATEGY. See Strategy
MISSILES
antiballistic missiles, 567, 615
East German acquisition, 646, 684
Maverick (AGM-65A), 562
medium range ballistic missiles (MRBM), 617
Nike-Sprint system, 668
Nike-X, 569, 605
Polaris, 564, 580
research and development, U.S.S.R., 558
role in conventional war, 576
Sprint, 605
submarines, U.S.S.R., 588
types, 549
U.S.S.R., 563, 570
vs. bombers, 606
See also Antimissile defense systems; Nuclear delivery vehicles; Rockets
MORALITY, effect on policymaking, 445
MOSCOW TREATY. See Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
MULTILATERAL NUCLEAR FORCE, 696, 708, 878, 909
proliferation of nuclear weapons. See under Proliferation of nuclear weapons
U.S.S.R., 898, 908
West Germany, 598
See also Alliance nuclear force; Atlantic nuclear force
MULTINATIONAL NUCLEAR FORCE. See Atlantic nuclear force
MULTIPOLARITY, 599, 748
See also Nonalined countries; Nonalinement
MUTUAL DEFENSE
Australia-U.S., 891
See also Security, international; Security, regional
MUTUAL DETERRENCE. See under Deterrence

N

NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NORAD. See North American Air Defense Command
NAGASAKI, legal aspects of nuclear bombing, 775
NATIONAL LIBERATION, WARS OF. See "Wars of national liberation"
NATIONALISM, 436, 439, 444, 660
NAVAL WARFARE, Great Britain, 593
NAVIES
Warsaw Treaty Organization, 709
See also Navy under specific countries
NEAR EAST
arms and armaments
trade and dissemination, 862
arms race, 741
equilibrium, 503
NEGOTIATION, ART OF, 882
NEGOTIATIONS
Canadian participation, 915
Chinese Communist participation, 934
U.N. role, 885
See also Conferences; Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament
NEUTRALISM, 467
NIKE MISSILE. See under Missiles
NONAGGRESSION PACT, NATO-Warsaw Pact countries, 875, 877
NONALINED COUNTRIES
Africa, 467
Asia, 467
Communist Chinese nuclear detonation, 658
disarmament policies and proposals, 737, 883
Soviet policy toward, 502
world role, 514, 795
See also Multipolarity; Nonalinement
NONALINEMENT
Chinese Communist view, 512
future, 473
Indian policy, 658
Indian-Yugoslav view, 526
U.S. policy toward, 478
See also Multipolarity; Nonalined countries
NONLETHAL WEAPONS. See Chemical and biological weapons
NONMILITARY DEFENSE, 809, 813, 826
NONVIOLENCE, 743, 809, 813, 816, 822, 826, 828, 833
See also Pacifism; Violence
NORTH AMERICAN AIR DEFENSE COMMAND, 607, 921
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
armed forces, 578, 702
Canadian view, 700
control of nuclear weapons, 620, 688, 691, 697, 704, 708, 909
criticism, 692
decisionmaking process, 700
defense policies and programs, 686
East German view, 702, 906
effect of nonproliferation treaty on, 878
European-U.S. relations, 716
European view, 847
financial contributions, 752
German reunification, 499
guerrilla warfare, 541
nonaggression pact (proposed), 877
nonproliferation treaty (proposed), 682
Norway, 672
nuclear deterrence credibility, 675, 680

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION--Continued
problems and prospects, 450, 680-681
reorganization (proposed), 522, 685, 689-690, 696, 699
role in peacetime, 448, 675, 678
West German view, 620, 632, 664, 687, 697
See also Alliance nuclear force; Atlantic nuclear force; Europe--defense policies and programs; European-U.S. relations; Multilateral nuclear force; Western countries; also NATO policy under specific countries
NORWAY, defense policies and programs, 672
NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS, 551, 767
NUCLEAR DECISIONMAKING, West German partnership, 664, 688, 697, 703-704
NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLES
Communist China, 670
orbital, 563
West Germany, 559
See also Bombers; Missiles; Rockets
NUCLEAR ENERGY
peaceful uses, 556, 725, 918
clandestine military applications, 581
Rumania, 749
NUCLEAR ENERGY INDUSTRY
diversification, Oak Ridge, 759
military use, 731
NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS
detection and measurement, 929
effects on communications systems, 922
peaceful uses, 723
See also Nuclear weapons tests; Radiation; Radioactive fallout
NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS, UNDERGROUND
industrial uses, 723
military uses, 556
seismic measurement, 926
NUCLEAR FORCES. See under specific countries
NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES, 873
Africa, 856, 859-860
Central Europe, 672, 865
Latin America, 861, 864
Scandinavia, 877
space, 866
NUCLEAR GUARANTEES
India, 658, 910
U.S. policies and proposals, 876, 920
NUCLEAR MATERIALS, transportation of, 890
NUCLEAR PARITY, 579, 625
nuclear weapons proliferation, 894
NUCLEAR PROPULSION. See type of vehicles propelled, e.g., Submarines, nuclear-powered
NUCLEAR RADIATION. See Radiation
NUCLEAR REACTORS, Systems for Nuclear Auxiliary Power (SNAP), 551
NUCLEAR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, 551
Bulgaria, 560
NUCLEAR STALEMATE, 531
NUCLEAR STRATEGY. See Strategy
NUCLEAR SYMMETRY. See Nuclear parity
NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY
effect on radioactive fallout levels, 742
extension to underground testing, 844, 884
effect on U.S. security, 934
U.S. policies and proposals, 871
inspection and verification. See Inspection and verification
Israeli view, 892
Soviet view, 853
U.N. role, 837
U.S. view, 879
NUCLEAR UMBRELLA. See Nuclear guarantees
NUCLEAR WAR
alternatives to, 536, 821
NUCLEAR WAR--Continued
Chinese Communist view, 497
civil defense, 735
demographic effects, 739
futility of, 453
legal aspects, 538
moral and ethical aspects, 761-762
prevention, 534, 743
See also Deterrence
radiation effects on battlefield, 764
risk of, 498, 540
Soviet view, 539
strategy. See Strategy
survival. See Survival
See also War
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Australian acquisition, 891
control of, in NATO. See NATO--control of nuclear weapons
delivery vehicles. See Nuclear delivery vehicles
deterrent role. See Deterrence
development
Australia, 901
Communist China, 670, 899
France, 624
India, 895, 914
Israel, 892
effects, 581, 743
See also Radiation; Radioactive fallout
international relations, effect upon, 453, 919
limited war, 540, 631
production, U.S., 731
proliferation. See Proliferation of nuclear weapons
reduction or elimination
Canada, 607
U.S. policies and proposals, 876
See also Nuclear-free zones
strategy. See Strategy
tactical uses
France, 619
U.S.S.R., 542
use of, legal aspects, 775
West German acquisition, 664, 703, 906, 913
World War II, 839
See also Missiles; Rockets; Space weapons
NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS
Communist China, 768
France, 740
underground, 556
See also Nuclear explosions; Radiation; Radioactive fallout
NUREMBERG TRIALS, international law, 780

O

OAK RIDGE (TENNESSEE), nuclear energy industry, 759
ODER-NEISSE LINE, 494
Polish view, 515-516, 527
West German view, 520, 525
ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, as a collective security system, 457
ORGANIZATIONS
Canadian Peace Research Institute, 806
Dubna, Joint Institute for Nuclear Research, 560
International Atomic Energy Agency, 787
Organization of American States, 457
World Federation of Scientific Workers, 844
World Peace Council, 808

P

PACIFISM, 672, 833
See also Nonviolence

PAKISTAN
relations with Communist China, 698
See also Indian-Pakistani conflict
PARITY. See Military balance; Nuclear parity
PARTIAL MEASURES. See Limited measures
PASSIVE RESISTANCE. See Nonviolence
PAUL VI, 810
U.N. speech, 818, 832, 870
PAULING, LINUS C., 724
PEACE
achievement and maintenance, 681, 806, 833
collective defense, 686
disarmament, 845
effect of nuclear weapons on, 777
military power, 852
nonalined countries, 514
role of developing countries, 451
role of international law, 779
U.N. role, 793, 796-797
West German view, 687
approaches, 743
disarmament, 855
East German view, 492
economic, 821
international cooperation, 830-831
military power, 488
religion, 810, 855
social sciences, 812, 851
unilateralism, 849
West European peace parliament (proposed), 790
West German view, 659
Communist view, 472, 524
Europe, 863
Polish policies and proposals, 874
problems in achieving, 534, 824
See also Pacifism; War
PEACE MOVEMENTS, 825
Great Britain, 828
Japan, 477, 842
religious, 811
scientists, 820
United States, 805
women, 827
"PEACE OFFENSIVE," United States, 661
PEACE RESEARCH, 443, 824, 851
Canadian Peace Research Institute, 806
PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE, 524, 831
Canadian view, 471
Communist view, 519
criticism, 641
East German view, 492
East-West powers, 687
Soviet view, 441, 460, 471-472, 501
PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES. See
Arbitration, international; Conflict--resolution; Negotiation, art of; Vietnamese war--negotiated settlement
PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY. See Nuclear energy--peaceful uses
PEACEKEEPING AND SECURITY FORCES
role in nonmilitary defense, 809
U.N. efforts, 838
U.N. General Assembly authority, 804
PEACEKEEPING AND SECURITY FORCES (PROPOSED)
evaluations and recommendations, 801
national standby forces, 802
permanent force, 803
"PEACESEEKERS," 833
PENN, WILLIAM, 833
PHOTOGRAPHY, AERIAL. See Aerial photography
PLOWSHARE, PROJECT, Soviet view, 723
POLAND
disarmament policies and proposals, 874
POLAND--Continued
relations with Germany, 516, 527
relations with West Germany, 515, 781
role in Communist bloc, 677
POLARIS. See under Missiles; Submarines, nuclear-powered
POLITICAL ASPECTS OF DISARMAMENT, 849
POLLS. See Public opinion
POLYCENTRISM. See Communist countries--polycentrism; Multipolarity
POTSDAM AGREEMENT (1945)
European security, 673
international law, 781
West German nuclear weapons acquisition, 906
PROJECT PLOWSHARE; PROJECT SAINT, ETC. See Plowshare, project; Saint, project, etc.
PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, 934
Australian view, 891
East German view, 707
effect on civil defense policy, 735
India, 904, 910
military balance, 894
multilateral nuclear force, 919
nonproliferation treaty (proposed), 873, 913, 920
East-West disagreement, 902, 916
effect on NATO, 878
guarantees, 893
Soviet policies and proposals, 896, 898, 907-908
Soviet-U.S. disagreement, 909
texts of draft treaties, 911
U.S. policies and proposals, 872, 898, 907
West German policies and proposals, 932
NATO, 681
prevention, 444, 844, 893-894, 905, 917, 919
Canadian policies and proposals, 915
East German view, 897
ENDC discussions, 900
Indian policies and proposals, 920
Soviet-U.S. cooperation, 598, 933
Soviet view, 856
U.N. role, 912
West German view, 659
probability of, 918
Sweden, 642
world order, 777
PUBLIC OPINION
achievement of GCD, 854
civil defense, 735
conflict resolution, 889
France
defense policies, 457
MRBM installations, 617
Sweden, national security policies, 642
Vietnamese war, 601, 841
West Germany, foreign policy, 480
PUGWASH CONFERENCE ON SCIENCE AND WORLD AFFAIRS, 820

R

RADIATION
cosmic, biological effects, 589
detection and measurement, 764, 770
aerial surveillance, 927
effects, 551, 765, 767, 769
electronics, 746
genetic effects, 763
permissible levels, 766
safety measures, 745, 770, 890
RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT
detection and measurement, 742, 768, 771, 928
effects, 748
RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS, 745

"RAPACKI PLAN," 863
RECIPROCAL MEASURES. See Limited measures
RECONNAISSANCE
  photogrammetry, 930
  satellites, 923, 930
  See also Inspection and verification
REGIONAL DISARMAMENT
  Latin America, 861
  See also Nuclear-free zones
REGIONALISM
  arms race, 862
  effect of nuclear weapons on, 798
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
  East-West balance, 573
  See also Defense research and development; Nuclear research and development
RISK OF WAR. See War--risk of
ROCKETS
  development, 582
  research and development, U.S.S.R., 558
  See also Missiles; Nuclear delivery vehicles
RULE OF LAW, 774, 777, 779
RUMANIA, nuclear policies and programs, 749
RUSSELL, BERTRAND RUSSELL, 3D EARL, 641
RUSSIA. See Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

S

SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM. See Bilateral safeguards; International Atomic Energy Agency--safeguards system
SAINT, PROJECT, 566
SATELLITES
  France, 693
  military uses, 550
  surveillance, 923
  See also Antisatellite defense systems
SATELLITES, RECONNAISANCE. See Reconnaisance--satellites
SATURATION PARITY. See Nuclear parity
SCANDINAVIA, nuclear-free zone, 877
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
  effect on:
    arms race, 579
    NATO defense policy, 716
    policymaking, 718, 722, 727
    world order, 831
  Swedish defense policies and programs, 613
  U.S.S.R., 579
SCIENTIFIC ELITE, role in decisionmaking, 718
SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION, 727
SCIENTIFIC-MILITARY RELATIONS, effect on strategy formulation, 596
SCIENTIFIC-POLITICAL RELATIONS, nuclear policy-making, 718
SEAPOWER
  role in counterinsurgency, 583
  United States, 564
  See also Naval warfare; Navies; Submarine warfare
SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL
  and regionalism, 798
  Australian view, 652
  collective defense, 686
  Europe, 522
  Organization of American States, 457
  regional guarantees, 861
  See also Mutual defense; North Atlantic Treaty Organization; Nuclear guarantees; Peacekeeping and security forces; Security, regional
SECURITY, REGIONAL, SEATO's role, 706
SHIMODA AND OTHERS V. JAPAN, 775
SIKKIM, Chinese Communist expansion in, 490
SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE, 537
  Chinese Communist territorial claims, 486
  risk of war, Central Asia, 694
  West German view, 496
SMUTS, JAN, 833
SOCIAL ASPECTS OF DISARMAMENT, 824
SOUTHEAST ASIA
  arms control in, 843
  Chinese Communist strategy in, 604
  East-West strategies in, 474
  role of airpower, 592
  U.S. policy in, 523, 608, 638, 648, 706, 887
SOUTHEAST ASIA TREATY ORGANIZATION, criticism, 706
SOVEREIGNTY, Soviet view, 446
SOVIET STRATEGY AT THE CROSSROADS [THOMAS W. WOLFE], 726
SOVIET UNION. See Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
SOVIET-U.S. RELATIONS
  and Communist China, 501, 695
  détente, 518, 526
  future of Europe, 522
  German reunification, 499
  space competition, 572, 586
  space policies and programs, 662
  United Nations, 800
  U.S. policy, 493
SPACE
  contamination, 869
  international cooperation, 693, 868
  military uses, 553, 572, 586, 655, 934
    manned orbiting laboratory, 557, 571, 616
    U.S.S.R., 566
    United States, 585
  nuclear-free zone, 866
  radiation, 589
  Soviet policies and programs, 584
SPACE CENTER, Vandenberg Air Force Base, 585
SPACE COMMUNICATIONS
  global communications net, 923
  military uses, 550
SPACE LAW, 867-868
  Soviet policies and proposals, 869
  U.S. legal declarations, 616
SPACE RACE, 550, 584, 586, 662
SPACE STATIONS, 586
SPACE VEHICLES, 549, 655, 866
SPACE WARFARE, 550
SPACE WEAPONS, 550, 662, 665
  U.S.S.R., 563, 566, 572, 934
SPRINT MISSILE. See under Missiles
STRATEGIC ANALYSIS, 714, 720
STRATEGIC DETERRENCE. See Deterrence; Missiles; Nuclear delivery vehicles; Nuclear weapons; Space weapons
STRATEGY, 591
  Australia, 679
  Communist China, 513, 604, 615, 634, 671
  France, 529
  geostrategy, 595
  Great Britain, 593
  influence of the humanities, 530
  influence of technology, 716
  nonmilitary defense, 813, 826
  NATO, 708
  space warfare, 550
  U.S.S.R., 539, 542, 663, 726
  war games and gaming, 596, 714, 720
  See also Damage-limiting strategy; Deterrence; Strategic analysis; War games and gaming
STRATEGY, U.S., 488, 590, 633
  alternatives, 631
  Communist China, 604

STRATEGY, U.S. --Continued
containment, 484
formulation, 717
maintenance of superiority, 625
naval, 676
role of intellectuals, 734
See also Damage-limiting strategy; Deterrence
STRIDA-II. See under Air defense systems
SUBMARINE WARFARE, 564, 580
SUBMARINES, U.S.S.R., 588
SUBMARINES, MISSILE LAUNCHING, U.S.S.R., 552
SUBMARINES, NUCLEAR-POWERED
France, 624
Polaris, 564, 580
SURVIVAL
fallout shelter simulation, 736
moral and ethical aspects, 761
nuclear war, 739, 747
role of U.S. Strategic Air Command, 656
SWEDEN
defense policies and programs, 613
nuclear policies and programs, 642
SYMMETRY. See Nuclear parity

T

TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS. See Nuclear weapons--tactical uses
TAHITI, nuclear weapons tests, 740
TENSION
arms race, 846
global, 464
reduction, 444
East-West relations, 517
unilateralism, 849
Sino-Soviet border, 694
West German militarism, 880
THAILAND, Chinese Communist threat to, 611
THERMONUCLEAR WEAPONS. See Nuclear weapons
"THIRD WORLD," 451
Chinese Communist policy in, 511
defense of, 521
Soviet policy in, 502
TOLSTOY, LEO, 833
TREATIES, AGREEMENTS, ETC.
Antarctic treaty, 858
Potsdam Agreement (1945), 673, 781
space regulation, 616
See also Bilateral safeguards; North Atlantic Treaty Organization; Nuclear Test Ban Treaty; Warsaw Treaty Organization
TREATIES, AGREEMENTS, ETC. (PROPOSED)
comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty
U.S. policies and proposals, 871
general and complete disarmament
Soviet policies and proposals, 853
German peace treaty, 781
effect on disarmament, 880
West German view, 507
"no first use" of nuclear weapons, 873, 920
nonproliferation treaty
East-West disagreement, 902, 916
guarantees, 873
Soviet policies and proposals, 896, 898, 907-908
Soviet-U.S. disagreement, 909
texts of draft treaties, 911
U.S. policies and proposals, 872, 898, 907
West German policies and proposals, 932
NATO-Warsaw Pact nonaggression pact, 875, 877
nuclear-free zone, 860, 864
THE TROUBLED PARTNERSHIP: A REAPPRAISAL OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE [HENRY KISSINGER], 522
TURKEY, foreign policy, 481

U

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE, 540, 546
See also Counterinsurgency; Guerrilla warfare; Insurgency
UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS. See Nuclear explosions, underground
UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT, 849
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
defense policies and programs
Central Asia, 694
See also Deterrence; Strategy
defense research and development, 555
disarmament policies and proposals, 853, 857
space, 866
United Nations, 837, 856
foreign policy
bibliographies, 466
national interests, 518
nonalined countries, 502
NATO, 878
peaceful coexistence, 471, 519
See also Peaceful coexistence
German reunification, 470
nonproliferation treaty (proposed). See under Proliferation of nuclear weapons
space policies and programs, 566, 572, 584
submarines, missile launching, 552
U.N. policies and proposals, 836
See also East-West relations; Sino-Soviet dispute; Soviet-U.S. relations
UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC, foreign policy, 503
UNITED KINGDOM. See Great Britain
UNITED NATIONS
aggression, 783
disarmament policies and proposals, 838, 859, 884-885
contribution to world order, 784
history, 837
role of developing countries, 435
East German membership, 509
international cooperation, U Thant Plan, 815
nonalined countries' participation, 514, 795
nongovernmental organizations, 792
nonproliferation treaty (proposed), 872, 911-912
peacekeeping and security forces
enforcement authority, 804
Indian view, 803
peacekeeping and security forces (proposed), 786
peacekeeping and security operations, 793
financing, 799
legal problems, 789
problems and prospects, 797, 800-801
reorganization (proposed), 802
problems and prospects, 788, 794, 796
role in settlement of disputes, 850
Security Council, 785
Soviet view, 836
space force (proposed), 868
space policies and programs, 616, 866
20th General Assembly disarmament discussions, 856
world role, 442, 779
UNITED STATES
containment policy, 484
defense budget and expenditures
economic impact, 760
effect of Vietnamese war on, 757-758
defense cutbacks. See Defense cutbacks
defense policies and programs, 628
bilateral treaties, 706
civil defense, 735

UNITED STATES--Continued
foreign military bases, 666
formulation and implementation, 657, 717
military commitments, 680
Southeast Asia, 654, 843, 888
Vietnam. See Vietnamese war--U.S. policy in
weapons development, 532, 562
See also Civil-military relations; Deterrence; Strategy, U.S.; War
disarmament policies and proposals, 590, 625
relation to national security, 879
United Nations, 837
world disarmament conference, 881
foreign policy, 501
and international law, 776
Antarctic Regions, 858
Atlantic community, 674
Communist China, 513, 695
criticism, 641, 844
effect of Vietnamese war on, 639
nonalinement, 478
role of intellectuals, 814
Southeast Asia, 474, 523
"world police force," 626
German reunification, 470
military assistance to South Vietnam, 614
national security policies
cold war, 493
review, 733
strategic analysis, 720
negotiation, art of, 882
nonproliferation treaty (proposed). See under Proliferation of nuclear weapons
nuclear policies and programs, 633, 898
criticism, 537, 731
history, 581
NATO, 708
nuclear weapons proliferation, 894, 905
World War II, 839
role of science in government, 722, 727
space policies and programs, 549, 807
military uses, 553, 571, 587
Soviet view, 655
U.N. policies and proposals, 836
See also East-West relations; European-U.S. relations; Soviet-U.S. relations
UNITED STATES (GOVERNMENT AGENCIES)
Air Force
airlift capability, 575
Strategic Air Command, 656
Vandenberg Air Force Base, 585
Army, 650
Dept. of Defense, 657
Navy, nuclear-powered ships, 564

V

VIETNAM, NORTH, reaction to U.S. policy, 887
VIETNAM, SOUTH, U.S. policy toward, 523, 614
VIETNAMESE WAR
Chinese Communist strategy in, 604
civil-military relations, 713
economic effects, 475, 755, 757-758
effect on U.S. weapons development, 562
escalation, 532, 608, 654, 844, 887
Japanese policy toward, 654
negotiated settlement, 523, 526, 638, 882
public opinion, 601
religious view, 811
role of U.S. airpower, 574
Sino-Soviet dispute, 639
U.S. antiwar movement, 841
VIETNAMESE WAR--Continued
U.S. policy in, 532, 603, 648
criticism, 608, 626, 639, 661, 823, 888
VIOLENCE
biological, 816
See also Nonviolence
V/STOL AIRCRAFT. See under Aircraft

W

WAR, 534, 834
changing nature of, 531, 533, 536
Communist view, 524
economic aspects, 528
just war, 818
Kashmir. See under Indian-Pakistani conflict
legal aspects, 538, 775, 780
moral and ethical aspects, 538
predictability, 440
prevention. See Deterrence
psychological aspects, 438
risk of, 434, 599
Soviet view, 460, 539
strategy. See Strategy
survival. See Survival
termination, 841
Vietnam. See Vietnamese war
See also Civil defense; Cold war; Conflict; Counter-insurgency; Guerrilla warfare; Insurgency; Limited war; Naval warfare; Nuclear war; Peace; Submarine warfare; Unconventional warfare; Violence
WAR GAMES AND GAMING, 596, 712, 734, 747
criticism, 730
guerrilla warfare, 545
international relations, 447
nonmilitary defense, 813
popularization, 455
"WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION," 511, 537, 687
Chinese Communist view, 491
international law, 783
probability of, 638
Soviet view, 460, 501
WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION
armed forces, 684
East German view, 707
navies, 709
nonaggression pact (proposed), 875, 877
West German nuclear armament, 682
WEAPONS. See Arms and armaments; also specific types of weapons, e.g., Missiles; Rockets; etc.
WEAPONS PARITY. See Military balance; Nuclear parity
WESTERN COUNTRIES
defense against Communism, 521
disarmament policies and proposals, 847
See also Europe; North Atlantic Treaty Organization
WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION (1965), 628, 807, 931
WORLD CONFERENCE ON WORLD PEACE THROUGH LAW (1965), 778, 782
WORLD CONGRESS FOR PEACE, NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE, AND GENERAL DISARMAMENT (1965), 825
WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE (PROPOSED), 737, 856, 870, 881, 885
WORLD FEDERATION OF SCIENTIFIC WORKERS
disarmament policies and proposals, 844
WORLD GOVERNMENT, 446, 830
WORLD LAW. See International law; Rule of law
WORLD ORDER, 442
effect on culture, 436
regionalism, 798
role of Europe, 863

WORLD ORDER--Continued
U.S. view, 474
See also International relations
WORLD PEACE COUNCIL, disarmament policies and proposals, 808

WORLD POLITICS. See International relations

Y

YUGOSLAVIA, nonalinement, 526

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1966 O—211-015